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The 2006 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Cross-Campus Integrated Study, 
titled “Maritime Threat Response” involved the combined effort of 7 NPS Systems 
Engineering students, 7 Singaporean Temasek Defense Systems Institute (TDSI) 
students, 12 students from the Total Ship Systems Engineering (TSSE) curriculum, and  
numerous NPS faculty members from different NPS departments.  After receiving 
tasking provided by the Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering at NPS in 
support of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the 
study examined ways to validate intelligence and respond to maritime terrorist attacks 
against United States coastal harbors and ports.  Through assessment of likely harbors 
and waterways to base the study upon, the San Francisco Bay was selected as a 
representative test-bed for the integrated study.  The NPS Systems Engineering and 
Analysis Cohort 9 (SEA-9) Maritime Threat Response (MTR) team, in conjunction with 
the TDSI students, used the Systems Engineering Lifecycle Process (SELP) shown in 
Figure ES-1 as a systems engineering framework to conduct the multi-disciplinary study.  
While not actually fabricating any hardware, such a process was well-suited for tailoring 





















System Modification (as required)
Critical Design Review
 
Figure ES-1:  Systems Engineering Lifecycle Process (SELP) 
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The SELP was an iterative process used to bound and scope the MTR problem, determine 
needs, requirements, functions, and to design architecture alternatives to satisfy 
stakeholder needs and desires. 
The SoS approach taken, shown in Figure ES-2, enabled the team to apply a 
systematic approach to problem definition, needs analysis, requirements, analysis, 




























































Figure ES-2:  System of Systems (SoS) Architecture Alternatives Approach 
Problem Definition 
The volume of global maritime commerce has risen dramatically during the later 
half of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century.  The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks 
on the United States has heightened concerns about the prospects of transnational terrorist 
groups using the global maritime commercial system as a vehicle to inflict high levels of 
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destruction upon the United States homeland.  While there have not been any 
documented transnational terrorist attacks on the United States homeland from the 
maritime domain to date, the attack on the USS Cole and other acts of maritime terror 
overseas, along with the 9/11 attacks, have caused great attention to be paid to the 
susceptibility of the United States to maritime terrorism.  The size of the U.S. coastline 
and the amount of shipping traffic entering and exiting numerous ports make preventing 
such acts of terror a challenging problem.  The difficulty in maintaining awareness of the 
global maritime domain makes the problem even more complicated. 
The Report of the 9/11 commission highlighted the criticality of information-
sharing and effective intelligence-gathering in preventing acts of terrorism.  Knowing an 
attack is going to take place is a necessary but not sufficient step, however.  The forces 
must be ready to act on such intelligence to prevent or stop the attack.  The SEA-9 MTR 
team made the assumption that the obtaining of such intelligence was a given from the 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) system.  The team then assessed how the  
United States might be best organized, equipped, and trained to respond to such maritime 
threats as they became known. 
Project Team Approach 
The SEA-9 MTR team used stakeholder inputs and a “Red Cell” approach to 
develop representative scenarios for maritime terrorist attack upon San Francisco and its 
environs.  With tasking to examine both externally and internally generated threats, three 
different scenarios were developed.  In the first scenario, a weapon of mass destruction 
(WMD) is smuggled onboard 1 of 20 possible innocent, unknowing container ships 
coming from Southeast Asia heading for San Francisco.  In the second scenario, a 
terrorist team has stowed away aboard 1 of 20 possible large merchant vessels coming 
from Southeast Asia heading for San Francisco.  The terrorists intend to seize control of 
the vessel and use the ship as a weapon (SAW) in a suicide attack against another vessel 
or point of critical infrastructure such as the Golden Gate Bridge.  In simplest terms, the 
tactics of the 9/11 attacks are applied to ships.  In the last scenario, a terrorist sleeper cell 
that is already established inside the United States obtains explosives and a small boat 
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located somewhere in San Francisco Bay to attack either a large merchant vessel or other 
point of critical infrastructure within the Bay (SBA). 
The MTR team, using the SELP as the process guide, defined the system of 
systems (SoS) problem, developed an effective need statement, performed an analysis of 
operational and system requirements, decomposed and allocated required functions in 
support of operational requirements, developed architecture alternatives, and evaluated 
and ranked the different alternatives based on their effectiveness and cost in responding 
to the different scenarios.  With policy guidance received from The National Strategy for 
Maritime Security (September 2005), the team constrained potential solutions such that 
they must absolutely minimize adverse impact on commerce due to delay and/or damage 
to shipping.  In addition, based on stakeholder inputs as well as policy guidance, 
emphasis was placed on developing and integrating existing systems and Program of 
Record (POR) systems, but used with new Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) as part of 
a nationally integrated, interagency response force. 
Three architecture alternatives were developed and evaluated during the study.  
The first was developed using an objective, fractional design of experiments focused on 
maximizing effectiveness in defeating terrorist threats independent of any cost 
considerations.  The second was developed in a subjective manner with each of the 
functional leads working on the project providing their best estimate as to the lowest cost 
system concept that was expected to meet top-level requirements.  All of the system 
concepts selected were then integrated into an overall architecture that should be  
cost-effective.  The third was developed using an objective, fractional design of 
experiments that sought to balance cost and effectiveness equally.  The costs associated 
with each architecture included any procurement costs required, operations and support 
costs associated with the forces while they were performing MTR missions, and any 
delay and damage costs that are imposed on maritime commerce in the course of 
executing the MTR mission. 
The performance of each architecture was measured through use of modular, 
discrete event simulations in terms of the likelihood of the architecture successfully 
stopping each of the three terrorist attacks as well as the delay and impact on commerce.  
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The modular approach enabled the use of a number of different modeling and simulation 
tools, to include Java software, Imagine That, Inc. EXTENDTM simulation software, 
Microsoft ExcelTM spreadsheet software, and Livermore National Laboratory’s Joint 
Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) interactive desktop war game. 
Results, Recommendations, and Conclusions 
The key findings of the study include: 
Overall MTR 
• Adequate intelligence is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of a 
successful homeland security posture.  Knowledge of an impending attack 
must be complemented by robust forces and their concept of operations in 
order to effectively stop an attack once it is determined with some 
confidence that it is underway.  With such forces in place and with 
established concepts of operation and rules of engagement, a variety of 
terrorist attacks can be successful repulsed without significant damage or 
impact on the homeland or the economy. 
• Responding to maritime terrorist threats requires an integrated, 
interagency response taking advantage of the specific capabilities and 
authorities resident in different organizations within the U.S. national 
security apparatus.  Historically, interagency missions and task forces 
have been far more successful when there have been preexisting command 
relationships and interagency representation established.  Natural, human 
barriers to effective communication and information sharing can be 
overcome through the establishment of personal relationships between 
members of different agencies at a Joint Inter-agency Task Force. 
The key findings of the study for each of the three scenarios include: 
Weapon of Mass Destruction Scenario 
• The majority of research effort in the field of radiation detection is 
centered on conducting a search as rapidly as possible; while a truck is 
driving through a border crossing, while a container is being off-loaded 
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from a ship to a truck bed, and the like.  Given reasonable intelligence 
latency of less than 160 hours, it was found that search teams could be 
placed onboard container ships with an opportunity to search the ship for 
over a week prior to entering United States territorial waters.  Such search 
time enables minutes to be spent on individual container searches and 
multiple hours spent on individual cargo holds.  Use of the Littoral 
Combat Ship’s high speed sprint capability (45+ knots) along with a small 
fuel capacity addition in its mission module spaces enabled the greatest 
time to search among all potential Navy and Coast Guard search and 
escort vessels (over 200 hours to search with 72 hours of intelligence 
latency). 
• Given search times ranging from 100-200 hours per ship, nuclear devices 
can be detected with high confidence even with slightly vague 
intelligence. 
Commandeered Ship as a Weapon Scenario 
• The threat of a commandeered ship can be effectively countered through 
the employment of ten man “Sea Marshall” teams that are placed onboard 
threatened vessels with the Harbor Pilot approximately 12 miles beyond 
the Golden Gate Bridge.  These teams serve to secure critical control 
spaces of the vessel in question until the vessel is safely docked within the 
port.  This approach needs to be complemented by a “shore battery” of 
some kind that can non-lethally disable the vessel, typically by fouling of 
its propellers and rudders, if it is found that the terrorists are in control of 
the vessel when the Harbor Pilot and Sea Marshalls attempt to board.  
There are a variety of weapons technologies that can perform this 
function.  Such a concept of operations precludes any opportunity to 
recapture the vessel in question once it is determined to be under terrorist 
control.  In addition, timing is absolutely critical and there is no room for 
delay in decision making. 
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• A different concept of operations can be employed that consists of surging 
Navy and Coast Guard vessels forward to intercept potentially threatened 
vessels as they come across the Pacific.  These vessels can then be 
boarded and searched to determine the crew’s status and use biometrics to 
attempt to identify any terrorists that are covertly onboard.  If terrorists are 
in control of the vessel in question in this case, there is adequate time to 
attempt to recapture the vessel from the terrorists, and if such a recapture 
attempt is not successful, then the ship can be disabled prior to becoming a 
threat to the United States.  This particular approach, while highly 
effective, places more U.S. personnel in mortal danger and is more costly 
in resource utilization than the Sea Marshall option. 
• Little data exists that the SEA-9 MTR team could access with regard to 
the difficulty and challenges of attempting recapture of a commandeered, 
large merchant vessel at sea.  As such, it is difficult to predict the 
prospects for success of such action and the amount of damage that such a 
ship might suffer during an ensuing firefight between U.S. forces and the 
terrorists onboard, as well as what potential exists for the terrorists in 
question to facilitate the sinking of the vessel if their plans were 
interrupted by U.S. MTR force action. 
Small Boat Attack Scenario 
• Even in the fairly narrow water-space areas of San Francisco Bay, 
attached, close escort of merchant vessels and passenger ferries proved to 
be more effective than the establishment of random, barrier patrols within 
the Bay.  Further, separate escort vessels (typically four in number per 
defended asset) proved to be more effective than the emplacement of 
escort teams onboard the defended merchant vessels and ferries 
themselves. 
• Effective countering of the SBA was much more likely if recreational boat 
traffic within the Bay was prohibited by local authorities and traffic within 
the Bay was limited to essential commercial traffic.  Such a prohibition 
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requires the effective coordination of numerous local law enforcement 
agencies. 
• “Red Cell” analysis of potential terrorist responses to MTR operations 
suggested that static points of critical infrastructure needed to be defended 
as well as vessels to prevent small boat attack against refueling piers and 
the like.  The analysis also suggested that passenger ferries and oil tankers 
were more likely terrorist targets than container ships and other dry  
cargo-carrying vessels. 
• While the increased numbers of crew-served weapon stations onboard 
mid-sized escort ships (100+ feet in length) and the longer-range visual 
detection capability associated with the same was found to increase the 
likelihood by approximately 11% of stopping a SBA, it was an 
extraordinarily costly approach when compared to just using small escort 
boats, helicopters, and unmanned surface vehicles. 
• The use of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) was a cost-effective option 
to counter terrorist SBAs when used as a complement to traditional escort 
forces.  The USVs increase total time available to engage a threat because 
they reduce the amount of time required to warn off as yet unidentified 
incoming boats. 
Caveats and Limitations 
The threat scenarios and target location of San Francisco were intended to serve 
as representative examples that could be adjusted.  The scenarios were picked as a result 
of Red Cell analysis of potential terrorist choices after extensive discussions with 
different stakeholders and reference to previous threat assessments conducted by agencies 
within the Department of Defense as well as agencies within the Department of 
Homeland Security.  San Francisco was picked as representative of a variety of different 
homeland security problems and was modeled in such fashion that the inputs could be 
changed to represent other potential target locations with different vulnerabilities.  The 
intent of the approach was to provide an example of the issues confronting homeland 
defense and security planners and enable adaptation to other scenarios and locales. 
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The SEA-9 Maritime Threat Response Cross-Campus Integrated Study was an 
academic exercise for purpose of validating and completing the education that the 
students received during their time at NPS.  It was not endorsed by any branch of the 
United States armed forces or any agency within the United States government.  The 
scope of the problem of maritime terrorism is daunting and could not be looked at in its 
entirety with the amount of personnel and time available for the study.  Simplifying 
assumptions were made and representative examples were picked in order to facilitate 
completion of the study during the allotted time.  While the problem could not be 
examined in its entirety and complexity, it was evaluated such that insights could be 
drawn from the study that will be useful to decision makers involved and highlighted 




























 The integrated project of SEA-9, Maritime Threat Response, would like to 
express our thanks and sincere gratitude for the time, dedication, expertise, and guidance 
of the following individuals. 
 
    The Honorable Peter Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant 
    Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
VADM Roger Bacon, USN (Ret.) 
RADM Wayne E. Meyer, USN (Ret.) 
    Dr. Frank Shoup 
    RADM Richard Williams, USN (Ret.) 
    Dr. Tom Huynh 
    Dr. Arden Duggan 
    Dr. Craig Smith 
    Dr. Robert Harney 
    Mr. Sean Kittrell 
    Mr. Albert Miller 
    CAPT Charles Dixon, USN 
    CAPT Wayne Hughes, USN (Ret.) 
    CAPT Jeff Kline, USN (Ret.) 
    CAPT Starr King, USN 
    CDR Tom Breske, USN 
    CDR Glenn Lintz, USN 
LTC Alejandro Hernandez, USA 
LTC Gregory Mislick, USMC (Ret.) 
LCDR Joseph Cahill, USN 
    LCDR Brad Keiserman, USCG 
    Mr. A.J. Gipson 
    Mr. Alice Cooper 
    Mr. Daniel Nagel 
Mr. Ed Nath 
Professor Patrick Parker 
    Professor Mark Stevens 
    Professor Mitch Brown 
    Professor Matthew Boensel 
    Professor Doyle Daughtry 
    Professor Bard Mansager 
    Professor William Solitario 
    Professor Paul Sanchez 
    Professor Dave Netzer 
    Professor Alex Bordetzky 
    Professor John Osmundson 
Professor Michael McCauley 
 xxxiv
Dr. Bill Dunlop 
Mrs. Sharon King 
    S.S. Lurline, Master and 1st Mate 
 
 Additionally, we would like to thank the remaining faculty and staff of the  
Wayne Meyer Institute for Systems Engineering who provided support to our project.  
Lastly, we would like to extend our warmest thanks to our families for their unwavering 





The Maritime Threat Response (MTR) System of Systems (SoS) is designed to 
address the resources and actions necessary to thwart a planned attack by terrorists within 
the maritime domain.  MTR is the next logical step after successful acquisition of 
information through the employment of Maritime Domain Awareness assets.  The MTR 
SoS is designed around three basic missions: a container ship carrying a Weapon of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), a large commercial Ship used As a Weapon (SAW), and a  
Small Boat Attack (SBA) conducted in a confined area such as a bay, harbor, strait, etc. 
 Due to events like 9/11 and the USS Cole attack, great efforts have been made to 
correct weaknesses in Maritime Defense and Maritime Protection.  Over the past few 
years, numerous DoD and DHS documents and instructions have been issued to ensure a 
unified sharing of information and response to potential terrorist threats to the  
United States maritime domain.  Exercises to test and refine existing maritime domain 
systems are ongoing (reference “Operation Seahawk,” Charleston, South Carolina). 
 The purpose and significance of this project is defined in the following  
problem statement: 
 “Define and select a cost-effective system-of-systems (SoS) architecture and its 
concept of operations that will enable responses to national security threats to the  
U.S. homeland that emanate from the maritime domain.  Consider, at a minimum, the 
threat being a WMD device smuggled onboard a ship and the threat being a vessel 
employed as a weapon itself.  The responses could be validation of a suspected threat 
and/or the negation of an identified threat. Intelligence regarding a threat to the homeland 
is assumed to be available to the appropriate agencies for use by the SoS.  The SoS will 
consist of systems that are currently in service, in development, or could be developed 
within the next five years.” 
 The scenarios around which the missions are developed will be viewed as two 
possibilities.  First, for the WMD and SAW scenarios, intelligence information alerts the 
NCA to a potential attack directed toward San Francisco, nuclear/radiological and 
collision respectively.  Both the WMD and SAW scenarios will originate in  
Southeast Asia and terminate in one of the San Francisco Bay port facilities.  The WMD 
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will be a containerized nuclear or radiological device.  The SAW will be a ship with 
immense destructive energy enclosed within a container, cargo, or tanker ship.  The 
attack may be conducted from one or more of a set of 20 potential attack vessels.  
Second, for the SBA scenario, intelligence information alerts the NCA to a potential 
small boat attack to be conducted in the San Francisco Bay Area.  This attack may be 
directed toward transiting commercial ships or critical infrastructure (port facilities, 
ferries, bridges, and cultural centers) within or adjacent to the bay.  This is all the 
information that is available and the SoS must be developed to fulfill the missions. 
We use a systems engineering approach to assign responsibilities and conduct our 
work.  A timeline is established to mark goals and milestones, deliverables were 
identified, and progress is tracked and maintained (see Gantt Chart, Appendix C). 
Once the template for the project is established, the work may begin.  First is to 
make the realistic assumptions necessary to bound the problem.  These assumptions are 
based on research of available intelligence, equipment, capabilities and personnel, as well 
as likely actions of the potential participants in the postulated scenarios.  Next is the need 
to establish measures of effectiveness and performance by which the system concepts 
will be evaluated. 
Numerous system concepts are then evaluated to determine cost, applicability and 
utility within the MTR SoS.  Also, concepts of operations are developed for employment 
of the various systems concepts.  Once completed, the selected system concepts are 
modeled within the various concepts of operations and simulations conducted to 
determine individual and overall SoS effectiveness.  The missions within the MTR SoS 
are not necessarily congruent but all contribute to the overall SoS.  This incorporation of 
multiple system concepts for evaluation in various missions is possible through the use of 
orthogonal arrays, which will be discussed in Section 7.1.2. 
The alternative system concepts are based on three SoS architecture possibilities; 
Maximum Performance, Top-Down Cost-Effective and Bottom-Up Cost-Effective.  
Maximum Performance means the best possible SoS Architecture regardless of cost.  The 
Top-Down Cost-Effective is objectively derived through the use of an orthogonal array 
which equally weights high capability and low costs.  The Bottom-Up Cost-Effective 
Architecture is based on the subjective assessment of the MTR Team with cost as a 
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consideration.  Once these three SoS architectures are developed, each one is compared 
to the other to asses the SoS cost versus effectiveness. 
Lastly, considering the academic nature of the SEA 9 MTR Project, 
recommendations and suggestions for further investigation are provided that may refine 
or expand upon the work done by the MTR Team, and possibly enhance the overall 
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2.0 PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
The team approached the project from the standpoint of an actual research and 
development project focused on the future development of a system for responding to 
maritime threats.  Without a true “customer,” the team consistently strove to develop a 
virtual representation of the kinds of information, needs, and desires that such a customer 
would normally convey.  The following sections outline and discuss the team’s specific 
approach and methodology for accomplishing these tasks during the course of the project. 
2.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Late in 2005, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) SEA-9 students at the  
Wayne E. Meyer Institute for Systems Engineering (WEMISE) addressed the growing 
challenge of responding to terrorist threats to the United States that emanate from the 
maritime domain.  The threats could be a nuclear WMD in a shipping container on its 
way to the United States, a merchant ship commandeered by terrorists used in an attack 
on infrastructures or high-value targets, and a suicide small boat carrying explosives 
aimed at a high value target (such as an oil tanker or passenger ferry). 
Through the Meyer Institute for Systems Engineering at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, the SEA-9 students were tasked by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Homeland Defense (OASD HD) to develop a conceptual, near-term, joint 
and interagency SoS in the 5-year timeframe to respond to terrorist threats to the  
United States that emanate from the Maritime Domain by (1) generating SoS architecture 
alternatives using existing systems, programs of record, and commercial off the shelf 
(COTS) technologies and developing concepts of operations; and (2) recommending a 
cost-effective SoS that must minimize impact on commerce. 
An examination of the strategy documents as well as the team members’ own 
operational experiences focused attention on the fact that simple knowledge of an 
impending event is often not a sufficient condition to prevent the event.  Forces, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTP) need to be in place to respond effectively once 
intelligence is obtained.  The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan for The 
National Strategy for Maritime Security (October 2005) deals principally with 
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assignment of roles and responsibilities to the different executive agencies of the  
U.S. government.  It discusses protocols for determining assignment of lead agency and 
supporting agency roles.  It does not cover specific TTP or address specific scenarios.  It 
was determined that a study in this particular area would be valuable to decision makers 
throughout the government and provide an appropriate venue as an academic exercise for 
the SEA students to validate their curriculum by applying a systems engineering 
approach to the problem.1 
 The problem was thus defined as follows: 
Define and select a cost-effective system-of-systems (SoS) 
architecture and its concept of operations that will enable responses to 
national security threats to the United States homeland that emanate from 
the maritime domain.  Consider, at a minimum, the threat being a WMD 
device smuggled onboard a ship and the threat being a vessel employed as 
a weapon itself.  The responses could be validation of a suspected threat 
and/or the negation of an identified threat.  Intelligence regarding a threat 
to the homeland is assumed to be available to the appropriate agencies for 
use by the system of systems.  The SoS will consist of systems that are 
currently in service, in development, or could be developed within the 
next five years. 
 Upon completion of the problem definition, the team used a “Red Cell” approach 
to identify perceived vulnerabilities and likely avenues of terrorist attack in the maritime 
domain.  Team members were tasked to individually develop a list of potential threat 
scenarios based on previous consultation with stakeholders and research in the public 
                                                 
1 At the outset of the project, the focus was initially on developing systems of systems for 
accomplishing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).  Based upon discussions with the Director of the 
Meyer Institute and other key decision-makers in the project process, it was determined that there were 
several critical issues regarding MDA that made it an ill-suited subject for this particular project.  The first 
had to do with the general classification of information and systems involved in the tasks supporting MDA.  
Most of such systems and information are classified at least SECRET/US ONLY or higher by the 
Department of Defense and other Cabinet-level agencies.  Since the bulk of this project would be 
conducted at the UNCLASSIFIED level because of the extensive involvement of foreign nationals from 
Singapore, it was determined that it would be very difficult to conduct a thorough and valuable study of 
MDA.  Even the appropriately cleared U.S. officers working on the project would have to be careful to 
limit their exposure to such classified material to prevent unintentionally incorporating some of its elements 
in an unclassified study.  The second issue pertained to the amount of effort currently ongoing in the area of 
MDA.  Numerous organizations in several Cabinet-level departments are currently conducting extensive 
research on MDA, and there are several research projects on it at the Naval Postgraduate School as well.  
As such, it was felt that there was already extensive attention on the subject of MDA, which is just one 
subcomponent of the overall strategy for maritime security.  It was thus decided and agreed that the SEA-9 
team would concentrate on another subcomponent of the overall maritime security strategy.  Given the 
decision to move away from MDA, the team examined the other aspects of maritime security. 
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domain.  This began an iterative process that the team used to develop missions to be 
considered to evaluate system performance and provide insight into the problems of 
achieving maritime security. 
2.2 PROJECT TASKING 
 Once the problem statement was defined, the team began a comprehensive 
research effort as well as an orchestrated attempt to contact all applicable stakeholders in 
the maritime security realm.  This involved discussions with subject matter experts at 
NPS as well as field trips to meet with stakeholders around the country.  The intention 
was to further narrow and bound the scope of the project as well as to ensure that the 
areas of focus were considered invaluable to the stakeholders. 
2.3 STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
 The conversations and meetings with different stakeholders and subject matter 
experts helped shape the problem for the team and allowed the team to further refine its 
focus of effort.  The interactions with stakeholders served to accomplish several 
purposes.  First, appropriate design reference missions that the system of systems must 
accomplish were defined.  Given the limited time available for the project, the team 
proceeded with the intention of capturing several representative missions rather than 
attempting to evaluate all possible missions that the system would have to perform.  
Second, key issues were determined that would be of value in exploring during the course 
of the project.  These consisted of new, potential concepts of operations, new applications 
of existing technology, and other issues found to be noteworthy by stakeholders. 
 Stakeholder interest with respect to the missions varied to a certain extent but had 
many points of commonality.  The scenario that receives the most attention in both the 
press as well as within threat planning conferences remains the WMD scenario.  The 
almost incalculable amounts of potential damage from such attacks make it important to 
almost all concerned.  With respect to the WMD scenario within the context of maritime 
security, the notion of a nuclear device smuggled into the country on one of the thousands 
of container ships that enter the country every year remains one of principal concern.  
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Given the stakeholder interest as well as the defined problem statement, it was decided 
early on that the WMD scenario would be one of the DRM considered for the study. 
Some stakeholders raised the issue regarding the possibility of a WMD device 
being smuggled into the country on one of the thousands of small, ocean-going pleasure 
craft that move up and down the coasts of the western hemisphere in the Atlantic and 
Caribbean as well as the Pacific.  This type of smuggling approach has been noted by 
many in evaluations of maritime security.2  It was decided, however, that such a threat 
presented more of an issue relating to maintaining awareness of the traffic and obtaining 
the intelligence of such an impending attack rather than stopping it once one became 
aware of it.  For this reason, the WMD scenario focused on what was considered the 
more difficult problem once intelligence was obtained, that being the container ship (or 
ships) that have up to 10,000 containers onboard. 
The concept of a ship as a weapon also resounded as a significant threat among 
various stakeholders interviewed.  Several stakeholders discussed the “trial run” 
hijacking of a merchant ship off of Sumatra in March 2003.  In that case, the pirates or 
hijackers took control of the ship and practiced driving it for some period of time, then 
abandoned the ship without taking any cargo.3  The parallels between this instance and 
the Al Qaeda flight students prior to the 9/11 attacks are easy to see and are a cause for 
concern.  Such a scenario has two potential subsequent branches.  In one case, the ship 
would maintain all normal track and schedule and would not deviate to become a weapon 
until the last possible moment.  In the other case, it is postulated that the ship would be 
hijacked at sea and then the hijackers would change its course to attack a different 
destination, a so-called “Rogue Ship” scenario.  Based on stakeholder feedback, it was 
assessed that the first case was the more difficult to detect and to counter, and it was 
therefore selected for investigation by the team. 
On-campus faculty consultants at NPS were also concerned with examination of 
terrorist threats that were not necessarily external in origin.  It was felt that the study 
                                                 
2 Siobhan Gorman and Sydney J. Freedburg, “Efforts to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Hindered by 
Porous Borders,” [http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0605/061705nj1.htm], June 17, 2005, Accessed on  
March 17, 2006. 
3 Simon Elegant and Kuala Sepetang, “Dire Straits.  Ships That Pass Through Some of the Busiest 
Waterways in Asia are Often the Target of Pirates.  Is a Terrorist Attack Next?” Time Asia, 
[http://www.time.com/], Accessed on March 19, 2006. 
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ought to consider instances where the terrorists were already established in the  
United States prior to mounting their attack, again following the modus operandi of the 
9/11 attacks.  Additional stakeholders assessed that the difficulty in locating small boat 
traffic inter-mixed with more sizable merchant traffic made SBA a worthwhile scenario 
to consider.  Based upon the combined input of stakeholders both on- and off-campus, it 
was decided that the SBA would become the third scenario for the study.  The problem 
statement is refined as follows: 
Develop a conceptual, near-term, joint and interagency system of 
systems (SoS) in the 5-year timeframe to respond to terrorist threats to the 
United States that emanate from the Maritime Domain by (1) generating 
SoS architecture alternatives using existing systems, programs of record, 
and commercial off the shelf (COTS) technologies and developing 
concepts of operations and (2) recommending a cost-effective SoS that 
must minimize impact on commerce.  The SoS would be deployed in three 
missions: prevention of a nuclear WMD attack, prevention or defeat of an 
attack using a merchant ship (SAW), and defeat of a suicide small boat 
attack (SBA) on a high value target (such as an oil tanker or  
passenger ferry). 
2.4 ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE 
 Following interviews with stakeholders and an initial analysis of their needs, the 
system of systems (in its primitive form) began to take shape by decomposing the 
problem into functions necessary to accomplish the stakeholder needs.  Section 5 
contains a complete system of systems functional decomposition.  The team was 
organized according to the five core functions the system of systems must perform: 
1) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 




Various student curricula including SEA, TDSI, TSSE, and NPS Homeland 
Security, as well as NPS faculty subject matter experts and professors dedicated to the 
project were then organized to support the execution of the project.  As shown in  
Figure 2-1, the organizational structure delineates interfaces among the various groups 
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participating in the project.  Tasking and guidance flowed periodically from the clients, 
depicted on the right side of the diagram, to the SEA9 project management team.  SEA9, 
shown in the middle of the diagram, provided requirements to and obtained input from 
technical teams and defense contractors located on the left side of the diagram.  In 
meeting mission requirements, specific group tasking was organized according to group 
technical specialization contributing to the overall project success. 
 
Figure 2-1:  Overall MTR Project Organization 
2.4.1 MTR Core Team 
The SEA-9 MTR core team consists of seven students.  Outside of the MTR core 
team, individuals and organizations providing supporting work to the MTR project are 
considered subcontractors.  The MTR core team is responsible for the designing the SoS, 
the final report and the final presentation.  Subcontractors, in the form of TDSI and TSSE 
students, are responsible for subsystem-level and component-level designs in support of 
the overall system architecture.  The organizational structure and relationships between 
MTR core team and supporting organizations is depicted in Figure 2-2. 
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Figure 2-2:  MTR Internal Organizational Chart 
2.4.2 Internal Interfaces 
The following internal customers interact directly with the MTR core team: 
• NPS Meyer Institute     Dr. Frank Shoup 
• SEA-9 MTR Faculty Advisor    Dr. Tom Huynh 
• LLNL Visiting Professor/MTR Nuclear Advisor Dr. Craig Smith 
• TDSI Faculty Advisors 
o Communications and Sensors  Dr. Gamani Karunasiri 
o Communications and Sensors  Prof. Dick Harkins 
o Operations Analysis and MOVES LCDR David Meyer 
o Information Operations/Assurance Prof. Karen Burke 
o Weapons and Tactical Missiles Dr. Chris Brophy 
2.4.3 External Interfaces 
SEA-9 interfaces with numerous external sources to ensure a solid perspective on 
each entity’s contribution and limitation within the realm of MTR.  Such interfaces 
include, but are not limited to, USCG, Customs, DoD, DoN, FBI, Local Maritime Patrol 
Agencies, Local Police, and FEMA.  The primary external customers are NORTHCOM, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, OPNAV N51, and  
Department of Homeland Security. 
The following external agencies were identified: 
• Project SEAHAWK, Charleston, SC 
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• COMTHIRDFLEET, San Diego, CA 
• USCG District 11, San Francisco, CA 
• NAVAL WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, Newport, RI 
• NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER CARDEROCK DIVISION, 
Detachment Norfolk, VA 
• MARITIME FORCE PROTECTION COMMAND 
• COMMANDER FLEET FORCES COMMAND, Norfolk, VA 
• NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND, Pawtuxet River, MD 
• DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, Washington, D.C. 
• NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,  
Washington, D.C. 
• SURFACE WARFARE DEVELOPMENT GROUP, Little Creek, VA 
Dialogue with these organizations continues throughout the project such that 
stakeholder input, feedback, and buy-in are appropriately incorporated into the MTR  
SoS architecture. 
2.5 MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
The SEA-9 MTR team applied the project management methodology espoused by 
Mooz and Forzberg.4  In this methodology, ten elements work in combination to help 
successfully orchestrate the project team and develop a quality product.  First, the core 
team focused on the “project requirements” and “project planning” elements.  For the 
initial step, the core team researched and attempted to fully understand customer needs 
and wants.  The team established contacts with and regularly consulted various  
on-campus subject matter experts and advisors, as well as appropriate personnel within 
the DoD.  These conversations helped both to bound the MTR problem statement and 
guide the team’s work, as well as establish proper expectations within the most likely 
final briefing audience.  Next, the team quantified the desired end state of the project by 
reviewing past SEA project reports and presentations, especially looking for any lessons 
learned by former project advisors and team members that could help identify and 
                                                 
4 Kevin Forsberg, Hal Mooz, and Howard Cotterman, Visualizing Project Management:  Models and 
Frameworks for Mastering Complex Systems, 3rd Edition, 2005, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Hoboken, NJ. 
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mitigate project risks.  The desired end state was captured as a list of elements to be 
covered in the final deliverable presentation and report, and from here, the list of work 
tasks that need to be completed to reach the desired end state was developed.  The work 
task list included all program management and system engineering tasks required to 
complete the conceptual design of an SoS architecture.  This became the initial  
Work Breakdown Structure and helped identify areas that could be tasked out to TDSI, as 
well as other interested cross-campus participants, any risks to project completion, and a 
realistic project schedule.  All of the preceding activities contributed to the writing of the 
final PMP and SEMP. 
As MTR project planning documents were developed, the core team also 
considered and incorporated the remainder of Mooz and Forsberg’s ten elements of 
project management:  organization options, project team, opportunities and risks, project 
control, project visibility, project status, and corrective action.  In organizing the project 
team, the goal is to best structure the project for success.  In the MTR project team, each 
SEA core team member was assigned certain main managerial-type roles, as well as one 
or more collateral duties.  One student served as the project manager, one, the chief 
systems engineer, one, the project planner, one, the configuration manager, and so on.  
During scenario development for the DRM analysis, the overall team lead assigned a lead 
to each scenario, as well as supporting personnel.  Following top-level functional 
analysis, team members were assigned to each top-level function.  For the project team 
element, although the core SEA project team and TDSI support were already defined, the 
MTR team recruited participation from critical specialty students, such as TSSE and 
operations research, across campus.  The team worked to identify any new technologies 
that could be applicable to the conceptual architecture.  Any schedule risks previously 
identified, plus the risks inherent in cross-campus or off-campus participant product 
delivery, were mitigated through scheduled triggers and fall-back plans.  The completed 
master schedule was given a prominent position in the team meeting room to increase 
project visibility for all involved.  All team documents were posted to the MTR 
SharePoint Website, which facilitates version control and history-keeping.  Minutes are 
recorded during all team meetings, which will occur weekly, and the master schedule, the 
14 
PMP, and the SEMP are used to track actual performance against the plan.  Corrective 
actions are developed and implemented at the early stages of variance from plan. 
The final critical project management element is leadership.  The MTR core team 
subscribed to Theory Y leadership, believing that all teammates want to put in a 
reasonable level of effort to make the project a success.  The team capitalized on 
members’ strengths when making roles and task assignments, as well as respecting 
personal interests and striving to place team members in the additional roles that most 
intrigued them.  With the project sufficiently bounded by plans, schedule, and a statusing 
method that are in keeping with the Mooz and Forsberg’s ten elements of project 
management, the team was encouraged to take ownership and be creative within the pre-
established boundaries. 
2.5.1 Project Life-Cycle 
An overview of the project life cycle (based on Mooz, p. 92-95) is depicted in 
Table 2-1.  It is important to note that the MTR SoS design is conceptual in nature and 
does not result in the manufacture of any actual system. 
Planned Start Date Planned End Date Key Activities 
November 2005 December 2005 Advanced Planning/Research Phase 
January 5, 2006 January 23, 2006 Finalize SEMP/TEMP/WBS; Needs Analysis; Feasibility Analysis 
January 12 January 12 MTR Internal Team Kickoff Meeting 
January 24 February 15 Requirements Development and Analysis 
January 31 February 7 Functional Analysis 
February 16 February 16 Initial Project Review 
February 16 March 22 Analysis of Alternatives 
March 16 March 16 Preliminary Design Review 
March 23 April 24 Architecture Evaluation and Ranking 
April 27 April 27 Critical Design Review 
April 15 June 16 Final Deliverables editing 
May 24 May 24 Final Project Review 
Table 2-1:  Project Deliverables Schedule 
2.5.2 Staffing 
The director of the Meyer Institute is responsible for assigning an Academic 
Advisor for the project and for formally assigning the students to the project.  The 
students assigned are responsible for electing a lead who acts as the Project Manager for 
the group.  TDSI Academic Advisors are responsible for assigning TDSI students to the 
project. Student project component staffing is conducted by the Project Manager, with the 
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Chief Systems Engineer approval.  Academic Advisor comments on staffing as required, 
but the Project Manager has final say. 
2.5.3 Communication 
Open communication is authorized and encouraged by all members of the team 
and sub-contractors.  The Project Manager is informed and provides authorization for 
communication involving assignment of responsibility outside of the SEA-9 MTR core 
team.  All external communications are made available to the entire team to ensure 
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3.0 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
3.1 INTRODUCTION/OVERVIEW OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
APPROACH 
The desired final products of the MTR project are an SoS architecture and an 
associated concept of operations (CONOPS) for responding to maritime threats.  In order 
to develop this architecture, a systems engineering approach is employed, which provides 
structure, thoroughness, and unity to the design effort. 
As depicted in Figure 3-1, the MTR design effort is divided into three main 
phases, each culminating in a design review.  The three phases are called  
Conceptual Design, Preliminary Design, and Final Design.  It is important to understand 
that the particular names selected for the different MTR phases should not be used, in and 
of themselves, to infer anything about the detail of the design and the particular type of 
products produced during that phase.  The Design Activity Boxes depicted on the  
right-hand side of Figure 3-1 list the pertinent design activities for each phase.  The three 
design reviews are the Interim Progress Review, Preliminary Design Review, and  
Critical Design Review.  Review feedback is incorporated into the design and used to 
refine the design products of all preceding phases.  The first step in any design process is 
to investigate and discover the critical mission needs.  These needs initiate the design 
process by defining the nature of the problem to be solved, as well as the criteria by 
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Figure 3-1:  MTR Systems Engineering Approach 
3.2 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
The MTR SoS design effort begins with the Conceptual Design phase.  This phase 
is preceded by a preliminary planning phase, meaning that a project planning revision and 
updating effort called Advance System Planning is necessary once the System Needs 
Analysis is completed.  The plans developed include a project management and systems 
engineering management plan, as well as the project schedule and personnel tasking. 
Problem definition goes hand in hand with System Needs analysis.  In this 
project, the needs of the stakeholders are identified with the aid of national strategy 
documents.5, 6  The problem statement, including terrorist threats that the MTR SoS 
would neutralize, is formulated and then refined and validated with information obtained 
from face-to-face interviews of stakeholders. 
Also through stakeholder interviews, the design reference mission scenarios are 
developed, followed by Requirements Analysis.  From the stakeholder needs and design 
reference mission, the operational requirements are derived and then used in the 
                                                 
5 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, (2006). 
6 White House, The National Strategy for Maritime Security, (2005). 
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development of functional requirements, which state the functions that the system must 
do, as well as quantitative performance requirements, which establish how well the 
system must be able to perform these functions.  During the MTR conceptual design 
phase, the top-level requirements and second level functional requirements are derived.  
A thread analysis is performed to establish the interfaces among the functions themselves 
and with the outside environment.  As described in Chapter 6.0, the thread analysis is the 
evaluation of the system functions with respect to a given scenario or mission, which 
ensures that the system meets the functional requirements set by the user.  The thread 
analysis also aids in the understanding and establishment of system boundaries, at times 
precipitating modification or reorganization of system functions, and in the modeling of 
the SoS. 
3.3 PRELIMINARY DESIGN 
Functional decomposition continues in the Preliminary Design phase.  All top-
level functions are decomposed to the lowest level possible to facilitate the assignment of 
appropriate resources.  In order to determine the utility of a particular resource 
assignment, the Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance established as 
part of Operational Requirements definition are finalized and allocated in the form of 
quantitative performance requirements to the lower levels of functional decomposition. 
In order to develop the physical view of the SoS architecture, system concept 
alternatives are identified for each SoS function.  This assignment of resources to perform 
one or several functional requirements is called Functional Embedding.  Alternative 
concepts are then assessed for feasibility and performance via modeling and simulation.  
The models are both analytic and probabilistic; the simulations are event-driven.7  
Concept alternatives that are found to be acceptable (i.e., meet the requirements) are 
considered as part of the SoS.  Thus, SoS Design Alternatives include all the possible 
combinations of system concept options corresponding to the SoS top-level functions.  
As discussed in Section 7.1.2.1, there are more than 3,000 possible combinations.  In 
order to test a manageable number of alternatives and select the optimal architecture, 
                                                 
7 Imagine That, Inc., “EXTENDTM Version 6 User’s Guide,” 2002, pp. E106-108. 
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orthogonal array experiments (OAE) are performed, followed by the so-called Taguchi 
data analysis.8 
3.4 FINAL DESIGN 
As detailed in Section 7.1.2, two different approaches are used to arrive at the 
final candidate SoS architectures:  (1) objective, experiment-driven analyses to select an 
architecture based on a fractional experiment design, and (2) a subjective, bottom-up 
approach focusing on cost-effectiveness.  Both function-specific as well as mission-
specific models are used to determine the SoS performance for each of the OAE trials, 
which represent 32 SoS design alternatives.  Performance of each design alternative is 
quantified in terms of time required, probability of success, and incurred delay and 
damage cost.  SBA mission performance is further assessed via wargaming.  The insights 
gleaned from the simulation efforts are used to refine and optimize the recommended 
force structure.  Lastly, cost is calculated for each SoS alternative, as described in  
Section 7.4.  Cost is combined with performance, and the resulting cost-effectiveness 
measure is the ultimate criterion used in the selection of the recommended  
SoS architecture. 
The three final candidate architectures are the Maximum Performance 
architecture, the Bottom Up Cost Effective (BUCE) architecture, and the Top Down Cost 
Effective (TDCE) architecture.  The Maximum Performance architecture disregards cost 
and seeks only to provide the best possible performance.  The BUCE weights cost and 
performance equally at the system level, while the TDCE weights cost and performance 
equally at the system of systems level.  As detailed in Section 7.5, the TDCE is the 
recommended MTR SoS architecture, because it provides the largest expected return (in 
terms of performance) on investment. 
3.5 SOS ARCHITECTING METHODOLOGY 
3.5.1 Purpose/Overview 
The stakeholder needs reveal that the MTR design is a SoS problem.  In an SoS 
problem, existing platforms or programs of records are used in new combinations or ways 
                                                 
8 R.K. Roy, “A Primer on the Taguchi Method,” New York:  Van Nostand Reinhold, 1990. 
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in order to provide a capability that has not previously existed.  National strategy 
documents9, 10 indicate that the MTR SoS should be low cost, minimize delay to 
commerce, and maximize the use of existing DoD and DHS platforms.  Figure 3-2 
depicts the SoS architecting methodology11 selected for the MTR project.  This 




























































Figure 3-2:  MTR SoS Architecting Methodology 
The SoS architecting methodology depicts the key sub-processes and process 
relationships that lead to an SoS design.  The key design processes are Needs Analysis, 
Requirements Analysis, Development of Architecture Alternatives, and Architecture 
Ranking.  The results of Needs Analysis are input to the other three design processes:  
                                                 
9 White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” 2006. 
10 White House, “The National Strategy for Maritime Security,” 2005. 
11 T.V. Huynh, “Architecture Engineering Methodology,” SI4001, Department of Systems 
Engineering, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005. 
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Requirements Analysis, Architecture Alternative development, and Architecture 
Ranking.  Requirements Analysis provides input to Architecture Alternative 
Development, while the Architecture Alternative development process and Architecture 
Ranking process both provide results to, and accept inputs from, each other.  Note that 
this diagram has no time domain; activities can happen concurrently and iteratively. 
3.5.2 Problem Definition 
The problem is defined by identifying and quantifying upstream design 
influences.  In the case of MTR, these influences included strategy and policy documents, 
the likely terrorist threats, the need to work in concert with existing DoD and DHS assets, 
the tight defense budget, and the need to avoid delaying the normal flow of maritime 
commerce.  Refer to Section 2.1 for the MTR problem statement.  Because existing assets 
will be used to provide a new capability, developing an MTR architecture is an SoS 
problem, setting in motion the process depicted in Figure 3-2. 
3.5.3 Needs Analysis 
SoS Needs are derived from threats, scenarios, and missions.  During  
Needs Analysis, the spectrum of potential maritime terrorist threats is researched and 
catalogued.  Three of these threats are selected for study and a scenario is developed 
concerning each of them.  The three representative threat scenarios for the MTR project 
are a WMD smuggled onboard an unsuspecting container ship, a merchant ship used as a 
weapon (SAW) to attack critical infrastructure on the approaches to and within  
San Francisco Bay, and an SBA against a high-value, commercial shipping unit within 
San Francisco Bay.  Representative commercial ships and area of operations for each 
scenario are displayed in Figure 3-3.  Once the scenarios are defined and vetted with 
stakeholders, the SoS missions are postulated to counter the terrorist threats.  These three 
missions bound the MTR SoS design, and from them, the full scope of SoS needs is 
determined.  Detailed information on the MTR design reference missions and their 








Figure 3-3:  MTR Mission Scenarios 
3.5.4 Requirements Analysis 
The Requirements Analysis process includes defining operational, functional, and 
quantitative performance requirements.  The operational requirements are derived 
directly from the SoS mission needs, while the functional requirements are derived from 
the operational requirements.  This progression is depicted graphically in Figure 3-4, 
which shows the three MTR missions at left leading to operational requirements 
definition, and operational requirements in turn leading to the five top-level capability 
requirements shown at bottom right:  C4ISR, Prepare the Battlespace, Find/Fix Threat, 













Figure 3-4:  Requirements Analysis Process 
The operational requirements are defined for each mission scenario and include 
the following categories:  mission profile, operational distribution, performance 
parameters, utilization requirements, effectiveness requirements, life cycle horizon, and 
operating environment.12  The requirements derived for the three MTR missions are 
displayed in Figure 3-5. 
                                                 
12 B.S. Blanchard and W.J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall,  
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Figure 3-5:  MTR SoS Operational Requirements 
The top-level functions along with their corresponding embedded subfunctions 
are presented in nested N2 diagram format in Figure 3-6.  N2 diagrams are selected to 
represent the fact that with “N” subsystems, there are N2 possible interfaces between 
these subsystems.  Thus, the use of this format reinforces the required focus on interfaces 
necessary to successful SoS architecting.  The MTR top-level functions are C4ISR, 
Prepare the Battlespace, Find/Fix Threat, Finish Threat, and Sustain.  For each top level 
function, there are two or more lower-level functions that enable its accomplishment.  
These subfunctions are further decomposed into their component capabilities.  Functional 
decomposition down to the fourth level is presented in Section 5.1.2, and the complete 
MTR functional decomposition is provided in Appendix A. 
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Figure 3-6:  MTR Top-Level Functional Requirements 
The quantitative requirements allocated each top-level function within the context 
of each mission are presented in Figure 3-7.  The probability of success for each mission 
is developed for the operational effectiveness requirement, and the required contribution 
of each top-level function in order to achieve this effectiveness is then defined in terms of 
both response time and probability of success.  Derivation of the overall system 
effectiveness requirements is detailed in Section 5.2.1, and the allocation process to lower 
levels of functional decomposition is described in Section 5.2.2.  The complete 
requirements allocation for both time and probability of success is provided as  
Appendix B. 
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 Defeat attack within 15 
seconds
 PS ≥ 0.94
 Disable PAV ≤ 21 min
 Sink PAV ≤ 21 min
 PS ≥ 0.91
 Transfer to DoE JTOFINISH
 Detect incoming small 
boats at sufficient range to 
allow warning, ID, and two 
shots prior to VA
 PS ≥ 0.94
 Determine PAV status 
upon boarding
 Search PAVs with Escort 
teams given time
 Search 9400 TEU ship 
in less than 160 hr
 Pd ≥ 0.96 PFA ≤ 10-6
 Dwell time ≤ 3 min per 
container
FIND/FIX
 Immediately start clearing 
non-essential boats
 Assemble crews and deploy 
escort vehicles in less than 1 
hr
 Assemble teams and 
deploy vessels in less than 
24 hrs
 Alert team with Pilot
 Assemble teams and 
deploy vessels in less 
than 24 hrs
PBS
 Process time NMT 1 hr Process time NMT 30 min 
(depending on intelligence 
latency)











Figure 3-7:  MTR Top-Level Function Performance Requirements 
3.5.5 Architecture Alternatives Analysis 
First, the existing DoD and DHS systems that can meet the requirements are 
identified.  Both command and control (C2) and communications structures and concepts 
are defined within the C4ISR function.  Force Composition concepts are defined to 
satisfy the combination of PBS, Finish, and Sustain functional requirements. 
When either systems do not already exist in the DoD or DHS portfolio of 
platforms or the performance of existing systems does not meet the MTR requirements, 
future systems are postulated.  This is the nature of gap analysis, which is performed for 
each of the top-level functions.  The need for a near-term MTR SoS solution, where 
“near-term” is operationally defined as deployable within the next five years, dictated 
that gaps be filled with Program of Record or commercial off the shelf (COTS) concepts, 
if they exist.  The gaps are identified for the C4ISR, PBS, Find/Fix, and Finish top-level 
functions.  All postulated systems are assessed for feasibility and are described in  
Section 7.1.1. 
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3.5.6 Architecture Ranking 
Critical performance parameters are identified and selected as a part of the 
operational requirements definition.  These parameters, the Measures of Performance 
(MOPs), reflect the performance of the system functions and are flowed down to the 
lower level functions.  The MTR Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) is the combination of 
(1) the costs associated with system procurement, operations, sustainment, and 
delay/damage, and (2) the probability of success in the available time window.  It is a 
type of cost effectiveness,13 where the figure of merit is the SoS probability of success 
divided by the total cost of SoS procurement, operations and support, and delay and/or 
damage to commercial shipping or critical infrastructure. 
 In order to determine the optimal SoS architecture, the different combinations of 
system concept alternatives are assessed against the MOPs and MOE.  This assessment is 
performed via modeling and simulation, where modeling is both analytical and 
probabilistic.  Since the number of possible system concept alternative combinations 
exceeds 3,000, and orthogonal array experiment (OAE) is utilized to reduce the number 
of combinations tested with no degradation in final results.  Refer to Section 7.1.2 for 
complete details on this approach. 
 Performance of each OAE trial within the context of each mission scenario is 
estimated via modeling and simulation, as detailed in Section 7.2.  Trade studies are 
conducted with the aid of simulative A Monte Carlo Analysis in order to compare the 
performance of different SoS architectures.  Each OAE trial is costed as described in 
Section 7.4.  Briefly, all system concept alternatives are assessed for procurement, 
operation, and support cost incurrence.  Procurement is incurred for new systems or for 
additional copies of existing systems that are not programmed in the DoD/DHS budget.  
Operating and support costs are incurred for the expected time during which the assets 
would be involved in MTR-related activities during a one-year period.  Note that 
technical risk is avoided by using existing hardware and software technology for MTR 
SoS components and is thus not a consideration in the ranking. 
                                                 
13 B.S. Blanchard and W.J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall,  
New Jersey, 1981, p. 360. 
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 As previously discussed in Section 3.4, the final candidate architectures are the 
Maximum Performance, TDCE, and BUCE, and the final recommended architecture, 
which provides the highest expected return on investment, is the TDCE.  Section 7.1.2 
contains a complete description of the development and the contents of all three 
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4.0 DESIGN REFERENCE MISSIONS 
 Identification of relevant missions and creation of thorough and realistic scenarios 
are an integral part of the needs and requirements analysis phases of the systems 
engineering process.14  SEA-9’s study considers three representative missions for a 
conceptual MTR SoS:  prevention of a nuclear WMD attack, prevention or defeat of an 
attack using a merchant ship as a WMD, and defeat of a suicide boat attack on a  
high-value target (such as an oil tanker or passenger ferry). 
4.1 MISSIONS 
 These missions are derived directly from threats and threat scenarios that appear 
in the Homeland Security Council’s Planning Scenarios document.15  They are also 
based on previous terrorist attacks and commonly postulated future attacks.16  The design 
reference missions are the result of significant research and stakeholder input.  The three 
missions span a full spectrum of threats and consequences and require different forces 
and CONOPS.  The three missions present a significant challenge to a maritime SoS. 
 The current National Strategy for Maritime Security lists three broad strategic 
principles to guide national effort in maritime security.  They are:  preserve freedom of 
the seas, facilitate and defend commerce, and facilitate the movement of desirable goods 
and people across borders while preventing the movement of undesirable goods or 
people.  It also states that the United States will prevent terrorist acts by “. . . stopping 
such activities at any stage of development or deployment . . . preferably overseas.”17  It 
emphasizes five strategic actions to support the strategic principles: 
1. Enhancing international cooperation 
2. Maximizing domain awareness 
                                                 
14 For example, see B. Blanchard and W. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis (3rd Edition); 
Defense Acquisition University, Systems Engineering Fundamentals; INCOSE and AIAA, Systems 
Engineering; or U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, Systems Engineering Primer and 
Handbook (2nd Edition). 
15 David Howe, Planning Scenarios, The Homeland Security Council, July 2004. 
16 See D. Eberhart, “Container Ships:  The Next Terrorist Weapon?” www.newsmax.com; “Peril on the 
Sea,” The Economist, 2 October 2003; and John Fritelli et al., Port and Maritime Security:  Background 
and Issues, Novinka Books, 2003. 
17 National Strategy for Maritime Security, pp. 8-9. 
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3. Embedding security into commercial practices 
4. Deploying layered security 
5. Assuring continuity of the marine transportation system18 
 The SoS architectures reflect an amalgamation of the eight goals above into two 
principles of maritime and homeland defense.  The two principles are: 
1. Meet and defeat threats as early as practicable 
2. Operate with minimum impact on commerce 
 These two principles are the primary customer requirements affecting the 
architectures and CONOPS developed for MTR.  The primary customer need is to 
accomplish the three missions described above. 
 The San Francisco/Oakland major metropolitan area (MMA) has numerous 
features that make it an attractive target for terrorist attacks.  The Bay area has a 
combined population of 3.2 million.19  It attracts over 11 million visitors and tourists each 
year.  It is the second-largest container port in California and the fourth largest in the 
nation.  The combined ports of San Francisco, Oakland, and Richmond receive an 
average of ten overseas merchant vessels daily, primarily crude oil tankers and container 
ships.20  There are also numerous points of critical infrastructure on or near the Bay. 
 The Golden Gate Bridge, connecting San Francisco to the Marin peninsula, is one 
of the nation’s premiere landmarks and one of the most famous bridges in the world.  The 
San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge is a vital economic connection between the two 
cities.  There are other large public transportation systems and hubs (as expected of any 
MMA), including two large airports, numerous ferries, rail lines, and three other bridges 
of significant size.  Any action that would curtail or stop transportation in the Bay area 
would have significant economic impact estimable in billions of dollars.21  In addition, a 
large explosion, fire, or chemical cloud at the Fisherman’s Wharf waterfront tourist area 
                                                 
18 National Strategy for Maritime Security.  The White House, September 2005. 
19 2004 estimate.  Source:  www.demographia.com; from 2002 U.S. Census Bureau data. 
20 Randy Young, “Baseline Study of U.S. Port Merchant Ship Traffic During 2004,” Office of Naval 
Intelligence, 31 August 2005.  Unclassified/For Official Use Only. 
21 Staff, “Port Shutdown for Terrorist Incidents Could Cost Billions, Drill Shows,” CQ Homeland 
Security, 5 December 2002.  Bruce Arnold et al., “The Economic Costs of Disruption in Container 
Shipments,” Congressional Budget Officer, 26 March 2006. 
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has the potential for mass casualties and the “cinematic” effect that Al-Qaeda and other 
groups pursue.22 
 The San Francisco/Oakland MMA is also relatively isolated from large military 
concentration areas, particularly naval assets.  The two West Coast fleet concentration 
areas are San Diego and Seattle.  The main assets for immediate maritime defense are 
therefore USCG units already in the Bay area.  This is not to say that USCG assets are 
not capable of performing MTR missions, but rather to highlight that assistance may be 
several days in arriving.  Even USCG PACAREA and District 11 assets are spread from 
the Oregon to Mexican borders. 
4.1.1 WMD Mission 
The use of a WMD to attack American citizens is the undeniable “worst case 
scenario” of homeland defense.  The WMD threat occupies a central place in all 
homeland defense strategy, planning, and research literature.  The National Strategy for 
Maritime Security states “Preeminent among our national security priorities is to take 
all necessary steps to prevent WMD from entering the country and to avert an 
attack on the homeland.”23  Eight of the 15 Department of Homeland Security Planning 
Scenarios involve WMD of some type.  A nuclear detonation in a major American city 
may cause tens of thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and hundreds 
of billions of dollars in damages.24 
 A WMD can be brought into the United States by many methods.  One of the 
most commonly mentioned is by standard cargo container.25  Millions of such containers 
enter the United States every year.  A very small percentage are actually opened and 
inspected.  Cargo control procedures and security methods are generally poor, 
particularly at certain overseas locations.26  Inspections of containers after they have 
                                                 
22 Fisherman’s Wharf hosted approximately 10 million visitors in 2004.  A calculation shows that 50% 
of the visitors arrived on a weekend would result in an average of approximately 52,000 visitors per 
weekend day and 18,500 visitors per weekday.  Almost all of these people would be compressed into an 
area of a few city blocks, and the number would be larger when local employees and commuters are added. 
23 National Strategy for Maritime Security, p. 7.  Emphasis in original. 
24 There are many works on nuclear terrorism.  SEA-9’s most common reference was Graham 
Allison’s Nuclear Terrorism: the Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Times Books, New York, NY.  2004. 
25 See Allison, Eberhart, and Fritelli, among others (op. cit.). 
26 See Fritelli (op. cit.) and Fred Evans, Securing the Nation:  Maritime and Port Security, Chelsea 
House Publishers, 2004. 
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arrived in the United States do not meet the two principles of the MTR system.  
Smuggling a WMD into the United States is by no means limited to containers or 
container vessels; it is, however, a viable method.  It also presents a challenging systems 
engineering problem. 
 The WMD scenario fills the “middle ground” that lies at the intersection of 
intelligence and threat response.  If one postulates that information concerning a 
smuggled WMD becomes available, and that the information is specific to a particular 
ship, then capabilities exist to counter the threat.  If one postulates that the intelligence 
system will produce no specific information concerning a smuggled WMD, then it is 
highly unlikely that a device could ever be found.  The only option in such a case is to 
close all ports and borders—which will disrupt commerce on a massive scale.  The 
scenario postulates that some specific information concerning origin and time of 
departure of a smuggled WMD is available, but not enough is available to allow 
identification of a single vessel.  Instead, a group of twenty potential attacking vessels  
is identified. 
 The device is presumed to be in a legitimate container on one of the twenty ships.  
The insertion of the device into the container is undetected by port authorities or the 
originating company and the ship’s crew is oblivious to its presence.  Therefore, there is 
no obvious “paper trail” to aid in the location of the device.  No terrorist is onboard to 
help “shepherd” the device to its destination. 
 The scenario considers two types of nuclear devices.  The first is a nuclear device 
using an IAEA-significant amount of either enriched uranium (greater than 25 kg) or 
Plutonium-239 (greater than 8 kg).  The second device is a Radiological Dispersion 
Device (RDD) or “Dirty Bomb.”  It is composed of a small amount of Cesium-137, 
Americium-141, Strontium-90, or Cobalt-60 wrapped around approximately 100 pounds 
of conventional explosive.  Both devices are shielded in either a square lead container of 
0.635 cm to 5.08 cm uniform thickness or by 128 cm of high-density nitrogen. 
 The nuclear device’s characteristics were used to determine a likely area of lethal 
effects which incorporates thermal radiation, gamma and neutron radiation, blast 
(overpressure), and likely fallout patterns. 
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 The threat in this scenario can be summarized as follows.  A nuclear WMD is in a 
container located on one of 20 container vessels.  The 20 vessels have departed a 
common Far East port within a 24 to 48 hour period.  The vessels are all bound for the 
United States.  The ship’s crews and owners are unaware of the nature of the cargo.  
There are no terrorists onboard the ship and the ship’s crews and owners are expected to 
cooperate with friendly forces when approached. 
4.1.2 SAW Mission 
A hijacked ship used as a WMD is a commonly postulated maritime threat.27  A 
small number of hijackers (less than the combined number of hijackers on  
September 11th) with appropriate training could control almost any modern merchant 
vessel.  The largest modern merchant ships are equal to or larger in size than a modern 
aircraft carrier.  Such a vessel, used as a weapon or used in combination with some 
dangerous cargo, is a formidable threat.  Particularly vulnerable are the large suspension 
bridges and waterside infrastructure of the Bay area.  This type of attack has been 
commonly characterized as “September 11th at sea.” 
 There are several historical precedents for envisioning ships used as weapons.  On 
6 December 1917, the French ammunition ship Mont Blanc exploded in the harbor of 
Halifax, Nova Scotia.  The resulting explosion and fire killed (approximately)  
1,900 people, injured 9,000 others, and damaged or destroyed 1,600 buildings.28  On  
16 April 1947, the French ammonium nitrate carrier S.S. Grandcamp exploded at the pier 
in Texas City, Texas, after an onboard fire.  This explosion, estimated to equal the yield 
of a two- to four-kiloton nuclear device, killed 581 and injured 5,000.  The resulting fire 
caused the destruction of two additional merchant ships near the Grandcamp, and the 
resulting conflagration burned the city for a week.  The blast threw the ship’s anchor, 
which weighed 3,000 pounds, over two miles.29 
 On 27-28 March 1942 British forces loaded the WWI-era destroyer  
HMS Campbelltown (ex-USS Buchanan) with four tons of explosives and rammed her 
into the St. Nazaire dry dock as part of an extensive special operations mission.  
                                                 
27 Eberhart, op. cit. 
28 www.cbc.ca/halifaxexplosion 
29 en.wikipedia.org; www.texas-city-tx.org 
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Disguised as a German gunboat, the ruse was detected as the Campbelltown entered the 
harbor.  The ship was under intense fire from a number of large caliber guns, including 
20 mm and 37 mm antiaircraft guns, 6 inch howitzers, and 75 mm, 150 mm, and 170 mm 
artillery pieces.  The ship took multiple hits and suffered numerous personnel casualties.  
Despite the damage the ship rammed into the dry dock at 18 knots, exactly as planned.30 
 On 9 May 1980, in the midst of dense fog and thunderstorms, the bulk carrier 
Summit Venture hit one of the supports of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge, a 15-mile 
cantilever-truss bridge connecting St. Petersburg and Bradenton, Florida.  The impact 
caused a 1,300-foot section of the bridge to fall into Tampa Bay, killing 35 people.31  On 
26 May 2002, a tug and barge hit a bridge portion of Interstate 40 over the  
Arkansas River.  A 600-foot section of the bridge collapsed, killing 14.32 
 In March 2003, the chemical tanker Dewi Madrim was boarded and seized by 
unknown persons.  Those persons remained onboard for roughly one hour, maneuvering 
the vessel repeatedly, until departing with the Captain and First Officer as hostages.  The 
incident has been characterized as “. . . the equivalent of flight training school for 
terrorists.”33  In June of the same year, Greek authorities discovered 680 tons of 
commercial mining explosives and 8,000 detonators on the cargo vessel Baltic Sky.  The 
shipment was bound for a bogus address in the Sudan.34 
 The study does not differentiate between the use of the ship as a weapon and the 
use of the ship’s cargo.  In either case, terrorists would need to seize control of the vessel 
for some period of time in order to commence the attack.  It is this critical action which 
must be defeated.  If brought to speed at the last moment, there is little chance of 
stopping the vessel in time to prevent an attack. 
 This analysis considers a team of terrorists onboard a merchant vessel, some of 
whom are onboard the ship in a legitimate capacity.  Some are trained to operate and 
                                                 
30 Robert B. Smith, “British Raid on St. Nazaire:  The Greatest Raid of All,” World War Two,  
March 2003.  Also see extensive analysis in CDR W. McRaven, “The Theory of Special Operations,” 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 1993. 
31 www2.sptimes.com 
32 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation re:  U.S. towboat Robert K. Love 
Collision with Interstate 40 Highway Bridge near Webbers Falls, Oklahoma 26 May 2002, 9 September 
2004, www.odl.state.ok.us 
33 Quoted in Charles Glass, “Officials Fear Terror on High Seas,” ABCNews.com, 10 September 2003. 
34 “Greece Traces Route of Seized Ship,” www.edition.cnn.com, 24 June 2003. 
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navigate the vessel.  They will take control of the ship at the last possible moment.  There 
are ten terrorists, two for each of five major control stations:  bridge, engineering control, 
after steering, and two engine rooms.  The terrorists are armed to eliminate the ship’s 
crew and defend against boarding.  If the ship is boarded (or an attempt to board is made) 
by friendly security forces, the terrorists will offer armed resistance and will seize control 
of the ship if they have not already done so.  Intelligence information can only narrow the 
list of potential attackers to one of twenty merchant ships inbound daily to the Bay area. 
4.1.3 SBA Mission 
Unlike the previous two scenarios, small boat attacks by terrorists have already 
occurred.  The SBA scenario is the most likely future attack because bombing of public 
transportation, suicide or otherwise, is the most common form of terror attack.  The 
number of terrorist attacks on transportation is too extensive to detail here; what follows 
are descriptions of the most recent maritime incidents. 
 On 12 October 2000, the USS Cole was severely damaged by the detonation of a 
terrorist suicide boat packed with high explosives.  Seventeen sailors were killed and  
39 were wounded in the attack, and the cost of repairing the ship was approximately  
$250 million.35  On 6 October 2002, the French oil tanker M/V Limburg suffered a 
similar attack three nautical miles from the coast of Yemen.  The attack produced an oil 
spill estimated at 90,000 barrels.  Both hulls of the ship’s double-hull design were 
breached by the explosion; this illustrates the vulnerability of large ships to such an 
attack.  On 24 April 2004, three suicide boats attempted to damage or destroy the  
Khawr Al Amaya and Al Basrah Offshore Terminals (KAAOT and ABOT), which 
handle 90% of Iraqi crude oil exports, and two Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) tied 
up alongside the terminals.36  The attack was foiled, but the damage or loss of the 
                                                 
35 CRS Report RS20721, “Terrorist Attack on USS Cole:  Background and Issues for Congress,” 
March 2001. 
36 “Countering Maritime Terrorism, U.S. Thwarts Attack, Builds Up Foreign Navies,” www.jinsa.org, 
17 June 2004. 
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terminals would have an enormous impact on the Iraqi economy.  Finally, two separate 
ferry bombings in the Philippines (one in 2004 and one in 2005) killed over 100 people.37 
 The San Francisco Bay area has many critical points of infrastructure as well as 
extensive commercial shipping traffic of all types and tonnages that are vulnerable to 
SBA.  An SBA on a densely packed passenger ferry would certainly cause extensive 
casualties and would make emergency response and casualty treatment much more 
difficult than a similar attack on a land-based target.  A significant oil spill from a large 
crude oil tanker could cause environmental damage in the large offshore marine 
sanctuary area and incur significant cleanup costs.  The Bay area has an extensive 
recreational boat community and infrastructure in which terrorists could operate and 
launch their attack. 
 The SBA scenario involves protection of 5 oil tankers inbound to the SF Bay area 
and the protection of 13 ferries operating on five different routes.  The five oil tankers 
arrive uniformly distributed over a 24-hour period; the ferries operate 12 out of every  
24 hours.  The scenario also requires the constant protection of five points of critical 
infrastructure representing strategic targets such as oil offload terminals, pipelines, power 
facilities, and so forth.  The attacker uses a single 30-foot civilian speedboat with a top 
speed of 40 knots.  The craft is loaded with 1,000 pounds of conventional explosives. 
 Figure 4-1 shows a map of the Bay area with major bridges and representative 
tanker and ferry routes.  These are only representations of facilities and routes, not  
actual installations. 
                                                 
37 Marichu Villanueva, “Superferry Sinking Last February a Terrorist Act,” www.newsflash.org,  
12 October 2004; “Thirty Injured in Philippines Ferry Bomb Attack,” www.thescotsman.scotsman.com,  




Figure 4-1:  Representative critical infrastructure in San Francisco Bay 
4.2 MISSION ANALYSIS 
4.2.1 WMD Mission Analysis 
 The analysis of the WMD mission focuses on three areas:  determining the 
minimum distance from San Francisco at which a nuclear detonation would produce 
minimal effects, assessing the feasibility of an at-sea radiological search on a container 
vessel, and determining the optimum location of ships to intercept the 20 suspect vessels.  
The first two are discussed in this section.  The optimum allocation of ships is 
incorporated in the WMD EXTEND™ mission model and is discussed in Chapter 7.0. 
 A minimum standoff distance of 100 nautical miles is assumed for sea-level 
detonation of a device with an IAEA-significant amount of fissionable material.  This 
distance, verified by stakeholders,38 minimizes the risk of fallout given prevailing winds 
and weather conditions. 
 Radiological detection onboard a container ship underway poses significant 
challenges.  Foremost among these is the physical difficulty of reaching all containers 
onboard.  Containers onboard container ships are typically divided into two main groups:  
above decks and below decks.  Lashed to the deck with cables, the above decks 
containers are typically stacked four or five high in paired rows.  Although tightly spaced, 
at least one lengthwise-end of every container is accessible with climbing gear or 
specialized equipment. 
                                                 
38 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
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 The below decks containers are divided among the ship’s cargo holds.  The holds 
are designed to maximize the space available for cargo and minimize “dead” space; the 
containers are packed as tightly as possible.  Modern container ships use cell guides in 
their cargo holds to guide the containers into position.  It is common to have just one or 
two inches of space between containers.  Metal framing for the cell guides makes the 
hold even more crowded.  Depending on the design of the vessel, the lengthwise ends of 
the containers may be inaccessible.  Figures 4-2 through 4-5 are photographs showing 
these aspects of a container vessel. 
 
Figure 4-2:  Cargo containers on deck 
 




Figure 4-4:  Cell guides in cargo hold 
 
Figure 4-5:  Cell guides in cargo hold, another view 
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The cramped shipboard environment impacts radiological search in several ways.  
First, the sensors used must have physical dimensions that allow them to be deployed in 
the most restricted spaces of the cargo holds.  The cramped quarters will delay search by 
forcing personnel to crawl and climb through awkward spaces between cell guide 
framing, bulkheads, ship’s equipment, and the containers.  Some areas may be 
completely inaccessible.  Personnel may face physical injury if seas are heavy or lighting 
is poor. 
 Second, because of these accessibility issues, the sensors must operate through 
intervening material that may include containers, the contents of the containers, 
bulkheads, and ship’s equipment.  Search methods must account for normally occurring 
radiological material (NORM) that may comprise some or all of the container’s contents. 
 Third, the ocean environment affects radiological search.  The absence of 
absorbing material (such as soil) results in more background radiation or “noise” that 
must be filtered by the sensor system.39  Other factors concerning sensors and 
radiological detection can be found in the classified addendum to this report. 
 The WMD EXTEND™ mission model determines the time available for and 
effectiveness of MTR radiological search teams.  The model is described in Section 7. 
4.2.2 SAW Mission Analysis 
 The analysis of the SAW mission, and the conclusions that flow from the 
analysis, are more dependent on initial assumptions than either the WMD or SBA 
scenarios.  Terrorists are assumed to resist any boarding attempt (see Section 4.1.2).  
Boarding inbound vessels thus becomes a guaranteed way to detect terrorists.  Our 
analysis considered the Golden Gate Bridge to be the “goal line” of the SAW mission; all 
system functions must be complete before vessels reach the bridge. 
 Once a boarding attempt is made, successfully or not, the next course of action for 
friendly forces becomes clear:  disabling or sinking the hijacked vessel.  An unmolested 
vessel can have the boarding team remain onboard until it reaches its destination. 
 The sea buoy marking the approach to San Francisco is 14 nautical miles from the 
Golden Gate Bridge.  A vessel at 25 knots will reach the bridge from the sea buoy in  
                                                 
39 http://www.eml.doe.gov/Factsheets/ShipEffect.pdf 
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33 minutes.  The mouth of the channel is nine nautical miles from the bridge; the 
corresponding travel time is therefore 21 minutes.  In that time, it is unreasonable to 
expect that the ship could be recaptured.  The only option available is to disable or sink 
the vessel before it reaches the bridge.40 
 A variety of weapons and platforms could be employed to disable a large 
merchant vessel.  Given the time constraints described, the weapon system must be 
available for use within minutes.  This leads to consideration of weapons that can be 
deployed upon receipt of initial intelligence and used immediately.  The exact type, 
characteristics, and effectiveness of this weapon or weapon system are open to research 
by future cohorts of the Systems Engineering and Analysis program. 
 Furthermore, according to research conducted in this study and subject matter 
experts, a command-activated, deployable mine or series of mines can accomplish this 
mission and could be fielded in the five-year timeframe mandated by the study. 
4.2.3 SBA Mission Analysis 
Determining Force Structure 
 Two methods were employed to determine force structure.  First, a schedule of 
HVUs and escorts is prepared to determine the number of forces required to escort all 
HVUs and impose no delay on commerce.41  Second, an EXTEND™ model is created to 
calculate the delay on commerce given a number of escorts.  The model is described in 
Appendix F.  Force structure is also affected by protection technique (see below). 
Determining Effectiveness 
 Architecture effectiveness in the SBA mission is assessed as a function of five 
areas:  protection technique, weapon effectiveness, platform effectiveness, escort option 
effectiveness, and architecture effectiveness.  The first two areas are described below; the 
other three are Section 7. 
                                                 
40 The Golden Gate Bridge is not the only target, but serves as a convenient boundary marking all of 
the targets inside the Bay area.  According to stakeholder sources, sinking or disabling a ship at this point in 
the channel or approaches (while undesirable) would not significantly affect ship traffic. 
41 The complete schedule and explanation can be found in Appendix E. 
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Protection Technique 
 Two techniques of HVU protection are close escort and barrier patrol.  In the 
close escort technique, friendly forces travel alongside the HVU from beginning to end of 
its transit.  Separation of escort and HVU generally varies from 50 to 200 yards 
(depending on the size of escort).  The close spacing allows escorts to concentrate on 
potential threats in relation to their proximity to the HVU and allows the most time to 
respond to a threat.  The proximity of escort to HVU means that an attack on the HVU is, 
in essence, an attack on the escorts. 
 The barrier patrol technique uses one or more escorts to patrol a barrier of fixed 
length.  The patrol keeps threats from crossing into a protected area or allows the patrol 
to respond to an incursion of the barrier.  In the SBA mission, barrier patrols could be 
used for critical infrastructure protection as well as patrol of the fixed shipping channels 
and ferry routes in the Bay.  The advantage of the barrier patrol is that generally smaller 
numbers of forces are required. 
 Determining Weapon Effectiveness 
The effectiveness four weapons against a single small boat attacker is assessed.42  
Primary sources of information for the statistical analysis of weapons against small boat 
threats are subject matter experts, previous unclassified studies, and open source weapons 
data.43  The following assumptions are made for weapon analysis (in addition to those in 
Section 4.1.3.): 
1. The attacker maintains course and speed (no evasive maneuvers) even if 
hit by defender fire; 
2. The defender has constant probabilities of hit (based on weapon type and 
range) even if attacker is hit by defender fire; 
                                                 
42 The example weapons and their abbreviations are: 
 LMG:  a .30 (7.62mm)) Light Machinegun, such as the M60 
 MMG:  a .50 cal (12.7mm) Medium Machinegun, such as the Browning M2 
 MCG:  a 25mm Medium Caliber Gun; such as the Navy Mk38 
 GL:  a 40mm Grenade Launcher; such as the Mk19 
43 Previous studies included the Thesis Technical Report of Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 
Seven, “Maritime Domain Protection in the Strait of Malacca,” June 2005 and R. Rigazzio, “Defense 
Against Small Boat Threat:  Single DDG and Surface Action Group (SAG) Transits; Analysis Supporting 
CONOP Development,” NWDC, June 2005. 
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3. Each “shot” by the defender is actually a burst of multiple rounds and a hit 
signifies that at least 75% of the rounds in the burst hit the attacker;44 
4. The time to reload a LMG, MMG, and GL is 10 seconds (reloading the 
MCG cannot be completed in the scenario time); 
5. Each shot is independent of other shots.  
 All weapons were assigned an ammunition capacity and rate of fire (ROF).  
Probability of hit data from an earlier study is used.45  The probabilities of hit increase as 
range decreases.  Three different range “bands” are used:  Band 1 (500-1,000 yards), 
Band 2 (200-500 yards), and Band 3 (50-200 yards).  Because each weapon is  
manually-aimed and mounted on a fixed mount or bipods/tripods, all weapons are 
assigned identical hit probabilities.  To account for its High Explosive (HE) round, the 
probabilities for a grenade launcher are slightly higher than those of the other weapons. 
 The number of hits required to kill the target (“hits to kill”) is determined in the 
following manner.  The attacking vessel is divided into five sections.  If a single burst of 
fire hits a vital compartment, the attacker is killed.  A statistical analysis indicates that the 
number of bursts required to guarantee a 0.90 probability of hitting a vital compartment 
once is three for the MMG, MCG, and GL and five for the LMG.46  The time for a 
weapon to fire one burst is obtained by dividing the burst size by the ROF.  Weapon traits 
are summarized in Table 4-1.47 
Table 4-1:  Weapon Characteristics 
                                                 
44 The terms “burst” and “shot” will be used interchangeably. 
45 Rigazzio, op. cit. 
46 A negative binomial cumulative distribution function, with probability of success of .40 (2/5), results 
in number of trials needed for 0.90 probability of one success. 
47 Although using different methodology, the number of individual rounds required to hit the target to 
achieve a kill (45 to 60) is comparable to the 50-100 round range used in earlier studies.  See Rigazzio,  
op. cit. 















Hits to Kill Time to Fire One Burst 
LMG 200 0.08 0.15 0.40 20 10 5 2 
MMG 200 0.08 0.15 0.40 20 10 3 3 
MCG 175 0.08 0.15 0.40 6 29 3 2 
GL 48 0.10 0.30 0.60 3 16 3 4 
46 
 The time the target is present in each range band (“target dwell time”) is 
computed by dividing the length of the range band by the target’s speed.  Then an 
engagement in each range band can be modeled as a binomial distribution.  The 
calculations are shown in Appendix D. 
 When the number of shots taken equals the ammunition capacity of the weapon, 
there is a reloading delay before another shot can be fired.  For example, the LMG 
requires two seconds to fire a burst and can fire ten bursts before reloading.  The 
attacker’s dwell time is 22 seconds in Band 1, it is 13 seconds in Band 2, and 6 seconds 
in Band 3.  Therefore, the LMG fires ten shots while the attacker is in Band 1.  Twenty 
seconds elapse.  It takes ten seconds to reload; the attacker continues to close the range.  
When reloading is complete, the attacker has 5 seconds remaining in Band 2 (22–20 = 2, 
2–10 = –8, –8+13 = 5).  The LMG fires two shots in Band 2 and three more shots when 
the attacker is in Band 3. 
 Finally, the probability of kill can be established for each weapon by determining 
the probability of gaining the required number of hits on the target across all range bands.  
This method allows multiple variations of the basic scenario.  Nine variations (“cases”) 
are analyzed.  A variation is characterized by the target initial distance, time to fire one 
burst, the number of weapons firing, and the reloading policy.  The nine cases are 
summarized in Table 4-2. 
Case Open Fire Range (yds) Rate of Fire 
Number of 
Weapons Reload Policy 
1 1,000 MAX 1 INDIVIDUAL 
2 1,000 MAX 2 (=1) COORDINATED 
3 1,000 AIMED 1 INDIVIDUAL 
4 1,000 MIX 1 INDIVIDUAL 
5 1,000 MIX 4 (=2) COORDINATED 
6 500 BEST 1 N/A 
7 500 BEST 2 N/A 
8 200 BEST 1 N/A 
9 200 BEST 2 N/A 
Table 4-2:  Nine variations of the basic attack scenario 
 The weapon analysis (See Appendix D) yields the probabilities of kill for the four 
weapons in each case.  They are found in Table 4-3. 
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Case LMG MMG MCG GL 
1 0.0213 0.0865 0.3198 0.2365 
2 0.0599 0.2123 — — 
3 0.0048 0.0526 0.0526 0.1614 
4 0.0036 0.0562 0.2392 0.2365 
5 0.2536 0.4738 0.6879 0.7242 
6 0.0260 0.1958 0.2392 0.2365 
7 0.2932 0.6158 0.6879 0.7242 
8 0.0000 0.0640 0.0640 0.0000 
9 0.0409 0.4557 0.4557 0.4752 
Table 4-3:  Weapon performance in nine variations of the basic attack scenario 
 Analysis similar to that described above was conducted for a twin MMG mount 
and a helicopter engagement against a small boat.  The main difference for the twin 
mount is a reduction in the hits to kill from 3 to 2 (because a burst size for a twin mount 
is now 30 to 40 rounds, instead of 15 to 20).  The helicopter has a moderately higher 
P(hit) and fewer hits to kill.48  In the helicopter case engagements are based on the total 
time of engagement, instead of the time derived from speed/distance.  These engagements 
are cases 10 through 13 and are summarized in Tables 4-4 and 4-5. 
Case 
Open Fire Range 
or Time of 
Engagement 
Rate of Fire Number of Weapons Reload Policy 
10 500 BEST 1 — 
11 200 BEST 1 — 
12 25 seconds BEST 1 — 
13 15 seconds BEST 1 — 
Table 4-4:  Four additional variations of the basic attack scenario 
Weapon Case 10 Case 11 Case 12 Case 13 
Twin MMG 0.4361 0.3520 — — 
Helo w/LMG — — 0.2160 0.6826 
Helo w/MMG — — 0.6480 0.9130 
Table 4-5:  Weapon performance in four additional variations of the basic attack scenario 
Results of Weapon Analysis 
 The first result of weapon analysis is that the number of shots at close range is the 
key driver of weapon effectiveness.  This has several implications. 
 First, the optimum employment of all weapons is to open fire when the target is at 
500 yards or less.  This increases the number of shots with the highest P(hit) and removes 
                                                 
48 This is Intended to show a better chance of directing fire into a vital compartment from the overhead 
angle of the aircraft. 
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reloading from consideration (all weapons can fire through the end of engagement 
without reloading if holding fire until 500 yards). 
 Second, because the number of shots can be increased by increasing the number 
of weapons, two weapons of lesser effectiveness can combine to be more effective than a 
single weapon of higher effectiveness.  This is particularly effective when combined with 
the “hold fire” policy.  Doubling the number of weapons causes a more-than-double 
increase in P(kill).  Also, two weapons holding fire are more effective than two weapons 
firing at maximum range even if the maximum range weapons coordinated their firing 
and reloading.  This benefit of multiple weapons applies to all cases.  In particular, only 
multiple weapons give adequate probabilities of kill against an extreme close range 
attacker (200 yards; cases 8 and 9). 
 Implications for force structure follow from these results.  In the absence of other 
considerations, larger escorts are preferable to smaller because they carry more 
weapons.49  All escorts should mount the maximum number of weapons possible, not the 
largest.  The MMG has the best average performance in all cases considered and it should 
be used when available.  The twin-MMG mount should also be used whenever possible. 
 The hold fire firing policy has benefits beyond weapon effectiveness.  In any 
homeland defense operating environment, it is highly unlikely that an engagement with 
shipboard weapons would commence at ranges greater than 500 yards.  First, current 
rules of engagement establish a protection zone of 500 yards around high-value units; 
vessels beyond 500 yards are free to operate as they wish.50  Discriminating a suicide 
attacker from an innocent recreational boater traveling at high speed is difficult.  Escorts 
face a challenging task of detecting and classifying high numbers of small boats.  
Without specific cueing to threat behavior, escorts will employ verbal and visual 
warnings against all boats fitting a target profile.  These actions take time, which will 
allow targets to close rapidly. 
                                                 
49 A Navy Cyclone-class patrol ship simultaneously mounts two 25mm guns, two twin-.50s, two 40mm 
Mk19 grenade launchers, and two 7.62mm MGs.  The class also has adequate deck space to station 
additional crew served weapons if circumstances permit. 
50 Current Coast Guard regulations require all boats to slow within 500 yards of designated high value 
units, and to stay 100 yards away from any high value unit.  When that is impossible, as in a narrow 
channel, the small boat must slow to bare steerageway.  Cited in Commander Coast Guard LANTAREA 
Letter (5800) dated 25 September 2001:  “Jurisdictional limitations of selected Coast Guard authorities.” 
49 
 Third, the potential for collateral damage to other boats, infrastructure, and 
civilians on shore is a strong push to minimize the number of shots taken.  Fourth, the 
hold fire policy increases the effectiveness of the LMG and MMG without affecting the 
performance of the MCG and GL.  It dispenses with the need to assume “perfect” firing 
and reloading coordination between two different weapon teams.  The LMG and MMG 
are the most common weapons available and the hold fire policy is an effective 
employment doctrine for them. 
 The results of the weapons analysis are used in the platform and architecture 
analysis which appears in Section 7.  The recommendations of the analysis were reflected 
in the armament of all escorts in the SBA EXTEND™ mission model which is described 
in Section 7. 
Results of Protection Technique Analysis 
 Comparison of the two methods reveals that barrier patrol is unsuitable for the 
SBA mission.  The large geographic area requiring protection calls for a large number of 
forces in both the close escort and barrier patrol techniques.  Table 4-6 displays a 
comparison of barrier patrol and close escort with parameters.  Moreover, barrier patrol 
reduces the effectiveness of friendly forces below acceptable levels.  See Appendix F  
for details. 
Protection Technique Parameters Forces Required Delay Imposed  on Commerce 
Close escort 4 per HVU 2 per critical point 124 0 
Barrier patrol 2 per nautical mile 144 0 
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5.0 REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
 Through extensive research and consultation with the stakeholders, SEA-9 has 
arrived at the MTR requirements for the SoS.  There are two types of requirements:  
Functional and Nonfunctional.  The functional requirements are derived from an 
abstraction of the customer's needs followed by the derivation of the objectives to be 
accomplished by the SoS.  The functional requirements are the functions, or actions, the 
SoS must perform to achieve these objectives.  Through functional analysis, the system 
level functions are derived, followed by the hierarchical decomposition of the system 
level functions to subsystem level functions.51  The nonfunctional requirements are the 
quantitative requirements associated with each function. 
5.1 FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
 The system-level functions required to meet the objectives of the SoS are defined 
and then followed by their decomposition to arrive at the subsystem level and  
supporting functions. 
5.1.1 System-Level Functions 
 In order to accomplish the SoS objectives for the WMD, SAW, SBA missions, 
five system-level functions are identified:  C4ISR, Prepare the Battlespace, Find/Fix 
Threat, Finish Threat, and Sustain.  The C4ISR (Command, Control, Computers, 
Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) function ensures that 
the SoS has the appropriate means to carry out the mission in terms of C2 and to have the 
appropriate lines of communication to keep the forces informed of the status of 
operations.  The Prepare the Battlespace function ensures that the SoS has the appropriate 
personnel, equipment, and platforms to carry out the mission.  Also, Prepare the 
Battlespace renders the area of operations ready for countering a potential attack.  The 
Find/Fix Threat and Finish Threat functions are executed as MTR forces actually carry 
out the mission.  The process of carrying out the mission includes searching and detecting 
                                                 
51 B.S. Blanchard and W.J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall, 
1998. 
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the threat and neutralizing the detected threat.  The Sustain function ensures that all units 
and equipment are properly supported and maintained for the duration of operations. 
5.1.2 Functional Decomposition 
 The decomposition of each of the system-level functions—C4ISR, Prepare the 
Battlespace, Find/Fix Threat, Finish Threat, and Sustain—is performed and represented 
in a tree structure (Appendix A).  The following sections discuss the system-level 
functions and their respective functional decomposition. 
5.1.2.1 C4ISR 
The C4ISR function is decomposed into these four subfunctions: 
Command and Control (C2), Communicate, Compute, and Provide Intelligence as shown 
in Appendix A. 
 The C2 function is supported by two subfunctions:  Command Forces and 
Interface with External C2.  The Command Forces function consists of the subfunctions:  
Plan Operation, Direct Operation, Coordinate Operation, and Control Operation.  The 
Interface with External C2 function enables the MTR C2 subsystem to interface with 
existing or planned C2 sources that are external to the MTR SoS, such as higher 
authority, coalition forces, the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), and the 
MDA system.  Interfacing includes receiving orders or information, requesting 
permission or information, coordinating efforts, and providing status updates as required.  
Thus, the subfunctions supporting the Interface with External C2 function are Interface 
with Higher Authority, Interface with Coalition C2, Interface with GCCS, and Interface 
with MDA. 
 The Communicate function is comprised of three subfunctions:  Provide 
Voice and Data, Network MTR Nodes, and Receive MDA Intelligence.  Within the 
Provide Voice and Data function, the MTR Communication subsystem must be able to 
transmit and receive voice, data, and images.  The Transmit and Receive functions 
comprise the Provide Voice and Data function.  The MTR Communication subsystem 
ensures that all nodes in the MTR SoS can quickly and reliably communicate with each 
other.  Thus, the subfunctions within the Network MTR Nodes function are  
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Provide Sufficient Nodes, Provide Robust Network, Minimize Downtime, Provide 
Redundancy, Minimize Data Corruption, Minimize Nodal Failure, and Reroute.  The 
Receive MDA Intelligence function maintains a communications link with the MDA 
system and routes MDA intelligence to the Compute function for processing.  The 
subfunctions supporting Receive MDA Intelligence are Maintain Link with MDA, 
Collect, Prioritize, Fuse Information, and Disseminate Information. 
 The Compute function contains two subfunctions—Information Assurance 
and Data Fusion.  Information Assurance provides a security policy that guarantees that 
data being received and sent by the C4ISR system has not been tampered with or 
corrupted.  Subfunctions that support Information Assurance are:  Provide 
Confidentiality, Provide Integrity, Provide Authenticity, Provide Availability, and 
Network Security.  Data Fusion enables rapid decision-making and situational awareness.  
Thus, the subfunctions within the Data Fusion are Data Association, Data Analysis, 
Threat Assessment Based on Scenarios, Automate Processes and Collaborative Tools, 
Request for Data Recollection, Collaborative Feedback, and Provide “No-MDA” 
Function. 
 The Provide Intelligence function receives fused information from the 
Compute function and transforms it into meaningful operational pictures that best 
enhance situational awareness.  The overall operational picture is created for the 
commander, while customized pictures are created for the individual functional teams 
based on their orders and operational needs.  Provide Intelligence is comprised of three 
subfunctions:  Form Overall Ops Picture, Analyze Operational Needs, and Provide 
Customized COPs. 
5.1.2.2 Prepare the Battlespace 
 The Prepare the Battlespace function addresses the first physical actions to 
be taken to prepare for an incoming threat as well as the prepositioning of forces to allow 
for the intercept of the potential threat.  As seen in Appendix A, Prepare the Battlespace 
has three subfunctions:  Activate Security Measures, Assemble and Prepare Teams and 
Platforms, and Deploy the Forces.  Each of these subfunctions covers the security 
planning, assembling component units, placement, and deployment of the SoS. 
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Activate Security Measures consists of the functions Prepare Critical 
Infrastructure and Activate Preplanned Operation Orders.  Prepare Critical Infrastructure 
involves heightening the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS)52 and Maritime 
Security (MARSEC)53 levels as well as upgrading or augmenting the existing security 
forces for the intended target area.  By increasing the HSAS level, the Department of 
Homeland Security ensures that all parties, civilian and government, in the target area are 
aware of the threat and are preparing accordingly.  The U.S. Coast Guard will set the 
MARSEC level to correspond with the HSAS level set by the DHS.  Upgrade/Augment 
Existing Security Forces involves increasing security to the areas that are critical to the 
operation or economy of a city or port facility.  Restrict Nonessential Boat Traffic applies 
more to the confined transit areas such as straits, bays, harbors, rivers, and inlets.  Restrict 
Nonessential Boat Traffic includes passive and active measures.  Passive measures are 
radio updates and “Notice to Mariners” while active measures involve boat ramp closures 
and patrol boats. 
 Assemble and Prepare Teams and Platforms consists of Activate Required 
Personnel, Issue Equipment, and Prepare Deployment Platforms.  This subfunction can 
vary greatly depending on the mission to be conducted and the time available to execute 
the mission.  For example, a container ship carrying a WMD on the open ocean may not 
require the same mission equipment as a threat of an SBA in a bay or harbor.  Also, 
considering the latency of intelligence, there may not be enough time to assemble all the 
desired equipment and personnel at one time. 
 Deploy the Forces consists of Embark Deployment Platforms, Move 
Deployment Platforms into Position, Move Teams to Potential Attacking Vessel, and 
Recover Teams from Potential Attacking Vessel.  Embark Deployment Platforms is when 
the teams and their equipment board the deployment platforms.  Move Deployment 
Platforms into Position involves the platforms, with teams and equipment onboard, 
traveling out to their area of concern.  Move Teams to Potential Attacking Vessel 
involves the gathering teams for debarkation of the deployment platforms and then 
providing them with a means of transportation to the potential attacking vessel.  Recover 




Teams from Potential Attacking Vessel involves gathering teams for debarkation of the 
potential attacking vessel and providing them with a means of transport back to the 
deployment platforms. 
5.1.2.3 Find/Fix Threat 
 The third system-level function, Find/Fix Threat, consists of three 
subfunctions:  Detect Threat, Identify Threat, and Assess Threat. 
 As directed by the National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13) the MTR SoS must be capable 
of conducting stand-off detection for weapons of mass destruction in the maritime 
domain while complementing existing and emerging cargo inspection systems and hand-
held detection devices.54, 55  According to this plan, the SoS needs to examine ways to 
integrate parallel efforts to improve WMD portable and standoff detection capabilities.  
In this light, the collaboration of several stakeholders to identify such parallel efforts is 
paramount.  Ongoing efforts undertaken by these stakeholders demonstrate the 
importance and urgency of placing the effective tools in place and on demand. 
The Find/Fix Threat function must place search teams on any one of the 
vessels of interest while in transit towards the mainland United States.  Once in place, the 
teams will use proven technologies to detect, with a high level of certainty, any material 
capable of being used as an ingredient in a WMD.  Accurate detection of a potential 
threat source alone warrants actions by the SoS to push the threat out of the system to 
external agencies such as the Department of Energy and the Joint Technical Operations 
Team to be isolated and/or destroyed.  When considering illicit devices that can be used 
against the United States it is important to consider much more than just the threat of a 
weapon of mass destruction.  As an extension, the Find/Fix Threat function will assist in 
locating persons of interest, as in the case a vessel has been taken over by terrorists.  
Additionally, when protecting High Value Units (HVU) that enter the area of operations, 
                                                 
54 National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime 
Security, October 2005. 
55 National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (NSPD-
41/HSPD-13) (Maritime Security Policy, December 21, 2004). 
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the SoS also provides capabilities to detect any attacking vessel or suspicious entity 
capable of inflicting damage or harm on the HVUs. 
 At the next level of decomposition, the Detect Threat subfunction will 
execute two processes, Scan Area of Interest and Process Scan Data.  Scanning the area 
of interest is intended to provide total iterative coverage.  As this scanning subfunction 
scrutinizes the area of interest, it is necessary to have the system process the information 
simultaneously, as intended in the Processing subfunction. 
 Once a potential threat has been detected with the level of certainty 
required of the overall system, the threat data is then sent to the appropriate external 
agencies aforementioned capable of dealing with a nuclear threat.  The Find/Fix Threat 
function will then incorporate the Identify Threat function to operate concurrently with 
the Detect Threat function.  By simultaneously detecting and identifying the source the 
system is prepared to redirect an identified threat to the appropriate agencies.  Unlike the 
improvised nuclear source, a person of interest detected on a potential ship as a weapon 
must be positively identified before the system can proceed.  This identification process 
will take place near-simultaneously with the detection function in such a manner that will 
provide a high level of certainty as to the identification of that person interest. 
 As it is not always possible to conduct identification while in the AOR, 
further sublevel functions necessary to complete this task would be both on-site and  
off-site analyses.  As part of the on-site analysis subfunction the search teams use the 
information immediately available to identify the threat.  Otherwise, if the information 
available is not sufficient to aid in making such a determination, then the information is 
sent away from the AOR via other communications and data transportation means 
described in the C4ISR functions to an off-site analyst, outside of the system, who can 
make the final determination using what has been collected. 
 The third subfunction of the Find/Fix function, Assess the Threat, provides 
means of evaluation of the potential of the threat.  In the case of the WMD, this 
subfunction assesses the magnitude of any possible detonation.  In the SAW and SBA 
missions, the Assess Threat function will evaluate the threat to see what type of damage 
this threat is capable of inflicting. 
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5.1.2.4 Finish Threat 
 The Finish Threat function includes all actions necessary to stop the threat.  
Finish Threat is divided into two subfunctions:  Use Nonlethal Measures and Use Lethal 
Measures.  As shown in Appendix A, Use Nonlethal Measures is composed of seven 
subfunctions:  Guard an HVU from an Internal Threat, Guard an HVU from an External 
Threat, Warn, Conduct a Nonlethal Weapons Engagement, Shoulder an Attacking Vessel, 
Tow a Disabled Vessel, and Conduct Search and Rescue Operations. 
 Guard an HVU from Internal Threat is the system’s main response in the 
SAW mission.  The mission analysis (Section 4.1) concludes that friendly forces had to 
board suspect vessels to verify that they are still in friendly hands, and if they are, the 
vessel should be guarded until safely pierside.  The embedded functions are  
Guard Control Spaces and Guard Crew.  Guard an HVU from External Threat is the 
system’s main response in the SBA mission.  The embedded functions are Escort HVU 
and Place Forces on HVU.  Warn, Conduct Nonlethal Weapons Engagement, and 
Shoulder Attacking Vessel are mainly associated with the SBA scenario.56  Their logical 
flow should be obvious; their inclusion is vital as the SoS will be operating in CONUS 
and interacting with the American public daily.  The Warn subfunctions are Use Visual 
and Use Auditory.  The embedded functions for Conduct Nonlethal Weapon Engagement 
are Use Anti-personnel and Use Anti-vehicle; each of these has the identical embedded 
functions of Target, Fire weapon, and Assess engagement.  Tow a Disabled Vessel and 
Conduct Search and Rescue Operations are consequence actions that the system must 
perform when other actions have been performed. 
 Use Lethal Measures is composed of three subfunctions:  Disable, 
Sink/Destroy, and Recapture.  Disable has the subfunctions of Target, Fire Weapon, and 
Assess Engagement; Sink/Destroy has the same three with the additional subfunctions of 
Detect/Track and Classify.  Recapture is composed of Board Vessel and Secure Control 
Spaces.  The Sink/Destroy function is expanded in the most detail because it is used in 
the SBA model.  The Disable function, a straightforward option in the WMD and SAW 
                                                 
56 Shouldering is the technique of maneuvering as escort vessel between an attacker and its target. 
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missions, does not require the same level of detail.  The Recapture function is the second 
main option in the SAW mission. 
5.1.2.5 Sustain 
The fifth system-level function, Sustain, is decomposed into two 
subfunctions, Support Units and Maintain Units, as shown in Appendix A. 
The Support Units function is composed of subfunctions responsible for 
delivering recurring-type necessities to ensure units can continue operations for the 
projected mission time.  Four subfunctions compose the Support Units function:  Deliver 
Consumables, Parts and Supplies to Units; Refuel Platforms; Provide Manning; and 
Provide Barracks. 
The objective of the Deliver Consumables, Parts and Supplies to Units 
subfunction is self-explanatory:  The delivery vehicle for the consumables will vary 
according to the situation and environment.  The Delivery function is decomposed 
according to specific unit-types within the system that require consumables during a 
mission:  Deliver to Military Ships and Deliver to Non-Military Ships.  Communication 
of each of the various units’ needs is part of the C4ISR function addressed earlier. 
Deliver to Military Ships applies to the WMD, SAW and SBA missions 
by ensuring ships and small boats underway receive resupply of consumables and parts, 
when needed, in order to continue extended-duration operations without affecting unit 
readiness.  The Deliver to Nonmilitary Ships function enables the military teams 
deployed to the transiting commercial ships (such as the container ships in the WMD 
mission or the water taxis in the SBA mission) to receive the consumables and supplies 
(such as food and replacement parts) necessary to conduct their mission. 
The Refuel Platforms function consists of the system’s ability to provide 
fuel (i.e., JP-5, F-44, etc.) to vehicles being used within each of the missions.  This 
function is further decomposed by platform types within the system requiring fuel for the 
duration of their mission.  The subfunctions composing Refuel Platforms are:  Refuel 
Ships, Refuel Small Boats, and Refuel Aircraft. 
Each of the Refuel subfunctions is concerned with conducting refueling 
operations that enable platforms to continue their mission with minimal impact to 
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continuous operations.  Refuel Ships applies to underway replenishment in the WMD and 
SAW missions; Refuel Small Boats and Aircraft applies to centralized gas station 
facilities for each of the respective platforms. 
The Provide Manning function allows the system to provide and deliver a 
pool of manpower to enable operations for the duration of the mission without exhausting 
the forces available in the process.  It ensures unit readiness is maintained at a constant or 
enhanced state throughout the mission.  In most cases this function will be accomplished 
by current military manpower systems (i.e., NAVPERS), but the function ensures other 
methods are in place to account for unexplained current-system shortfalls.  Provide 
Manning is further decomposed into the following subfunctions:  Receive Manning 
Reports, Identify Deficiencies, Locate Manning Sources, and Transport Manning  
to Units. 
Receive Manning Reports is accomplished through lower level C4I system 
subfunctions (i.e., standard Naval message traffic, personnel musters being faxed or 
emailed, etc.).  It provides the method for reporting units’ current and required manning.  
Receive Manning Reports allows the next subfunction, Identify Manning Deficiencies, to 
input units’ manning reports and identify differences between the current and required 
manning.  In most cases this is accomplished by the current military administrative and 
logistics commands (such as NAVPERS), but it also allows a centralized mission 
administrative and logistics support unit to verify manning levels, in order to add a level 
of redundancy to ensure the function is accomplished.  Locate Manning Sources receives 
the information concerning needed manning to correct deficiencies from the unit(s) 
performing the Identify Manning Deficiency function.  Locate Manning is  
self-explanatory and draws manning from current military manpower pools, such as the 
Naval Training Command center, available manpower within the fleet, etc.  Once 
available manpower is located, the Transport Manning function is activated, moving the 
located manpower to its final destination (the unit with manning deficiency, as identified 
by the unit performing the associated function).  The final destination of the needed 
manpower determines the variables associated with the transportation of the manpower, 
such as use of ground transportation to transfer to a shore station, aircraft to transfer to a 
ship at sea, etc.  Transportation of manning is further decomposed by the location of the 
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unit requiring manpower.  The subfunctions composing Transport Manning are  
self-explanatory:  Transport Manning to Military Units at Sea, Transport Manning to 
Military Units in Port and Transport Manning to Nonmilitary Units at Sea. 
The Provide Barracks function ensures that berthing of manpower is 
accomplished for all units conducting the mission, including those units without pre-
constructed (or preplanned) berthing locations (such as civilian agencies or units that 
were not originally conceived with military missions in mind).  Provide Barracks is 
decomposed by unit-type (military or nonmilitary) and environment (at sea or import) in 
which the barracks are required.  Provide Barracks subfunctions are:  Provide Barracks 
for Units Onboard Military Ships at Sea; Provide Barracks for Units Onboard 
Nonmilitary Ships at Sea; and Provide Barracks for Units in Port. 
Berthing aboard military ships is planned prior to ship construction to 
enable the ship’s crew to conduct their missions.  Missions calling for additional crew 
berthing beyond the preplanned, allotted facilities aboard ships may come up  
short-handed, affecting unit readiness during the mission.  The Provide Barracks for 
Units Onboard Military Ships at Sea function ensures total crew (both organic and non-
organic) berthing is planned for and assigned to ensure unit readiness is maintained (or 
enhanced).  Berthing aboard nonmilitary ships such commercial cargo carriers, on the 
other hand, is set during ship-construction planning to maximize economic revenue.  
These ships have a low probability of being able to provide berthing beyond their 
immediate organic crew.57  Provide Barracks for Units Onboard Nonmilitary Ships at Sea 
therefore ensures non-organic crew berthing is planned for and assigned in the mission.  
Missions conducted in or near port facilities have a much greater variety of berthing 
options available:  aside from barracks facilities within military bases, hotels and other 
nonmilitary berthing is available (however, at a price).  Provide Barracks for Units in Port 
therefore ensures that berthing facilities are planned for so as to minimize the total 
mission cost, while ensuring readiness is maintained or enhanced. 
Maintain Units differs from the Support Units function in that  
Support Units is concerned with predictable consumables that apply to all units (such as 
food, fuel and manpower), Maintain Units requires supplies and parts specific to each 
                                                 
57 Interview with M/V Lorlei Master, 24 March 2006. 
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platform or equipment type (such as engine-specific parts).  Maintain Units is 
decomposed into Identify Maintenance Deficiencies, Nondepot-Level Maintenance, and 
Depot-Level Maintenance. 
The Identify Maintenance Deficiency function enables the system to 
identify units conducting the missions that do not have the manpower, training, 
equipment or capability to conduct organic (nondepot-level) maintenance.  The Identify 
Maintenance Deficiency function is decomposed into Receive Unit Capability Reports, 
Asses System Capability, and Correct System Deficiency. 
The Receive Unit Capability Reports is accomplished through lower level 
C4I system subfunctions in the same manner as the Receive Manning Reports 
subfunction (i.e., standard naval message traffic, personnel musters being faxed or 
emailed, etc.).  It provides the capability within the system for reporting units’ 
maintenance capabilities and is accomplished through current military maintenance-type 
reporting systems, such as the Navy’s Casualty Reporting System (CASREP).  Receive 
Unit Capability Reports outputs information to the Asses System Capability subfunction.  
Asses Unit Deficiencies receives the unit capability reports, such as CASREPs, and 
analyzes the system of system’s ability to continue the mission.  For example, a unit with 
major system malfunctions that requires depot-level facilities to correct the problem will 
not be able to continue its mission.  However, other units within the SoS (still  
mission-capable) may be able to continue the mission by assuming the non-mission 
capable unit’s duties. 
The Assess System Capabilities function outputs information to the 
Correct System Deficiency function to enable the system to take action allowing the 
system of systems to continue operating in the wake of unit casualties.  Should one unit 
within the system become non-mission capable, upon assessment of the overall remaining 
system capabilities, the Correct System Deficiency function then activates a unit capable 
of assuming the duties to allow the SoS to continue functioning. 
The Non-Depot Level Maintenance function involves unit organic 
maintenance and repair capabilities that allow the unit to conduct continuous mission 
operations, should maintenance be required or a component failure occur.   
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Nondepot-Level Maintenance is decomposed into the following subfunctions:  Identify 
Components, Stock Spares, and Replace Components. 
The Identify Components subfunction enables the system to analyze 
component reliability and operational availability levels over the duration of the mission.  
The information from the Identify Components function is input to the Stock Spares 
function; the Stock Spares function identifies spare part inventory levels to ensure 
continuous system operation throughout the mission.  The Replace Component 
subfunction then utilizes the inventory of spare parts to fix broken components, allowing 
the system to continue (or resume) operating with minimum impact on  
mission effectiveness. 
The Depot-Level Maintenance function allows the system to rotate units 
(out of operation) to conduct depot-level Preventative Maintenance Services (PMS), 
Corrective Maintenance Services (CMS), or Unit Stand-down (i.e., annual leave).  The 
Depot-Level Maintenance function enables total life-cycle system management by 
maintaining overall unit readiness beyond the duration of the mission.  Depot-Level 
Maintenance is decomposed into the following subfunctions:  Identify Prescheduled 
Depot-Level Maintenance and Enable Unit Rotation. 
The Identify Prescheduled Depot-Level Maintenance subfunction enables 
the system to analyze unit depot-level maintenance schedules (such as engine grooming, 
annual leave schedules, etc.).  Analysis of maintenance schedules is performed by current 
military commands, such as Operations and Material (i.e., J3/J4) departments within  
unit squadrons. 
Unit depot-level maintenance requirements resulting from analysis are 
output from the Identify Prescheduled Depot-Level Maintenance function to the Enable 
Unit Rotation function; the Enable Unit Rotation function enables the system to rotate 
units in and out of mission use without affecting the ability of the SoS to continue the 
mission.  Enable Unit Rotation is decomposed into the following subfunctions:  Identify 
Unit Replacements and Schedule Unit Turnover. 
The Identify Unit Replacements function allows the system to identify 
replacements that meet mission capability and availability requirements.  Information 
from the Identify Unit Replacements function is input to the Schedule Unit Turnover 
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function; the Schedule Unit Turnover function then ensures unit rotation into and out of 
the mission is conducted by efficient, smooth, timely and complete unit turnover.  This 
ensures that the SoS continues unfaltering operation, while allowing units to conduct 
their depot-level requirements, thus ensuring total life-cycle readiness is maintained  
or enhanced. 
5.2 NONFUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The development of a method for measuring success for each of the subfunctions 
follows the SoS functional decomposition.  The nature of the systems involved in 
Maritime Threat Response implies a degree of reactionary actions taken in response to a 
situation.  Time is selected as a measure of effectiveness (MOE) for each of the system 
functions and subfunctions.  The probability of success (Ps) in accomplishing each of the 
system functions is also selected as an MOE. 
Values of the MOEs are then assigned for the top-level system functions and 
subsequently allocated to each subfunction.  The development of the operational 
requirements is discussed in the following sections.  To allocate requirements to the 
subfunctions, the requirement assigned to the top-level function is mathematically 
divided down among the subfunctions according to the structure of the functional 
decomposition and the execution order (parallel or sequential) of the subfunctions. 
5.2.1 Top-Level System Effectiveness Requirements 
Top-level system effectiveness requirements need be quantified.  As stakeholders 
are unable to quantify effectiveness required of the Maritime Threat Response (MTR) 
SoS against individual threats described in the missions, the top-level system operational 
performance requirements are developed in this project, taking into account a number of 
sources, as follows. 
 The likely amount of damage, measured in economic cost, caused by successful 
terrorist attacks in each of the three scenarios, is assessed.  For instance, a total amount of 
direct costs of $27.2 billion resulted from the attacks against the World Trade Center 
complex on 9/11, which account for the direct costs associated with destruction of 
property (two 110-story towers, five ancillary buildings, and 25 buildings surrounding the 
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Center) estimated at $16.2 billion and those associated with rescue and clean-up efforts 
estimated at $11 billion.58 
While the size of the nuclear device and the location and altitude of its detonation 
can have an enormous impact on the overall amount of damage, a 10-kiloton nuclear 
device would cause damage to a major metropolitan city approximated at an amount of a 
$500 billion (FY2004).59  This amount could fluctuate wildly dependent on the 
circumstances of the terrorist attack, but it is a reasonable estimate of the costs resulting 
from such an attack.  This is less than 20 times the amount of direct damage cost 
estimated at the World Trade Center. 
In a successful SBA, in which the target vessel sinks, the damage (the total loss of 
the value of the ship as well as its cargo) is roughly $1 billion (FY2004).60  Again, the 
total amount of damage in a successful SBA can vary, but this estimate can be used as a 
reasonable figure on which to base further calculation. 
The damage from the SAW attack consists of the damage similar to that from a 
successful SBA, assuming the ship is sunk with all of its cargo onboard, and the cost of 
damage to critical infrastructures under attack.  The critical infrastructures could be port 
facilities, tourist attractions such as Fisherman’s Wharf in downtown San Francisco, or 
bridges.  The total damage is estimated at $2,500,000,000 (FY2004).61 
Next, the relative probabilities of occurrence of the three different envisaged 
scenarios are assessed, based on an assessment of the technical difficulty as well as 
expense in conducting the different types of attacks.  The nuclear weapon attack appears 
to be the most expensive and technically difficult scenario for a terrorist group to 
accomplish.  The SAW scenario, much less technically difficult and less expensive to 
                                                 
58 Robert Looney, “Economic Costs to the United States Stemming from the 9/11 Attacks,” Strategic 
Insight, Issue 6, Volume I, August 2002. 
59 David Howe, “The Homeland Security Council Planning Scenarios:  Executive Summaries, Version 
2.0,” (July 2004) available online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2004/hsc-
planning-scenarios-jul04.htm, accessed on December 15, 2005. 
60 The estimate assumes the value of a large merchant vessel at approximately $300M and its cargo at 
approximately $700M.  The values of the cargoes can obviously fluctuate.  A 6,000 car carrier would 
nominally have a smaller value of approximately $120M to $180M in cargo.  A 6,000 TEU container ship 
would nominally contain up to 360,000,000 pounds of cargo, if each TEU carried 30 tons.  A large LNG 
tanker carries 250,000 cubic meters of LNG. 
61 The ship as a weapon estimate can be derived from the assumption that the ship and its cargo are 
totally destroyed ($1B), the target is the Golden Gate Bridge and the attack is successful ($1.3B for the 
bridge), and additional property damage ($200M). 
65 
accomplish than the nuclear weapon scenario, is similar to the Al Qaeda 9/11 attacks—
simply using a commandeered ship rather than a commandeered aircraft.  The small boat 
attack appears to be the least difficult and expensive to accomplish, and similar attacks 
have been staged by Al Qaeda in the form of the USS Cole attack in Yemen in 2000 and 
the M/V Lindberg attack off of Yemen in 2003.  Given these variations, and after 
consulting numerous stakeholders and analysts, the SBA appears to be twice as likely as 
the SAW attack, and the SAW one hundred times more likely than a nuclear  
weapon attack. 
Finally, the relative probabilities of occurrence are multiplied by the damage 
estimates for each of the three scenarios to provide an expected value of damage caused 
by the attacks when there is no defensive system in place to counter the terrorist attacks.  
The required probabilities of success in countering the different types of terrorist attack 
are then calculated, assuming that the expected value of damage from each of the attacks 
with a defensive system in place is equal.  In other words, the top-level probability of 
success is adjusted for each mission so that the expected value of damage cost from each 
mission is equal.  Table 5-1 shows the calculated damage cost and system  
Ps requirements. 
When the system stops the terrorist attack from occurring, a success is declared.  
In the WMD mission, success means that the device is located and disarmed, or, if the 
terrorists somehow detonate it, such a detonation occurs at least 100 NM away from the 
United States coast.  For the SAW mission, success means that the ship is either protected 
from seizure, recaptured if previously seized, or disabled prior to being used as a weapon.  
In the SBA mission, success means that the SBA is prevented from happening such that 
the terrorist attack boat does not significantly damage the protected merchant vessels or 
critical infrastructures. 
During the course of the MTR SoS operating in each of the missions, commerce 
may suffer from costs through either delay costs associated with accomplishing the MTR 
mission or through damage to the vessels in question.  These costs, not considered in the 
expected damage calculations, are factored into the costs associated with a given system 
option in the system cost-effectiveness analysis.  In other words, MTR system 
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architectures that increase delays on commerce or damage to merchants may be less  






















WMD 95 500,000 0.001 1,000 50
SAW 90 2,500 1.0 500 50
SBA 88 1,000 2.0 400 50
Table 5-1:  Damage Cost and System Ps Requirements 
5.2.2 Requirements Flow Down 
The requirements flow down process begins with the information obtained from 
the various stake-holders and SMEs involved in the project.  At the beginning of the 
problem definition phase the missions and scenarios are not fully developed, resulting in 
stakeholder needs stated in more general and abstract form.  As the scenarios become 
more fully fleshed out, the stakeholder needs are redefined in more detail.  Once the  
top-level system functions are identified (C4ISR, PBS, Find/Fix, Finish, and Sustain), the 
stakeholder system requirements are broken down by requirements within each of the 
system functions.  For example, a stakeholder need for a system that stops WMD from 
being carried by commercial container ships into U.S. ports is broken into its C4ISR 
requirements (tracking the shipment via the MDA system), PBS (deploying teams to the 
container ship prior to arrival in port), Find/Fix (searching the container ship and being 
able to pinpoint the container holding a potential WMD), Finish (disposing of the WMD), 
and Sustain (enabling the search teams to conduct their mission).  Top-level values are 
then assigned to each of the functional requirements.  For example, in the WMD mission 
the typical container ship carrying a shipment from Singapore to a port in San Francisco 
would take approximately 21 days to complete its voyage across the Pacific Ocean.  
According to the stakeholders and SMEs, a search of the containers for a WMD on the 
vessel as it is transiting would take at least 7 days (see Appendix B for a complete 
description).  Since the stakeholder requirement is to find the WMD cargo prior to 
entering the U.S. port, and the search would take at least 7 days to complete, the top-level 
time requirement for PBS is 14 days or less.  All the subfunctions within PBS must 
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therefore aggregate to no more than 14 days (though some subfunctions may take place in 
parallel; in this case, their time requirements do not necessarily add to 14 days). 
As each of the top-level system functions is decomposed into subfunctions, the 
system requirements categorized by each top-level function are also allocated to the 
subfunctions such that the aggregate top-level requirement would reflect the subfunction 
requirements when combined in series or parallel (depending on how the subfunctions 
interacted with each other).  For example, in the Sustain Function the top-level 
probability of success (Ps) for the function is set at 0.9999 (see Appendix B).  The 
probability of success required for the two second-level subfunctions (Support Units and 
Maintain Units) is obtained by taking the square root (since the two subfunctions 
operated in series) of the top-level function requirement , yielding the requirement of Ps 
equal to 0.99995 for Support Units and Maintain Units. 
 Determination and assignment of values for each of the functions and 
subfunctions are then used as goals for the designing the system components.  
Additionally, these requirement goals are used as objectives when measuring the 
effectiveness of the systems during the modeling and simulation phase.  When a system 
achieves the established Ps or time objectives, the system is then deemed successful in 
meeting the associated stakeholder requirement.  For example, for an SoS architecture, if 
an aggregate time for all PBS subfunctions is less than 14 days, then the PBS function 
within that architecture is deemed a success. 
5.2.2.1 C4ISR 
 There are two types of system-level requirements for C4ISR—timing and 
probability of success.  The required probability of success for C4ISR is near unity 
(99.9%).  The probability of success requirement is flowed down to a near unity 
probability of success for all lower-level functions as shown in Appendix B. 
The maximum time for the C4ISR function to issue initial ROE and orders 
is 24 hours for the WMD mission, 30 minutes for the SAW mission, and 1 hour for the 
SBA mission.  This time period functions as the C4ISR system’s initial response time, 
and commences at time zero when the C4ISR system receives the initial tasking order 
from higher authority.  For the WMD scenario, the C4ISR function has the additional 
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requirement to activate all forces within 1 hour of receiving this initial tasking order.  
Since both must occur within 1 hour of time, the timing allocation for the SBA initial 
response is used for the WMD forces activation and is covered in the SBA section only.  
Furthermore, the SAW mission timing allocation is also used for the WMD mission’s 
operational response time and is discussed in the SAW section only.  Trade studies are 
performed and subject matter experts are consulted in allocating the requirements to 
lower-level functional requirements as shown in Appendix B.  This flow down for each 
mission follows. 
WMD Mission 
 To provide the capability to issue orders and ROE, C4ISR requires the execution 
of these four functions:  C2, Communicate, Compute, and Provide Intelligence.  
Subtracting the initial 1-hour force activation time, these functions must therefore be 
completed within the remaining 23 hours.  The C2 function has a total of 11 hours within 
which to gather and understand the available information and to prepare the final detailed 
orders and ROE.  To do this rapidly, the C2 function employs the Communicate, 
Compute, and Provide Intelligence functions.  The Communicate function has a total of  
4 hours within which to send and receive information.  The Compute function has a total 
of 7 hours to assure incoming information and fuse it for use by the Provide Intelligence 
function.  The Provide Intelligence function then has no more than 1 hour within which to 
form both the overall and the customized operational pictures. 
 C2 consists of commanding forces and simultaneously interfacing with external 
C2.  Commanding forces must take place with 6 hours, while interfacing with external C2 
must be completed in less than 5 hours.  In order to perform C2, information must be 
transmitted and received via the Communicate function.  The three communication 
subfunctions of Providing Voice/Data, Networking MTR Nodes, and Receiving MDA 
Intelligence are assumed occur simultaneously within a 4-hour total period.  Data 
received via the Communicate function flows to the Compute function where it is first 
assured and then fused.  The Information Assurance function must take no more than  
1 minute while the Data Fusion function can run for up to 7 hours in order to converge on 
the best solution.  The fused information is simultaneously routed to both the C2 function 
for review and the Provide Intelligence function for transformation into an overall 
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operational picture.  Provide Intelligence has a maximum of 1 hour to perform the 
functions:  Form Overall Operational Picture, Analyze Operational Needs, and Provide 
Customized COPs.  Each of these subfunctions can take no longer than 20 minutes. 
SAW Mission 
 As in the WMD mission, C4ISR requires the execution of these four functions:  
C2, Communicate, Compute, and Provide Intelligence.  These functions must therefore 
be completed within the 30-minute initial response time requirement.  At time zero, 
intelligence data begins to flow through the Communicate function into the Compute 
function.  Communications into the system may take no more than 5 minutes.  Once the 
information is assured, it is available to the C2 function for initial review.  Information 
assurance must be completed in 1 minute.  Simultaneous with C2 review, the Compute 
function fuses the data and creates or updates the COP.  Data fusion occurs within  
13 minutes and COP creation within 1 minute.  The C2 time includes the 14 minutes 
allocated to the Compute function as well as an additional 5 minutes following Compute 
function completion for final review of orders prior to sending.  The process of 
communicating the orders to all forces must take place within 5 minutes. 
 The C2 function consists of commanding forces and interfacing with external C2.  
Commanding forces must take place within 14 minutes, while interfacing with external 
C2 must be completed in less than 5 minutes, for a total of 19 minutes.  In order to 
communicate, no more than 5 minutes can be used in receipt of information and no more 
than 5 minutes can be used to transmit information, for a total communication time limit 
of 10 minutes.  The Network MTR Nodes function is assumed to occur simultaneously 
and therefore must occur within this 10-minute period.  The Provide Intelligence function 
includes forming the overall and customized COPs as well as analyzing operational 
needs.  These three subfunctions are assumed to occur nearly simultaneously within  
1 minute. 
SBA Mission 
 As in the WMD and SAW missions, C4ISR requires the execution of these four 
functions:  C2, Communicate, Compute, and Provide Intelligence.  These functions must 
therefore be completed within the 1-hour initial response time requirement.  At time zero, 
intelligence data begins to flow through the Communicate function into the Compute 
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function.  Communications into the system may take no more than 5 minutes.  Once the 
information is assured, it is available to the C2 function for initial review.  Information 
assurance must be completed in no longer than 1 minute.  Simultaneous with C2 review, 
the Compute function fuses the data and creates or updates the COP.  Data fusion occurs 
within 33 minutes and COP creation within 1 minute.  The C2 time includes 5 minutes of 
initial review time, 34 minutes allocated to the Compute function, and an additional  
10 minutes following Compute function completion for final review of orders prior to 
sending.  The process of communicating the orders to all forces must take place within  
5 minutes. 
 The C2 function consists of commanding forces and interfacing with external C2.  
Commanding forces must take place within 30 minutes, while interfacing with external 
C2 must be completed in less than 19 minutes, for a total of 49 minutes.  In order to 
Communicate, no more than 5 minutes can be used in receipt of information and no more 
than 5 minutes can be used to transmit information, for a total communication time limit 
of 10 minutes.  The Network MTR Nodes function is assumed to occur simultaneously 
and therefore must occur within this 10-minute period.  The Provide Intelligence function 
includes forming the overall and customized COPs as well as analyzing operational 
needs.  These three subfunctions are assumed to occur nearly simultaneously within  
1 minute. 
5.2.2.2 Prepare the Battlespace 
There are two types of system-level requirements for preparing the 
battlespace—timing and probability of success.  The required probability of success for 
prepare the battlespace is near unity (99.9%).  The probability of success requirement is 
flowed down to a near unity probability of success for all lower-level functions 
(Appendix B). 
The maximum time to prepare the battlespace is 124 hours for the WMD 
mission, 36 hours for the SAW mission, and 6 hours for the SBA mission.  Trade studies 
are performed and subject matter experts are consulted in allocating the requirements to 




 Prepare the Battlespace requires the execution of these three functions:  Activate 
Security Measures, Assemble and Prepare Teams and Platforms, and Deploy the Forces.  
These functions must therefore be completed within 124 hours.  Both the activation of 
security measures and the assembly and preparation of teams and platforms must occur 
within 24 hours from the arrival of the intelligence.  Forces must be deployed within  
100 hours from the time the teams and platforms have been assembled and prepared. 
 Activating security measures consists of preparing the critical infrastructure and 
simultaneously activating preplanned operational orders (OPORDS).  Preparing the 
critical infrastructure must take place within 12 hours, while activating preplanned 
OPORDS must be completed in less than 24 hours.  In order to prepare the critical 
infrastructure, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) level must be heightened 
in less than 1.5 hours.  The process of heightening the HSAS level accounts for the time 
to initiate the command to the Department of Homeland Security to heighten the level 
and the time to receive compliance that the level has been heightened.  The 24-hour 
timing requirement for activating preplanned OPORDS accounts for placing specialized 
teams on alert within 24 hours and getting the United States Coast Guard to activate their 
specific Maritime Security (MARSEC) plan within 1 hour.  In order to place the 
specialized teams on alert, the SoS must contact the specialized teams in less than  
2 hours, assemble them in less than 12 hours, and activate them within the following  
10 hours. 
 The time to assemble and prepare teams and platforms is composed of the time to 
activate the required personnel, the time to issue equipment, and the time to prepare 
deployment platforms.  Personnel can be activated for the entire 24-hour period while 
team composition must be decided within 2 hours, all necessary personnel contacted 
within 2 hours, and personnel mustered within 20 hours.  Equipment must be issued in 
less than 14 hours, of which no more than 12 hours will be spent for gathering specialized 
equipment and no more than 2 hours for providing arms, protective gear, and equipment.  
The remaining activity is to prepare the deployment platforms, which must be completed 
within 16 hours.  During this time, all mission specific configurations will be set. 
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 The forces must be deployed within 100 hours of the completion of the 
preparation of teams and platforms in order to get the teams and their equipment out to 
the merchant vessels traveling across the ocean with sufficient time to search the 
containers.  The time to deploy the forces accounts for the times it takes for the teams to 
embark the deployment platforms, to move the deployment platforms into position, to 
move teams and their equipment to potential attacking vessels, and to recover the teams 
from the potential attacking vessels when their search is complete.  The teams, with all 
their equipment, must embark the deployment platforms in less than 1 hour.  After all 
teams are onboard, the deployment platforms must be moved into position in less than  
96 hours.  Once in position, the teams and all their equipment must be moved to the 
potential attacking vessel in less than 2 hours.  Within this 2-hour period, the teams must 
be gathered for debarkation of the deployment platforms in less than 30 minutes, and they 
must be provided with a means of transport to the potential attacking vessel within the 
remaining 1.5 hours.  After carrying out their search mission, they must be gathered for 
debarkation and then returned to the deployment platforms in less than 2 hours. 
SAW Mission 
 As in the WMD mission, Prepare the Battlespace requires the execution of these 
three functions:  Activate Security Measures, Assemble and Prepare Teams and 
Platforms, and Deploy the Forces.  These functions must therefore be completed within 
36 hours.  Both the activation of security measures and the assembly and preparation of 
teams and platforms must occur within 24 hours from the arrival of the intelligence.  
Forces must be deployed within 12 hours from the time the teams and platforms have 
been assembled and prepared. 
 Activating security measures consists of preparing the critical infrastructure and 
simultaneously activating preplanned operational orders (OPORDS).  Preparing the 
critical infrastructure must take place within 12 hours, while activating preplanned 
OPORDS must be completed in less than 1 hour.  In order to prepare the critical 
infrastructure, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) level must be heightened 
in less than 1.5 hours and the existing security forces within the bay area must be 
upgraded and/or augmented in less than 12 hours.  The process of heightening the HSAS 
level accounts for the time to initiate the command to the Department of Homeland 
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Security to heighten the level and the time to receive compliance that the level has been 
heightened.  The time to upgrade and/or augment existing security forces accounts for 
notifying gas line personnel in less than 4 hours and upgrading and/or augmenting 
security teams at points of critical infrastructure in less than 12 hours.  The 1-hour timing 
requirement for activating preplanned OPORDS accounts for placing specialized teams 
on alert within 1 hour and getting the United States Coast Guard to activate their specific 
MARSEC plan within 1 hour.  In order to place the specialized teams on alert, the SoS 
must contact the specialized teams in less than 15 minutes, assemble them in less than  
15 minutes, and activate them within the following 30 minutes. 
 The time to assemble and prepare teams and platforms is composed of the time to 
activate the required personnel, the time to issue equipment, and the time to prepare 
deployment platforms.  Personnel can be activated for the entire 24-hour period while 
team composition must be decided within 2 hours, all necessary personnel contacted 
within 2 hours, and personnel mustered within 20 hours.  Equipment must be issued in 
less than 6 hours, of which no more than 4 hours will be spent for gathering specialized 
equipment and no more than 2 hours for providing arms, protective gear, and equipment.  
The timing requirements reflect the fact that it takes less time to load a smaller amount of 
equipment for the SAW mission than the WMD mission.  The remaining activity is to 
prepare the deployment platforms, which must be completed within 16 hours.  During 
this time, all mission specific configurations will be set. 
 The forces must be deployed within 12 hours of the completion of the preparation 
of teams and platforms in order to get the teams and their equipment out to the merchant 
vessels traveling across the ocean with sufficient time to search the crew and escort them 
to their final destination.  The time to deploy the forces accounts for the times it takes for 
the teams to embark the deployment platforms, to move the deployment platforms into 
position, to move teams and their equipment to potential attacking vessels, and to recover 
the teams from the potential attacking vessels when their search is finished.  The teams, 
with all their equipment, must embark the deployment platforms in less than 1 hour.  
After all teams are onboard, the deployment platforms must be moved into position in 
less than 12 hours.  Once in position, the teams and all their equipment must be moved to 
the potential attacking vessel in less than 1.5 hours.  Within this 1.5-hour period, the 
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teams must be gathered for debarkation of the deployment platforms in less than  
30 minutes, and they must be provided with a means of transport to the potential 
attacking vessel within the remaining 1 hour.  After carrying out their search and escort 
mission, they must be gathered for debarkation and then returned to the deployment 
platforms in less than 1 hour. 
SBA Mission 
 As in the WMD and SAW missions, Prepare the Battlespace requires the 
execution of these three functions:  Activate Security Measures, Assemble and Prepare 
Teams and Platforms, and Deploy the Forces.  These functions must therefore be 
completed within 4 hours.  The activation of security measures and the assembly and 
preparation of teams and platforms must begin immediately upon receipt of the 
intelligence.  The activation of security measures must be completed within 24 hours 
from the arrival of the intelligence while the assembly and preparation of teams and 
platforms must be completed within 55 minutes from the arrival of the intelligence.  
Forces must be deployed within 30 minutes from the time the teams and platforms have 
been assembled and prepared. 
 Activating security measures consists of preparing the critical infrastructure and 
simultaneously activating preplanned OPORDS.  Preparing the critical infrastructure 
must take place within 4 hours, while activating preplanned OPORDS must be completed 
in less than 1 hour.  In order to prepare the critical infrastructure, the HSAS level must be 
heightened in less than 1 hour and the existing security forces within the bay area must be 
upgraded and/or augmented in less than 4 hours.  The process of heightening the HSAS 
level accounts for the time to initiate the command to the Department of Homeland 
Security to heighten the level and the time to receive compliance that the level has been 
heightened.  The time to upgrade and/or augment existing security forces accounts for 
notifying gas line personnel in less than 30 minutes and upgrading and/or augmenting 
security teams at points of critical infrastructure in less than 2 hours.  The 1-hour timing 
requirement for activating preplanned OPORDS accounts for getting the United States 
Coast Guard to activate their specific MARSEC plan within 30 minutes and beginning 
the restriction of non-essential boat traffic within 1 hour.  In order to begin that 
restriction, the SoS must initiate the command to the USCG to post a “Notice to 
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Mariners” in less than 30 minutes, receive compliance that “Notice to Mariners” has been 
posted in less than 30 minutes, and activate the boat traffic restriction teams in less than 
30 minutes. 
 The time to assemble and prepare teams and platforms is composed of the time to 
activate the required personnel, the time to issue equipment, and the time to prepare 
deployment platforms.  Personnel can be activated for the entire 55-minute period while 
team composition must be decided within 15 minutes, all necessary personnel contacted 
within 15 minutes, and personnel mustered within 25 minutes.  Equipment must be issued 
in less than 50 minutes, of which no more than 30 minutes will be spent for gathering 
specialized equipment and no more than 20 minutes for providing arms, protective gear, 
and equipment.  The remaining activity is to prepare the deployment platforms, which 
must be completed within 45 minutes.  During this time, all mission-specific 
configurations will be set. 
 The forces must be deployed within 40 minutes of the completion of the 
preparation of teams and platforms in order to get the teams and their equipment out to 
the high value targets with sufficient time to carry out escorting/guarding missions.  The 
time to deploy the forces accounts for the times it takes for the teams to embark the 
deployment platforms, to move the deployment platforms into position, to move teams 
and their equipment to potential attacking vessels (if necessary, depending on the 
architecture alternative), and to recover the teams from the potential attacking vessels 
when their search is finished (if necessary, depending upon the architecture alternative).  
The teams, with all their equipment, must embark the deployment platforms in less than  
5 minutes.  After all teams are onboard, the deployment platforms must be moved into 
position in less than 25 minutes.  Once in position, the teams and all their equipment must 
be moved to the potential attacking vessel in less than 10 minutes.  Within this 10-minute 
period, the teams must be gathered for debarkation of the deployment platforms in less 
than 30 seconds, and they must be provided with a means of transport to the potential 
attacking vessel within the remaining 9.5 minutes.  After carrying out their escort/guard 
mission, they must be gathered for debarkation and then returned to the deployment 
platforms in less than 10 minutes. 
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5.2.2.3 Find/Fix the Threat 
 There are two types of system-level requirements for Find/Fix the threat—
timing and probability of success.  The required probability of success for Find/Fix the 
Threat is different for each mission:  96% for WMD, 99% SAW, and 94% for SBA.  
Trade studies are performed and subject matter experts are consulted in allocating the 
requirements to lower-level functional requirements.  The requirement flow down for 
each mission follows. 
WMD Mission 
 Find/Fix the threat requires the execution of three functions:  Detection, 
Identification, and Assessment.  These functions must be completed simultaneously 
within 160 hours.  Detection consists of physically walking the ship while simultaneously 
following standard operating procedures (SOP).  Detection must take place within  
3 minutes per container. 
 As personnel proceed through the ship to prosecute each cargo container, the 
organic capabilities of the detection devices will help to identify what source is present 
within the range of the operator.  The final portion of Find/Fix the nuclear threat is to 
assess the nuclear source once it is located and identified.  This process is also required to 
take place simultaneously with the detection and identification, thus the  
3-minute requirement. 
SAW Mission 
 As in the WMD mission, Find/Fix the threat requires the execution of these three 
functions:  Detection, Identification, and Assessment.  These functions must therefore be 
completed upon boarding the vessel of interest.  While stepping through the process to 
Find/Fix the threat, the functions of detection, identification and assessment need to be 
completed simultaneously.  Detection consists of physically walking the ship to 
interrogate each member of the ship’s crew while following SOP.  As personnel proceed 
through the ship to scrutinize each crew member, the detection devices will also help to 
identify the person.  The final portion of Find/Fix the terrorist threat is to assess the 
destructive potential of that person once he is located and identified.  This process is also 
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required to take place simultaneously with the detection and identification and has a goal 
of being completed before arriving in San Francisco. 
SBA Mission 
 As in the previous two missions, Find/Fix the threat requires the execution of 
these three functions:  Detection, Identification, and Assessment.  These functions must 
therefore be completed within the time it would take the assets available to detect an 
incoming small boat at a sufficient range, issue a warning, identify the profile of the 
potential attacker and fire two warning shots.  While stepping through the process to 
Find/Fix the threat, the functions of detection, identification and assessment need to be 
completed simultaneously.  Detection consists of physically viewing the area of interest 
while simultaneously following SOP.  As personnel scrutinize the actions of all vessels 
within the area they also have to be able to identify a potential attacking profile of small 
boats in the area.  The final portion of Find/Fix the small boat threat while in the  
San Francisco Bay is to assess the potential that each small boat has in damaging or 
destroying the high value unit.  This process is also required to take place simultaneously 
with the detection and identification and is an ongoing process. 
5.2.2.4 Finish Threat 
There are two system-level requirements for Finish—probability of 
success and time.  The probability of success for Finish varies with mission.  It is near 
unity (99.9%) for the WMD mission, 94% for the SAW mission, and 87.5% for the SBA 
mission.  The time requirements also vary with mission.  The time requirement is over 
five days for the WMD mission, 21 minutes for the SAW mission, and 15 seconds for the 
SAW mission.  The probability of success is flowed down to all lower level functions.  
The probability of success and timing requirements only apply to functions that are 
necessary and sufficient for mission success (see Appendix B). 
WMD Mission 
 Finish requires the execution of only one function—Sink/disable—because the 
scenario assumes a cooperative merchant and no terrorists onboard.  Also, if a WMD is 
found on the vessel the response functions will be handled by specialized personnel from 
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the Department of Energy (DOE).  Per stakeholder guidance, those functions are out of 
the scope of the MTR SoS. 
 In unforeseen circumstances, or by order of DOE or higher authority, a suspect 
vessel may need to be sunk.  All of the U.S. platforms considered in the study carry 
weaponry sufficient to accomplish this task in the time allotted.  Other DHS and DoD 
assets are also presumed to be capable of assisting if so ordered.  The time allowed for 
this function will be measured in days.  It is reasonable to assume that the collective law 
enforcement and military assets of the United States could sink a stationary, unarmed 
merchant vessel at a known location in five days. 
SAW Mission 
 Finish requires the completion of four functions in this scenario:  Guard HVU 
from internal threat, Use of lethal measures, Disable, and Recapture.  The probability of 
success and time required for these functions are listed in Appendix B. 
 The probability of success and timing requirements are best considered in 
conjunction with the Prepare Battlespace functions for the SAW mission.  The Finish 
functions cannot occur or have any probability of success unless the PBS functions are 
successfully completed.  The Find/Fix functions relating to SAW mission are also 
precursors to Finish in this mission.  A near unity (99.9%) probability of success is 
assumed for the SAW mission. 
SBA Mission 
 Finish requires the completion of 3 functions and 7 subfunctions in this mission.  
They are Guard HVU from external threat (Escort with other units, Place escorts on 
HVU), Conduct nonlethal weapon engagement, and Use lethal measures (Detect/Track, 
Classify, Target, Fire weapon, Assess engagement).  The probability of success and time 
required for these functions are listed in Appendix B. 
5.2.2.5 Sustain 
There are two types of requirements for Sustain—timing and probability 
of success.  Each system-level requirement is flowed down to all lower-level functions 
and is described in Appendix B. 
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WMD Mission 
Based on the normal transit time of a commercial container ship transiting from 
Southeast Asia to a port in San Francisco, the WMD mission is assumed to last no longer 
than 20 days (not counting latency of intelligence concerning the container ships cargo).  
Long range ships used within the WMD mission therefore require supply of parts and 
consumables less than or equal to once per 20 days (assuming long range ships are 
capable of carrying at least 20 days’ worth of consumable supplies such as food). 
Based on stakeholder needs, the system must be capable of providing ships that 
can sprint from their home port of origin to the transiting container ship without being 
refueled prior to first intercept.  Initially estimated time for a military ship to go from 
underway (from home port in San Diego) until intercept of the container ship is 
approximately five days.  The system must therefore be able to refuel the military ships 
within five days of getting underway—assuming the military ships are the method used 
to transport the MTR search teams to the container ship.  Another possibility for MTR 
search team transport is by long range, medium lift helicopter (large enough to carry the 
MTR team and equipment).  According to the SMEs, the distance would be great enough 
that in-flight refueling would be required at a rate of six times per day. 
Current joint military doctrine makes use of the Status of Resources and Training 
System (SORTS) for reporting unit location, identification and general status to the 
operational commander.62  Updates to SORTS are required within four hours of a change 
in status, unless otherwise stated by a unit’s standard operational procedure.  Changes to 
manning and other unit needs would therefore be reported no more than six times per day 
(assuming constant change during a 24-hour period).  Consequently, SORTS reports 
would be input and assessed no more than six times per day (per assessment), and actions 
taken in response to SORTS updates would be performed no more than six times per day. 
An MTR team would either be transported to the container ship once and remain 
there until the conclusion of their search or require (worst case) three sections of teams 
working eight hour shifts each, being transported to/from the container ship every eight 
hours.  A worst case requirement of transport is three times per day.  A best case is twice 
per 20 days (one transport on, one transport off at conclusion of search). 
                                                 
62 D. Schrady, “Combatant Logistics Command and Control for the Joint Force Commander.” 
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MTR search teams onboard the container ships require berthing (i.e., sleeping 
quarters) once per day per team.  Berthing can be reutilized for multiple search teams 
when working in shifts (i.e., hot-racking). 
Units’ organic maintenance and medical capabilities need only be identified once 
Prior to the start of the mission in order to asses their needs during the mission.  Military 
ships normally will obtain or maintain an inventory of spare parts and supplies sufficient 
to maintain themselves for the duration of an assigned mission.  Given that a ship 
understands its mission and the parts and components of vital use during the mission, it 
would require supply of those spare parts and replacement components prior to beginning 
the mission (assuming it could maintain all spares within its store-rooms). 
The WMD mission is estimated to last no longer than 20 days.  Should the 
mission duration be extended to several months or longer, an impact on post-unit 
readiness could become a factor if the unit were not allowed its normal rotational 
maintenance and leave schedules.  Units with scheduled depot-level maintenance such as 
yard periods must be allowed to rotate duty with other units to ensure a future mission 
readiness is maintained.  Because the mission duration is estimated at 20 days, rotational 
schedules will most likely not be affected. 
The overall time to support the units can be estimated by the considering the most 
limiting subfunction (time to deliver consumables, time to refuel platforms, time to 
provide manning, time for barracks).  This yields a requirement of less than or equal to 
six times per day to support the units involved in the WMD mission.  The system-level 
requirement for Sustain is calculated in the same manner (consisting of the two  
second-level subfunctions, Support Units and Maintain Units).  This yields a value of less 
than or equal to six times per day that the Sustain function must be performed, based on 
stakeholder needs and SME input. 
SAW Mission 
From a Sustain functional perspective the SAW mission does not differ drastically 
from the WMD mission with respect to the subfunctions and requirements involved.  The 
CONOPS in both missions involve a ship intercepting a large tonnage commercial vessel.  
Upon intercept of the commercial vessel, rather than delivering search teams, the SAW 
mission delivers a Visit Board Search and Seizure (VBSS)-type team to retake the 
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commercial vessel under hostile terrorist control.  The VBSS team’s actions to retake the 
commercial vessel will not last more than a few hours—therefore the requirement to 
sustain the VBSS team is limited to one delivery and pickup, by helicopter (fast-rope) or 
small boat transfer.  Based on SME input helicopters fly a 4-hour mission (with  
30 minutes in between operation included) and require refueling (at most) six times per 
day.  All other subfunctions composing Sustain in the SAW mission have requirements 
assigned in the same manner as in the WMD mission as per WMD mission. 
SBA Mission 
The SBA mission involves small boats (i.e., RHIBs), medium-size ships  
(i.e., USCG 110-foot class ships), helicopters, Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs), or  
Sea Marshal-type boarding teams.  The SBA mission takes place within a harbor along 
the U.S. coast, extending out to the 12-NM mark at sea.  All sustain functions occur by 
movement of units to a centralized shore-based site where they receive parts, supplies, 
fuel, spares, and/or conduct crew swap out.  Based on the SBA scenario description (see 
Section 4) the duration of a unit’s mission lasts (at most) 14 hours per day.  Requirements 
assigned to Sustain subfunctions are therefore based on a 14-hour day, as shown below. 
During the operational day, High-Value Unit (HVUs) commercial vessels (not 
including water taxis) transiting into or out of the harbor require escort to and from the 
12-NM marker by their assigned MTR unit.  Small boats assigned to escort water taxis in 
the harbor swap crews out every seven hours (for a total of two duty sections per day).  
Each duty section carries one meal per person.  Based on stakeholder input, performing 
escort duty for non-water taxi HVUs must be continuous; maintaining the same escort 
unit throughout the transit is preferred.  Small boats performing this escort function are 
unable to operate in crew “shifts” since they are unable to return to their home base 
during the 14-hour day.  Therefore, they receive two meals per crew member per day.  At 
the end of the operational day, small boats performing either HVU or water taxi escort 
return to their home base where maintenance and refueling are conducted.  Small boat 
crews are housed and sleep at a shore facility until the beginning of the next duty day. 
Medium-size ships operate continuously throughout the 14-hour day.  Two meals 
per crew member are supplied to each ship per day.  Like small boats, at the end of the 
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duty day the ship’s crew is housed and sleep at a shore facility until the beginning of the 
next duty day. 
Helicopters require refueling once per four hours (including a 30-minute refueling 
period) or four times per operational day.  In the 30-minute refueling period the crew will 
eat at the short facility (therefore requiring no meals to be carried during their mission).  
To affect a continuous escort of HVU and water taxis, two sections of helicopters are 
operated; when one helicopter requires refueling a second helicopter takes over escort 
duty for the next 3.5 hours.  At the end of the second helicopter’s 3.5 hours the first 
helicopter (now refueled) resumes the escort.  Thus continuous coverage is provided.  
This also causes a helicopter crew to fly for no more than seven hours per day—thus no 
helicopter crew swap out is necessary.  Maintenance on helicopters is conducted at the 
end of the operational day; helicopter crews are housed and sleep at a shore facility until 
the beginning of the next duty day. 
A Note on Probability of Success Requirement for Sustain 
Stakeholder input set Ps for Sustain at 99.99%.  The flowed-down subfunctions 
composing Sustain combine in series and must therefore result in the value of .9999 for 
Ps.  Subfunctions have therefore been calculated to reflect the aggregate value for Sustain.  
The values for each of the subfunctions (essentially unity) reflect a stakeholder desire for 
virtually no failures in any of the Sustain subfunctions.  This has a profound effect on the 
number of units and spare parts required to allow the system of systems to function 
continuously without the threat of any system failure causing a delay in the mission. 
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6.0 THREAD ANALYSIS 
Thread analysis allows functional traceability within a system.  A thread or 
scenario is a sequence of system operations.  It is an ordered list of events and actions 
which represents an important behavior.  It normally does not contain branches; that is, it 
is a single serial scenario of operation, a stimulus/response thread.  Branches are 
represented by additional threads.”63  Therefore, thread analysis is the evaluation of 
system functions with respect to a given scenario or mission.  The analysis follows a 
thread through the sequence of system operations, to ensure for a designated mission the 
system meets the functional requirements set by the stakeholders. 
By convention a thread is only traced within the same level from function to 
function.  So, a thread traced at the top level functions would look very basic going from 
C4ISR to PBS to Find/Fix to Finish, for a very simple mission depiction, while threads 
traced amongst second-level functions show additional details (Figure 6-1).  Threads 
enter a function as a functional input into the top of a function box and exit the function 
from the right side as a functional output to the next function.  The outputs exiting the left 
side of the function box are for feedback to previous functions and are feedback inputs to 
the bottom of a previous function box. 
At the third-level functions there is better identification of action sequences as 
well as feedback loops for a scenario within any mission.  The first three levels of the 
SoS Functional Decomposition are seen in Table 6-1.  In Appendix A, the functions are 
broken down into fourth-, fifth-, and even seventh-level functions in some cases.  These 
provide more clarity to specific actions to be completed. 
                                                 




Figure 6-1:  Second-Level Functional Threads 
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First Level Second Level Third Level 
1.0 C4ISR 1.1 Command and Control 1.1.1 Command Forces 
  1.1.2 Interface with External C2 
 1.2 Communicate – Provide 
onshore, ship-based and sea-
based communication network 
1.2.1 Provide VOX/Data 
 
  1.2.2 Network MTR Nodes 
  1.2.3 Receive MDA Intel 
 1.3 Computing 1.3.1 Information Assurance (Security Policy) 
  1.3.2 Data Fusion (Redundant System) 
 1.4 Provide Intelligence 1.4.1 Form Overall Operational Picture 
  1.4.2 Analyze Operation Needs of Individual Functional 
Teams 
  1.4.3 Provide Customized COP Overlays to Various 
Functional Teams Based on Operational Needs 
2.0 Prepare the Battlespace 2.1 Activate Security Measures 2.1.1 Prepare Critical Infrastructure 
  2.1.2 Activate Preplanned Operation Orders 
  2.1.3 Restrict Nonessential Boat Traffic 
 2.2 Assemble Forces 2.2.1 Activate Required Personnel 
  2.2.2 Issue Equipment 
  2.2.3 Prepare Deployment Platforms 
 2.3 Deploy Forces 2.3.1 Embark Deployment Platforms 
  2.3.2 Move Deployment Platforms into Position 
  2.3.3 Move Teams to Attacking Vessel 
  2.3.4 Recover Teams From Attacking Vessel 
3.0 Find/Fix Threat 3.1 Detect Threat 3.1.1 Scan Area of Interest 
  3.1.2 Process Data from Scan 
 3.2 Identify Threat 3.2.1 Analyze Data On-Site 
  3.2.2 Analyze Data Off-Site 
  3.2.3 Quantify Threat 
 3.3 Assess Threat 3.3.1 Determine Intent 
  3.3.2 Determine Damage Potential 
4.0 Finish Threat 4.1 Use Nonlethal Measures 4.1.1 Guard HVU From Internal Threat 
  4.1.2 Guard HVU From External Threat 
  4.1.3 Warn 
  4.1.4 Conduct Nonlethal Weapon Engagement 
  4.1.5 Shoulder 
  4.1.6 Tow disabled vessel 
  4.1.7 Conduct SAR 
 4.2 Use Lethal Measures 4.2.1 Disable 
  4.2.2 Sink/Destroy 
  4.2.3 Recapture 
5.0 Sustain 5.1 Support Units 5.1.1 Deliver consumables, parts and supplies to units 
  5.1.2 Refuel platforms 
  5.1.3 Be able to provide disposal services (both for 
vessels [within 12nm of land] and people) 
  5.1.4 Provide appropriate manning for sustained 
operations 
  5.1.5 Provide barracks (i.e., sleeping quarters) for 
sustained manning 
 5.2 Maintain Equipment and 
People 
5.2.1 ID units without organic maintenance/medical 
capabilities 
  5.2.2 Provide trained bodies to conduct 
maintenance/health care where deficiencies exist 
  5.2.3 Rotate units to conduct Preventative 
Maintenance Services (PMS)/Corrective 
Maintenance Services (CMS)/Stand-down 
Table 6-1:  Functional Architecture (showing first three levels) 
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Sample Mission Thread Analysis 
A thread analysis is performed to show the relationships among all third-level 
functions for a sample SAW mission.  The scenario begins when information is received 
about the intent of terrorists to use a ship as a weapon in the San Francisco Bay Area.  
The rest of this section explains the flow of the mission and is depicted through threads 
on the associated figures. 
The C4ISR threads link subfunctions to other subfunctions, representing the flow 
of attributes through the C4ISR system.  The subfunctions generate outputs which are 
inputs to different subfunctions.  Figure 6-2 shows the thread diagram for the C4ISR 
system, and an explanation of this graphic representation follows.  See Table 6-1 for the 
function associated with the numerical designations. 
 
Figure 6-2:  C4ISR SAW Thread Diagram 
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The C4ISR system is activated when an order is received from higher authority.  
The order comes in through the communicate function, interfaces with external C2 
function, and passes to the Command Forces function.  Command Forces either requests 
further information or permission via the Interface with External C2 function or sends 
orders and rules of engagement (ROE) through the function—Provide Voice/Data to the 
functions—Activate Security Measures and Assemble Forces within PBS.  The ROE and 
orders are simultaneously sent to the Provide Intelligence function for use in creating 
customized operational pictures.  Intelligence provided by the MDA system is received 
via the Communicate function.  This intelligence is sent in the form of both data and 
imagery, which is next routed to the Compute function.  Within the Compute function, 
the data and imagery are first passed through the Information Assurance function, which 
transforms the intelligence into Assured Data.  The Assured Data next flows to the Data 
Fusion function, where it is correlated and exits as Fused Information.  The Fused 
Information then flows into the Provide Intelligence function where it is transformed by 
the Form Overall Operational Picture function into Situational Awareness.  This Situation 
Awareness flows into the Command Forces function where it is used to complete the 
generation of orders and ROE.  The orders and ROE are used by the Analyze Operational 
Needs function to create information that is used by the Build Customized COPs 
function, wherein specialized views are developed for the individual teams based on their 
operational assignments.  The overall COP and custom COPs are routed to the 
Communicate function which sends them to both the Interface with External C2 and the 
PBS Deploy function.  Mission specific feedback from PBS, Find/Fix and Finish is 
routed to the communicate function Provide Voice/Data.  Voice information is sent to 
Command Forces and while data and imagery is sent to Information Assurance for 
further routing through intelligence to become part of the COP and then routed back to 
Command Forces.  All other system-level functions are linked to the overall network 
through the Communicate function 1.2.2 and can exchange voice, data, and imagery. 
 In Figure 6-3, the PBS third-level functions for the SAW mission receive 
direction from C4ISR via C4ISR 1.2.1 and is sent to Activate Preplanned OPORDs.  
These orders then are forwarded to Prepare Critical Infrastructure and Activate Required 
Personnel to and then flows to Issue Equipment.  Activate Required Personnel receives 
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input from the Sustain function Provide Appropriate Personnel.  Next the thread is traced 
to Prepare Deployment Platforms.  The thread is then traced through the Move 
Deployment Platform subfunction to position the Response Force ships to intercept the 
PAV, which sends a thread back to C4ISR for communication feedback and receives a 
thread from Sustain for resupply and replacements.  The next PBS thread is progressed to 
the Boarding Teams embark on the PAV subfunction.  This thread now flows to the 
Find/Fix set of functions. 
 
Figure 6-3:  PBS SAW Thread Diagram 
The Find/Fix functional threads are shown in Figure 6-4.  The PBS Employ 
Teams function flows into Scan Area of Interest, which for SAW refers to taking crew 
information, pictures and fingerprints.  The thread is then traced to Process Data from 
Scan and then to Analyze Data Onsite, this means the data is input into a recognition 
device and then analyzed.  The thread flows to Quantify Threat and then Determine 
Intent.  From here a thread is sent back to C4ISR to provide information feedback and a 
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thread also progresses forward to the Finish functions in Implement Nondestructive 
Measures. 
 
Figure 6-4:  Find/Fix SAW Thread Diagram 
To demonstrate threads to all main level subfunctions it is assumed no terrorists 
were found in the initial search so the boarding teams will assume an escort posture to 
escort the ship the remaining distance to the designated port facility.  Under this 
assumption, Figure 6-5 shows the thread flow from Determine Intent to the Finish 
subfunction 4.1.1 Guard HVU from Internal Threat.  Now the concealed terrorists reveal 
themselves and attempt to take control of the ship, so the thread progresses to the 
Recapture function for the embarked Boarding (Escort) team.  Since the Recapture 
function failed, the feedback thread goes back to the C4ISR function Provide Voice/Data 
that eventually links to Command Forces which then through the Provide Voice/Data 
output gives the order to the Finish function, Disable, and the PAV is disabled so the 
terrorists are no longer able to control the ship.  The next threads in this scenario are to 
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report the status of the disabled PAV to the C4ISR function Provide Voice/Data, which 
links to Command Forces.  Command Forces flows to Provide Voice/Data to direct 
another Recapture.  Now that the PAV is recaptured, a report is then sent to C4ISR again 
and an order is sent to tow the disabled ship, as shown by the thread from C4ISR 1.2.2 
Input to 4.1.6 Tow Disabled Vessel.  This completes the interaction action portion of the 
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Figure 6-5:  Finish SAW Thread Diagram 
 Sustain functions are accomplished concurrently throughout the duration of the 
mission as directed by the C4ISR Command Forces function through the Provide 
Voice/Data function.  In this case the thread flows from the C4ISR functions previously 
mentioned to the 5.1.4 Provide Appropriate Manning function which then feeds back to 
the PBS Activate Required Personnel (Figure 6-6).  After receiving the feedback from 
PBS Move Deployment Platforms that the Response Ships are underway, the C4ISR 
Provide Voice/Data function then directs the Sustain functions (Deliver Consumables, 
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Parts and Supplies to Units and Refuel Platforms) to provide support to those deploying 
ships.  This is shown with the threads that link Deliver Consumables, Parts and Supplies 
to Units and Refuel Platforms to the PBS Move Deployment Platforms.  When the 
deployment platforms provide feedback to the C4ISR function that there is a need for 
external maintenance/medical support, a thread is then enacted from C4ISR to the Sustain 
function 5.2.2 (Provide trained bodies to conduct maintenance/health care where 
deficiencies exists) or to 5.2.3 (Rotate units to conduct Preventative Maintenance 
Services/Corrective Maintenance Services/Stand-down) as needed. 
 
Figure 6-6:  Sustain SAW Thread Diagram 
 This thread analysis shows one possible scenario out of several dozen.  It 
demonstrates the flow of information and actions from beginning to end and how each is 
linked.  Once the thread analysis is complete it will show if any disconnects exist or if an 
illogical step is taken.  It also helps to identify if a needed function has been unknowingly 
omitted from the functional hierarchy.  Once the thread flow is refined and unbroken, the 
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mission is ready to be addressed with a SoS Architecture that can support it from 
beginning to end. 
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7.0 SYSTEM DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
7.1 MAPPING OF FUNCTIONS TO SYSTEM CONCEPTS 
7.1.1 C4ISR 
7.1.1.1 C4ISR System Framework 
The essential function of the C4ISR system is to facilitate responsive 
decision making with respect to a threat in the maritime domain.  The inputs to the 
C4ISR system are information from the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) system, 
data from local sensors, and inputs from higher command.  All inputs, including inputs 
from higher command, are processed into intelligence, which is primarily manifested as a 
Common Operating Picture (COP) and sent to the operating units for mission execution.  
A graphic depiction of the MTR C4ISR system boundary, as well as its fundamental 
internal and external interfaces, is provided in Figure 7-1. 
 
Figure 7-1:  MTR C4ISR System Interfaces 
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Figure 7-1 indicates information, such as plans, weather conditions, sensor data, 
private sector data, vessel locations, and so on, flowing into the C4ISR system from both 
global and local intelligence sources.  Information is also depicted flowing both into and 
out of the C4ISR system from higher authority and MTR operating units.  Figure 7-2 

















Figure 7-2: C4ISR Primary Data Flow 
Figure 7-3 depicts the functions of a general C4ISR system.  While detection and 
collection is external to the MTR C4ISR system, data processing, data fusion, analysis, 
and dissemination, and formulation of the appropriate response to the threat are internal 
to the MTR C4ISR system. 
 
Figure 7-3:  Decision-Making Enablers 
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7.1.1.2 C4ISR Concept Alternatives 
The C4ISR system concept alternatives are based on open source 
information and are identified according to the functions to be performed by the  
C4ISR system. 
Command and Control (C2) 
The C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander.  The knowledge 
developed by the C2 system is utilized in planning, directing, coordinating and 
controlling forces or operations.  The main design considerations are span of control, 
command structure, and the suite of communications and computing tools employed. 
“Span of control” relates to the size of the geographic region as well as the 
number of operating units within that region being directly controlled by a single 
commander.  The span of control for the MTR C2 system is either Area, Local, or some 
combination thereof.  The MTR SoS must be able to neutralize threats across the breadth 
of the Pacific Ocean as well as within San Francisco Bay.  An Area commander controls 
approximately 20 high-value commercial ships that must be searched and/or protected by 
MTR forces.  A Local commander controls the forces to protect a single high-value unit 
(HVU). 
 As used in the militaries of the world, a command structure can be control-free, 
selective-control, mission-oriented, problem-bounding, problem-solving, objective-
oriented, interventionist, or cyclic.  First employed by the WWII German military, the 
control-free structure is highly distributed.  In this structure, the commander seeks to 
assign missions to his subordinates, who then employ all the assets available to them to 
accomplish their missions.  In a selective-control structure, the higher command issues 
mission orders and expects subordinates to take broad and deep initiatives.  The higher 
command follows the battle in detail and is prepared to intervene.  The Israeli Army 
employs this kind of C2 structure.  In a mission-oriented structure, each command level 
assigns missions to its subordinates and permits them to define further details of the 
military situation, beginning with selecting the objectives necessary to accomplish the 
missions.  In a problem-bounding command structure, as used by the British military, the 
higher command composes its directives in terms of the objectives to be accomplished, 
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but couches them in very general terms.  The U.S. military has traditionally used the 
problem-solving approach, which involves issuing directives that articulate both missions 
and objectives for two levels of subordinates.  Substantial guidance as to how the 
objectives are to be achieved is also included.  An objective-oriented structure allows 
some level of trust, creativity, and initiative in subordinate commands, but it stresses 
synchronization of assets and actions.  This approach most closely reflects the ideas 
underpinning Network Centric Warfare.  An interventionist structure, used by the modern 
Soviet military, relies heavily on central authority to issue directives, but it also maintains 
very detailed information about the battle and attempts centralized control through 
detailed directives.  The greatest degree of centralization occurs in a cyclic structure, 
mainly used by the Chinese, in which the senior command issues orders to all 
subordinates and does so on the basis of a preset cycle time. 
In the maritime domain, the objective-oriented structure is the most appropriate;64 
thus, it will be carried forward as a C2 command structure option.  It incorporates the 
advantages of the problem-bounding and problem-solving structures.  It also allows some 
level of trust, creativity, and initiative in subordinate commands, but the stress is on 
synchronization of assets and actions.  Consequently, there will be greater coordination 
and more continuous contact between superior and subordinate commands, as well as 
among subordinate commands.  Because the U.S. military has traditionally used the 
problem-solving approach, it will also be carried forward as a C2 command structure 
option.  The problem-solving approach is used to represent a back-up command structure, 
which would be used in the event of either net-centric technology failure or lack of trust 
in either technology or subordinates. 
 The last critical C2 consideration is the suite of communications and computing 
tools needed to support the C2 function.  MTR communications infrastructure must be 
near real-time, transoceanic, and interoperable across local law enforcement,  
National Fleet, and coalition forces.  Computing tools must provide comprehensive 
decision support, including courses of action, resource pairings, optimal assignment 
                                                 
64 D.S. Alberts and R.E. Hayes, “Command Arrangements for Peace Operations,” Command and 
Control Research Program (CCRP) Publications, National Defense University, [http://www.dodccrp.org], 
May 1995. 
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schemes, and targeted search plans.  Fused products must enable a high level of 
situational awareness, while minimizing the chance of information overload. 
Communicate 
To network the entire force, the communications system provides links for the 
transfer of messages, data, voice or images between various parties in the MTR SoS.  The 
aim is to ensure that information exchanged between parties is transmitted and received 
efficiently, with minimal delays so that necessary actions can be taken.  The linkages can 
be divided into two categories:  internal and external.  Internal communications take 
place within a small group, task force, or agency, while external communications refers 
to communication links among all MTR actors.  Different technologies are considered for 
these two communication system categories.  The internal communications focus on local 
area networks, while the external communications are facilitated by wireless networks 
and paging systems. 
Compute 
The two main components of the computing system are: information assurance 
and data fusion.  Information assurance refers to the “technical and managerial measures 
designed to ensure the confidentiality, possession or control, integrity, authenticity, 
availability and utility of information and information systems.”65  Typically, the 
information security measures are enforced from a security policy that is recommended 
by information technology (IT) personnel and approved by the top management.  This 
security policy states the security measures that are taken to protect the systems and the 
information in the organization, during processing, transit, and storage.  It also includes 
the risk remaining despite such measures and the roles and responsibilities of everyone in 
the organization.  Lastly, it includes the training and awareness program that must be 
conducted to ensure everyone knows his role. 
In the context of the MTR environment, because the information of most of the 
external systems is only known in the most general terms, it is assumed that these 
systems are secured.  They are assumed to employ proper security measures and will be 
treated as trusted systems.  Thus, the MTR information assurance system will concentrate 
                                                 
65 Answers.comTM, “Information Assurance,” [http://www.answers.com/information%20assurance], 
2006, accessed in April 2006. 
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on protecting and securing the systems and information within the MTR domain.  The 
MTR system ensures that information is protected against unauthorized access via 
encryption and authentication, that it is protected from modification without notice via 
hashing the information, and that the mission is protected against the loss of information 
via system redundancy.  These protections are in force during the entire period that 
information is being transmitted, received, processed, and stored within the MTR 
domain.  Computing systems are secured to minimize vulnerabilities to subversion and 
exploitation either by outsiders and insiders.  Redundant systems are included for disaster 
recovery in order to prevent the loss of information or services to the commanders.  The 
Defense in Depth Security Model presented in Figure 7-4 is the guiding framework for 
the MTR information assurance system concept. 
 
Figure 7-4:  Defense in Depth Security Model 
Having been certified as authentic from the trusted external sources, the 
information is sent to the fusing system.  Here, the data/information is processed and 
correlated based on the set of rules and requirements provided by the commanders.  
Assured data is used to generate intelligence data that will eventually be supplied to the 
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COP.  The correlation rules include the location and movement associated with the 
objects of interest, which include both targets and MTR forces. 
Several technologies can be employed for computation of situation assessment 
and information fusion.  Table 7-1 presents a comparison of these technologies. 
Technology Pros Cons 
Rule-based system - Simple concept (based on 
“if…then” statement) 
- Can retrace logic structure 
underlying decision 
- Cannot manage uncertainty and 
complexity 
- Hard to combine expert knowledge 
with data 
- Hard to maintain 
Neural Networks - Based on sound statistical learning 
techniques 
- Good in data rich domains 
- Cannot understand logic underlying 
decision 
- Hard to combine data with expert 
knowledge 
Classification trees - Simple concept 
- Good in data rich domains 
- Cannot handle rare events 
- May generate too many rules 
Bayesian networks - Intuitive framework 
- Sound theoretical basis 
- Can integrate data with expert 
knowledge 
- In development 
Table 7-1:  Comparison of Computation Technologies 
The concepts considered for data fusion include automated, man in the loop, and 
hybrid systems.  Automated Data Fusion employs a self-learned algorithm architecture, 
which could be by means of either artificial intelligence (AI) or a neural network.  The 
advantages of this “man-free” system are that it is fast, autonomous, and does not require 
trained personnel.  However, the disadvantages include the complexity and cost of such a 
system, as well as the dependency on technology it would create if the machine-generated 
decisions came to be trusted.  In contrast, the man-in-the-loop architecture employs a 
rule-based architecture, which is advantageous in that it is relatively less expensive, and 
that humans can verify and decide on the results.  Because this option is less dependent 
on machines, it is slower, requiring highly trained personnel in the loop at all times.  A 
hybrid concept seeks to combine the advantages of the two concepts by employing both a 
rule-based and a self-learned algorithm.  Although the hybrid will still require a number 
of humans in the loop to provide verification and perform final decision making, the 
overall speed of the system is increased via its self-learned component. 
100 
Provide Intelligence 
The different alternatives for the Provide Intelligence system include sending the 
entire fused COP to all operating units, sending the entire fused COP blended with the 
common intelligence picture to all teams, or sending specific fused COPs blended with 
the common intelligence picture to the appropriate teams. 
Alternative Concepts Summary 
The possible combinations of the alternative subsystem concepts discussed above 
form the C4ISR concept alternatives.  Table 7-2 contains the alternative subsystem 
concepts. 
Alternative C2 Comms Compute Intell 
1 Area LAN Defense in Depth Overall COP 
2 Local WMAN Automated Data Fusion Overall COP + CIP 
3 Problem Solving WA Paging System Man-in-the-Loop  Specific COP + CIP 
4 Objective-Oriented Combined System Hybrid Fusion — 
5 Hybrid — — — 
Table 7-2:  C4ISR Subsystem Concept Alternatives 
Preferred Subsystem Concepts 
A subsystem analysis is performed to select preferred concepts.  The key 
performance parameters used in this analysis are speed and cost.  The utility of all 
informational products is a function of the timeliness of their delivery to operating units, 
which places great emphasis on the throughput of the computational and communications 
pipeline.  The aforementioned characteristics are the basis for the selection of the 
subsystem concepts that follow. 
Communications Systems 
The communications systems provide the links for transmit and receipt of 
messages, voice, videos and images between the various components of the MTR SoS.  
Three different means of communication are proposed:  wireless network, local area 
network, and wide area paging. 
Wireless Network 
The 802.16 wireless can be employed for transmitting large amounts of 
information between the various parties separated by long distances.  The 802.16 
provides up to 70 megabits per second (Mbps) of shared point-to-multipoint transmission 
in the 10 to 66 gigahertz (GHz) frequency bands as far as 48 kilometers.  It can be used to 
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create a wireless metropolitan access network across the San Francisco Bay or across the 
Pacific Ocean (Figure 7-5).  To increase coverage, more base stations can be set up on 
shore and possibly even floating buoys deployed in the sea.  Preexisting base stations, 
such as satellites, can be utilized to minimize the need to step up additional base stations. 
 
Figure 7-5:  Notional MTR WMAN Satellite Connectivity 
The 802.16 is chosen over the more well-known 802.11 mainly because of the 
coverage capability.  The 802.11 is designed to cover only hundreds or thousands of 
square meters, operating at very low powers to prevent frequency interference from 
neighboring networks in the same area.  Defined as a Wireless Metropolitan Area 
Network (WMAN), the 802.16 is designed to cover an area of tens or even hundreds of 
square kilometers. 
Local Area Network (LAN) 
Boarding teams onboard suspect vessels require connectivity for various activities 
such as biometric data gathering, radiation detection, text messages, voice, video, and 
other collaborative efforts.  A LAN system is proposed to meet the connectivity 
requirement—connectivity within the vessel as well as connectivity to shore.  In addition, 
the network has to be rapidly deployable.  Ruggedized marine grade laptops, biometric 
scanners, satellite phones, storage devices, printers, and routers are some of the essential 
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components that will form part of this rapidly deployable LAN system.  Long range 
communications via satellite is possible, and existing satellite base stations can be used 
for this purpose.  Figure 7-6 shows a schematic of the notional MTR LAN configuration. 
 
Figure 7-6:  Notional MTR LAN 
Wide Area Paging System 
The wide area paging system provides the means to transmit short messages to 
any party subscribed to the paging system.  Figure 7-7 depicts the various components 
that comprise the wide area paging system.  It consists of a network of telephone lines, 
base station transmitters, and large radio towers that simultaneously broadcast a page 
from each base station.  A message can be sent to selected parties via a phone keypad or 
modem.  The paging control center then dispatches the page received from the public 
switched telephone network (PSTN) throughout the service area using base stations 
which then broadcast the page. 
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Figure 7-7:  Notional MTR Wide Area Paging System 
A summary of the three components comprising the preferred communications 
concept is provided in Table 7-3. 
Concept Brief Description Typical size per info packet (average)
Frequency 
Band Data Rate Coverage Remarks
Wireless 
network
Buoys as wireless LAN stations
802.16 connectivity
Wireless Metropolitan Area 
Network (WMAN) designed to 






Within 48km of 
access points
802.16 provides up to 70 Mbps of 
shared point-to-multipoint transmission 
in the 10 to 66GHz frequency bands as 
far as 48 km.
Wire area 
paging system
Brief messages notifying the need 
to contact a particular location to 
receive further instructions
4000 bits 15kHz(FLEX) 3200bps Worldwide
Limited capacity (typically 500 
characters is the maximum practical 
message size).
High latency, with messages potentially 
taking minutes or longer to be delivered.
Local area 
network
Provide connectivity while onboard 
suspect vessel for activities such 
as biometric data gathering, 
radiation detection, text 









(5 km, though 
some report 
success at up to 
120km where LOS 
can be 
established)
Note that speed is distance dependent. 
Speed drops as distance increases. 
Also, the actual data throughput is 
generally no more than half of the rated 
speed because 802.11 uses a collision 
"avoidance" technology (CSMA/CA) 
rather than the collision "detection" 
method (CSMA/CD) in wired Ethernet. 
Wired systems can detect a collision, 
but wireless cannot, thus, the CSMA/CA 
method waits for an acknowledgment 
from the other end to determine if the 
packet was transmitted properly. A 54 
Mbps rated speed yields only about 27 
Mbps in real throughput.  
Table 7-3:  Combined Communications Concept 
Compute 
Defense in Depth Information Assurance 
The preferred information assurance concept is in accordance with the Defense in 
Depth Security Model presented in Figure 7-4.  The Compute system employs this 
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strategy of defense in depth to protect its data and systems within the MTR domain.  As 
illustrated in Figure 7-8, layer defense is operated by enforcing different security 
mechanisms in different layers.  If one layer fails, the other layers will still be in place to 
impede any perpetrators from compromising MTR computing assets.  This strategy is 
coupled with public key infrastructure (PKI) to ensure the information or data received 
from external sources are authentic and tamper-free.  Details of the MTR information 
assurance concept follow. 
 
Figure 7-8:  MTR Information Assurance Concept 
When data is received from an external system, the data is first authenticated via a 
PKI.  The PKI uses a paired public-private key mechanism.  The sender will hash and 
digitally sign the information with his or her private key, creating a one-way encrypted 
output.  The key is owned solely by the sender and proves the authenticity of the person.  
The recipient will decrypt the data with the sender’s public key, which is issued either by 
the sender or by the certificate authority (CA) with whom the sender registers. 
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The integrity of the source information is then verified by the comparing the 
hashed value of the digitally signed information with the hashed value of the original 
information.  If the two hashed values match, the information is verified to be free from 
tampering or modification. 
By definition, a security policy is a plan of action for tackling security issues, or a 
set of regulations for maintaining a certain level of security.  In the MTR context, it refers 
to the security measures taken in relation to system, network and applications to protect 
the data and the system from being compromised.  It contains the assets to be protected, 
the possible vulnerabilities, and the threats that might be encountered, so that a strategy 
can be formulated to mitigate and minimize the risk.  Defense in Depth coupled with PKI 
is employed to protect the system and information.  Each layer is protected with a set of 
security mechanisms to ensure vulnerabilities to all threats are minimized.  In the event 
that one security mechanism fails, the remaining security mechanisms continue to protect 
the assets.  The policy also includes the training to assist the IT people in configuring the 
security equipment and appliances in accordance with the security policy.  User 
awareness is the final portion of the policy, ensuring that proper security procedures  
are practiced. 
The best way to protect the assets is to prevent unauthorized access by non-
authorized personnel.  The most primitive way to enforce this measure is to secure the 
building and rooms physically with either physical or digital locks so that only authorized 
personnel are allowed access to the systems.  Together with the locking system, guards 
ensure that personnel are identified physically before being allowed access to the building 
or room housing computer systems. 
Analogous to physical defense to the user, perimeter defense serves as the first 
line of defense or the first door to the source traffic before it can enter the network.  
Several mechanisms are implemented to enforce this layer of defense.  Network access 
control is enforced by the router that permits only authorized traffic into the network.  
Any traffic from unknown sources is blocked by this router.  The demilitarized zone 
(DMZ) is a network segment that sits between an organization’s internal network and an 
external network.  It allows contained servers to provide services to the external network 
while protecting the internal network from possible intrusions.  The firewall enforces 
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more stringent rules to restrict the traffic into the network.  The router inspects not only 
the normal packet, but also the source and destination packets, and it does so in either a 
stateless or a stateful mode where the firewall creates a table to track the packets 
traversing during a communication session established between a conversational pair.  
Any packets not registered in the table are rejected.  Bastion servers are another means to 
protect possible intrusion from external sources.  Bastion servers accomplish this function 
by providing services to the external network and limiting direct external network access 
to the internal network.  For example, quarantine control contains any viruses outside the 
internal network. 
Network defense primarily deals with protecting the traffic or the systems within 
the internal network.  Network segmentation by routers separates the systems and users 
so that no unauthorized users are able to access classified system segments.  For example, 
Top Secret is separated from both Secret and Unclassified segments.  Internet protocol 
security and virtual private network (IPSec/VPN) encrypts the information at the network 
layer so that data in transit is protected from unauthorized observation.  The encryption 
starts and terminates between the end-to-end terminals where only end-to-end users or 
devices are able to observe and read the data.  The Network Intrusion Detection System 
(NIDS) observes the network traffic traversing in the network and detects any malicious 
traffic.  Upon detection, it both alerts the network administrator and triggers actions to 
mitigate this traffic.  The NIDS increases the likelihood that timely measures can be 
taken to prevent the system or data from being compromised.  Lastly, antivirus software 
is deployed to contain any outages so that impact is minimized. 
Host defense protects the host system itself.  It includes operating system (OS) 
hardening that turns off unwanted services which may otherwise provide a means for a 
perpetrator to compromise the systems and to access to the information.  Patch 
management is implemented automatically by the system to fix any known vulnerabilities 
of the OS.  Host antivirus software is updated regularly for new signatures; thus, viruses 
can be detected effectively and removed or quarantined within the system.  This practice 
prevents viruses from either disrupting or bringing down the network or system, resulting 
in a loss of services or data.  A Host Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is implemented to 
allow the host to detect any intrusion based on a signature.  Identification and 
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Authentication (IA) by means of password, biometrics, or common access card (CAC) is 
used to ensure that the user is an authorized user.  “Two-factor IA,” which uses two types 
of the three possible methods, is deployed to ensure a strong IA security component.  
Lastly, audit is enabled at all times to account for all the events occurring in the system, 
which includes the user login and any changes made to the system; any compromise to 
the system or data can thus be traced. 
 Application defense is deployed in the application layer.  Similar to OS 
hardening, the application can be hardened or patched to fix any known vulnerabilities so 
as to prevent it from being exploited to subvert the system or the data.  Application 
encryption, such as a secured socket layer (SSL), is implemented to prevent the 
application content from being observed while it is on transit to the destination.  The 
application proxy server checks the contents of the application to detect any malicious 
traffic or pattern and drops the application if any is detected.  It also hides the server from 
the external traffic, acting as a middle server to protect the backend systems  
from subversion. 
Data defense is the layer of defense focused on protecting the data.  Access-
control list (ACL) is implemented to permit authorized users the rights of access.  Data is 
hidden from unauthorized users by encrypting it with a password or key.  Furthermore, a 
backup and restore strategy provides redundancy.  The disaster recovery center is 
implemented to ensure that no data is lost as a result of a breakdown of the system or  
the network. 
Unfortunately, even with all of the above security mechanisms in place, foolproof 
protection is still not realizable.  The information assurance protection measures 
minimize the possibility of a security breach or the compromise of data or systems, yet 
the system components themselves possess vulnerabilities.  Proactive actions must be 
taken to ensure all the components are secured and patched when vulnerabilities are 
discovered.  The security policy must also be periodically reviewed to ensure that the 
security measures are updated to reflect any changes to systems and their  
corresponding vulnerabilities. 
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Hybrid Data Fusion 
A Hybrid Data Fusion concept is employed, which encompasses both automated 
and man-in-the-loop data fusion and analysis.  A graphic overview of this concept is 
provided as Figure 7-9.  The motivating factors for such a hybrid concept follow. 
 
Figure 7-9:  MTR Data Fusion Concept 
The main idea is to substantiate or support the generated scenarios with evidence 
as the real world unfolds in time, and thereby continually adjusting system perceptions of 
the unfolding future so as to remain relevant and valid.  To achieve this, each generated 
scenario is associated with indicators that are observable in the real world.  Evidence for 
these indicators is collected to determine the extent to which the scenarios are actually 
happening as forecast. 
Having evidential support for what is or what is not happening allows an analyst 
to check the correctness of previous analyses and perceptions.  The analysis is revised as 
informed by the new and current evidence, which correspondingly revises the scenarios, 
if necessary, and also the plans or decisions associated to the scenarios.  In a sense, an 
evidential feedback loop is implemented to continually correct the scenarios to ensure 
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their relevance and congruence with reality, thus reducing or mitigating the risks in any 
scenario-based application. 
To further reduce uncertainty, and also to mitigate or overcome natural human 
biases and limitations, multiple perspectives are exploited.  Specifically, multiple 
interpretations of past data are enabled, which can lead to multiple perceptions of how the 
current state will change in time, and thus multiple scenarios.  It is already an accepted 
technique in scenario planning to have more than one scenario; however, it is generally 
limited to only a few because the human mind has difficulty cognitively coping beyond a 
certain number.  The MTR data fusion system allows for unlimited scenarios without 
overwhelming the human users' cognitive limits.  Also, what constitutes the indicators for 
a given specific scenario and the degree of association can also be given to multiple 
interpretations and the degree of agreement or disagreement in these interpretations are 
exploited as indications of risk or “knowability” of a situation. 
It is unlikely that the future can be forecast in its precise details, but a forecast can 
be very useful in certain situations.  One of these situations involves the notion of 
convergence, in which all evidences point to one scenario, or a cluster of related or not 
inconsistent scenarios, as being far more likely than the rest, and the evidential support 
for this remains constant and stable over a certain period of time.  The other notion is that 
of robustness, by which it is meant that the fusion system is indifferent to the remaining 
variability or uncertainty in the scenarios.  Thus, convergence can be detected and lack of 
convergence is an indication of several possible errors in the prior analysis, namely, the 
failure to account for some scenarios, the incorrect identification and associations of the 
indicators, or the failure of collection to obtain the necessary evidential support.  This is 
thus a trigger for revision or correction of the previous analysis and scenarios or of a 
review of the collection process. 
Provide Intelligence 
The preferred Provide Intelligence concept creates an overall fused COP, blends 
the COP with a common intelligence picture (CIP), and sends specific portions of the 
COP/CIP to operating units.  The Provide Intelligence system displays and disseminates 
knowledge relevant to the coordination of forces.  Intelligence is most rapidly derived 
from data that has previously been assured, correlated, and analyzed.  This intelligence is 
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then packaged in the form of the COP.  The overall COP is provided to the global C2 
system while customized COPs are provided to the different ground forces.  
Customization of the amount and types of information included in the COP allows the 
ground unit to better focus on the assigned mission and also reduces the analytical and 
decision cycle of the local operator.  The customization is based on each particular asset’s 
mission, location, operational influence, and capabilities. Capabilities include factors 
such as weapon range and response time.  Figure 7-10 shows a possible scenario, in 
which the specific COP area and the size of that area are determined by the unit location 
and capability, respectively. 
 
Figure 7-10:  COP Customization Concept 
System-Level Concept Alternatives 
The subsystem analysis described in the preceding sections successfully selects 
the optimal communications, computing, and provide-intelligence concepts, determining 
the optimal C2 hybrid requires further study of the other four C2 concept alternatives.  
The four C4ISR concept options forwarded to the Modeling Phase are:  Area Problem 
Solving (APS), Area Objective Oriented (AOO), Local Problem Solving (LPS), and 
Overall Operational Picture
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Local Objective Oriented (LOO).  All four options include the same Communicate, 
Compute, and Provide Intelligence concepts, namely: 
• Communicate–combined LAN, WMAN, and WAP 
• Compute–Defense in Depth and Hybrid Data Fusion 
• Provide Intelligence–Customized COP and CIP 
The dual purpose of the C4ISR modeling effort is to both gain further insight into 
the performance of preferred Communicate, Compute, and Provide Intel concepts, as well 
as to better understand the implications of the four C2 alternative combinations of Area 
and Local span of control, and the Problem Solving and Objective Oriented command 
structures.  Table 7-4 displays the complete composition of each of the C4ISR concept 
alternatives used as levels in the orthogonal array experiment. 
Level Option Control Command Communicate Assure Fuse Provide Intell 
1 APS Area Problem Solving Combined Defense in Depth Hybrid Specific COP and CIP
2 AOO Area Objective-Oriented Combined Defense in Depth Hybrid Specific COP and CIP
3 LPS Local Problem Solving Combined Defense in Depth Hybrid Specific COP and CIP
4 LOO Local Objective-Oriented Combined Defense in Depth Hybrid Specific COP and CIP
Table 7-4:  C4ISR Concept Alternative Components 
7.1.2 PBS 
WMD and SAW PBS Architecture Analysis 
 In the Weapon of Mass Destruction mission, Preparing the Critical Infrastructure 
and Activating Preplanned OPORDs are primarily centered on notifying the Department 
of Energy Joint Technical Operations (JTO) Teams as well as other existing chemical and 
biological specialists throughout the DoD and other various government and civilian 
agencies.  For the SAW mission, those same functions would identify the critical 
structures and population centers that could be affected and take the necessary efforts to 
protect those areas to the greatest extent possible. 
 Assemble Forces will utilize the existing forces in the proximity of the 
deployment platforms.  These forces can be Special operations forces, Marines, and 
trained boarding teams, specially trained on how to use the various types of search 
equipment (discussed in Section 7.1.1.3.1.) in addition to Visit, Board, Search, and 
Seizure (VBSS) tactics. 
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 The linchpin in Assemble Forces and Deploy Forces is the platforms and 
transportation needed to facilitate positioning forces in the right place to intercept the 
potential threat approaching CONUS.  The larger concentration of effort is on identifying 
the locations of the assets to be deployed and the response capability of those assets and 
platforms.  The average cruising speed of a large commercial vessel is assumed to be  
20 knots.  Initial WMD mission research indicates that, based on transit and search time 
requirements, the platform needs to remain on station for 100 hours to enable a complete 
search of a container ship carrying a variable quantity of TEUs (2,000 to 10,000).  The 
primary objective of the SAW mission is to intercept a potential threat vessel to 
determine the credentials of the personnel onboard.  For both WMD and SAW missions, 
the platforms would need to be deployable for more than nine days to allow for the 
potential need to intercept multiple ships.  With these requirements, the determination 
quickly narrows to the use of waterborne assets, specifically, DoD and DHS (USCG) 
vessels.  Table 7-5 shows the potential ships available and the locations of these ships 
with respect to the Pacific Ocean operating area.  The areas shown have been chosen to 
allow for intercept of a threat vessel along various points of a great circle route from East 
Asia to San Francisco. 
Note that Table 7-5 shows only frigate, destroyer, cruiser and cutter locations for 
the Current Ship Systems.  The Program of Record (PoR) ships considered are the LCS 
(Littoral Combat Ship) and WMSL (National Security Cutter), and a Commercial-Off-
The-Shelf (COTS) option.  The LCS and WMSL are being produced at this time and will 
be available in the very near future.  The COTS option is a converted NASSCO Tote 
Orca car carrier used as a mother ship to position itself along a route that will allow it to 





LOCATION U.S. NAVY66 U.S. COAST GUARD67 
San Diego, California 6 CGs; 14 DDGs; 5 FFGs 2 WHECs 
Kodiak, Alaska N/A 
2 WHEC (recommend alternative 
basing, currently four based in 
Alameda) 
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 3 CGs; 5 DDGs; 2 FFGs 2 WHECs 
Yokosuka, Japan 2 CGs; 5 DDGs; 2 FFGs N/A 
Pacific Region (PoR) ~ 30 LCSs68 ~ 4 WMSLs (NSC)69 
Pacific Region (COTS) 3 Tote Orca Class modifications  
Table 7-5:  United States National Fleet Assets in Pacific Ocean 
Table 7-6 shows the ships to be evaluated and their associated characteristics. 
Ship Type70 Speed Crew Weapons Helicopters Small Boat 
FFG 28 knots 215 
one Mk 75 76mm/62 cal. rapid 
firing gun, MK 32 ASW torpedo 
tubes, one Phalanx CIWS 
2 SH-60 1- Launch 
DDG 30 knots 380 
one Mk-45 5-inch/62 cal. 
lightweight gun, two Mk-41 VLS 
for Standard missiles and 
Tomahawk ASM/LAM, two 
20mm Phalanx CIWS, two  
Mk-32 triple torpedo tubes for 
Mk-50 and Mk-46 torpedoes 
2 SH-60 1- Launch 
CG 32 knots 400 
Mk 41 VLS for Standard 
missiles, Tomahawk, ASROC; 
Mk 46 torpedoes, Harpoon 
missile launchers, two Mk 45  
5-inch/54 caliber lightweight 
guns, two Phalanx CIWS 
2 SH-60 1- Launch 
WHEC71 25 knots 164 
5-inch/38 caliber gun, 2-
20mm/Mk 67 MG, 2- triple 
torpedo tubes/Mk32 
1 HH-60 1- Launch 
LCS72 45 knots 15-50 Varies by module 1 MH-60R/S 
11-m RHIBs or 
40-ft High 
Speed Boats 
NSC (WMSL) 27 knots 126 SeaRAM, 57 mm gun, .50 cal. machineguns 2 HH-60s 2 11-m RHIBs 
NASSCO Tote 
Orca Class 24 knots 18 
two Phalanx CIWS 
8- .50 cal. machineguns 2 SH-60s 
6 Wally 
interceptors 
                                                 
66 U.S. Navy, “List of Home Ports,” [http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ships/lists/homeport.html]. 
August 2005, accessed June 2006. 
67 U.S. Coast Guard, “378-foot High Endurance Cutter (WHEC),” [http://www.uscg.mil/datasheet/ 
378whec.htm], September 5, accessed April 2006. 
68 Global Security, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ 
lcs.htm], May 2004, (June 2006). 
69 U.S. Coast Guard, Integrated Deep Water System, National Security Cutter (NSC), 
[http://www.uscg.mil/deepwater/system/nsc.htm], 2006, accessed March 2006. 
70 Jane’s Information Group Limited, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2003-2004, Sentinel House, 2003, p. 832. 
71 Jane’s Information Group Limited, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2003-2004, Sentinel House, 2003,  
pp. 826-830. 
72 Jane’s Information Group Limited, Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2003-2004, Sentinel House, 2003,  
p. 823. 
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Ship Type70 Speed Crew Weapons Helicopters Small Boat 
118-ft Wally 30+ knots 6 .50 cal. machineguns   
Table 7-6:  Ship Type Characteristics 
The use of the ships discussed thus far does not preclude that of other ships 
already deployed in the vicinity of a potential threat; but for mission planning purposes 
the latter ships are assumed to be in port.  The amphibious ships and carriers either lack 
the speed needed to intercept a threat in a timely manner or, with all the normally 
embarked operating systems, will take too long to prepare for deployment. 
Current Ship Systems (CG, DDG, FFG, and WHEC) and the Program of Record 
Ships (LCS and WMSL) need AOE (underway replenishment ship) logistical support 
during the respective missions.  The COTS modification option will be able to operate 
independently for over 20 days. 
 The concepts are grouped by availability—Current Ship Systems (CG, DDG, 
FFG, and WHEC), Program of Record Ship Systems (newly deploying systems), and 
COTS Modification (commercial existing systems capable of modification to meet the 
mission).  The analysis assumes that one-half of Navy ships in any location are available 
for surge operations at any time.  Ships stationed in Japan already operate in the  
Western Pacific and will be rerouted when a threat is identified; therefore all Yokosuka 
ships are assumed available.  Likewise, all USCG assets are assumed to be available to 
respond to the maritime threat.  The Tote Orca class modified ships are designed for the 
MTR purpose and therefore assumed to be on call at all times.  Table 7-7 shows the three 
different PBS concepts; parenthetically, each could apply to both WMD and  
SAW missions. 
Concept Yokosuka Kodiak Pearl Harbor San Diego 
1 (Current Ship Systems) 2 CGs; 5 DDGs; 2 FFGs 1 WHEC 1 CG; 3 DDGs;  1 FFG; 2 WHECs 
3 CGs; 7 DDGs;  
3 FFGs; 2 WHECs 
2 (PoR Ship Systems) 3 LCSs  6 LCSs; 2 WMSLs 6 LCSs; 2WMSLs 
3 (COTS modification) 1 Orca w/6 Wallys  1 Orca w/6 Wallys 1 Orca w/6 Wallys 
Table 7-7:  PBS System Concepts by Ship Type 
 As shown in Table 7-7, a large number of ships are allocated in Concept 1, which, 
due to the speed of the ships being used and ships being intercepted, may be needed.  The 
faster LCS employed in Concept 2 allows for shorter transit times and the potential to 
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intercept more than one potential threat vessel.  Concept 3 relies on the use of the Tote 
Orca class ship as a base from which to deploy the faster 118-ft Wally interceptors.  One 
foreseeable concern with Concept 3 is the slow speed of the Tote Orca class ship coupled 
with any excessive intelligence latency, which would not give the ship the lead time 
necessary to pre-position along the transit route.  For all three concepts, the ships and 
Wallys are considered to be in an escort profile while searching a potential threat vessel 
and are not anticipated to interact with multiple vessels simultaneously. 
 The home base of the Concept 1 ships and the potential home basing of  
Concepts 2 and 3 ships allow for each of the functions identified for PBS (in Appendix 
A) to be met.  The level of success within each Concept will be dependent on the number 
of potential threat vessels to be intercepted, the distances to traverse to execute the 
intercept, and the latency of the information about the threat vessels. 
 SBA PBS Architecture Analysis 
Determination of Platform Probability of Kill 
 The weapon analysis described in Section 4.2.3 produces the probability of kill 
for various combinations of weapons.  The following analysis determines the probability 
of kill for a single platform. 
 Two types of platforms are considered:  Small escort and medium escort.  A small 
escort is a small boat, approximately 25-35 feet long, with a crew of four or five.  It has a 
top speed of 40 knots and is very maneuverable.  The 34-ft Dauntless used by Navy 
Inshore Boat Units (IBUs) is an example of a small escort.  A medium escort is a larger 
craft ranging from 80-150 feet long and has a crew of 20.  It features inboard engines and 
can reach a top speed of 35 knots.  The 110-ft Coast Guard cutter is a medium escort. 
 The essential difference in armament between a small and medium escort is the 
ability to mount a medium caliber gun.  The small escort cannot; the medium can (in the 
bow position only).  The medium escort can mount two single weapons on the port and 
starboard positions, the small can mount one each.  The medium escort also has a longer 
endurance (which affects the number of vessels required in an overall force structure.)  
More information on force endurance that topic can be found in Appendix E. 
 Figure 7-11 shows escort weapon mounts. 
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Figure 7-11:  Small boat weapon mounts 
The mounts cover “firing arcs” as shown below: 
 
 
Figure 7-12:  Small boat mount firing arcs 
 Both escorts have the same firing arcs.  For both escorts, the weapon in the bow 
position and the weapon(s) in one of the two side positions can engage a target.  This 
reflects the overlapping firing arcs as well as the maneuverability of the craft. 
 The escorts are armed as follows, reflecting inputs from the individual weapon 
analysis.  The small escort mounts one MMG in each position.  The medium escort has a 
MCG in the bow position and two MMG on each side position.  The team onboard the 
HVU is treated in a slightly different manner.  The team consists of six 2-man teams each 
armed with a LMG.  The teams are evenly distributed around the HVU.  The probability 
of kill is based on the number of teams engaging a target.  All escorts follow the  
“Hold Fire” firing policy.  The platform/team probabilities of kill are as follows: 
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Platform P(kill), 500-yd Engagement P(kill), 200-yd Engagement 
Small escort 0.6158 0.4557 
Medium escort 0.8708 0.7682 
3 LMGs 0.6491 0.2666 
2 LMGs 0.2932 0.0409 
Table 7-8:  Escort Platform Probabilities of Kill 
Determination of Escort Option Probability of Kill 
 The next step of analysis is to determine the probability of kill of an escort option, 
which is comprised of combinations of platforms.  The escort options are shown in 
Figure 7-13: 




























Figure 7-13:  PBS(3) Concept Formations 
Consideration of escort option probability of kill takes into account more than the 
combination of different platform probabilities of kill.  It includes the initial distance of 
the engagement, the number of escorts, the distance of escorts from the HVU, the 
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coordination of fires from more than one escort, and the relative movement between 
targets and escorts.  It also considers the ability of the team onboard the HVU to 
reposition during an engagement.  The analysis considers all of these factors by assigning 
a probability of engagement for the escorts based on initial engagement distance.  In 
general, more escorts increase the likelihood that one can engage an attacker.  Close 
spacing of small escorts increases the difficulty of coordinating fire, but contributes to the 
likelihood of engagement.  Two escorts have fewer coordination issues but more 
maneuvering to accomplish to engage a target that may approach from any direction.  
The probabilities are summarized in Table 7-9. 
Escort Option 500-yd Engagement 200-yd Engagement 500-yd P(kill) 200-yd P(kill) 
#1 – 4 small 100% chance of 1 of 4 100% chance of 1 of 4 0.6158 0.4557 
#2 – 2 medium 75% of 1 of 2 50% chance of 1 of 2 0.6531 0.3841 
#3 – 2 small, 2 medium 
100% chance of 1 of 4. 
Equal chance of small or 
medium 
100% chance of 1 of 4. 
Equal chance of small or 
medium 
0.7433 0.6120 
#4 – team onboard 100% chance that 3 of 6 engage 
50% chance that 3 
engage, 50% chance that 
2 engage 
0.6491 0.3378 
Table 7-9:  PBS(3) Concept Probabilities of Kill 
This method is an abstraction of a complex set of relationships.  A detailed vector 
analysis, including acceleration of the units involved, would give more evidence 
concerning the number of escorts that can engage an attacker.  Such an analysis is 
recommended as a follow-on topic for future SEA cohorts. 
7.1.3 Find/Fix 
WMD F/F Architecture Analysis 
Find/fix of the WMD mission involves conducting a search of each container ship 
to determine if any of the containers have a nuclear device inside of them.  In order to 
determine this, each detection and identification system must be evaluated in terms of its 
ability to detect nuclear devices and NORM, as well as its potential for false alarms.  In 
addition, characteristics of individual systems include the distance from a given container 
as well as the integration or dwell time required to confidently search each container. 
Some systems have unique qualities that offer significant advantages with respect 
to performance of the Find/Fix function of the WMD mission.  In particular, the LRM 
detector system can be lowered down between the guide rails between individual 
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containers.  This affords the opportunity for the actual detector elements to be 
significantly closer (on the order of 1.5 m versus up to 6 m).  It also allows for up to eight 
containers to be simultaneously scanned.  In addition, the long potential dwell time of the 
Fission Meter enables it to be placed in a given cargo hold and collect neutron data over 
extraordinarily long periods of time, which is often necessary with lower energy emitting 
nuclear devices that may be shielded.  The Fission meter also can search multiple 
containers because it is simply collecting neutron emissions throughout the hold, rather 
than being focused on any one particular container. 
Appendix I offers an analysis of the expected numbers of containers that will 
alarm due to the presence of NORM, containers that will alarm due to false alarm from 
elevated random noise levels, and overall probabilities of success in detecting a device 
given the different potential search protocols.  Appendix J describes the physics behind 
the detection of radiation. 
 SAW F/F Architecture Analysis 
Find/Fix for the SAW mission involves searching for suspected terrorists among a 
merchant vessel’s crew.  The architectures developed for the SAW mission all included 
the same search and identification mechanisms.  Those mechanisms are fingerprinting, 
database searches, and biometric data collection and comparison.  Our analysis considers 
a functional biometric search system to be feasible within the next five years and thus 
satisfies our near-term requirement for emerging technology.73 
SBA F/F Architecture Analysis 
Find/Fix of the SBA mission involves only conducting a search for surface 
contacts during escort operations.  This search can be done by visual means, radar, or a 
combination of both.  Almost every modern vessel of appreciable size does both as a 
matter of routine.  The distinction between the two is more important when discussing 
small craft, such as the small escort (described below).  Small vessels with limited height 
of eye have a short visual detection radius.  Visual search is also dependent on weather 
conditions.  The EXTEND™ SBA model varies detection capability based on the 
                                                 
73 For example, see Richard Hunton, “A Proposed Model for the Collection and Use of Biometric 
Identifiers Obtained at Sea as an Effort to Prevent Seaborne Terrorist Activity and Enhance Security at the 
Port of Charleston, South Carolina,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,  
March 2005. 
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presence of visual detection mechanisms, radar detection mechanisms, or a combination 
of both; see below for details. 
7.1.4 Finish 
7.1.4.1 WMD Finish Architecture Analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter 4.0, assumptions of the WMD scenario render 
detailed analysis of the Finish function unnecessary. 
7.1.4.2 SAW Finish Architecture Analysis 
There is one element considered in the SAW Finish analysis: the weapon 
system required to disable or sink a large merchant vessel.  A variety of weapons and 
platforms could be employed to complete this task.  Given the time constraints described, 
the weapon system must be available for use within minutes.  This leads to consideration 
of weapons that can be deployed on receipt of initial intelligence and used immediately.  
The exact type, characteristics, and effectiveness of this weapon or weapon system are 
open to research by future cohorts of the SEA program. 
According to research conducted in this project and subject matter experts, 
a command-activated, deployable mine or series of mines can accomplish this mission 
and could be fielded in the five-year timeframe, assuming that the mines and all assets 
required to deploy and recover the mines are feasible. 
7.1.4.3 SBA Finish Architecture Analysis 
Finish functions in SBA must be considered in conjunction with the PBS 
analysis described above.  To this point analysis has focused on weapons, platforms, and 
combinations of platforms (escort options).  The focus now shifts to the additional 
advantages the defender gains by employing two supplementary units. 
Determination of Supplement Option Advantages 
 The supplementary units considered are armed helicopters and unarmed 
unmanned surface vehicles (USV).  As with the escort options, these supplemental units 
are analyzed to offer a wide range of forces which may result in higher effectiveness or 
cost-effectiveness. 
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 The armed helicopter offers two potential benefits to the defender.  First, the 
helicopter offers additional capability to challenge suspicious small boat traffic and “clear 
a path” for the HVU.  Second, the helicopter offers additional engagement capability.  
(See Section 4.2.3 for an analysis of helicopter engagements against small boats.) 
 The USV offers different capabilities.  The SBA mission is challenging in a 
domestic port with a high volume of recreational and working boat traffic.  An average of 
300 to 400 vessels of all types can be found in Bay area waters in a single 24-hour 
period.74  The USV allows friendly forces to physically impose themselves between 
suspicious vessels and the HVU without risk to personnel.  The USV also allows 
challenges and warnings to be delivered at greater distances from the HVU.  This 
increases the time available for a lethal engagement if required.  Although unarmed, the 
USV could be outfitted with loudspeakers, police lights, various cameras and other 
sensors, pyrotechnics, or other low-cost measures to warn innocent boaters and classify 
surface contacts.  A USV could also shoulder suspect vessels or ram identified targets.  
The USV could also complicate enemy plans by forcing the enemy to take action earlier 
than desired. 
 Details of the USV, including its control system, were not examined in great 
detail.  Research and existing programs led to an assessment that a USV with the 
capabilities described could be fielded within the five-year time limit established for the 
scenario.  A detailed analysis of the technologies, capabilities, and costs of USVs 
employed in this manner is recommended as a follow-on topic for future SEA cohorts. 
 The benefits of both helicopter and USV are incorporated in the SBA EXTEND™ 
mission model.  An exact description of the benefits (greater initial attacker distance and 
reduced time to classify targets) can be found in the description of the model in  
Section 7.2.4. 
                                                 
74 United States Coast Guard District 11, Summary of San Francisco Bay Area Vessel Transits, 2005 
(2006) via email from LT D. Valadez, Vessel Tracking Center. 
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7.1.5 Sustain 
7.1.5.1 WMD Mission 
The WMD mission begins with receipt of intelligence that several 
commercially owned and operated container ships transiting from Southeast Asia to a 
port in the San Francisco harbor are carrying concealed nuclear devices.  The concept of 
operations for the WMD search on the containership (described in Section 7.1.3 Find/Fix 
the Threat) requires as much time as possible for the search teams onboard to conduct 
their search.  To support these requirements U.S. military ships must depart as soon as 
possible from their homeports to intercept each of the container ships.  Upon intercept, 
each military ship will transfer the MTR Find/Fix search teams to the container ship to 
conduct their search.  Military ships will transit at their maximum speed to intercept the 
container ships in order to allow the search teams the maximum possible search time.  
Military Sealift Command type ships (i.e., T-AO class) have a maximum speed of  
20 knots or less75 and will therefore lag behind the military ships during the sprint to 
intercept the container ships.  Refueling will therefore not be available for the military 
ships until after intercept of the container ships.  This creates a requirement that ships 
must sprint at their maximum possible speed, but have enough fuel remaining after 
intercept to meet the refueling ship. 
Ships consume fuel at varying rates according to their speed of transit.  
Along with fuel efficiency, fuel capacity varies by ship class.  Ships will vary in the 
amount of fuel remaining after sprinting to intercept the container ship, based on sprint 
speed, distance covered, and maximum fuel capacity.  Section 7.2.5 shows the results of 
modeling various ship classes in their sprint to intercept the container ships. 
Four locations currently utilized by the U.S. military will allow ships 
home ported (and in port at the beginning of the mission) to get underway and intercept 
the Eastward-transiting container ships:  Yokosuka, Japan (U.S. Navy only),  
Kodiak, Alaska (U.S. Coast Guard only), Hawaii (U.S. Coast Guard and Navy), and  
U.S. West Coast ports (i.e., San Diego and San Francisco, California, and  
Everett, Washington).  Ships from these four locations will be utilized based on the 
                                                 
75 United States Government Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-1, Navy Aircraft Carriers:   
Cost-Effectiveness of Conventionally and Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carriers, August 1998. 
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latency of the intelligence received about the container ships possessing WMD:  As the 
amount of time increases from container ships getting underway from Southeast Asia, the 
farther East their transit can potentially take them depending on their transit speed.  Once 
past the Yokosuka base, Navy ships would be hard done by to intercept the container 
ships on an Eastward chase.  Therefore, if intelligence is received early, more ships will 
be utilized from Yokosuka and Kodiak.  If intelligence is received later, Yokosuka and 
Kodiak ships will not be utilized, and all U.S. West Coast ships will be employed. 
MTR Team Transport from Military Ship to Container Ship 
Stakeholders from the maritime industry indicate that most container ships do not 
have a flight deck or a helipad for helicopter boardings; the deck space will in general be 
fouled by mast-heads, lines, communications gear, etc.  Additionally, the size of the MTR 
search team is larger than an SH-60B Seahawk (carried on most U.S. Navy ships) or  
H-65 Dolphin (carried on most USCG ships) can carry in one lift.  Container ships are, 
however, designed for small boat transfers and boardings, normally conducted by pilots 
for waterway escort.  Transfers of MTR search teams onto and off container ships will be 
conducted by either special-warfare tactics (i.e., fast-roping) or by small boat transfer 
(utilizing military ship’s RHIBs). 
Berthing the MTR Teams onboard the Container Ship 
Based on stakeholder input, the majority of container ships do not contain 
sufficient number of additional berthing compartments for all of the MTR search team 
members to sleep in.  Two arrangements are available for berthing the MTR  
search teams: 
1) Search teams carry portable sleeping arrangements, such as light weight 
cots, sleeping bags, etc. onto the container ship.  Team members then 
make use of any available location for a berthing area, allowing minimal 
impact on the container ship’s company berthing spaces.  Sleeping on the 
container ship therefore requires search teams to carry additional 
equipment onboard.  Sleeping quarters will likely be haphazard and in 
rough seas not well suited for a portable cot.  Search team members are 
likely not to get good sleep when off duty.  The payoff is that military ship 
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support is minimized as the ship is not required to stay within small boat 
transport range of the container ship. 
2) Search teams are transported off the container ship at the end of their shift.  
The search teams are recovered to the military parent ship where they are 
berthed.  Most current military ships contain additional crew berthing 
(“overflow” berthing) that will be utilized.  Search team members will get 
good sleep in their off-shift, and do not need to carry more than one shift’s 
worth of food with them onto the container ship.  The limitation of this 
arrangement is that the military parent ship must remain within the 
vicinity of the container ship. 
The effect of sleep on the search team is modeled in Section 7.2.5 to observe how 
detrimental haphazard sleeping conditions become. 
Feeding the MTR Teams while onboard the Container Ship 
Stakeholders from the maritime industry stated container ships will only carry 
enough food for their organic crew, and only enough to get them from their point of 
departure to the next arrival destination.  MTR search teams boarding the container ship 
therefore must carry all of their own food onto the container ship.  Each MTR search 
team is envisioned to conduct a nominal 7-day search.  Each team member will therefore 
carry 21 meals (nominally).  A case of prepackaged Meals Ready-to Eat (MREs) contains 
12 meals; each team member would therefore carry nominally two cases of MREs with 
them.  The two arrangements described above imply the following for food: 
1) Search teams carry up to two cases of MREs per person.  For a nominal 
search team size of 9 people, 18 cases of MREs will be carried aboard. 
2) Teams working in a nominal 2-section duty carry one MRE per person 
aboard the ship (or for a nominal search team size of 9 members, less than 
one case of MREs total, per day).  At the end of the shift the search team 
is transported by small boat to the parent military ship where they will be 
fed, berthed, and re-supplied for the next day.  The parent military ship 
must remain within a limited range (approximately 100 NM) of the 
container ship.  Support equipment transferred with the search team is  
thus minimized. 
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7.1.5.2 SAW Mission 
From a Sustainment perspective, the SAW mission is similar to the WMD 
mission in the following ways: 
1) Military ships get underway from their homeport to intercept a 
commercial ship transiting eastward from Southeast Asia. 
2) Military ships will transit at their maximum possible speed to intercept the 
container ship. 
3) A boarding team will be transferred onto the container ship upon intercept.  
Sustainment is not required for the boarding team because their mission is 
to retake the container ship, rather than to search over several days. 
7.1.5.3 SBA Mission 
As discussed in Section 7.1.4, the SBA mission requires several small 
boats, medium size ships, helicopters or USVs to protect points of vital infrastructure, 
transiting commercial ships of high value, and water taxis.  Operations will be conducted 
continuously for up to 30 days.  While medium-size ships (i.e., USCG 110-ft long class 
or U.S. Navy PC ships) contain several redundant systems, small boats can be viewed as 
much simpler systems overall and therefore have lower operational availability and 
reliability.  Platforms used within the SBA mission that do not have multiple redundant 
subsystems built into them are more susceptible to failure resulting in a complete loss of 
mission capability:  therefore will yield a higher probability of failure to the overall 
Sustain function.  The reliability of small boats and helicopters is modeled to observe 
quantity of spares required to support the Sustain probability of success. 
7.1.6 System Concepts Summary 
 Table 7-10 shows the breakdown of different system concepts that are considered 
for implementation in the overall SoS architectures.  Some functions have as many as 
four different system concepts to consider.  Others had as few as two concepts.  Only 
those areas where more than one system concept is modeled and considered are listed in 
the matrix.  The areas of the SoS where only one system concept is considered are not 
listed in this table.  For example, the solution for the Finish(1) function in the WMD 
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mission is simply to turn over discovered devices to Department of Energy JTO teams for 
disarmament and disposal.  The concept is preexisting and believed to be effective.  As 
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Table 7-10:  System Concepts Considered for SoS Architecture by Function 
 The concepts considered include current operational systems, Program of Record 
systems such as Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and National Security Cutter (WMSL), and 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies.  It is not suggested that the system 
concepts listed encompass all possible system solutions.  Rather, they were determined to 
be potential “best fit” solutions based on the research and analysis conducted  
during the study. 
7.2 SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE SELECTION 
 A two-pronged approach to architecture development and selection is employed.  
The first prong consists of objective, experiment-driven analyses to select an architecture 
based on a fractional experiment design seeking to optimize the overall system 
effectiveness.  This approach is used to first identify an optimum architecture in terms of 
effectiveness alone, without regard to cost, and then to seek out a suboptimum 
architecture that balances the values of low cost with high effectiveness.  In this 
approach, potentially hidden or counter-intuitive interactions among the system concepts 
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would be highlighted and their synergistic benefits or adverse costs could be determined.  
The details of this approach will be discussed in Section 7.2.1. 
The second prong is to develop and select an architecture from a subjective, 
bottom-up approach focusing on cost-effectiveness.  Such an approach allows insights of 
the experienced members of the SEA-9 MTR team to be brought forward into the 
development of an overall SoS architecture.  This approach is equivalent to the so-called 
heuristic approach to systems architecting (M&R).  The details of this approach will be 
discussed in Section 7.2.2. 
7.2.1 Selection of Architecture via Orthogonal Array Experimentation 
 As highlighted in Section 7.1.6, seven separate system functions (factors), each of 
which could be satisfied by two to four different system concepts.  The number of 
possible combinations of these system concepts, 3,072, need be evaluated for their 
effectiveness.  The evaluation is done by simulation.  Each simulation run takes more 
than three minutes.  It would therefore take 704 days (or two years of around the clock) to 
evaluate all 3,072 potential architectures (combinations), with each architecture requiring 
100 simulation runs in order to evaluate each architecture (combination).  This would  
be impractical. 
 An efficient form of fractional experiment design is needed, which would enable 
the optimization of overall system performance, but dramatically reduce the overall 
number of experiment trials and simulation time.  The most efficient form of experiment 
design is known as the Taguchi MethodTM, most commonly associated with measures to 
achieve higher levels of quality control during a manufacturing process.76  The method 
involves the use of orthogonal arrays, obtaining the so-called response from each 
combination, an analysis of the effects and interactions of the different system concepts, 
and determining an optimal architecture from the analysis.  In the Taguchi parlance, the 
system functions are called factors, and the various system concepts corresponding to the 
system functions are called levels.  This method amounts to optimally assigning the 
levels (system concepts) to each factor (system functions) in order to achieve the best 
possible result for some response function.  The application of the Taguchi method to this 
                                                 
76 Ranjit K. Roy, A Primer on the Taguchi Method, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990, p. xi. 
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assignment problem is motivated by a successful extension of the Taguchi method to 
solve assignment problems.77 In the case of the MTR project, the response function is 
taken to be both the overall SoS probability of success in stopping a terrorist attack and 
the cost-effectiveness measure.  Given the number of factors (7) and levels (2-4), the 
standard orthogonal array L32(21 x 48) is selected and modified as shown in Table 7-11.  
Note that each level is used in each factor and each appears an equal number of times.  
As an example, each of the four levels for C4ISR has eight trials (combinations or rows) 
dedicated to them.  The different combinations are varied throughout the array so that 
each level has at least one trial with every level from every other factor. 
TRIAL C4ISR PBS(1,2) PBS(3) F/F(1) F/F(3) FINISH(2) FINISH(3)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 1 3 3 3 1 1 3
4 1 1 4 4 2 2 4
5 2 1 1 2 2 1 3
6 2 2 2 1 1 2 4
7 2 3 3 4 2 1 1
8 2 2 4 3 1 2 2
9 3 1 2 3 2 1 2
10 3 2 1 4 1 2 1
11 3 3 4 1 2 1 4
12 3 3 3 2 1 2 3
13 4 1 2 4 1 1 4
14 4 2 1 3 2 2 3
15 4 3 4 2 1 1 2
16 4 1 3 1 2 2 1
17 1 1 4 1 2 2 3
18 1 2 3 2 1 1 4
19 1 3 2 3 2 2 1
20 1 2 1 4 1 1 2
21 2 1 4 2 1 2 1
22 2 2 3 1 2 1 2
23 2 3 2 4 1 2 3
24 2 3 1 3 2 1 4
25 3 1 3 3 1 2 4
26 3 2 4 4 2 1 3
27 3 3 1 1 1 2 2
28 3 1 2 2 2 1 1
29 4 1 3 4 2 2 2
30 4 2 4 3 1 1 1
31 4 3 1 2 2 2 4
32 4 2 2 1 1 1 3  
Table 7-11:  L32 Orthogonal Array for MTR SoS Architecture Optimization 
                                                 
77Huynh, T.V., “Optimal File Allocation in a Distributed Computer Network by Orthogonal Array 
Experiments,” IEEE, Vol. 0-7803-3741-7/97, 1997, pp. 105-114. Huynh, T.V. and D.C. Gillen, “Dynamic 
Bandwidth Allocation in a Satellite Communication Network,” IEEE Aerospace Applications Conference 
Proceedings, Vol. 3, 2000, pp. 1221-1232. 
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7.2.1.1 Architecture Development for Maximum Effectiveness 
In the first iteration of system architecture development via orthogonal 
array experiment, the objective is to generate the maximum performing system 
architecture.  In this case, the response is the system probability of success, which is the 
system probability of success for each of the three DRM as well as their average.  Each of 
the 32 different experiments is performed by running the EXTENDTM model 100 times.  
The experimental (simulation) results are then analyzed using MINITABTM Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) tables.  The ANOVA table for Overall SoS Ps can be found in  
Table 7-12.  Figure 7-14 depicts the main effects of the different system concepts for 
each of the system functions with system probability of success considered in aggregate, 
and independent of system cost.  Figure 7-15 shows the interactions among the different 
system concepts. 
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 Analysis of Variance for SoS Ps, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
Source  DF     Seq SS     Adj SS     Adj MS      F      P 
C4       3  0.0042465  0.0041186  0.0013729   3.29  0.050 
PBS1,2   2  0.0021319  0.0000791  0.0000395   0.09  0.910 
PBS3     3  0.0719979  0.0718044  0.0239348  57.36  0.000 
F/F1     3  0.0022190  0.0021207  0.0007069   1.69  0.211 
F/F3     1  0.0007508  0.0008956  0.0008956   2.15  0.164 
FIN2     1  0.0126655  0.0127015  0.0127015  30.44  0.000 
FIN3     3  0.0098204  0.0098204  0.0032735   7.84  0.002 
Error   15  0.0062592  0.0062592  0.0004173 
Total   31  0.1100911 
S = 0.0204274   R-Sq = 94.31%   R-Sq(adj) = 88.25% 
Table 7-12:  ANOVA Table for Overall SoS Ps for All System Concepts 
An examination of the ANOVA table indicates that choices of C4 system, 
PBS(3) system, FIN(2) system, and FIN(3) systems significantly affect, with high 
confidence, the overall SoS Ps.  Figure 7-14 shows that the “best” options for those 
categories are Option 4 for C4ISR, Option 3 for PBS(3), Option 1 for FIN(2), and Option 
4 for FIN(3).  Referring to Figure 7-15, as there is a significant crossing of lines in any 
one interaction block, an interaction between different system concepts for the two 
different system functions may exist.  As an example, the interaction between C4 concept 
and FIN(2) concepts implies that longer delays associated with some C4 concepts 
prevented the FIN(2) disable option from succeeding because the forces in question may 
not receive permission to act in time.  Such insights lead to a change in the postulated 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) and SOP for the MTR forces.  Some interactions are found 
to have no significance and to be the result of chance occurrence within the fractional 
experiment.  In other words, a crossing of lines does not mean that there is a definitively 
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Figure 7-15:  Interaction Effects of System Concepts on Overall SoS Ps 
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The data are also analyzed with each of the three missions’ individual 
probability of success as the response function in MINITABTM.  Table 7-13 displays the 
ANOVA SBA mission Ps as the response with only the SBA system concepts considered.   
Figure 7-16 shows the main effects of system concepts, while Figure 7-17 shows the 
interaction effects of system concepts pertaining to the SBA mission.  Slight variations 
are noted in selections for system concepts between individual mission probability of 
success responses and all three mission probabilities of success aggregated.  In such 
instances, the p-value calculated from the ANOVA table often indicates a lack of 
statistical confidence in the selection of one system concept over another.  The system 
concept is then selected by the individual response.  An example of one such occurrence 
where the difference was thought to be significant can be seen with respect to the 
selection of system concepts for Find/Fix(3) for SBA.  Option 1 referred to using a visual 
look-out detection scheme for incoming attackers.  Option 2 referred to using a 
combination of visual look-out with surface search radar support to detect incoming 
attackers.  This system function applies only to SBA and does not impact the other two 
missions at all.  When considered in aggregate, as shown by Figure 7-14, a slight bias 
exists in favor of Option 1.  As shown in Table 7-12, the p-value of 0.164 for Find/Fix(3) 
is not insignificant, and there is thus approximately a 16% chance that the result is 
random and not a function of the selection at all.  For the SBA mission alone, a stronger 
bias is demonstrated in favor of Option 2, as the p-value for Find/Fix(3) reduces to a 
more significant 0.09 (Table 7-13).  It does not meet the often used standard of 95% 
confidence, but it comes closer to suggesting an actual effect.  In this case, based on the 
results of the individual response, Option 2 is selected for the final architecture design. 
Analysis of Variance for Ps, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
Source  DF    Seq SS    Adj SS    Adj MS      F      P 
C4       3  0.000453  0.000453  0.000151   0.03  0.991 
PBS3     3  0.299557  0.299557  0.099852  23.11  0.000 
F/F3     1  0.013654  0.013654  0.013654   3.16  0.090 
FIN3     3  0.261554  0.261554  0.087185  20.17  0.000 
Error   21  0.090752  0.090752  0.004322 
Total   31  0.665970 
S = 0.0657384   R-Sq = 86.37%   R-Sq(adj) = 79.88% 
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Figure 7-17:  Interaction Effects of SBA System Concepts on SBA Mission Ps 
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A Taguchi analysis of the aggregated response, the three individual 
responses, and the interactions between concepts yields the final architecture for 
maximum effectiveness.  Displayed in Table 7-14, this architecture is known as the 
Maximum Performance Architecture. 
System Function Option # System Concept 
C4ISR 4 Locally controlled, objective-oriented approach 
PBS(1,2) 2 Littoral Combat Ships and Maritime Security Cutters supported by Oil tankers 
PBS(3) 3 Small escort boats combined with medium escort ships 
F/F(1) 1 Linear Radiation Monitor and Fission Meter 
F/F(3) 2 Visual look-out backed up by radar search 
FIN(2) 1 Escort potential attackers and recapture seized vessels 
FIN(3) 4 Organic weapons, armed helicopters, and USV support 
Table 7-14:  SoS Architecture selected based on maximum effectiveness criterion 
7.2.1.2 Architecture Development Balancing Cost and Effectiveness 
As solutions to the problem of maritime security have to minimize cost to 
commerce and impact on global trade, this cost must also be incorporated into the 
response in the orthogonal array experiment in order to develop an architecture that 
minimizes this cost while maximizing mission effectiveness.  To this end, the cost and 
the probability of success are amalgamated into a single, dimensionless quantity by 
normalizing the results from the 32 experiments for cost and probability of success into 
dimensionless quantities of values ranging from 0 to 100.  The trial that yields the most 
expensive system architecture is assigned a score of 0 for cost, while the trial that yields 
the least expensive system architecture a score of 100 for cost.  Likewise, the trial that 
yields the highest aggregate probability of success is assigned a score of 100 for 
effectiveness, while the trial that yields the lowest aggregate probability of success a 
score of 0 for effectiveness.  For each of the 32 trials, the normalized cost and probability 
of success are then added to yield a “cost-effectiveness” quantity that has a minimum 
value of 0 and a maximum value of 200.  Table 7-15 shows the overall Ps, system cost, 










1 0.841667 $290.31 55.47264 95.82896 151.3016
2 0.899833 $1,628.21 84.41128 62.47898 146.8903
3 0.8945 $4,100.46 81.75788 0.853089 82.61097
4 0.7995 $174.11 34.4942 98.72555 133.2197
5 0.862 $309.93 65.58872 95.33992 160.9286
6 0.917833 $1,650.88 93.3665 61.91388 155.2804
7 0.893833 $4,077.79 81.4262 1.418188 82.84439
8 0.841 $122.98 55.14096 100 155.141
9 0.92 $1,721.68 94.44444 60.14899 154.5934
10 0.816167 $286.20 42.78607 95.93128 138.7173
11 0.901833 $1,364.97 85.4063 69.04084 154.4471
12 0.856333 $4,134.68 62.76949 0 62.76949
13 0.931167 $1,699.01 100 60.71409 160.7141
14 0.8235 $266.59 46.43449 96.42032 142.8548
15 0.871667 $1,384.59 70.39801 68.5518 138.9498
16 0.873167 $1,850.18 71.14428 56.94602 128.0903
17 0.751167 $246.78 10.44776 96.9141 107.3619
18 0.918167 $1,664.42 93.53234 61.57649 155.1088
19 0.773833 $4,065.67 21.72471 1.720228 23.44494
20 0.8655 $184.71 67.33002 98.46117 165.7912
21 0.730167 $239.05 0 97.10679 97.10679
22 0.928333 $1,714.43 98.59038 60.32967 158.92
23 0.839833 $4,015.65 54.56053 2.967048 57.52758
24 0.901667 $1,377.54 85.32338 68.72751 154.0509
25 0.863833 $1,785.24 66.50083 58.56478 125.0656
26 0.791833 $215.32 30.67993 97.69814 128.3781
27 0.853667 $1,434.43 61.44279 67.30932 128.7521
28 0.8695 $1,765.37 69.32007 59.05998 128.38
29 0.889667 $1,735.22 79.35323 59.8116 139.1648
30 0.743333 $223.05 6.55058 97.50546 104.056
31 0.879667 $1,426.70 74.37811 67.50201 141.8801
32 0.874167 $1,752.37 71.64179 59.38399 131.0258  
Table 7-15:  Normalized Cost-Effectiveness Scores by Trial Number 
As in the original experiment, for each trial 100 simulation runs are made.  The 
simulation results are then analyzed using MINITABTM ANOVA tables.  In this case, the 
response is the cost-effectiveness score.  The ANOVA table for Overall SoS Cost-
effectiveness can be found in Table 7-16.  Figure 7-22 depicts the main effects of the 
different system concepts for each of the system functions with system probability of 
success considered in aggregate, and independent of system cost.  Figure 7-8 shows the 
interactions among the different system concepts. 
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 Analysis of Variance for Cost-Eff, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
Source  DF   Seq SS   Adj SS  Adj MS      F      P 
C4       3    918.0   1063.8   354.6   1.95  0.165 
PBS1,2   2   9827.6  10016.0  5008.0  27.52  0.000 
PBS3     3   5398.1   5500.0  1833.3  10.07  0.001 
F/F1     3   1477.3   1415.5   471.8   2.59  0.091 
F/F3     1    310.8    205.0   205.0   1.13  0.305 
FIN2     1   3217.0   3303.5  3303.5  18.15  0.001 
FIN3     3  12885.2  12885.2  4295.1  23.60  0.000 
Error   15   2730.1   2730.1   182.0 
Total   31  36764.2 
S = 13.4910   R-Sq = 92.57%   R-Sq(adj) = 84.65% 
Table 7-16:  ANOVA Table for Overall SoS Cost-Effectiveness for All System Concepts 
The ANOVA table indicates that choices of PBS(1,2) system, PBS(3) system, 
FIN(2) system, and FIN(3) systems significantly affect, with extraordinarily high 
confidence, the overall SoS Ps and are not due to chance.  Figure 7-18 shows that the 
“best” options for those categories are Option 2 for PBS(1,2), Option 1 for PBS(3), 
Option 1 for FIN(2), and Option 2 or 4 for FIN(3).  The cost-effectiveness scores for 
FIN(3) Options 2 and 4 are extraordinarily close, as can be seen in Figure 7-18.  Option 2 
scores 148.525, while Option 4 scores 147.471—a difference of less than 0.7%.  A runoff 
in the model of both concepts with all other system concepts remaining unchanged 
indicates that Option 4 generates a 10% increase in SBA mission Ps for only $21.9M, or 
approximately 7.6% in added system cost.  FIN(3) with Option 4 is therefore selected.  
Referring to Table 7-14, once cost is accounted for, PBS(3) now has a different result 
than when effectiveness was considered on its own.  In other words, PBS(3) Option 3 is 
no longer the optimum choice because it is so expensive.  Interaction effects, depicted in 
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Figure 7-19:  Interaction Effects of System Concepts on Overall SoS Cost-Effectiveness 
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 A Taguchi analysis of the cost-effectiveness scores and the interactions between 
concepts yields the final architecture for maximum cost-effectiveness.  Displayed in 
Table 7-17, this architecture is known as the Top-Down Cost-Effective Architecture. 
System Function Option # System Concept 
C4ISR 4 Locally controlled, objective-oriented approach 
PBS(1,2) 2 Littoral Combat Ships and Maritime Security Cutters supported by Oil tankers 
PBS(3) 1 Small escort boats only 
F/F(1) 1 Linear Radiation Monitor and Fission Meter 
F/F(3) 2 Visual look-out backed up by radar search 
FIN(2) 1 Escort potential attackers and recapture seized vessels 
FIN(3) 4 Organic weapons, armed helicopters, and USV support 
Table 7-17:  SoS Architecture Selected Based on Cost-Effectiveness Criterion 
7.2.2 Architecture Development Based Upon Bottom-Up Approach 
 The third alternative architecture is heuristically developed.  Based on the cost 
and performance data and experience, the lowest cost options from the potential system 
concepts for the system functions that would meet system effectiveness requirements are 
selected.  High performance, but costly, systems are disregarded as long as there is a 
cheaper system that meets requirements, even if its overall performance is below that of 
the high performance system.  The selected options together form a cost-effective 
architecture, shown in Table 7-18.  The principal differences between this architecture 
and that derived by the orthogonal array experiment lie in two concepts.  The first is the 
application of “Sea Marshall” teams and disabling protocols rather than escorting 
potential SAW ships across the Pacific and recapturing the vessels if they have been 
seized for FIN(2).  The second is the absence of USVs to support the escort vessels 
within San Francisco Bay for FIN(3).  This architecture is known as the Bottom-Up  
Cost-Effective Architecture. 
System Function Option # System Concept 
C4ISR 2 Area controlled, objective-oriented approach 
PBS(1,2) 2 Littoral Combat Ships and Maritime Security Cutters supported by Oil tankers 
PBS(3) 1 Small escort boats only 
F/F(1) 1 Linear Radiation Monitor and Fission Meter 
F/F(3) 1 Visual look-out 
FIN(2) 2 “Sea Marshall” teams with harbor pilots, disable seized vessels via shore battery concept 
FIN(3) 2 Organic weapons and armed helicopters 
Table 7-18:  SoS Architecture Selected Based on Subjective Cost-Effectiveness Criterion 
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7.2.3 Existing “As Is” Architecture 
 The existing “as-is” system architecture consists of those systems currently 
fielded to at least an initial operating capability (IOC).  The performance of such systems, 
the numbers of forces allocated, the level of readiness, and the concepts of operations for 
employment of such forces are classified.  The performance analysis of this as-is system 
architecture is classified.  The performance of this as-is system serves as a basis for a 
comparison of the three architectures discussed above. 
7.3 ARCHITECTURE RANKING APPROACH 
 An analysis of governing policy documents, such as The National Strategy for 
Maritime Security, leads to the definition of several measures of system effectiveness.  
They are the probability of stopping the impending terrorist attack and the cost associated 
with stopping the attack.  A combination of modeling, simulation, and analysis is used to 
evaluate the performance of the different architectures with respect to these  
two measures. 
 At least 100 simulation runs are made for each architecture for each of the three 
design reference missions.  The SoS architecture probability of failure in each mission 
area is obtained by dividing the numbers of terrorist attack successes in a given mission 
by the total number of simulation runs.  The probability of success in each mission area 
for each SoS architecture is then obtained. 
 The architectures are then ranked in terms of their probabilities of mission success 
and also in terms of their cost-effectiveness. 
 The cost associated with stopping the attack consists of two separate and distinct 
elements.  The first element is the cost to commerce associated with the architecture and 
its concept of operations.  The amount of delay time suffered by any container ship is 
calculated and converted into an economic cost assumed to be at most $20,000 per 
container per day, taking into account direct costs and indirect costs associated with the 
stoppage of container traffic at U.S. ports and the resulting impacts on the economy.78  In 
addition, economic damage costs to shipping are also included, as damage may occur to 
                                                 
78 Bruce Arnold et al., United States Congressional Budget Office, “The Economic Costs of 
Disruptions in Container Shipments,” Report to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 29 March 2006, pp. 2-21. 
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shipping during the course of attempting to prevent a terrorist attack and in particular to 
recapture a seized vessel or disabling a seized vessel. 
 The second element in the overall cost is the actual cost of system research and 
development, procurement, and operations and support.  For the most part, there is not 
significant cost for system research and development, procurement, because the system 
concepts in the architectures considered consist of systems that have been already 
procured (existing systems, programs of record, COTS technologies) and make use of 
mature technologies that could be procured within the next five years.  The costs of 
operations and support (O&S) are calculated, using analogy and extrapolation from 
actual.  Since the systems envisioned would only be performing MTR missions in 
response to impending attack, operations and support costs are adjusted to reflect only the 
time that they are performing the MTR missions as a share of their total annual O&S 
costs.  These costs together represent the total system procurement and operations costs 
for each architecture. 
 The total cost is calculated by adding the total system procurement and operations 
costs and damage and delay costs.  This total cost is then used in assessing the  
cost-effectiveness of each architecture. 
7.4 MODELING AND SIMULATION 
Maritime Threat Response modeling and simulation aids in the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the proposed SoS architectures.  The models represent the capabilities of 
the various subsystems and equipment to be employed in the three missions as well as the 
operating limitations of the personnel and equipment.  Also incorporated in the models 
are the location and availability of assets to be used in each mission and the relative 
distances to be traversed in order to respond to the maritime threat.  The probabilities of 
detection, false alarm, and success discussed in Section 5 are included in the models.  
Simulation models are broken down by functional application to mission, as listed in 
Table 7-19.  Results from individual functional models are compiled as modules into 
architectures for the three missions (WMD, SAW, and SBA).  Architecture modules, 
using output from the functional models, is then modeled using 100 simulation trials 
within Extend to determine the overall SoS effectiveness.  The modeling and simulation 
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of each architecture is independent of cost so as to strictly evaluate the capability of the 
SoS.  Cost will be applied later to determine affordability and the possible need for 
tradeoff considerations. 
Mission Function Model WMD SAW SBA 
Receiving Communications X X X 
Command and Control X X X 
Compute X X X C4ISR 
Transmit Communications X X X 
Mission Database X X X 
PAV Generator X X  
Ship Intercept X X  
Sea State Generator X X  
PBS 
Initial Orders   X 
Container Search X   Find/Fix Ship Search and Engagement  X  
Small Boat Attacker Generator   X 
Helicopter Engagement    X 
MTR Escorts or Teams Onboard Engagement   X Finish 
Delay to Commerce   X 
Ship Fuel Consumption X X  
Watch Team Sleep Analysis X X X 
Small Boat Availability and Reliability   X Sustain 
Helicopter Availability and Reliability   X 
Table 7-19:  Functional Model to Mission Application 
 The modeling tools used consist of Microsoft Excel, Extend v6, and the  
Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST) v1.0.26.  Excel processes probabilistic 
outcomes from each mission.  Extend v6 model each mission with respect to how it 
would have to be conducted via a logical sequence of events as applied to the SoS 
Functional Architecture.  The Extend model allows parameters to be set so that decisions 
can be made within the model, based on the random results from probabilities of success 
at each node.  The Extend model allows random variation of search and detection times, 
vessel locations, actual threat location, vessel sizes, latency of information and actions of 
the terrorists.  Specific assumptions with respect to each model will be addressed later as 
it applies to the individual mission.  One general assumption is that the level of training 
and proficiency is assumed to be at peak performance for all units and personnel 
involved.  This removes the variable of whether the individual or commander will make 
the appropriate decision at the appropriate time.  The possibility of the human making a 
mistake is not considered. 
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 The Excel model allows for determination of the sets of probabilities associated 
with each subfunction and subsystem to determine if the overall SoS will meet the 
minimum Probability of Success required for each mission (Appendix B).  The Extend 
model determines the likelihood of the SoS to meet the MOEs of the mission and 
assesses which MOPs or asset quantities could be varied to ensure a successful mission. 
 The SBA mission is rigorous and has been also evaluated through the use of 
computer simulated war gaming.  This tool is available at the Naval Postgraduate School 
through its War Gaming Department using the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation 
(JCATS) software applications.  The previously determined probabilities and capabilities 
of each architecture are applied to the mission profile in the computer simulation.  
Multiple players face off as members of Red and Blue teams to better assess the 
difficulties associated with identifying an unknown enemy in a high traffic area.  While it 
is still a two dimensional representation on a LCD screen, it does allow for the realism of 
the uncertainty associated with a small boat attack. 
 The WMD and SAW mission CONOPS have been evaluated using the  
Joint Theatre-Level Simulation (JTLS) software available through the NPS War Gaming 
Department.  Missions are evaluated to determine the expected distances between 
multiple PAVS within the missions, as well as the average distances helicopters would 
fly in order to deliver search teams to the PAVS. 
7.4.1 C4ISR Model 
The Extend model of the C4ISR system determines the average time to issue 
initial activation orders to MTR operating units.  In this simulation, the receipt of the 
initial tasking order from higher authority occurs at the beginning of the simulation run.  
The model simulates the multiple functions performed by the C4ISR system once this 
initial tasking has been received, namely, downloading intelligence data from both the 
MDA system and other sources, transforming the data into an optimal course of action 
and a common operating picture, activating and controlling MTR operating units, 
communicating with both higher authority and local operating units, and enabling the 
sharing of information between MTR SoS nodes.  Many of these functions are performed 
in parallel. 
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The C4ISR model has four main sections, which are represented in Extend as 
hierarchical blocks.  These four blocks are Comms In, C2, Compute, and Comms Out.  
Message traffic is generated within the Comms In block as one of four different item 
types:  intelligence data, orders from higher authority, node permission or information 
requests, or node to node communications.  The amount of each item type generated 
varies based on the C4ISR concept option being evaluated.  This is performed via the 
input parameters database.  Immediately after generation, the following attributes are 
assigned to all items:  communications type, file size, and start time.  With the exception 
of node to node communications, which are routed directly to the communications 
transmission section of the model, all items exiting the Comms In block then flow 
through the remaining sections of the C4ISR Extend model, where they are processed and 
transformed as appropriate.  Intelligence data, orders from higher authority, and nodal 
requests are transformed into both ROE/Orders and a common operating picture.  Node-
to-node communications are routed directly to the Comms Out block.  Within the Comms 
Out block, items exiting the system are sorted by communications type attribute, and 
their total time spent within the C4ISR model is recorded in the “C4ISR Delays” database 
described in Section 7.4.1.6.  The four model sections, as well as the input and output 
databases, are described in more detail in the sections that follow. 
7.4.1.1 Receiving Communications 
Within the Comms In block shown in Figure 7-20, items are generated and 
attributes are assigned.  While the file size assigned is random, the communications type 
attribute is assigned as follows: 
Type 1 = Orders from higher authority 
Type 2 = Node requests 
Type 3 = Intelligence Data 
Type 4 = Node to node communications 
Next, items flow into a priority queue where their exit order is based on 
communications type.  Type 1 receives the highest priority; Type 4 the lowest.  Once 
exiting the queue, items proceed through one of three possible communications system 
routes:  LAN, land-based WMAN, or satellite WMAN.  The land-based WMAN route 
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simulates messages being sent within 48 kilometers of either a land- or ship-based access 
point, while the satellite WMAN simulates messages being sent via satellite access 
points.  All three communications routes feature a message size delay that is calculated 
based on message size and media bandwidth, as well as an exponential access delay to 
simulate collision avoidance.79  The satellite WMAN incorporates an additional satellite 
access delay.80  Lastly, items proceed to the next processing stage (either C2 or Compute) 
in accordance with their communications type. 
 
Figure 7-20:  Comms In Hierarchical Block 
7.4.1.2 Command and Control 
Within the C2 block, which is shown in Figure 7-21, incoming items are 
transformed into either finished C2 products or queries to the Compute system.  These 
functions are performed by the humans in the loop, which are modeled by resource pools.  
There is one commander and one operator resource in each pool, and both must split their 
available attention between responding to incoming communications and responding to 
                                                 
79 Interview between Professor Richard Harkins, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, and the 
authors, 5 April 2006. 
80 Interview between Professor Chris Olsen, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, and the 
authors, 5 April 2006. 
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Compute system products.  The commander resource receives Type 1 and 2 message 
traffic directly from the Comms In block.  Type 5 message traffic is received from the 
Compute block and will be described in more detail in the following section.  In both 
cases, the commander reviews the incoming communications and responds by either 
issuing orders or by requesting further processing from the operator/analyst resource.  If 
further processing is requested, the operator inputs a query to the Compute block.  The 
following C2 Product attributes are assigned in this block: 
Type 6 = Queries to Compute 
Type 7 = ROE/Orders 
Type 9 = Approved Type 5 items 
 
Figure 7-21:  C2 Hierarchical Block 
7.4.1.3 Compute 
The Compute hierarchical block displayed in Figure 7-22 contains two 
product flow paths.  On the upper path, Compute receives Type 3 communications traffic 
from Comms In, assures the data, and then fuses it.  The processed data is transformed in 
various products that enable situational awareness, such as optimal resource pairings, 
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alternative courses of action, the common operating picture, and answers to operator 
queries.  Due to parallel processing, all the aforementioned products can be created 
simultaneously.  Items exiting from this flow path are assigned the Type 5 C2 Product 
attribute and are routed to the C2 block for commander review. 
In contrast, the lower Compute path receives approved C2 products from 
the C2 commander resource, transforming these items into customized operating pictures 
for each of the deployed units.  The following C2 Product attributes are assigned in  
this block: 
Type 5 = Situational Awareness (SA) 
Type 8 = Customized COPs 
 
Figure 7-22:  Compute Hierarchical Block 
7.4.1.4 Transmitting Communications 
The Comms Out hierarchical block is shown in Figure 7-23.  As in the 
Comms In block, items flowing through the Comms out portion of the model traverse one 
of three possible communications system routes:  LAN, land-based WMAN, or satellite 
WMAN.  The Comms Out block also contains the Data Capture functionality, which is 
described in Section 7.4.1.6. 
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Figure 7-23:  Comms Out Hierarchical Block 
7.4.1.5 Input Parameters 
In order to evaluate the four C4ISR concept options, input parameters are 
varied via the “C4I Options” Database.  As displayed in Figure 7-24, this database 
contains one record per concept option, and each record is comprised of 12 data input 
fields.  Record 1 represents APS, Record 2 represents AOO, Record 3 represents LPS, 
and Record 4 represents LOO.  The rationale for each of the parameter values follows. 
 
Figure 7-24:  C4ISR Options Database 
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The Node to Node parameter represents the message generation rate.  It is 
the amount of node to node communications per hour, and its units are in minutes.  
Message arrival time follows an exponential distribution and is in minutes.  Since four 
node to node messages per hour are estimated for Area control, items are randomly 
generated every 15 minutes for Options 1 and 2.  Local control requires twenty messages 
per hour; thus, items are randomly generated every 3 minutes for Option 3 and 4.  The 
increased communications rate represents the Local C2 nodes performing deconfliction 
among themselves via node to node message traffic.  Also, the NPS Tactical Network 
Topology Group (TNT) exercise communication logs81 are used to validate the amounts 
of messages generated per hour. 
The H.A. Orders parameter represents the generation rate of messages 
from higher authority.  This is the number of H.A. orders sent to MTR C4ISR system per 
hour.  As with the Node to Node parameter, the database value is the mean of the 
exponential distribution.  Thus, the 10 messages per hour for PS Options 1 and 3 are 
randomly generated every 6 minutes (on average), and the one message per hour for OO 
Options 2 and 4 is randomly generated every 60 minutes. 
The rate of Node Permission (or information) Requests parameter follows 
similar logic.  Generation rate is higher for PS command structure.  Messages are 
generated every 6 minutes for Options 1 and 3 and every 60 minutes for Options 2 and 4. 
The COP Creation activity delay parameter represents the processing time 
required to generate SA products.  There is a longer time delay for Area since there is 
much more data to process.  One minute is used for Area span of control (Options 1 and 
2); 0.5 minutes for Local Options 3 and 4. 
The COP Review time parameters represent the processing time of the 
human in the loop when presented with Compute SA products.  COP Review time 
follows a triangular distribution.  There is a longer time delay for Area since the humans 
in the loop are reviewing information for 20 PAVs, vice only 1 PAV for Local.  For Area 
Options 1 and 2, the minimum review time is 0.5 minutes, the most likely review time is 
2 minutes, and the maximum review time is 5 minutes.  For Local Options 3 and 4, the 
                                                 
81 R. Dash, B. Rideout, and B. Creigh, TNT 06-2 Groove Chat NPS TNT 06-2, (Winter 2006) and  
R. Dash, B. Rideout, and B. Creigh, TNT 06-2 Event Log NPS TNT 06-2, (Winter 2006). 
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minimum review time is 0.25 minutes, the most likely review time is 1 minute, and the 
maximum review time is 2 minutes. 
The COP Create parameter applies to the Area options only.  For Area 
options 1 and 2, this parameter represents the additional processing time required to 
create customized COPs for each of the 20 operating units.  For Local Options 3 and 4, 
this activity is not required and is therefore set to zero. 
Both the COP Unbatch and ROE/Orders Unbatch parameters apply only to 
Area control.  For Options 1 and 2, this parameter represents the 20 different sets of 
orders and customized COPs produced by the C4ISR system and sent to operational 
units.  For Local control (Options 3 and 4), this activity is not required and a single item 
is therefore issued at the Unbatch block output. 
The Comms In DE Select parameter represents the percentage of incoming 
message traffic that is received over the LAN.  Option 1 APS has the highest percentage 
(20%) due to the increased number of orders coming from higher authority.  Option 2 
AOO has a reduced percentage (10%), but is still able to receive some intelligence data 
via the LAN.  Both Local options receive all communications over the WMAN; 
therefore, this value is set to zero for Options 3 and 4. 
The final parameter, Comms Out DE Select, represents the percent of 
outgoing message traffic that is transmitted over the LAN.  Both Area options transmit 
only 10% over the LAN, while both Local options transmit over the LAN 90% of  
the time. 
These parameters are applied to the C4ISR model in concert with the 
concept option under evaluation via the Taguchi Runs database, a portion of which is 
shown in Figure 7-25.  The first column of the Taguchi Runs table represents the 
experiment number, while the values in the C4ISR column specify which C4ISR Options 
database record to apply during the 100 runs of the overall mission simulation. 
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Figure 7-25:  Taguchi Runs Database 
7.4.1.6 Data Capture 
In order to obtain initial C4ISR Delays table values, the C4ISR simulation 
is run for 1,000 time units (in this case, minutes), and processing delay data is captured 
for all four communications types at the culmination of the Comms Out process.  This 
portion of the model is provided in Figure 7-26.  From these data, Extend calculates the 
mean delay values, which are then manually recorded and used as initial values in the 
C4ISR Delays table.  This process is performed for each of the four C4ISR concept 
options.  Initial time delays are in minutes and are displayed in Table 7-20. 
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Figure 7-26:  Data Capture Portion of the C4ISR Model 
 Comms Type H.A. Order Node Request Intel Data Node to Node 
 Field # 1 2 3 4 
Area PS 25.1 24.9 19.8 0.060 
Area OO 9.5 9.9 7.3 0.054 









Local OO 6.7 7.2 3.05 0.047 
Table 7-20:  C4ISR Delay Table Initialization Values 
The C4ISR module is then run simultaneously with the mission models.  
During the simulation, a delay time is exported to the C4ISR Delays database, shown in  
Figure 7-27, as each item exits the simulation, overwriting the previous value.  The 
appropriate value from the C4ISR Delays table is pulled by the mission models whenever 
a C4ISR delay is required.  Type 3 communications are used to approximate the time to 




Figure 7-27:  C4ISR Delays Database 
7.4.1.7 C4ISR Insights 
This same model is used to generate an initial-orders time delay for all 
three mission models.  Because the model is not used to generate delays during 
operations, certain aspects of the C4ISR concept are not modeled.  Specifically, these are 
the wide area paging (WAP) system and the time critical COP update capability.  For the 
SBA mission, time criticality requires providing the most rapid dissemination of 
information in a way that immediately causes the operator to take notice.  Both WAP and 
COP updates can be employed to serve this purpose. 
In addition to meeting the need of the mission models, the C4ISR model 
provides some very interesting lessons learned in and of itself.  The most important 
discovery is the bottleneck in the C2 block at the upper commander review delay block.  
Despite the fact that review time for all incoming communications is limited to no more 
than 5 minutes, the queue preceding the upper commander review consistently grows 
without limit for the PS command structure.  After 1,000 time units (approximately  
17 hours), the delays begin to exceed the self-imposed 30-minute operational time delay.  
If the C4ISR module had been used for operational time delays in the larger mission 
models, the C4ISR system would not have provided the required near-unity probability of 
successfully producing products within the required time window.  While further division 
and delegation of command functions is certainly a possible solution to this queuing 
problem and could be modeled by increasing the number of resources in one or both of 
the resource pools, this bottleneck seems to clearly indicate that the OO structure better 
supports time critical operations.  By decreasing the percent of the time that the 
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commander’s attention is divided between requesting/giving permission and producing 
useful guidance products for the units under command, OO increases the likelihood that 
the commander will be able to produce high quality SA products in a timely fashion. 
Important C4ISR insights are also gained during the SBA war gaming 
exercise. First, war gaming shows that directly controlling more than one small boat in a 
PS fashion results in a lack of timely response to neutralize the threat.  Second, the 
exercise illustrates the necessity of being able to both see and hear own force actions.  A 
suspected small boat’s response to warnings provides important clues as to whether or 
not the boat is actually a threat.  If other units on the escort team are not privy to 
communications sent to suspected small boats, these clues provided by their actions are 
either missed or can be misinterpreted.  Lastly, the war game display screen indicates that 
there would be value in displaying warning and buffer zone boundaries on the COP, as 
well as using the color scheme to indicate the estimated threat level of all contacts. 
7.4.2 Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Mission Model 
 The WMD mission model consists primarily of an EXTENDTM model that 
accepts inputs and processes outputs from surrounding ExcelTM spreadsheets.  The 
spreadsheets are used for data storage and management as well as the processing of some 
lower level model functionality associated with certain stochastic Monte Carlo 
simulations performed in Excel.  The model is constructed and functions in a  
modular format. 
7.4.2.1 WMD Mission Database Module 
 The WMD Mission Database Module is where the various characteristics 
associated with each of the different potential system concepts are stored and drawn from 
during a simulation run.  For each specific experiment the WMD mission model is run 
100 times and then shifts characteristics to the parameters of the new experiment based 
on the information that it pulls out of the overall database.  The model could also be 
adjusted through manipulation of the database module such that the parameters and 
characteristics could be adjusted based on new information or to change the systems 
represented in any one experiment. 
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 The module itself consists of the Database Manager block in EXTENDTM.  
This block is connected to the Discrete Event Executive and serves as the principal 
interface to adjust parameters and record as well as retrieve data.  Throughout the model, 
Database Write blocks are used to take information generated within the model and post 
it into one of the tables.  Database Look-up blocks are used throughout the model to pull 
information from the tables in the database from the Database Manager at such times as 
the information is needed by different modules of the model.  Within the Database 
Manager is a Database Viewer, which allows access the different tables stored in the 
database.  As an example, the C4ISR model writes to the overall Database Manager the 
amount of time it takes for the MTR C4ISR system to process orders and respond to units 
in the field.  This information is posted to the “C4ISR Delays” table within the database.  
It is passed to a specific field (which in EXTENDTM parlance refers to columns in the 
table) depending on the type of delay in question.  For C4ISR, theses delays can be 
delays from higher authority requests, delays from operational unit requests to 
headquarters, initial delays in sending out orders to units once intelligence is received, or 
delays in processing communications between different operational units.  Depending on 
the type of C4ISR system selected by the experiment, in addition to what events are 
going on in the model at that time, the values written to those fields will vary.  When 
another element of the model needs the delay time associated with C4ISR decisions, it 
uses a Database Look-up block to pull the current delay time for orders processing out of 




Figure 7-28:  Database Manager and Viewer Interface in EXTENDTM 
To accomplish the experiment defined by the L32 orthogonal array as 
described in Section 7.1.2.1, there is a table within the database that consists of all of the 
values listed in Table 7-11.  As the simulation begins, the model seeks out the values that 
correspond to a given system concept from each of the different fields, C4ISR or 
PBS(1,2), as examples.  The model runs the first 100 times looking at the values in record 
one (in EXTENDTM parlance, rows are referred to as records).  These are the system 
concepts for experiment one in the orthogonal array.  By pulling out values that identify 
which system concept is being explored from this table, that information can be used as 
an input to draw out values associated with a given concept’s parameters from other 
tables.  After the first 100 runs of the simulation, the model will shift to examining record 
two for the second experiment, and so on, until it proceeds through all 32 experiments 
over the course of 3,200 simulation runs.  In this manner, the entire experiment can be 
performed without user involvement or interface.  Such a construct enables fairly simple 
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re-running of the experiment if modifications to system concept parameters and the like 
are desired or required. 
Following is an illustration of a situation within the Ship Intercept module 
of the WMD Mission model.  The simulation is assumed to be currently running trial 
number 754. The current run number is pulled out via a System Variable block.  The 
current run of 754 instructs the Database Look-up block to seek out the value in the 
eighth record (for runs 701 through 800).  The Database Look-up block is set to look-up 
the PBS(1,2) field in the eighth record.  In this case, based on the orthogonal array set-up, 
the value 2, associated with Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Maritime Security Cutter, is 
pulled out of the database.  This information tells the Ship Intercept module that LCS is 
the type of ship being used for this particular intercept.  The value of 2 also tells another 
Database Look-up to select the second record when it looks up the U.S. ship sprint speed.  
The second record returns a value of 45 knots associated with LCS in this case, which is 
then used in the calculation of the time for an intercept to occur and the location where 
such an intercept occurs. 
7.4.2.2 Potential Attack Vessel Generator Module 
The Potential Attack Vessel (PAV) Generator module is a fairly simple 
and straightforward.  As the simulation begins, 20 PAVs are generated by a Generator 
block.  They are then passed through a Set Attribute block, where their attributes are 
randomly assigned based on the results of a series of Input Random Number blocks at the 
beginning of each simulation run.  The values assigned to each attribute are intended to 
reflect the expected value that only 1 of the 20 PAVs will have a bomb onboard as well 
as all other attributes intended to reflect the representative characteristics of the  
trans-Pacific container shipping flight in terms of speeds, stops, and sizes.  The details of 
the different distributions are found listed in Table 7-21. 
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Random Attribute Value Generated Comment 
Does the PAV have a bomb 
onboard? 
0.95 probability of 0 (No bomb) 
0.05 probability of 1 (Bomb onboard the 
ship) 
On average, one vessel will 
contain a WMD device, but 
some runs will have no 
devices and some runs will 
have two or more devices, 
based on binomial 
distribution. 
How many containers does the ship 
carry? 
0.05 probability of 2,000 (Min) 
0.05 probability of 3,000 
0.05 probability of 4,000 
0.15 probability of 5,000 
0.30 probability of 6,000 (Mean) 
0.20 probability of 7,000 
0.10 probability of 8,000 
0.05 probability of 9,000 
0.05 probability of 10,000 (Max) 
Based on estimates of the 
actual distribution of ship 
sizes in the global merchant 
fleet, an empirical table 
generates discrete results 
with the parameters listed at 
left.82 
How many stops does the vessel 
make after leaving Singapore prior 
to heading to the West Coast of the 
United States? 
0.2 probability of 0 stops 
0.3 probability of 1 stop 
0.2 probability of 2 stops 
0.2 probability of 3 stops 
0.1 probability of 4 stops 
Based on review of typical 
shipping companies planned 
routes and schedules for 
vessels departing Singapore 
eventually en route to the 
United States. 
How fast is the vessel’s normal 
speed of advance? 
0.4 probability of 20 knots 
0.3 probability of 22 knots 
0.2 probability of 25 knots 
0.1 probability of 26 knots 
Based on analysis of typical 
shipping companies planned 
speeds of advance from 
route schedules. 
Table 7-21:  Random distributions of attributes assigned to each PAV per simulation run 
Following the assignment of attributes, the PAVs exit the module and 
enter the Ship Intercept Module.  The attribute assignment distributions are designed to 
be easily modified to reflect new or different assumptions as well as to change the size 
and scope of the problem. 
7.4.2.3 Ship Intercept Module 
 The Ship Intercept Module models the plotting of PAV track across the 
Pacific towards the United States, the readying of the U.S. ships to intercept them, and 
the actual intercept of the PAVs by their associated U.S. escorts. 
 The module begins with the calculation of the random times for each PAV 
to move through their intermediate stops, if they make any, en route to the United States.  
                                                 
82 The random ship sizes generated were adjusted to reflect anticipated increases in average size of 
container ships expected over the course of the next five years.  For some estimates of current ship size 
distribution for all container ships, see Rob Harrison, Does Size Matter?  The Potential Impacts of 
Megaship Operations on Gulf Port, The University of Texas at Austin, Center for Transportation Research, 
[http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~harrison/presentations_pdf/megaships.pdf], accessed on 13 March 2006. 
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The delay time of each PAV in any given en route port visit is follows a normal 
distribution with a mean of 12 hours and a standard deviation of 2 hours.  
Simultaneously, U.S. ships are readied to get underway once they receive word to surge 
in response.  The intelligence latency inhibits any efforts by U.S. ships to get ready until 
the latency has expired and they have received orders from the MTR C4ISR system to 
surge.  Upon receipt of orders, the ships will spend a variable amount of time preparing to 
get underway, usually distributed triangularly with a most likely time of 24 hours with a 
minimum time of 21 hours and a maximum time of 27 hours.  At the same time, the 
model can be set up to delay the ships’ departure until such time as a specialized search 
team arrives from the United States with its equipment.  This is normally selected to 
occur within the prescribed 24 hour requirement specified in the system. 
 As the PAVs begin to track across the Pacific, they are placed in queues 
placed appropriately for potential intercepts from the four different U.S. bases:  
Yokosuka, Japan; Kodiak, Alaska; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and San Diego, California.  The 
intercept priority begins with Yokosuka, then Kodiak, Pearl Harbor, and then finally  
San Diego.83  This priority scheme seeks to maximize the amount of time from intercept 
to the time of the PAV arrival in San Francisco.  If a priority base either runs out of 
possible interceptors or if a PAV has gotten far enough along in its track that it would 
make more sense to intercept it from a lower priority base, the PAV is moved to the next 
priority base from its current queue.  For example, once a PAV, traveling at normal 
speeds, is more than 300 nautical miles past Yokosuka on the great circle route towards 
San Francisco, an intercept will be culminated more quickly from a vessel on a closing 
intercept from Kodiak than from a vessel in a rundown intercept coming out of 
Yokosuka.  In similar fashion, PAVs are passed from the Kodiak queue to the  
Pearl Harbor queue to the San Diego queue.  Figure 7-29 shows the general great circle 
route of traffic from Singapore through the strait between Taiwan and the Philippines to 
                                                 
83 In initial iterations of the model, it was examined to use Guam as one of the U.S. intercept locations.  
Upon review of the tracks of the PAVs it was determined that Guam did not offer significant benefit versus 
intercepts originating out of Yokosuka, Japan.  This came as a result of study that indicated almost all 
trans-Pacific shipping traffic would venture towards the northern, great circle route rather than steering 
considerably south due to the excess time associated with the transit.  In addition, since no U.S. surface 
combatants were already home-ported in Guam, there would be additional cost in placing vessels there on a 
full-time basis.  For these reasons, Guam was removed from consideration as a potential staging base for 
MTR forces. 
159 
San Francisco along with the locations of the primary interceptor bases.  Table 7-22 
displays the available number of ships assumed to be at each base. 
Staging Base Ships 
Yokosuka, Japan 2 Cruisers, 
5 Destroyers, 
2 Frigates 
- Alternately, 9 LCSs or 1 Car Carrier 
- 4 in-port available 
- 5 at-sea, recalled within 72 hours 
Kodiak, Alaska 2 High Endurance Cutters 
- Alternately, 2 Maritime Security Cutters 
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 3 Cruisers, 
6 Destroyers, 
2 Frigates 
- Alternately, 11 LCSs or 1 Car Carrier 
- 50% of ships assumed deployed and unavailable 
San Diego, California 6 Cruisers, 
14 Destroyers, 
4 Frigates 
- Alternately, 24 LCSs or 1 Car Carrier 
- 50% of ships assumed deployed and unavailable 
Table 7-22:  Ship Availability at Each Staging Base 
 The logic of flow from one queue to the next lower queue is a function of 
one of the following events:  1) there are no more intercept vessels located in the priority 
intercept base that may surge to intercept the PAV in question; and 2) the PAV reaches 
such a point in its track across the Pacific that the intercept will be culminated more 
expeditiously from the lower priority base than the higher priority base.  The latter 
typically occurs when intelligence is highly latent or a U.S. interceptor vessel is 
abnormally late to respond to its tasking to surge to intercept the PAV.  In either case, the 
PAV is not held in the queue unless there is a chance that an optimized intercept can take 
place from the location in question. 
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Figure 7-29:  Great Circle Route, Singapore to San Francisco, with U.S. Intercept Bases 
The intercept equations resident in the Ship Intercept module compute the 
time it takes to consummate an intercept and the distance that the PAV travels during the 
course of the intercept.  This enables computation of how much time there is between the 
time at which a U.S. vessel arrives to escort the PAV to the time at which the PAV 
arrives in San Francisco.  It is assumed that once a U.S. vessel closes within 100 nautical 
miles of San Francisco that the search team can be ferried to the PAV via helicopter.  The 
speeds for the PAVs and the U.S. vessels are adjusted from their normal cruising and 
sprint speeds according to the sea state that is output from the Sea State module discussed 






Container Search module discussed in Section 7.2.2.4, which determines if any PAV is 
delayed from its normal arrival time in San Francisco because the container search of its 
cargo has not been completed. 
7.4.2.4 Container Search Module 
 Once a PAV has been intercepted by a U.S. escort vessel, it is sent to the 
Container Search module of the overall WMD model.  As it enters the module, the ship is 
checked to determine if there is a WMD device onboard from the Ship Generation 
module.  If there is, the module randomly determines which of the containers onboard 
contains the actual device. 
 The PAV itself as an item in the discrete event simulation is then 
converted into a given number of containers based on the number of containers 
determined in the Ship Generation module.  This process helps with the flow of the 
model and will enable the group of containers to be converted back into a ship to exit the 
module once all the containers have been searched. 
 Using Database Look-up blocks, the probability of detection, probability 
of false alarm, dwell (or integration) time for the type of detector selected for the given 
experiment, and the number of detectors per team are pulled out of the Database 
Manager.  These variables drive the performance of the search team in the module itself. 
 The probability of detection for each detector is obtained either from 
external agencies or from a Monte Carlo simulation run in Excel to determine the 
probability of detection of a given type of WMD device against a given detector at a 
given range.  The Monte Carlo simulation in Excel is provided by Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory.84 
For some of the detectors considered, a probability of false alarm of 0.01 
has been used as a basis for setting the threshold for detection.  As a result, an expected 
                                                 
84 The Excel spreadsheets were provided by Dr. Thomas B. Gosnell.  For information regarding his 
efforts in modeling probabilities of detection for different types of detectors against different types of 
nuclear devices at different ranges, see Thomas B. Gosnell, “The Challenges of Passive Detection of Fissile 
Material:  Analytic Methods for Nuclear Nonproliferation and National Security,” presentation given at 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 28 July 2005; and Thomas B. Gosnell, “Statistical 
Considerations for Nuclear Search:  Determination of the Maximum Detection Range of a Radiological 
Monitoring Instrument,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Report UCRL-TR-200393,  
October 2003, pp. 5-49. 
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number of 60 false alarms per 6,000 container ships, using a single look search doctrine, 
is considered unacceptable.  By applying a “two out of three required” detections 
approach prior to declaring a valid detection, the probability of false alarm for any one 
container could be reduced to 0.000298, with an expected value of 1.78 containers false 
alarming per 6,000 containers searched.85  Figure 7-30 shows the number of false alarms 
for each 6,000 container ship searched. 
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Figure 7-30:  PDF of Number of False Alarms per 6,000 Containers 
The same look doctrine increases the net probability of detection from the 
single-look probability of detection, since a target can be missed once and still be 
detected as long as it is seen on the other two looks.  In this manner, the overall 
probability of detection for a detector whose single-look probability of detection is 0.9 
will be 0.972.86 
                                                 
85 The 2 out of 3 look doctrine turns the false alarm probability into a binomial distribution with 3 total 
trials, a probability of success (false alarm) of 0.01, and a requirement to have either 2 or 3 successes.  
When this is calculated, the probability becomes 0.000298.  Once again trade studies were conducted to 
determine the appropriate number of trials and required number of successes within those trials. 
86 The same logic applies to probability of detection.  A binomial distribution with 3 total trials, a 
probability of success of 0.9, and a requirement to have 2 or 3 successes yields a net probability of 
detection of 0.972. 
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The default value stored in the database is for a search team consisting of 
six passive detector teams per PAV.  Figure 7-31 shows the predicted time to search 
container ships of varying sizes with six or nine passive detectors, assuming a 180-s 
dwell time and a two-out-of-three look doctrine.  Since intelligence latency of less than 
210 hours affords at least 100 hours of search time on average, six detector teams are 
found to be sufficient.87 
The Container Search module then processes each container, simulating 
the passive detections against each container, whether it contains a WMD device or not.  
Once every container has been passively searched, the model reconverts the group of 
containers into a ship and evaluates the elapsed time.  If the elapsed time exceeds the 
time available to the 100-nautical mile point from San Francisco, the ship will be 
considered delayed at that point and the delay time is calculated in economic cost.  If the 
elapsed time is less than the time available to the 100-nautical mile point, the ship will be 
considered completely searched in such time to avoid any delay and no delay cost was 
assessed to the system. 
If a WMD device is present on the ship in question but not passively 
detected, then the system has failed to perform and the WMD device is allowed to reach 
San Francisco.  This is a more conservative estimate than would actually occur, since the 
concept of operations involves attempting identification of any containers that were 
assessed via manifest to contain potential sources of naturally occurring radioactive 
materials (NORM) as well as any other containers thought to be suspicious based on prior 
intelligence-gathering and analysis of the registered contents.  As such, it is estimated 
that the system would have a chance to stop some WMD that the model otherwise 
calculated as having made it through without detection. 
                                                 
87 Trade studies were performed between mean time required to conduct the search based on dwell 
time, number of containers found on a ship, and “look doctrine” selected in terms of number of queries 
performed on any given container and number of positive replies required before a “hit” was considered to 
have been made upon the container in question.  Based on a series of analyses, it was determined that six 
passive detectors would be sufficient to cover an entire vessel in the amount of time typically afforded by 
the surge deployment scheme. 
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PREDICTED PASSIVE EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH TIME 
BASED UPON 180 SECOND DWELL TIME AND A 2 OUT OF 






























Figure 7-31:  Predicted Search Time as a Function of the Number of Containers and Detector Teams 
7.4.2.5 Sea State Generator Module 
The Pacific Ocean encompasses an enormous amount of the surface of the 
earth and has widely disparate conditions across its entirety.  Significant weather in the 
form of high sea states are often encountered, particularly when transiting the northern 
reaches of the Pacific as is done on a great circle route between East Asia and  
North America.  As such, it is expected that U.S. ships proceeding to intercept as well as 
the container ships themselves will be slowed from their normal sprint and  
cruising speeds. 
 The module employs the concepts implemented in the model of a previous 
Systems Engineering and Analysis cohort examining the problems of Joint Expeditionary 
Logistics.88  The module adjusts existing sea states over time and then varies the impact 
of such sea states on the ship speed.  For a surface combatant traveling at a nominal  
20 knots wave height generally reduces the ship speed by between 5% (for a 4-ft wave 
                                                 
88 Matthew Boensel and David Shrady, “JELO:  A Model of Joint Expeditionary Logistics 
Operations,” Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report NPS-OR-05-001, Monterey, CA, October 2004, 
pp. 4-42. 
165 
height) and 60% (for a 28-ft wave height) 89  Generally, the sea state is updated every six 
hours, but for modeling purposes, the speeds of the PAVs and the intercept ships are set 
at the beginning of each phase throughout the intercept model.  For the PAVs, this 
consists of when they depart Singapore for their first stop and subsequent stops, when 
they have left their last port prior to transiting the Pacific before being intercepted, and 
when they have been intercepted and are en route to San Francisco being escorted by a 
U.S. vessel.  The same methodology applies to the approximation of the reduction in the 
speed of the U.S. vessels as a function of wave height, as the U.S. vessels are affected to 
a greater degree than are the larger container vessels. 
7.4.2.6 WMD Mission Model Results Administration 
 The simulation results, stored in Excel, indicate whether or not a bomb has 
been allowed to enter the United States without detection and identification and include 
the delay cost associated with the time required to complete the search of each individual 
ship.  The simulation results for each experiment are then used in the calculation of the 
overall mission probability of success (number of successes in 100 trials) and the average 
delay cost associated with each of the 32 experiments.  These outputs are used to obtain 
the response calculated in MINITAB 14 for purposes of identifying the “best” systems in 
terms of effectiveness as discussed in Section 7.5.  These same outputs, combined with 
the cost analysis as discussed in Section 7.6, make up the cost-effectiveness results as 
discussed in Section 7.7. 
7.4.3 Ship as a Weapon (SAW) Mission Model 
 The Ship as a Weapon (SAW) model bears strong resemblance to the WMD 
model and is built using the WMD model as the baseline.  The primary differences 
between the two models reside in activities that occur once a U.S. ship has intercepted  
a PAV. 
                                                 
89 Charts depicting such impacts are available on-line at Naval Meteorology and Oceanography 
Operational Support Web, [https://www.cnmoc.navy.mil/nmosw/thh_nc/gendisc/graphics/fig1-4.gif], 
accessed on 17 January 2006. 
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7.4.3.1 SAW Mission Database Module 
 The Database module for SAW is very similar to the WMD Database 
module.  The difference lies in the storage of information pertaining to the specifics of 
the SAW mission in terms of the actions and characteristics of the potential terrorists 
onboard a PAV as well as the U.S. search and escort teams coming onboard.  
Specifically, the database includes the normally distributed random time required to 
search a PAV per ton of ship size, the exponentially distributed number of casualties that 
blue forces will suffer during insertion onto the PAV and during Close Quarter Battle 
(CQB) with the terrorists, the probability of successful recapture of a seized PAV, the 
amount of damage in economic cost suffered by the ship during CQB between blue 
forces and terrorists as well as during non-lethal disabling, the probability of U.S. forces 
successfully disabling a PAV, along with the time from San Francisco when the terrorists 
would choose to seize the PAV, the number of terrorists onboard the ship, the reaction of 
terrorists to the attempted boarding of U.S. forces, as well as the relative capabilities of 
terrorists versus blue forces for use in Lanchester attrition equations used during CQB 
(Close Quarter Battle).  The use of the Database module as an interface between other 
modules and lower-level models remains the same as in the WMD model. 
7.4.3.2 Potential Attack Vessel Generator Module 
 The Potential Attack Vessel Generator Module is almost identical to that 
in the WMD model.  The only difference is that, rather than determining the existence of 
a WMD device onboard a given ship, the module randomly determines the presence of a 
terrorist cell onboard each ship.  As in the WMD model, every ship has a 5% chance of 
having a terrorist cell onboard.  The potential numbers of ships with terrorists onboard 
out of 20 are depicted in Figure 7-32. 
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Figure 7-32:  Probability Density Function of Commandeered Ships 
7.4.3.3 Ship Intercept Module 
 The Ship Intercept module is the Ship Intercept Module in the WMD 
mission model. 
7.4.3.4 Ship Search and Engagement Module 
 The biggest difference between the WMD model and the SAW model 
occurs in the Ship Search and Engagement Module once U.S. forces have arrived on the 
scene of a PAV.  The manner in which they arrive is dependent upon the Finish(2) option 
selected for a given experiment or architecture.  In Finish(2) Option 1, such arrival occurs 
by ship intercept in the exact same manner as in the WMD model.  The PAV is 
intercepted by a U.S. ship and a Search and Escort team is conveyed onto the PAV to 
search the ship.  In Finish(2) Option 2, the arrival occurs when a Search and Escort team 
is conveyed onto the PAV with the Harbor Pilot prior to reaching the Golden Gate Bridge 
and the mouth of San Francisco Bay. 
 When the U.S. team arrives onboard the PAV, the first thing that the 
module determines is whether or not terrorists are onboard.  If no terrorists are onboard, 
the U.S. team is allowed to board without incident and the ship proceeds through the 
model, typically without any delay.  If the terrorists are onboard, the model determines 
whether or not they have already seized control of the ship prior to the arrival of  
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U.S. forces.  If the terrorists have already seized control when U.S. forces arrive, the 
terrorists will automatically resist the insertion of U.S. forces onto the vessel. 
 If the terrorists are onboard, but are not yet in control of the vessel, their 
response to the introduction of U.S. forces depends upon a random distribution to 
determine their reaction.  They will either remain covert and attempt to avoid detection or 
attempt to resist at that point and forcibly resist the boarding by U.S. forces.  If they do 
remain covert, the U.S. forces will not suffer any casualties during the insertion.  If they 
expose themselves and resist, the U.S. forces may suffer casualties during the insertion 
and then will commence CQB with the terrorists with the surviving forces from  
the insertion. 
 If the terrorists remain covert during insertion, the U.S. forces will 
continue to search the vessel and perform screening of all personnel onboard the vessel in 
accordance with the concept of operations for finding terrorists.  Once they come across 
the terrorists, if any, CQB between the U.S. forces and the terrorists commences. 
 If the terrorists are already in control of the PAV or if they choose to resist 
the insertion of the U.S. forces even if they were not yet in control, the model routes the 
situation based on the selection for Finish(2) option for the given experiment.  If Option 1 
is selected, the U.S. forces will continue to attempt to insert under fire and then attempt to 
recapture the vessel by killing or capturing all of the terrorists.  If Option 2 is selected, 
the U.S. forces will withdraw from the vessel, abandon efforts to insert themselves, and 
then use quasi nonlethal means to disable the ship by damaging its rudders and 
propellers.  If the first attempt to disable fails, the model determines if sufficient time is 
available to attempt to disable the vessel again; if time is not available, the model 
assesses that the terrorists have succeeded in getting a ship as a weapon into  
San Francisco Bay. 
 If Option 1 is selected, the model proceeds to simulate the flow of events 
as depicted in Figure 7-33.  The amount of time taken to board as well as the casualties 
suffered during insertion is calculated.  From there, a Lanchester attrition differential 
equation in the Engagement module is implemented to determine numbers of casualties 
on each side during the ensuing CQB between the U.S. forces and the terrorists.  The 
model assumes a “fight to the finish” mentality such that whichever side is reduced to 
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zero is considered the losing side and the other side becomes the winning side of the 
CQB.  If the U.S. forces are the winners of the CQB, the ship is considered recaptured 
and the model simply calculates the amount of damage suffered by the ship in  
economic cost. 
 If the terrorists are the winning side in the CQB, the model then enables 
the U.S. forces to attempt to disable the PAV.  If the PAV is successfully disabled, 
damage cost due to disabling is calculated and the ship is considered no longer a threat.  
The model does not pursue events that would take place subsequent to the successful 
disabling of a merchant vessel with terrorists still onboard and potentially in control of 
the ship. 
 If the PAV is not successfully disabled and sufficient time is not available 
to re-attempt disabling, the ship is considered to have successfully penetrated  



































































Figure 7-33:  EXTENDTM Ship Recapture Submodel of Ship Search and Engagement Module 
7.4.3.5 SAW Mission Model Results Administration 
 Once each run of the simulation is completed, the results are sent to an 
Excel spreadsheet.  The results indicate whether or not a ship in terrorist control has been 
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allowed to enter the United States and include the amount of damage cost associated with 
the clearing, recapture, and/or disabling of each ship under terrorist control or with 
terrorists onboard.  The results from the 100 simulation runs for each experiment are then 
used to calculate the overall mission probability of success (number of successes in  
100 runs) and the average damage cost associated with each of the 32 experiments.  
These outputs are used as inputs to calculate the response in MINITAB 14 for purposes 
of identifying the “best” systems in terms of effectiveness as discussed in Section 7.3.  
These same outputs, combined with the cost analysis as discussed in Section 7.4, make 
up the cost-effectiveness results as discussed in Section 7.5. 
7.4.4 Small Boat Attack (SBA) Mission Model 
 The SBA mission model consists primarily of an EXTENDTM model that accepts 
inputs based on the different system concepts being modeled.  The SBA model simulates 
a high-value target being attacked by a small boat attacker.  MTR forces are assumed to 
be either 100% or 0% effective.  The MTR forces are 100% effective when they 
successfully stop the small boat attacker before it hits the high value target.  The MTR 
forces are 0% effective when the small boat attacker hits the high-value target. 
7.4.4.1 SBA Mission Database Module 
 The various characteristics associated with each of the different potential 
system concepts are stored in and drawn from the SBA Mission Database Module during 
the course of a simulation run.  For each specific experiment 2,000 simulation runs are 
made, the values of the parameters for each experiment are pulled out of the  
overall database. 
 The module itself consists of the Database Manager block in EXTENDTM.  
This block is connected to the Discrete Event Executive and serves as the principal 
interface to adjust parameters and record as well as retrieve data.  Throughout the model, 
Database Write blocks are used to take information generated within the model and post 
it into one of the tables.  Database Look-Up blocks are used throughout the model to pull 
information from the tables in the database from the Database Manager at such times as 
the information is needed by different modules of the model.  Within the Database 
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Manager is a Database Viewer which enables one to access the different tables stored in 
the database. 
To accomplish the experiment defined by the L32 orthogonal array, there is 
a table within the database that consists of all of the values listed in Table 7-11.  As the 
execution of the model begins, it obtains the values that correspond to a given system 
concept from each of the different fields, C4ISR or PBS(3), as examples.  The model runs 
the first 2,000 times looking at the values in record one (in EXTENDTM parlance, rows 
are referred to as records).  These are the system concepts for experiment one in the 
orthogonal array.  By pulling out values that identify which system concept is being 
explored from this table, that information can be used as an input to draw out values 
associated with a given concept’s parameters from other tables.  After the first 2,000 runs 
of the simulation, the model will shift to examining record two for the second 
experiment, and so on, until it proceeds through all 32 experiments over the course of 
64,000 simulation runs.  In this manner, the entire experiment can be performed without 
user involvement or interface until the data analysis phase after experiment completion.  
Such a construct enables fairly simple re-running of the experiment if modifications are 
desired or required to system concept parameters and the like.  To see how this is carried 
out in practice within the model, an example is discussed for the WMD mission in 
Section 7.4. 
7.4.4.2 Initial Orders Module 
 The first module in the SBA mission model is the Initial Orders Module.  
Within this module, the initial orders are given to the MTR forces via the C4ISR Module.  
Depending upon the C4ISR alternative being modeled, there are four different time 
delays associated with the action of giving initial orders.  Initial orders are given upon 
receipt of intelligence that a small boat attack might occur.  If the SBA takes place before 
or in the time it takes to give the initial orders, to assemble and prepare teams and 
platforms, and to deploy the forces, then the MTR system will be unsuccessful in 
stopping the attack.  However, if the SBA is generated after initial orders are given, teams 
and platforms have been assembled and prepared, and the forces have been deployed, 
then the MTR system has a chance to succeed in stopping the attack. 
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7.4.4.3 Small Boat Attacker Generator Module 
 The small boat attacker is created using a Generator block.  The small boat 
attacker is given an initial attacking distance from the high-value target.  This distance 
represents the range at which the small boat attacker will begin their attack.  The distance 
follows a normal distribution with mean of 500 yards and standard deviation of  
150 yards.  The distance may then be adjusted depending on the PBS(3) and Finish(3) 
alternatives for that given run.  The initial attacking distance will increase by the amounts 
shown in Table 7-23 for each of the alternatives. 





Table 7-23:  Change in initial attacking distance based on PBS(3) and Finish(3) alternatives 
The output of this module is the small boat attacker with an adjusted initial 
attacking distance.  The Small Boat Attacker Generator Module sends the small boat 
attacker to the Helicopter Engagement Module, if the given alternative includes a 
helicopter in the MTR force structure.  If there is no helicopter, then the Small Boat 
Attacker Generator Module sends the small boat attacker to the MTR Escorts or Teams 
Onboard Engagement Module. 
7.4.4.4 Helicopter Engagement Module 
 The input to this module is the small boat attacker with adjusted initial 
starting distance.  The MTR forces are given time to identify and classify the small boat 
attacker.  If the Find/Fix(3) alternative is visual only, then the MTR forces need  
10 seconds to identify and classify the small boat attacker.  If the Find/Fix(3) alternative 
is visual and radar, then the MTR forces only need 5 seconds to identify and classify the 
small boat attacker. 
 The small boat attacker is then taken through a series of decisions 
depending on how much distance remains between the small boat attacker and the  
high-value target before the small boat attacker impacts the high-value target.  This 
distance is determined using the following equation, assuming that the small boat 
attacker’s speed is 40 knots at all times during their attack, 
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Remaining Distance Initial Distance (40 ) (Elapsed Time)knots= − ∗  
The first decision is whether or not there is enough remaining distance to allow the 
helicopter to warn and/or engage the small boat attacker.  If there is not enough distance, 
then the Helicopter Engagement Module outputs the small boat attacker to the MTR 
Escorts or Teams Onboard Engagement Module.  If there is enough distance, then a 
decision is made as to whether or not enough distance remains to give a non-lethal 
warning to the small boat attacker.  If there is enough distance, the helicopter is given  
10 seconds to carry out the nonlethal warning.  If the Finish(3) alternative being modeled 
includes USVs, then the MTR forces only need 5 seconds to carry out the  
nonlethal warning. 
 After the nonlethal warning takes place or if there is not enough distance 
for a non-lethal warning, the helicopter fires lethal warning shots at the small boat 
attacker for 5 seconds.  If the Finish(3) alternative being modeled includes USVs, then 
the MTR forces only need 2.5 seconds to fire lethal warning shots at the small boat 
attacker.  The next decision is whether or not there is enough distance remaining for the 
helicopter to lethally engage.  If there is not enough distance remaining, then the 
Helicopter Engagement Module sends the small boat attacker to the MTR Escorts or 
Teams Onboard Engagement Module for lethal engagement by the MTR escorts or teams 
located onboard the high-value target.  If there is enough distance remaining, the 
helicopter lethally engages the small boat attacker. 
 The chance that the helicopter kills the small boat attacker is determined 
by the amount of distance over which the helicopter can engage.  If the small boat 
attacker is closer than 1,200 yards from the high value unit, then the probability of kill is 
61%.  If the small boat attacker is greater than 1,200 yards, then the probability of kill is 
91%.  If the small boat attacker gets killed by the helicopter, then the SoS is 100% 
effective for that run.  If the helicopter does not kill the small boat attacker after lethal 
engagement, then the Helicopter Engagement Module sends the small boat attacker to the 
MTR Escorts or Teams Onboard Engagement Module. 
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7.4.4.5 MTR Escorts or Teams Onboard Engagement Module 
The input to this module is the small boat attacker either just after being 
generated or after exiting the Helicopter Engagement Module for those architecture 
alternatives that involve a helicopter.  This module resembles the Helicopter Engagement 
Module in that there are a series of decisions made based on the remaining distance 
between the small boat attacker and the high-value target after identifying and classifying 
the small boat attacker.  The MTR forces are given 10 seconds to identify and classify the 
small boat attacker if the Find/Fix alternative being modeled is visual detection only and 
5 seconds if the Find/Fix alternative is visual and radar detection.  A decision is then 
made as to whether or not there is enough distance remaining between the small boat 
attacker and the high-value unit for MTR forces to nonlethally warn the small boat 
attacker.  If there is enough distance, then the MTR forces take 10 seconds to nonlethally 
warn the small boat attacker.  If the architecture alternative includes USVs, then the MTR 
forces need only 5 seconds to do the nonlethal warning.  If the entity being nonlethally 
warned happened to be an innocent boater, then it would be deterred by the nonlethal 
warning and would not continue driving toward the high-value unit.  If there is not 
enough distance or if the nonlethal warning is unsuccessful, then a decision is made as to 
whether or not there is enough distance to carry out a non-lethal engagement on the small 
boat attacker.  If there is enough distance, then the MTR forces will spend 10 seconds 
carrying out a nonlethal engagement.  If the entity being nonlethally engaged happened to 
be an innocent boater, then they would be deterred by the nonlethal engagement and 
would not continue driving toward the high-value unit. 
 The next decision determines whether or not enough distance remains to 
lethally warn the small boat attacker.  If there is enough distance, then the MTR forces 
will lethally warn the small boat attacker for 5 seconds or 2.5 seconds for alternatives 
which have USVs.  Again, if the entity being lethally warned happened to be an innocent 
boater, then they would be deterred by the lethal warning and would not continue driving 
toward the high value unit.  If there is not enough distance for lethal warning or if lethal 
warning fails, then the MTR forces lethally engage the small boat attacker once they are 
within 500 yards of the high-value unit.  The chance that the MTR forces will be able to 
kill the small boat attacker depends on the remaining distance between the small boat 
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attacker and the high-value unit and the corresponding probability of kill values for the 
architecture alternative being modeled.  Table 7-24 contains the probability of kill values 
as input to this module. 
PBS(3) Alternative Pkill for 50 to 200 yards Pkill for 200 to 500 yards 
1 0.4557 0.6158 
2 0.3841 0.6531 
3 0.612 0.7433 
4 0.3378 0.6491 
Table 7-24:  Probability of kill for a given range of engagement and PBS(3) alternative 
If the small boat attacker is within 50 yards of the high-value unit, then the 
MTR forces do not have enough time to lethally engage the attacker so the SoS will be 
0% effective for that simulation run. 
7.4.4.6 SBA Delay to Commerce Module and Results 
 An EXTENDTM model is used to determine the number of hours of delay 
that MTR forces would inflict on ferries and tankers traveling within the area of 
operations.  The goal is to determine the most cost-effective number of escort teams.  
Inputs to the model include the number of days that the operation will last, the number of 
ferries that need to be escorted, and the number of oil tankers that need to be escorted. 
 There are three types of units simulated in the EXTENDTM model:  eight 
ferries traveling between the hours of 0700 and 1900 everyday; five oil tankers per day, 
equally spaced throughout each 24-hour period; and the escort teams available each day.  
The number of teams available is dependent on the MTR force structure and is varied to 
see the impact of adding or subtracting teams from the MTR forces.  The variables are 
the number of escort teams available each day and the number of days over which the 
operations take place.  The concept of operation for the MTR forces in the simulation is 
to give oil tankers priority for escorting.  That is, if an escort teams become available and 
there is an oil tanker and a ferry requiring an escort, the escort team will choose the oil 
tanker to escort.  This choice is based on the fact that the impact to commerce due to 
delaying an oil tanker is greater than the impact to commerce due to delaying a ferry.  
Given the fixed number of oil tankers and ferries each day, the number of escorts 
required to cause zero delay to either the oil tankers or the ferries is 13. 
176 
 Additional inputs to the model include the amount of time required to 
escort each oil tanker and each ferry.  Assuming that the ferries run constantly from  
0700 to 1900 everyday, they will each need to be escorted for the entire 12-hour period.  
The model assumes that each oil tanker needs to be escorted for 10 hours. 
 The simulation results from the SBA Delay to Commerce Module indicate 
that the delay times to commerce decrease as the number of escort teams increase.   
Figure 7-34 shows the total hours of delay to oil tankers, given the number of days over 
which the operation takes place and the number of escort teams available.  Figure 7-35 
shows the total hours of delay to ferries given the number over which the operation takes 
place and the number of escort teams available. 






















Figure 7-34:  Delay to oil tankers given the number of days over which the operation takes place and 
the number of available escort teams 
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Figure 7-35:  Delay to ferries given the number of days over which the operation takes place and the 
number of available escort teams 
 The outputs of the SBA Delay to Commerce Module are used in the cost 
analysis to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of alternative architectures as discussed in 
Sections 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7. 
7.4.4.7 SBA Mission Model Administration 
 Once each run of the simulation is completed, the results are sent to an 
Excel spreadsheet.  The results indicate whether or not the MTR forces were successful 
in stopping the small boat attacker from carrying out their attack.  Additionally, the SBA 
Delay Commerce Module results are used to determine the most cost-effective number of 
escort teams to use.  As each experiment is run 2,000 times, this enables calculation of 
overall mission probability of success (number of successes in 2,000 trials) associated 
with each of the 32 experiments.  These outputs are used as inputs to the response 
function in MINITAB 14 for purposes of identifying the “best” systems in terms of 
effectiveness as discussed in Section 7.5.  These same outputs, combined with the cost 
analysis as discussed in Section 7.6, make up the cost-effectiveness results as discussed 
in Section 7.7. 
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7.4.5 Sustain Module 
Four Sustain functional models—Ship Fuel Consumption Model, Watch Team 
Sleep Analysis Model, Small Boat Availability and Reliability Model, and Helicopter 
Availability and Reliability Model—are created to evaluate mission CONOPS and 
determine logistical requirements for the different architectures. 
7.4.5.1 WMD/SAW Mission Ship Fuel Consumption Model (ShiFCoM) 
The purpose of the WMD/SAW mission ship fuel consumption model is 
to determine the following: 
1) Maximum sprint speed of ships transiting from each of the four homeports 
to intercept target container ships while maintaining sufficient fuel 
reserves to escort a container ship eastward for up to 24 hours. 
2) Approximate percentage of fuel remaining after sprinting to intercept a 
container ship, by ship class. 
3) Choice of ships to use from each port ranking maximum sprint speed and 
amount of fuel consumed during mission. 
Assumptions 
Ships executing the WMD/SAW mission are berthed in various home ports.  
Upon receipt of intelligence pertaining to the WMD or terrorist transport ships, selected 
national fleet assets (i.e., U.S. Navy and USCG) ships get underway and sprint to 
intercept target ships.  Simultaneously a nominal value of 72 hours is assigned for the 
latency of the intelligence.  Military Sealift Command (MSC) refueling ships  
(i.e., T-AO class) get underway and sprint to rendezvous to conduct underway 
replenishment (UNREP).  Within 24 hours, after the container ships have been 
intercepted, it will take up to 24 hours after intercept of target ship to rendezvous with the 
MSC ship for refueling.  A transit speed of 21.9 knots is assumed for the escort portion of 
the mission (Table 7-30). 
Table 7-5 lists the home ports and the force distributions from which military 
ships will begin the WMD mission. 
Based on the modular nature of LCS, it is assumed an additional fuel storage tank 
can be installed into the LCS mission module bay.  The resulting LCS is titled “LCS+.”  
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The additional fuel tank has a capacity of 10% of the volume available within the normal 
General Dynamics LCS mission module bay.90 
Method 
Amount of fuel consumed for each ship class is calculated using the following 
equation:91 
Fuel consumed (Kgal) = fuel consumption rate @ sprint speed (Kgal/hr) x 
distance traveled (NM)/sprint speed (NM/hr). 
The percentage of fuel remaining in a military ship’s tanks once it has intercepted 
its assigned container ship are calculated using the following equation:92 
Fuel remaining (%) = fuel consumed during sprint (Kgal)/maximum fuel capacity 
(Kgal). 
Equation 1 is used to calculate fuel consumption rate-curves for CG-47, DDG-51, 
FFG-7, and AOE-1 class ships;93 Equation 2 is used for WMSL and WHEC-378 class 
ships.94  The U.S. Army Vessel (USAV) Joint Venture HSV-X1 ship was utilized as an 
analogous ship class to estimate fuel consumption rate data for the LCS-class ship.  
Equation 3 is used for the LCS-class ship.95  The T-AO-187 Henry Kaiser-class MSC 
ship was utilized as an analogous ship class to estimate fuel consumption rate data for the 
modified merchant TOTE-Orca-class ship listed in Table 7-6.  Equation 1 is used to 
calculate fuel consumption rate curve (Figure 7-37) for the modified merchant class 
TOTE-Orca ships.  Coefficients and assumptions for variables for each ship class are 
shown in Table 7-25. 
 Equation 1:  Kgal/hr = b0 + b1 * exp(b2 * (speed/100)^3) 
Equation 2:  Kgal/hr = b0 + b1*exp(b2*speed) 
                                                 
90 Data based on Bath Iron Works – A General Dynamics Company, “Fact Sheet:  General Dynamics 
Littoral Combat Ship,” [http://www.gdbiw.com], 27 May 2004, accessed on 6 April 2006. 
91 Additional fuel required for intercept maneuvering is not considered. 
92 No reserve capacity for unexpected operations is considered. 
93 D.A. Schrady, G.K. Smyth, and R.B. Vassian, Predicting Ship Fuel Consumption:  Update, Naval 
Postgraduate School, July 1996. 
94 Integrated Coast Guard Systems, S012-07, NSC Endurance Fuel Calculation, 9 March 2005; and  
E. Diehl and W. McCarthy, “Summary of Cutter Energy Management Audit Results and 
Recommendations,” U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development, CG-D-14-00, May 2000. 
95 David D. Rudko, “Logistical Analysis of the Littoral Combat Ship,” Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2003. 
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Equation 3:  Kgal/hr = b0 + b1*displacement + b2*speed^3 + b3*average  
wave height 
Coefficient AOE CG-47 DDG-51 FFG-7 LCS WHEC-378 NSC 
b0 –27553.4 –1429.04 –764.433 –545.716 –7997.87 0 0
b1 27821.2 2215.39 1379.62 951.117 3.281 27.127 43.329
b2 12.2579 37.4831 51.5925 51.8843 0.129 0.1769 0.1386
b3      647.403    
full displacement (long tons)      1671.4    
average wave height (feet)      6    
Table 7-25:  Fuel consumption rate-curve coefficients and variable assumptions 
 Ship Intercept Module data provides mean distance (and standard deviation) 
military ships must travel to intercept the container ships.  These two metrics are input 
into the ShiFCoM model to calculate maximum sprint speed to intercept container ships, 
based on ship’s home port.96  95% confidence intervals are calculated based on two 
standard deviations surrounding the mean.  The upper and lower confidence intervals 
bracket 95% variation in the expected distance ships must travel to conduct the mission, 
based on a normal distribution of trials.97  Applying the ship fuel consumption rate curves 
for each respective ship’s maximum speed, fuel expended during the sprint from home 
port to intercept the container ship is calculated. 
After intercept of the container ship and refueling from MSC ship the military 
ships escort the container ships east towards their final destination port (San Francisco, 
CA).  Weighted escort speeds shown (outputted from the Intercept Module, section 
7.2.2.3) in Table 7-26 are used to calculate an average container ship transit speed (and 
matching escort speed for military ships).  Weights are assigned based on SME estimates 
of percentage of time container ship will transit at the respective speed.  Weighted 
average escort speed is input into SFCM model to calculate total amount of fuel 
consumed during container ship escort by ship class, per home port of origin.  Fuel 
consumed during the sprint phase to intercept is added with fuel consumed during escort 
of container ship, to calculate total mission fuel consumed by ship class, per home port of 
                                                 
96 Ships already at sea that could potentially become opportunistic participants are not considered. 
97 The calculations are therefore accurate for ships traveling distances within two standard deviations 
of the mean travel distance.  Based on a normal distribution of trials, 5% of the population is expected to 
travel distances outside that considered. 
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origin.  Results are shown as percentage of respective ship maximum fuel capacity, 
displayed in Figures 7-41, 7-45, 7-49, and 7-53. 






Table 7-26:  Container ship escort speed and assigned value weights 
Results 
The distance military ships will travel to intercept the container ships, starting at 
each of the four bases (Table 7-5).  Using the data from Figures 7-36 and 7-37, and the 
outputted distance ships travel to intercept target container ships from the Intercept 
Module (Section 7.2.2.3), the fuel remaining after intercept, per ship class, is calculated.  
By adjusting the sprint speed of each ship, amount of fuel remaining at intercept of 
container ship is adjusted to ensure ships have 10% or more (of their max capacity) 
remaining.  This is necessary to allow up to 24 hours for refueling ships to rendezvous 
with the military ships.  Ships sprinting at speeds higher than those calculated as 
optimized maximum sprint speeds will arrive at intercept with their assigned container 
ship at less than 10% capacity fuel remaining, and therefore will be unable to continue 
transiting with the container ship until they have been refueled. 
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Figure 7-36:  Maximum Fuel Capacity by ship class.98  The source data was multiplied by a factor of 
1.5 to account for absolute maximum fuel capacity, vice operational fuel capacity.99 
                                                 
98 Data for ship fuel capacity based on David D. Rudko, “Logistical Analysis of the Littoral Combat 
Ship,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2003; and Bath Iron Works – A 
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Figure 7-37:  Fuel consumption rate for ships.100  Note that these fuel curves are only accurate for 
speeds greater than 20 knots. 
                                                                                                                                                 
General Dynamics Company, “Fact Sheet: General Dynamics Littoral Combat Ship,” 
[http://www.gdbiw.com], 27 May 2004, accessed on 6 April 2006. 
Global Security, “Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).” [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ 
lcs.htm]. May 2004, accessed June 2006; Integrated Coast Guard Systems, “Deepwater Cutters:  National 
Security Cutter.” [http://www.icgsdeepwater.com/objectives/cutters/NSC.php] February 2005, accessed on 
April 6, 2006; and GlobalSecurity.Org, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/index.html. 
99 In general, unclassified data available on ship fuel capacity is based on an “operational mission 
range” at a given speed.  The “operational” range does not account for actual distance ship could transit at 
the given speed until out of fuel.  It is the authors’ opinion that this data is intentionally obscured to hide 
actual (classified) information.  To account for this, the authors have included the multiplicative factor (of 
1.5), though the resultant values continue to be incorrect. 
100Data based on the following sources:  D.A. Schrady, G.K. Smyth, and R.B. Vassian, “Predicting 
Ship Fuel Consumption:  Update,” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 1996; Integrated Coast 
Guard Systems, S012-07, NSC Endurance Fuel Calculation, 9 March 2005; E. Diehl and W. McCarthy, 
“Summary of Cutter Energy Management Audit Results and Recommendations,” United States Coast 
Guard Research and Development CG-D-14-00, May 2000; and David D. Rudko, “Logistical Analysis of 
the Littoral Combat Ship,” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2003. 
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Yokosuka, Japan 
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Figure 7-38:  Maximum Sprint Speed from Yokosuka, Japan 
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Figure 7-39:  Fuel remaining after sprinting to intercept container ships, shown by ship class, ships 
based in Yokosuka, Japan.  Upper and lower 95% confidence intervals based on two standard 
deviations in distance ships will travel, resulting from container ship intercept simulation. 
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Figure 7-40:  Total fuel used by each ship, originating from Yokosuka, for the duration of the mission 







AOE CG-47 DDG-51 M od.
M erchant


















upper 95% CI M ISSION FUEL USED (% of  total)
M EAN M ISSION FUEL USED (% of  total)
lower 95% CI M ISSION FUEL USED (% of total)
 
Figure 7-41:  Total fuel used by each ship, originating from Yokosuka, for the duration of the 
mission.  Fuel consumed shown in percentage of total respective ship capacity. 
WMD/SAW mission CONOPS call for ships to get underway on receipt of 
intelligence concerning the mission.  Intelligence latency greater than approximately  
160 hours precludes the use of ships home ported in Yokosuka:  Container ships 
underway for greater than 160 hours will the pass acceptable intercept position for 
Yokosuka-based ships; resulting in an eastward chase without being able to intercept 
prior to the 100-nm point (should they attempt to intercept the container ship).  Based on 
the results (Figure 7-42), LCS (both with the addition of the mission module fuel tank 
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[LCS+] and without [LCS]) allows for the highest sprint speed out of Yokosuka.  
Sprinting at higher speed causes LCS to have a lower mean fuel percentage remaining 
upon container ship intercept, as seen in Figure 7-41.  The upper 95% confidence interval 
involves larger distance sprinted to intercept the container ships.  Due to LCS’ more 
economical fuel consumption rate curve (Figure 7-41), LCS consumes a smaller amount 
of fuel over the upper 95% confidence interval sprint distance than the other ships home 
ported out of Yokosuka.  LCS+ shows an even smaller percentage of fuel consumed for 
both the mean and upper and lower 95% confidence intervals due to its increased 
maximum fuel capacity. FFG-7, DDG-51, and CG-47 class ships have an upper 95% 
confidence interval value of approximately 100% (Figure 7-41).  This upper 95% 
confidence interval limit for the FFG-7, DDG-51, and CG-47 class ships is due to their 
lower sprint speeds causing them to intercept the container ship in the immediate vicinity 
of Yokosuka (therefore the ships travel a smaller distance to intercept the container ship 
than the LCS and LCS+, since their path to intercept is shorter).  This indicates that 
although LCS and LCS+ have a maximum sprint speed higher than the other ship classes, 
sprint speed out of Yokosuka at greater than approximately 32 knots causes them to 
consume more fuel at little gain (the payoff is intercept of the container ships further west 
along their transit).  However, because of LCS’ improved fuel economy, capability for 
higher sprint speed, and lower total mission fuel consumed, the LCS affords the PBS 
option 2 a greater capability value per dollar cost than the other PBS options. 
Figure 7-40 shows the AOE and CG-47 class ships consume the largest amount of 
fuel for the mission, while LCS and LCS+ consume the least.  LCS+ consumes only a 
slightly higher total amount of fuel during the mission due to a slightly higher sprint 
speed (45 knots for LCS+ compared to 40 knots for LCS; Figure 7-38).  The additional 
fuel capacity present in the LCS+ allows it to perform the entire mission with a mean 
total mission fuel consumed of 54%, 95% confidence interval bands of 41%-70% of the 
its total capacity.  The LCS without the added mission module fuel tank, on the other 
hand, consumes approximately twice its total fuel capacity in fuel throughout the mission 
(compared to the LCS with the added fuel tank).  This means the added mission module 
fuel tank affords the LCS the capability to perform the entire mission without being 
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refueled, whereas the LCS without the mission module fuel tank requires at least one 
refueling during the mission. 
Kodiak, Alaska 



















AOE CG-47 DDG-51 M od.
M erchant












Figure 7-42:  Maximum Sprint Speeds from Kodiak, Alaska 
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Figure 7-43:  Fuel remaining after intercept of container ships, by ship class home ported in  
Kodiak, Alaska.  Upper and lower 95% confidence intervals based on two standard deviations in 
distance ships will travel, resulting from container ship intercept simulation. 
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Figure 7-44:  Total fuel used by each ship, originating from Kodiak, for the duration of the mission 
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Figure 7-45:  Total fuel used by each ship, originating from Kodiak, for the duration of the mission.  
Fuel used shown in percentage of each ship’s maximum fuel capacity. 
There are currently no U.S. Navy warships permanently home ported in  
Kodiak, Alaska.101  The listing of ship classes shown in the above figures therefore 
allows ship classes that are or potentially will be stationed in Alaska (i.e., the WHEC-378 
and WMSL) to have their capabilities compared.  The WMSL-class ship offers improved 
fuel efficiency over the WHEC-378 at speeds over 20 knots (Figure 7-37), resulting in a 
                                                 
101 United States Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, “SITES,” 
[http://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/sites/lookupinstallation.do], version 4.1.5.31, accessed on April 2006. 
188 
higher maximum sprint speed for the WMSL (Figure 7-42), since it will consequently 
consume less fuel at the same speeds as the WHEC-378.  The improved fuel efficiency of 
the WMSL over the WHEC-378 results in the WMSL consuming less total fuel during 
the duration of the WMD/SAW mission (Figure 7-44).  However, due to the WMSL 
having a slightly smaller fuel capacity than the WHEC-378 (Figure 7-36), the WMSL’s 
resulting endurance is slightly less than the WHEC-378 (Figure 7-45).  Therefore, the 
WMSL may require more frequent replenishment in long-duration missions, compared to 
the WHEC-378 class ships. 
The WMSL’s slightly higher maximum sprint speed allows it to intercept the 
container ship at a point further west in its transit than the WHEC-378.  Intercepting the 
container ship further west in its route allows the search teams (for the Find/Fix teams in 
the WMD mission or the VBSS teams in the SAW mission) more time to conduct their 
mission, which in the WMD mission translates into a higher probability of successfully 
finding a WMD aboard the container ship prior to entering port (and therefore a higher 
probability of mission success).102  The WMSL’s increased maximum sprint speed and 
lower total mission fuel consumed (compared to the WHEC-378) affords PBS option 2 a 
higher mission capability per dollar cost than the other options. 
                                                 
102 Effects of search time on probability of detecting WMD aboard the target container ship are shown 
in Section 7.2.2.4 Container Search Module. 
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Hawaii 
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Figure 7-46:  Maximum Sprint Speed from Hawaii 
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Figure 7-47:  Fuel remaining after intercept of container ships, by ship class from Hawaii.  Upper 
and lower 95% confidence intervals based on two standard deviations in distance ships will travel, 
resulting from container ship intercept simulation. 
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Figure 7-48:  Total fuel used by each ship, originating from Hawaii, for the duration of the mission 
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Figure 7-49:  Total fuel used by each ship, originating from Hawaii, for the duration of the mission.  
Fuel used shown in percentage of each ship’s maximum fuel capacity. 
Of the nine ship classes considered for the mission, the LCS’ more economical 
fuel consumption rate (Figure 7-36) results in the largest maximum optimized sprint 
speed during the sprint to intercept (Figure 7-46).  Consequently, LCS consumed a 
greater percentage of its fuel (Figure 7-47) though of the ship classes the LCS has one of 
the smallest fuel capacities (Figure 7-36).  The hypothetical additional fuel tank in LCS+ 
afforded the LCS a much higher maximum optimized sprint speed (45 knots compared to 
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35 knots), while only consuming a slightly larger percentage of its fuel during the sprint 
to intercept.  Due to the LCS’ efficiency in fuel consumption, the LCS consumed the 
least amount of total mission fuel, as compared to the other ship classes.  The LCS+ 
consumed almost twice as much fuel as the LCS (Figure 7-48); however, with the 
increased sprint speed affords a large advantage in getting the search teams onboard the 
container ships.103 
San Diego 
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Figure 7-50:  Maximum Sprint Speed from San Diego 
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Figure 7-51:  Fuel remaining after sprint to intercept, by ship class from San Diego.  Upper and 
lower 95% confidence intervals based on two standard deviations in distance ships will travel, 
resulting from container ship intercept. 
                                                 
103 Weight from additional fuel in the hypothetical mission module tank is assumed to be incorporated 
into the fuel consumption rate curve equation. 
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Figure 7-52:  Total fuel consumed by each ship, originating from San Diego, for the duration of  
the mission 
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Figure 7-53:  Total fuel used by each ship, originating from San Diego, for the duration of the 
mission.  Fuel used shown in percentage of each ship’s maximum fuel capacity. 
Of the ships available for the WMD/SAW mission home ported in San Diego, the 
FFG-7, WHEC-378 and WMSL result in the lowest sprint speeds (< 24 knots) for 
intercepting the container ship (Figure 7-50).  Due to these low sprint speeds, these ships 
are therefore less desirable choices for use in the mission when stationed along the  
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West Coast of the United States.104  The modified merchant ship class considered is 
based on a hypothetically modified TOTE Orca class merchant ship, designed for a 
maximum speed of 24 knots.105  The modified merchant’s maximum optimized speed is 
therefore constrained more by its maximum achievable speed than its fuel consumption 
rate and fuel capacity.  Consideration of a different modified merchant-class ship, one 
designed with a higher maximum speed, may result in a higher maximum optimized 
transit speed, though high-speed, large-tonnage commercial vessels are not normally 
designed due to low fuel consumption efficiency. 
The AOE, CG-47 and LCS class ships have approximately the same maximum 
optimized sprint speeds (Figure 7-49) as well as the same approximate percentage of fuel 
remaining after the container ships have been intercepted (Figure 7-50).  The LCS, 
however, consumes a vastly smaller amount of fuel throughout the mission compared to 
the AOE and CG-47 (Figure 7-51).  When compared to the other ship classes, the smaller 
fuel capacity of the LCS causes it to consume a greater percentage of its fuel than the 
AOE and CG-47 classes.  The addition of the hypothetical mission module fuel tank in 
LCS+ makes up for the LCS’ smaller fuel capacity, allowing a much higher maximum 
optimized sprint speed (45 knots; Figure 7-49), while still reaping the benefits of LCS’ 
improvement over AOE and CG-47 in fuel consumption efficiency.  Thus, while the 
AOE and CG-47 class ships (and to a lesser extent the DDG-51) afford a sprint capability 
slightly better than LCS, the LCS’ fuel consumption efficiency results in a vast savings in 
total mission fuel usage.  LCS+ affords the LCS a vast increase in sprint speed capability, 
while only slightly increasing the total amount of fuel consumed (seen in Figures 7-50 
and 7-52). 
                                                 
104 FFG-7, WHEC-378 and WMSL may instead be used to intercept “leaker” target container ships that 
are closer to the coast.  Therefore, while not the optimum ship classes to use for the mission from  
San Diego, they are still of great value and use within the mission from all bases. 
105 TOTE Ships | TOTE – Shipping Cargo to Alaska, [http://www.totemocean.com/ts-ships.htm], 
accessed in February 2006. 
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Conclusions 
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Figure 7-54:  Maximum optimized sprint speed by ship class, averaged over the four bases 
considered (Yokosuka, Kodiak, Hawaii, San Diego) 
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Figure 7-55:  Fuel percentage remaining, by ship class, after sprinting to intercept the container ships 
in the WMD/SAW mission, averaged over the four bases considered (Yokosuka, Kodiak, Hawaii,  
and San Diego) 
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Figure 7-56:  Total fuel consumed, by ship class, for entire mission, averaged over the four bases 
considered (Yokosuka, Kodiak, Hawaii, and San Diego).  Mission fuel is measured from departing 
from home port, sprinting to intercept container ships, then escorting container ships into port with 
the San Francisco harbor. 
Figure 7-54 shows that LCS has, from almost all bases, the highest maximum 
optimized sprint speed out of the ship classes considered.  Of the four home ports 
considered, when based out of San Diego LCS experiences a drop in its maximum 
optimized sprint speed due to the longer distance it must travel in order to intercept its 
assigned container ship.  The smaller fuel capacity of LCS causes the sprint speed to be 
reduced when traveling long distance, in order that it will have at least 10% or more of its 
fuel remaining after intercept (one of the mission constraints).  The additional fuel tank 
offered in LCS+ shows a very large payoff in sprint speed from all bases, at only a small 
increase in total mission fuel expended (Figure 7-56), compared to LCS (sans additional 
fuel tank).106  If the mission module fuel tank in LCS+ is, in fact, turns out to be more 
than just hypothetical, the implications would be to vastly increase the endurance and 
transit speed of LCS, while continuing to afford a lower fuel cost option (compared to 
other CRUDES ships). 
The AOE class ship affords a high sprint speed even when averaged over the four 
considered bases (Figure 7-54).  AOE’s high sprint speed comes at a large price in terms 
                                                 
106 WMD/SAW missions consider target container ships transiting eastward only.  Missions where 
both target container ships and national fleet assets travel westward may yield less importance in the utility 
of the LCS+ over the LCS; however, this is left for further study. 
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of fuel consumed for the mission, as seen in Figure 7-56.  The CG-47 class ship offers 
comparable if not better sprint speeds with a very large savings in fuel over the total 
mission.  The difference in sprint speeds and fuel usage seen amongst the various ship 
classes can all be related to the ship fuel consumption rates (Figure 7-37).  The end result 
of a more fuel consumption efficiency is translated into maximum allowable transit speed 
(i.e., sprint speed) and fuel consumed throughout the mission. 
Fuel capacity contributes to the mission depending on the frequency of refueling 
available.  For missions where refueling is quickly available, sprint speeds may be 
increased (resulting in larger sums of fuel being consumed).  Replenishment ships tend to 
be larger and slower than Navy warships, thus restricting their ability to enter the theatre 
as quickly.  Replenishment ship prepositioning becomes a trade-off for speed; however, 
the UNREP ship’s lack of speed still limits the mission by constraining the maximum 
optimized sprint speed for ships, as presented in the above results.107 
7.4.5.2 WMD/SAW Watch Team Sleep Analysis Model (WaTSAM) 
The Find/Fix search teams require adequate sleep to maintain a vigilance 
level that ensures a probability of success in noticing alarms from their search equipment.  
The VBSS team must likewise remain in a state of high alertness in order to properly 
recognize signs of deceit from potential sleeper-cell terrorists onboard the ship.  Due to 
the limited amount of space available on most container ships, the maximum search team 
size is constrained:  while a larger team allows a larger volume of containers to be 
searched, the time spent not working is constrained by the amount of space available to 
live in while minimizing inconvenience to the ship’s organic crew.  In order to minimize 
the size of the search team crew, the working duty sections must be minimized, but must 
still allow adequate sleep to provide the workers with a minimum vigilance level 
necessary to conduct their search and not miss or fail to recognize an alarm.  By reducing 
the probability for operator error, the overall probability of success in detecting WMD or 
terrorists on the commercial ship search is maximized. 
                                                 
107 UNREP will further restrict ships in the mission due to the slower speed at which UNREP is 
normally conducted (e.g., less than 15 knots), as well as the amount of time required to conduct the 
replenishment underway (determined by amount of replenishment needed, sea state, weather, etc.). 
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 Sleep loss analysis is used to determine the level of ship-based support 
necessary to allow the Find/Fix and VBSS teams to conduct their search while meeting 
the minimum vigilance level.  As ship support is minimized, the number of hours each 
member of the search team must operate continuously (without sleep) increases.  As sleep 
is lost, operator errors will increase due to the drop in vigilance levels.  As vigilance 
levels drop and operator errors increase, the overall probability of detecting the WMD or 
sleeper-cell terrorists aboard the container ship is reduced.  By keeping the military ships 
closer to the container ship, personnel transfers can be conducted more frequently, thus 
allowing team members the ability to work in shifts while sleeping and eating aboard the 
military ship.  Amount of sleep, therefore, becomes an important factor in determining 
the CONOPS for the WMD and SAW mission. 
Work and sleep schedules are modeled using the Fatigue Avoidance 
Scheduling Tool (FAST) to determine the maximum number of hours the Find/Fix team 
personnel can operate.  Results of the WaTSAM analysis are used to determine WMD 
and SAW mission CONOPS. 
 The WaTSAM is utilized to determine the manning levels necessary to 
ensure a minimum probability of detection for searching in the WMD, SAW and SBA 
missions.  WaTSAM results are used to adjust CONOPS within each of the missions to 
ensure the effects from crew fatigue are accounted for and minimized, in order that the 
overall mission probability of success is maximized (at least from as many factors  
as possible). 
Assumptions 
 Manning requirements from the WMD mission search model were used as input 
for the WaTSAM assumptions (see Appendix H).  In particular, a nominal container 
search team size of nine people was calculated, performing a container search over a  
7-day period.  SME input concerning container ship searches in the WMD mission 
indicated the majority of commercial container ships would likely be limited in the 
amount of berthing available for the MTR search teams.  The limited amount of berthing 
poses a constraint on either the maximum size of the search team or the necessity for 
providing off-ship support (in order that the search teams may be transferred off board 
the container ship to sleep).  In order to limit the search team size, two watch sections 
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were set as the upper limit in the case where off-ship support is not provided.  In the case 
where off-ship support is provided, a four-section watch rotation was set, where two 
sections would be onboard the container ship at any time performing the search.  These 
teams, supported by military ships within the vicinity of the container ship, would 
conduct their search for 24 hours, then be transferred off the container ship to the military 
ship where they will eat and sleep (i.e., a “recovery” period) for 24 hours.  While the first 
two watch sections are resting off-ship, another two watch sections are continuing the 
search on the container ship.  Every 24 hours the teams are swapped in order to maintain 
a continuous 24-hour search over 7 or more days. 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the field of human sleep analysis were referred 
to in order to determine the minimum vigilance level necessary to carry out the WMD 
and SAW search mission, though results can be applied to the SBA mission as well.  The 
Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool© (FAST)108 (developed for the Department of 
Transportation (DoT), the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force) was used to model fatigue and 
vigilance levels as a result of sleep loss.  Based on comparisons between alcohol-induced 
impairment and impairment due to fatigue, vigilance levels have been related to  
blood-alcohol (BAC) level with some degree of confidence.109  The U.S. Air Force, 
Army, and DoT have determined an effectiveness level should be maintained above 
77.5%,110 since a lower effectiveness level (due to sleep loss) relates to a BAC higher 
than .05.111  BAC of .05 was chosen as the baseline due to its legal definition “Driving 
While Intoxicated” in most states.112  (The vigilance effectiveness level must therefore be 
kept higher than 77.5% to ensure its comparable BAC level is less than .05.)113  For 
simplicity, 77.5% was rounded down to 77% for the duration of the modeling. 
                                                 
108 FAST version 1.0.26U, developed by SAIC and CTI, Inc. 
A.M. Williamson, A. Feyer, R.P. Mattick, R. Friswell, and S. Finlay-Brown, “Developing Measures of 
Fatigue Using an Alcohol Comparison to Validate the Effects of Fatigue on Performance,” Accident 
Analysis and Prevention, 33, 200), pp. 313-326. 
110 One hundred percent effectiveness refers to zero errors being made during task work. 
111 BAC .05 equates to .05 grams of ethanol per 100 milliliters of blood (Oracle ThinkQuest Education 
Foundation, “BAC and BAL,” [http://library.thinkquest.org/23713/effects/bac.html], accessed in  
May 2006). 
112 James B. Jacobs, “The Law and Criminology of Drunk Driving,” Crime and Justice:  An Annual 
Review of Research, edited by Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, Vol. 10, Fall 1988, pp. 171-229. 
113 A.M. Williamson, A. Feyer, R.P. Mattick, R. Friswell, and S. Finlay-Brown, “Developing Measures 
of Fatigue Using Alcohol Comparison to Validate the Effects of Fatigue on Performance,” Accident 
Analysis and Prevention, 33, 2001, pp. 313-326. 
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The CONOPS for the WMD search team was developed and assumed to be  
the following: 
a) The U.S. ship is underway, destined to meet the suspect container ship 
along its eastward voyage in the Pacific Ocean.  Actual location of the 
container ship was not taken into account, but it was assumed the latency 
of intelligence would allow the U.S. ship to meet the container ship at a 
minimum of seven days prior to entering port in the United States. 
b) The U.S. ship is on a course that will allow the MTR search team to make 
its initial transfer onto the container ship at 0600 on day 1. 
c) The MTR search team spends day 0, resting; although the sleep schedule 
is designed to allow the teams to operate at or above the minimum 
vigilance level (.77), the teams are assumed to be in surge operations and 
therefore not use to a two-section shift work schedule (i.e., the teams have 
not had time to accustom themselves to working at night time or under 
such extreme circumstances).  Normal daytime working circadian rhythms 
still affect the teams’ performance, although given time the teams’ 
circadian rhythms will adjust to the new schedule. 
d) 30 minutes per 8-hour period has been taken into account for meals and 
personal hygiene.  This is an extreme understatement of the normal 
amount of time people take to eat, clean, relax, etc.; however, it was 
chosen to represent the severity of the mission.  Analysis of the resultant 
watch bill will reveal how restricted a real schedule would need to be in 
order work within the given constraints. 
Method 
The FAST© program was used to model sleep loss for two sections of 
“unsupported” watch teams and four sections of “supported” watch teams over a 7-day 
search.  For the unsupported two-section watch teams, a 6-, 8-, and 12-hour duration 
work/sleep schedule was considered and modeled.  The supported four-section watch 
team utilizes a 6-hour work/sleep rotation.  During modeling, when worker effectiveness 
levels dropped below 77% the watch team work/sleep schedule within the FAST program 
was altered to allow the team that was “on watch” a break.  The effect from this was to 
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allow a temporary reprieve to the “on watch” team, however at the expense of the  
“off watch” team’s rest.  By allowing one team a break in work, the other team therefore 
would suffer later on, when it was their “on-watch” time.  The effects were generally 
compounding:  altering the work/sleep schedule never resulted in a long-term benefit to 
either of the two watch sections.  Therefore, the original work/sleep schedule, without 
break, was used for analysis.  It should be noted this was a nominal way of approaching 
the problem, and future studies are recommended to determine a more complete effect on 
watch rotation considering many different options, such as assigning extra workers to 
enable individual work/break rotation. 
Results 
The FAST program charts display a generic individual worker effectiveness level 
over the 7-day period (seen as the squiggly sinusoidal-looking line).  The comparison to 
BAC level is shown to the right of the chart.  The dotted line represents the 77% 
effectiveness level (comparable to .05 BAC).  The red triangles to the bottom of the 
graph represent the drop off and pick of the teams to and from the container ship (thus 
their start time and end time).  The red highlighted section indicates the working hours, 
while the blue section indicates the sleeping hours (sections without red or blue 
highlighting is time spent not working, but not sleeping).  FAST model results are shown 
below in Figures 7-61 through 7-68.  Results are grouped according to whether or not the 
search teams are supported by (allowing rotation off-ship) nearby military ships and the 
number of hours each team conducts their mission working/not working (i.e., 6-, 8-, or 
12-hour watches). 
Unsupported 6-on/6-off Watch Rotation 
Figures 7-57 and 7-58 display the resultant effectiveness levels from the 
unsupported 6-on/6-off watch bill rotation over seven days (Figure 7-57 represents team 
A, Figure 7-58 represents team B). 
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Figure 7-57:  Basic 6-hour on/6-hour off section watch-schedule for Team A, Vigilance Level 
(Effectiveness) and BAC over seven days 
 
Figure 7-58:  Basic 6-hour on/6-hour off section watch-schedule for Team B, Vigilance Level 
(Effectiveness) and BAC over seven days 
Team A, as seen in Figure 7-57, is able to maintain vigilance level above 77% 
throughout the duration of the seven days.  This is due to a match-up between their 
normal circadian rhythm (being “adjusted” for daytime working hours) and adequate 
sleep to keep fatigue levels at bay.  By the morning of day 2, however, Team B has fallen 
below the minimum vigilance level by approximately 0314 hours.  The schedule does not 
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allow adequate sleep to counteract their normal circadian rhythm—thus Team B 
continues to have a drop in their vigilance level that is below the 77% requirement. 
Unsupported 8-on/8-off Watch Rotation 
Figures 7-59 and 7-60 display the resultant effectiveness levels from the 
unsupported 8-on/8-off watch bill rotation over seven days (Figure 7-59 represents  
Team A, Figure 7-60 represents Team B). 
 
Figure 7-59:  Basic 8-hour on/8-hour off section watch-schedule for Team A, Vigilance Level 
(Effectiveness) and BAC over seven days 
 
Figure 7-60:  Basic 8-hour on/8-hour off section watch-schedule for Team B, Vigilance Level 
(Effectiveness) and BAC over seven days 
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 Both Teams A and B experience drops in their effectiveness level below 77% 
over the duration of their watches.  Though the 8-on/8-off watch rotation allows more 
sleep for the workers than the 6-on/6-off watch rotation, the result of splitting a 24-hour 
period into three 8-hour “watches” results in a rotating sleep schedule that does not align 
with human circadian rhythms.  The workers thus find themselves working during hours 
they would normally be sleeping, resulting in a natural drop in effectiveness level during 
the times when they would otherwise be sleeping.  Because the workers do not maintain a 
consistent schedule from day to day (every other day a worker finds himself sleeping the 
opposite hours he had on the previous day), they are unable to recover from the mismatch 
of their circadian rhythm with their sleep routine.  Though not included in the modeling 
results for Figures 7-59 and 7-60, this would result in the degradation of the quality of the 
worker’s sleep—ultimately resulting in a much more rapid drop in effectiveness level 
below the 77% requirement. 
Unsupported 12-on/12-off Watch Rotation 
Figures 7-61 and 7-62 display the resultant effectiveness levels from the 
unsupported 12-on/12-off watch bill rotation over seven days (Figure 7-61 represents 
Team A, Figure 7-62 represents Team B). 
 
Figure 7-61:  Basic 12-hour on/12-hour off section watch-schedule for Team B, Vigilance Level 
(Effectiveness) and BAC over seven days 
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Figure 7-62:  Basic 12-hour on/12-hour off section watch-schedule for Team B, Vigilance Level 
(Effectiveness) and BAC over seven days 
Like the 8-hour watch rotation schedule (seen in Figures 7-59 and 7-60), the  
12-hour watch rotation schedule enables teams to get a good deal of sleep when off 
watch.  This contributes to a higher effectiveness level at the beginning of each watch 
period, per team.  The effects from mismatch of circadian rhythm and sleep schedule can 
be corrected in the 12-on/12-off watch rotation because a consistent work/sleep routine 
can be maintained for the duration of the mission (i.e., workers sleep the same hours each 
day).  Though not shown in the model, this would contribute to more “effective” sleep, 
resulting in a more rested worker and thus higher starting effectiveness levels.  The 
effects of a “meshed” circadian rhythm/sleep schedule are clearly seen in Figure 7-61, 
where watch Team A is able to work during hours they are naturally awake and alert.  
Watch Team B also benefits from a routine sleep schedule; however, because they are 
forced to work the “night” shift, the B workers find themselves having to adapt to a 
different routine (seen in Figure 7-62).  Though not seen in the FAST model, eventually 
the watch Team B workers’ circadian rhythm would adapt to their work/sleep routine, 
likely enabling higher continuous effectiveness levels.  Based on the WMD and SAW 
mission CONOPS, the search conducted by the watch teams is not expected to last longer 
than 20 days; therefore, the period of time it would take the workers to adapt their 
circadian rhythm with their sleep routine would still affect the first few days’ worth of the 
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mission (assuming the teams have not already been preconditioned to work in this 
environment before starting the mission).  Thus, even with the routine sleep schedule 
available in the 6- or 12-hour watches, the workers’ effectiveness levels is still degraded 
for a percentage of the mission. 
The effects from working hours as long as 12 continuous hours were not input 
into the WaTSAM FAST models.114  Longer duration work periods have a similar effect 
upon human vigilance levels as fatigue due to sleep loss.115  Thus the 12-hour work 
period, while providing plenty of time for sleep and allowing a routine work/sleep 
schedule, will likely result in a drop in effectiveness level over time as workers’ arousal 
levels declines with the continued monotonous searching required in the mission.  The 
12-hour watch rotation is therefore not preferable because of the length of the  
“on watch” hours. 
Supported 6-on/6-off 
One of the advantages of providing a military ship in the vicinity of the container 
ship in the WMD/SAW mission is the ability to transfer on and off multiple sections of 
search teams.  With more workers available to swap on and off watch, more frequent 
breaks become possible for the working watch sections while maintaining a continuous 
search.  The supported 6-on/6-off watch rotation includes four groups of workers, two of 
which will be onboard the container ship continuously for a 24-hour period.  Note that 
other watch rotation schedules (such as having three sections of watch teams working  
8-hours on and 16-hours off) are also made possible by providing a military ship to 
support the container ship search.  It is also possible to transfer watch teams on and off a 
few container ships using medium to long-range helicopters, such as the V-22 Osprey.  
The difficulty lies mainly in the actual transfer of personnel on and off of the container 
ship:  SMEs indicated most container ships do not have flight decks and are not familiar 
with a sort of multiple-person transfer that would need to occur without a flight deck.  
Additionally, the commercial ship design may not support personnel transfer by 
                                                 
114 Other than the 30 minutes break per 8-hour period, no other work-break is considered during a  
work shift. 
115 C. Wickens et al., An Introduction to Human Factors Engineering, 2nd Edition, Pearson/Prentice 
Hall, 2004. 
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helicopter at all, since top-side deck space may not be free of fouling elements such as 
masts, antennae, lines, etc. 
Regardless of the actual method of transfer, a supported 6-on/6-off watch team 
rotation is shown below in Figures 7-63 and 7-64.  After 24 hours of searching on the 
container ship, the two “working” sections are transferred off, and the two “fresh” 
sections are transferred on to continue the search (the watch team swap out is depicted in 
Figures 7-67 and 7-68 by the red triangles). 
 
Figure 7-63:  6-hour on/6-hour off (with breaks) section watch-schedule for Team A, Vigilance Level 
(Effectiveness) and BAC over seven days 
 
Figure 7-64:  6-hour on/6-hour off (with breaks) section watch-schedule for Team B, Vigilance Level 
(Effectiveness) and BAC over seven days 
207 
 The rotation off-ship for a 24-hour period allows the A and B watch teams a 
“sleep recovery” period onboard the military support ship.  This allows them to reduce 
their accumulated sleep debt from continuous operations on the container ship.  Since 
their sleep debt is cleared every 24 hours, all teams are able to conduct the search mission 
at effectiveness levels > 77% for the duration of the container ship’s voyage.  An 
additional bonus from the off-ship crew rotation is a schedule that has no more than  
five hours of work for any team at any point (work breaks are possible due to the 
additional workers available from the support ships).  This may serve to ensure that 
fatigue levels accumulated from actual work are maintained within acceptable limits.  
Thus the watch teams, when supported, are able to maintain continuous operations 
without a drop in efficiency below the minimum required value; work breaks are enabled, 
as well as shorter work shifts; thus, overall watch team readiness is maintained rather 
than placed into a degrading situation over time. 
Conclusions 
Figures 7-57 through 7-62 show that unsupported two-section watch teams will 
fall below the minimum require effectiveness level at some point during their working 
periods over the duration of the mission.  Drops in effectiveness increase the probability 
of “accidents” occurring:  for example, 60%of class A aircraft mishaps in the Air Force 
are attributed to fatigue (Palmer et al., 1996).  Increasing the number of workers to allow 
for work breaks or shorter work shifts is limited by the capacity for a container ship to 
berth the workers in their off-shift hours.  Introducing a military support ship, to provide 
berthing for the workers, solves the dilemma; however, then requires constant support 
from the ship.  If drops in effectiveness (which will reduce the overall probability of 
detection and therefore probability of success for the mission) are allowable, the trade-off 
of not providing a support ship will likely save money due to the fuel requirements for 
the support ship alone.  However, to maximize the mission probability of success, shorter 
work shifts and therefore more workers are required, as shown by comparing the drops in 
effectiveness in Figures 7-63 and 7-64 to those in Figures 7-57 though 7-62. 
In addition to allowing the teams adequate sleep and working hours to maintain 
generally higher vigilance levels than if unsupported, rotating the crew off the container 
ship every 24 hours partially solves the dilemma of carrying food and hygiene by each of 
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the teams.  Since a support ship would be within 24 hours of the container ship, each 
team need only bring enough food for 24 hours.  Additionally, assistance is more readily 
available should a piece of search equipment malfunction or break and need to be fixed.  
Allowing the crews to sleep on a support ship (vice the container ship) allows much more 
comfortable rest since berthing can be assigned (for example, use of an 18-man berthing 
compartment aboard a DDG would be available). 
The negative side of using a support ship during the container ship search mission 
is that it ties a support ship to the search teams, keeping it always within 24 hours of the 
container ship’s navigation track.  Since one of the entering assumptions to the WMD 
and SAW mission was that no more than 20 container ships would be implicated, if the 
navigation tracks of each of the 20 container ships varies more than 24 hours apart, up to 
20 support ships would be necessary for all of the search teams (one support ship per 
container ship).  Though this mission is by nature a surge operation, the cost to operate up 
to 20 support ships must be balanced against the possibility of allowing lower 
effectiveness levels in the search teams, subsequently allowing an increased probability 
of false detection (Type I error) or failure to detect true signal (Type II error). 
7.4.5.3 Small Boat Availability and Reliability Model (SARM) 
 The SBA mission CONOPS consists of military units patrolling a 
commercial U.S. port (the port of San Francisco) to protect vital points of infrastructure 
(such as the Golden Gate bridge) and commercial high-value units (such as water taxis 
and transiting large-tonnage merchant ships) from terrorist surface-ship-based attack.  
The mission is assumed to last for up to 30 days, though further analysis will be useful to 
determine the impacts of extended SBA mission duration.  Time and probability of 
success objective values were set by stakeholders, as described in Section 5.2.2.5  
Sustain Non-Functional Requirements.  An overall probability of success value of 
99.99% was set for the Sustain subfunctions; this is translated as a stakeholder need for a 
system with Sustain functions that work properly virtually every time they are used 
(Section 5.2.2.5 provides a detailed discussion of the reasoning behind stakeholder needs 
for a Ps set at this value).  The Sustain subfunctions that apply to systems used by  
U.S. forces in the SBA mission, such as small boats or helicopters, must therefore be 
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capable of accomplishing the flowed-down requirement from the original  
stakeholder needs. 
 Sustain function flow-down applies to the PBS and Finish SBA-mission 
architecture options resulting from Orthogonal Array Experiment and BUCE.  
Orthogonal Array Experiment selections resulted in PBS architecture option 3 and Finish 
architecture option 4.  BUCE selections resulted in PBS architecture option 1 and Finish 
option 2.  Each architecture option is composed of different types and numbers of 
platforms required to conduct the SBA mission within the Ps requirements.  Analysis of 
CONOPS for each architecture option resulted in a number of hours per day that each 
platform will be required to perform its mission to meet the stakeholder-derived 
functional requirements for probability of success.  The various platforms composing 
each of the selected architecture options and the respective number of hours they will 
operate during the course of the 30-day SBA mission is shown in Table 7-27. 
PBS Option 1 (Small Escort) Quantity Hours of Operation/Day Total Hours Operated
Small Boats 124 8 240 
Teams 120 8 240 
PBS Option 3 (Mixed Escort) Quantity Hours of Operation/Day Total Hours Operated
Small Boats 72 8 240 
Ships 44 8 240 
Teams 120 8 240 
FIN Option 2 (Helo) Quantity Hours of Operation/Day Total Hours Operated
Helicopters 26 7 210 
FIN Option 4 (Helo + USV) Quantity Hours of Operation/Day Total Hours Operated
Helicopters 26 7 210 
USV 92 8 240 
Table 7-27:  Unit Quantities and Operational Hours for the SBA Mission 
Interviews with stakeholders and SMEs identify ships used in the SBA 
mission (such as U.S. Navy PC-class ships and USCG WPB-110 class ships) as able to 
meet the Sustain functional requirements (see Appendix B) for the following reasons:  
Vessels of this size are generally considered to include redundant systems within their 
design, such that they are highly reliable as well as containing crew capable of 
performing repairs.  Thus, depot-level maintenance is not generally required to repair 
ship systems (except for major system failures or scheduled yard periods).  Ship 
operational availability is assumed to be such that they will always be operationally 
available during the 30-day SBA mission. 
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 Small boats are not designed with multiple redundant systems and 
therefore do not share the high level of operational availability and reliabilities ships 
enjoy.  Additionally, small boats are generally unable to conduct maintenance while 
operating, therefore requiring a portion of the 30-day SBA mission to conduct 
maintenance.  The availability and reliability assumptions afforded to ships therefore do 
not apply to small boats.  The Small Boat Availability and Reliability Model (SARM) 
models small boat availability and reliability to determine the total number of small boats 
required to meet the functional requirements composing the Sustain function.  For model 
simplification the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) 11-meter Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boat 
(RHIB) is used to represent the plethora of small boats available for use within the  
SBA mission. 
RHIB Reliability Model 
 Reliability and operational availability data for the NSW 11-m RHIB is used to 
represent the community of small boats available for use in the SBA mission.   
NSW 11-m RHIB data is listed in Table 7-28. 
Reliability 0.91 
Availability 0.99 
Range (NM) 200 
Cruise Speed (knots) 33 
Table 7-28:  NSW 11-m RHIB Operational Data116 
Dividing the cruise speed by the range at cruise speed yields an operational cruise 
time of approximately six hours.  This is assumed to be the period over which reliability 
for the NSW 11-m RHIB is measured.  Reliability is defined as:  R(t) = exp(-λ·t), where t 
is time in hours, λ is the number of failures per hour.  Setting t = 6 hours and R(6) = .91 
for the 11-m RHIB, then solving for λ, yields .0155 failures per operational hour.  The 
reciprocal of this (1/ λ) = 64.3 operating hours until failure (approximately).  This value 
is input into the Extend RHIB Reliability Model as the expected amount of time a RHIB 
operates until failure.  The SBA mission is assumed to take place on short notice, thus 
relocating small boats from a variety of different locations for use in the port of  
                                                 
116 Federation of American Scientists, “Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boat,” [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ship/rhib.htm], 10 February 2000, accessed in March 2006. 
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San Francisco for the mission.  The operational lives117 of each of the RHIBs is unknown, 
therefore some RHIBs may be closer to “breaking” than others.  A uniform distribution 
of RHIB operational “lives” is used because this represents a generally random 
distribution of lives, with no specific mean about which the RHIBs lives would fall 
within a standard deviation.  The “failure point” of the RHIBs will therefore occur, on 
average, any time within the 64.3-hour period. 
 Once “broken” the RHIB is removed from the pool of RHIBs in use and sent to 
repair facilities (Figure 7-65).  No limit is placed on the number of RHIBs the repair 
facility can work on simultaneously, as in reality if one repair facility was backlogged, 
enough civilian small boat repair facilities exist within the greater San Francisco area 
that, if needed, they could be utilized.  A triangular distribution is used to determine the 
amount of time the repair facility takes to repair and return the RHIB to operation.  
Within the triangular distribution, a minimum value of 1 hour, maximum value of  
48 hours, and most likely value of 6 hours is used.  These times include the time it would 
take to transport the RHIB to the repair facility, fix the broken part it, and return the 
RHIB to a waiting pool. 
                                                 
117 Operational life of a RHIB refers to the age of the RHIBs components in terms of requiring major 
service and/or replacement. 
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Figure 7-65:  EXTENDTM RHIB Reliability Model 
 As shown in Table 7-27, 72 RHIBs are required to meet the PBS Ps requirement.  
Based on the availability and reliability shown in Table 7-28, each of the 72 RHIBs is not 
expected to remain continuously operational for the duration of the SBA mission  
(30 days, 14 hours of operation per day, or 420 operational hours total).  As RHIBs 
“break” they are removed from service and transported to the repair facility.  To meet the 
operational requirement of 72 RHIBs in use continuously, a “spare” RHIB (held in a 
“waiting” pool) is then put into service to resume operation where the broken RHIB 
stopped.  For the purposes of modeling, transportation RHIBs to and from the designated 
area of operations within the port, as well as crew turnover, is considered instantaneous.  
The number of spare RHIBs is then varied to determine what mean minimum value 
allows a 99.99% probability of success in meeting the operational requirement (where the 
operational requirement is defined by the PBS functional analysis as maintaining  
72 RHIBs in service at all times).  The model is run for 100 trials with the mean results 
displayed in Figure 7-66. 
 A second model, the Poisson RHIB Reliability Model, using the Poisson 
distribution is calculated.  This model yields a mathematical expected probability of 
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success, where success is defined as completing a 14-hour period with at least k out of n 
RHIBs still operating.  K is set at the operational requirement, 72.  N is defined as the 
total force size, or k + the number of spare RHIBs provided.  The number of spare RHIBs 
is varied to show affect on Ps.  Results are compiled in Figure 7-66. 
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Figure 7-66:  The Effect of spare RHIBs (in waiting) on meeting the requirement to maintain  
72 RHIBs in continuous operation 
 For the Extend RHIB Reliability Model, Figure 7-66 shows a positive linear 
increase in the mean probability of meeting the 72-RHIB operational requirement as the 
number of spare RHIBs is increased (until Ps = 1).  Treating the 72-RHIB operational 
requirement as a constant “customer” demand, the number of RHIBs required to meet the 
“demand” can be considered the stock level.  For the Extend RHIB Reliability Model, the 
demand is met when the stock level (i.e., number of spare RHIBs) is 40 or greater.  Thus 
to maintain 72 RHIBs in continuous operation for the duration of SBA mission, the 
Extend model yields a total force size of 112 or greater to ensure that the Ps requirement 
for both Sustain and PBS functions is met.  The Poisson RHIB Reliability Model meets 
the Ps requirement at a stock level of 104 total RHIBs (32 spare RHIBs).  The Poisson 
and Extend models agree at total RHIB inventory = 91 (corresponding to Ps = .83) and 112 
(corresponding to Ps = .9999).  The difference in necessary total force inventories yielded 
by the two models stems primarily from the difference in RHIB operational-life 
assumption made by the distributions utilized within the models:  Poisson, being a 
“memory-less” distribution, implicitly fails to account for different points a RHIB may be 
in its service life—therefore causing the time of failure for all RHIBs to occur about a 
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mean (the expected failure time for RHIBs).  The Extend model, on the other hand, 
accounts for differences in service life and so does not result in a majority of RHIBs 
failing at approximately the same time.  The Extend model therefore may reflect real-life 
situations more closely and can be considered the more conservative estimate for total 
force inventory required between the two models.  For this reason, the Extend model 
results were inputted into the architecture cost vs. effectiveness for PBS options 1 and 3. 
RHIB Availability Model 
The RHIB Availability Model is used to determine the effects of operational 
availability on the total force size.  Based on PBS assumptions (Table 7-27), each day a 
RHIB is required to be operational for 14 hours to conduct the SBA mission.  Using  
72 RHIBs as the required number to be in operation during a 14-hour work day, a 
binomial distribution is used to determine the probability of success of providing the 
required number of RHIBs, given a variable number of spares.  Two operational 
availability values were input into the model in order to reflect total RHIB inventory 
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Figure 7-67:  Availability-based model for determining total force size necessary to maintain  
72 RHIBs in operation at any given time 
As shown in Figure 7-67, for RHIB operational availability = .99, the probability 
of success requirement (.9999) is met when 6 spare RHIBs are provided, for a total force 
size of 78 RHIBs.  When the RHIB operational availability is decreased to .9, the number 
of RHIBs required to meet the Ps requirement is increased to 22 (for a total force size of 
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94).  Thus, as RHIB operational availability is decreased the number of spares required to 
meet the probability of success requirement increases.  The RHIB Reliability Model 
places a requirement of 40 spare RHIBs (for a total RHIB force size of 112) in order to 
meet the Ps requirement of .9999.  By providing 40 spare RHIBs, both Availability and 
Reliability requirements for spares is met. If the total force size is set at 112 RHIBs (as 
required by the Extend RHIB Reliability Model), the RHIB Availability Model allows for 
RHIBs utilized in the mission with operational availabilities of .74 or greater (equivalent 
to spending approximately 26% or less time not in service due to maintenance/supply 
issues). 
7.4.5.4 Helicopter Availability and Reliability Model (HARM) 
Helicopters contain multiple redundant systems for many subsystems, but 
in general require more maintenance than ships.  Operational availability is lower for 
helicopters than ships due to rigorous maintenance and inspection requirements placed 
upon aircraft.  The HARM models helicopter availability and reliability to determine the 
total number of helicopters required to meet the flowed-down functional requirements 
composing the Sustain function.  For model simplification the Sikorsky SH-60B Seahawk 
is used to represent the plethora of helicopters available for use within the SBA mission. 
Assumptions 
Reliability and operational availability data for the SH-60B is used to represent 
the community of helicopters available for use in the SBA mission.  Five-year averaged 
data obtained from NAVAIR is displayed in Table 7-29. 
t (hours) =    7.0 
L (lambda, failures per hour)    0.0009 
R(t) =    0.9935 
Operating Hours Until Failure   1077.0242 
Full Mission Capable   36.39% 
Mission Capable   25.48% 
Maintenance 28.45% Non-Mission Capable Supply 9.68% 
Combined Non-Mission Capable   38.14% 
Total   0.00% 
Operational Availability (%)   61.86% 
Table 7-29:  NAVAIR 5-Year Average Data for SH-60B 
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SH-60B overall vehicle failure rate (λ) is the number of overall system failures 
per time period that result in a change of status from Mission Capable (MC) to  
Non-Mission Capable (NMC).  Reliability is defined as:  R(t) = exp(-λ·t), where t is time 
in hours, λ is the number of failures per hour.  1 – R(7) = .0065, the probability an  
SH-60B will “fail” after a 7-hour flight period.  This value is input into a binary decision 
gate within the HARM model.  SH-60Bs enter “service” for a 7-hour period.  At the 
conclusion of the 7-hours they are passed through the binary decision gate, with a  
.0065 probability of passing into a NMC status due to a system failure.  The NMC 
helicopters are transported to a centralized repair facility.  The repair facility uses a 
triangular distribution to determine amount of time to return the helicopter to MC status.  
The triangular distribution is set at a minimum value of 1 hour, maximum value of  
96 hours, and most likely value of 12 hours.  These represent the estimated amount of 
time an SH-60B will take to be repaired, including administrative and supply delay time.  
Upon repair, the helicopter is transferred into a MC pool, awaiting return to flight. 
Method 
SH-60Bs falling into the .9935 probability in the binary decision gate pass into a 
second binary decision gate to determine if daily maintenance is required (Figure 7-68).  
The operational availability (Table 7-33) is input into the second binary decision to 
determine whether the SH-60B requires daily maintenance or not.  The SH-60B is passed 
to a “no maintenance required” pool with a .6186 probability, or to a “maintenance 
required” pool with a .3182 (or 1-.6186) probability.  SH-60Bs not requiring daily 
maintenance are passed into a MC pool awaiting flight.  SH-60Bs in the “maintenance 
required” pool are passed to a centralized maintenance facility.  The maintenance facility 
utilizes a real, uniform distribution to determine time required to complete maintenance.  
The real, uniform distribution is used to simulate a range of possible events that could 
happen with an equal likelihood (such as administrative or supply delays, backlogged 
work, variations in available maintenance personnel, variations in time required for 
different maintenance checks, etc.).  The real, uniform distribution is given a minimum 
value of 1 hour, maximum value of 6 hours based on SME estimation.  Upon completion 
of maintenance the helicopter is passed to the MC pool awaiting flight. 
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Figure 7-68:  EXTENDTM Helicopter Availability and Reliability Model 
Finish function helicopter operational requirements from Table 7-31 are used as 
input for the number of helicopters in starting inventory (26 SH-60Bs total).  Based on 
PBS requirements (see Appendix E), each mission day 14 hours of continuous air 
coverage are required.  SH-60Bs have an endurance of approximately 3.5 hours,118 
therefore to ensure continuous air coverage two SH-60Bs will be utilized in shifts of  
3.5 hours (at a time).  This results in 7 hours of flight per SH-60B per day, or 210 flight 
hours over the 30-day mission.  Two hundred ten flight hours is input into the HARM 
model as the total continuous simulation time a model trial will run for.  One hundred 
trials are run for the HARM model; inventory of SH-60Bs are varied to observe the 
probability of maintaining 26 helicopters in continuous operation (the operational 
requirement).  Results are displayed in Figures 7-73 and 7-74. 
                                                 
118 GlobalSecurity.Org, “SH-60B,” [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/sh-60b-
specs.htm], 29 March 2006, accessed in April 2006; and Federation of American Scientists, “SH-60 
LAMPS MK III Seahawk,” [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/sh-60.htm], 27 December 1999, 
accessed in April 2006. 
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Figure 7-69:  Mean Probability of Success in meeting the operational requirement (26 SH-60Bs 
operational during a 7-hour flight day) 






























Mean in SH-60Bs in MC status
Mean SH-60Bs requiring Maintenance
Mean SH-60Bs Broken
 
Figure 7-70:  Number of SH-60Bs in MC status, requiring Maintenance, and requiring Repair 
Results 
 For an SH-60B inventory of 0 to approximately 34 there is a positive linear 
increase in the mean Probability of meeting the operational requirement (Figure 7-69).  
The positive linear increase is also seen in Figure 7-70, for mean number of SH-60Bs in 
MC status.  An “elbow” appears in the rate of increase of Ps (Figure 7-69) and mean 
219 
number of SH-60Bs in MC status (Figure 7-70) when the total inventory size is 
approximately 34, and levels out thereafter.  From the PBS requirements (Table 7-31), 
the Sustain requirement (.9999) is met at a total SH-60B inventory of approximately 43.  
At this point (43 SH-60Bs in inventory), both the PBS operational requirement and the 
Sustain operational requirement are met or exceeded.  Therefore, 43 SH-60Bs are 
required to meet both operational requirements.  However, the “elbow” at inventory level 
of 34 SH-60Bs indicates a decreasing payoff in meeting both requirements thereafter.  An 
inventory of 34 SH-60Bs provides .9881 probability of success in meeting the Sustain 
functional requirement.  The payoff for the additional probability of success capability is 
.0013 Ps increase per SH-60B, after 34 are placed in the total SH-60B inventory. 
 As the number of SH-60Bs is increased the number requiring maintenance or 
repair after each 7-hour flight day increases according to an approximately positive linear 
slope (Figure 7-70, orange and red lines).  This is due to the static value used for 
operational availability and reliability within the HARM model.  In reality some  
SH-60Bs may be maintained in a NMC status for cannibalization purposes  
(i.e., “hangar queens”).  This, however, is not reflected in the HARM model.  The 
variability in the slope for maintenance and repairs (Figure 7-70) occur for unknown 
reasons, possibly due to failures in the HARM model to account for realistic conditions.  
Another possibility may be the distributions used to represent the maintenance and repair 
times (triangular for the repair time; real, uniform for the maintenance time) would better 
reflect reality if modified.  Exploration of these details is left for future study. 
7.5 SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 The performance of each architecture previously defined is evaluated across each 
of the three missions.  The results of the architectures’ performance are then compared in 
order to evaluate the relative merit of the different architectures. 
 For each architecture 500 simulation runs for the WMD and the SAW missions, 
and 2,000 simulation runs for the SBA mission Figure 7-75 displays the average 
performance of each architecture in the MTR missions. 
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Figure 7-71:  Architecture Effectiveness in Each DRM 
 As shown by Figure 7-71, each of the three architectures has virtually identical 
performance with respect to the WMD mission.  Each uses similar system concepts 
without any significant difference noted over the course of 500 simulation runs.  
However, differences in the effectiveness of the different architectures exist with respect 
to the SAW and SBA missions. 
The Bottom-Up Cost-Effective architecture and the other two architectures are 
somewhat close in performance in the SAW mission.  The Bottom-Up architecture uses 
Finish(2) Option 2 (“Sea Marshalls” with the Harbor Pilot, and disabling if terrorists were 
in control) while the other two architectures use Finish(2) Option 1 (Surge deployment 
with escort and recapture if terrorists were in control) for the SAW mission.  A statistical 
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analysis is then performed to evaluate the difference between the two  
potential architectures. 
A two-sample t-test indicates that there is a 99.9% chance that the two 
architectures are statistically different, with a t-value of 6.74.  The 95% confidence 
interval in the amount of increased effectiveness in terms of probability of success 
between Option 1 and Option 2 was determined to be between 0.03 and 0.08, with an 
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Figure 7-72:  SAW Mission Experiment Results 
 Based on the number of trials conducted, a two sample t-test indicates that there is 
a 100% chance that the Maximum Performance architecture out-performs the Top-Down 
Cost-Effective architecture and the Bottom-Up Cost-Effective architectures with t-values 
of 9.36 and 15.73, respectively.  The estimated difference between the mean probabilities 
of success is 11.7% and 21.0%, respectively.  Figures 7-73 and 7-74 display the raw data 
for the Maximum Performance architecture versus the two other architectures.  An 
analysis of the systems incorporated into the architectures and their impact on 
architecture performance demonstrates that the addition of the higher firepower weapons 
on the medium-sized escort ships in the Maximum Performance architecture leads to a 
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significant improvement in SBA mission Ps.  The larger improvement in SBA mission Ps 
as compared to the Bottom-Up Cost-Effective architecture is attributed to the  
Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV) incorporated in the Maximum Performance 
















Raw data points for Ps for SBA Top-down Cost-Effective versus Maximum Performance Architectures
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Figure 7-74:  SBA Mission Results between BUCE and Max Perform Architectures 
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 Based on the number of trials conducted, a two-sample t-test indicates that there is 
a 100% chance that the Ps for the Bottom-Up and Top-Down Cost-Effective architectures 
are also statistically different, with a t-value of 7.98.  The 95% confidence interval for the 
amount of increased effectiveness in terms of probability of success between BUCE and 
TDCE was determined to be between 0.116 and 0.069, with an estimate of 9.25% better 
performance from the TDCE.  Figure 7-75 displays the raw data points for Ps for the 
SBA mission for the BUCE and the TDCE architectures.  An analysis of system 
components in the architectures and their performance show that the difference is 
attributed to the additional benefit associated with the USVs used in the TDCE 
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Figure 7-75:  SBA Mission Results between BUCE and TDCE Architectures 
7.6 COST ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
7.6.1 Overview of Method 
There are three main categories of costs considered in the comparison of different 
MTR architectures:  procurement cost, operating and support costs, and delay and 
damage cost.  Delay cost is determined in terms of time delay to commerce via the 
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mission-level Extend models described in Section 7.4.  Damage cost is determined from 
these same models in terms of percent of system failures to neutralize the terrorist threat.  
The derivation of all other cost estimates is described in this section. 
For each system-level concept described, the costs of the main components are 
determined, and the total cost for each option is then calculated via Excel.  All cost 
figures are normalized to fiscal year 2006 millions of dollars (FY2006$M), and are used 
as selection criteria for the Bottom Up Cost Effective architecture.  Additionally, a grand 
total cost is calculated for each of the 32 trials in the orthogonal array experiment, and 
used as a response in determining the Top-Down Cost Effective architecture.  Lastly, the 
grand total cost of the three final candidate architectures is calculated and used as one 
criterion in the final MTR SoS selection. 
7.6.1.1 MTR O&S Costs 
For platforms that already exist in the immediate vicinity of the MTR 
operating area, and in the numbers needed, official Navy operations and support (O&S) 
data are used to determine an MTR O&S cost.  These data are drawn from the  
Naval Center for Cost Analysis VAMOSC (Visibility and Management of Operating and 
Support Costs) Website119 as average annual O&S costs, adjusted for the expected 
amount of time that these resources would be involved in MTR-related training, 
exercises, and operations per year.  Where VAMOSC data do not exist, existing 
analogous VAMOSC data are scaled. 
VAMOSC 
VAMOSC data includes all costs for personnel, maintenance, fuel, and 
expendables incurred over a year’s time.  The average O&S cost for selected classes of 
ships and aircraft is the basis for MTR SoS platform O&S estimates, and is divided by 
365 to obtain a daily O&S rate. 
A daily O&S rate was similarly obtained for MTR personnel.  The most recent 
annual outlay for all officer and enlisted pay and allowances for both the Navy and 
Marine Corps were totaled, then divided by the total number of full time equivalents 
                                                 
119 Naval Center for Cost Analysis, Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
Database, http://www.navyvamosc.com 
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(FTEs) in both services for that year.  Dividing this figure by 365 days yields a standard 
daily rate per person. 
Standard durations are assumed for MTR-related training, exercises, and 
operations.  A two-week annual training course is assumed for boarding/search teams for 
each of the MTR missions.  Additionally, all platforms are assumed to participate in one 
ten-day exercise for each mission per year.  One actual operation per year is assumed for 
each mission.  The WMD and SAW missions are assumed to last for 20 days each, while 
the SBA mission continues for 30 days.  Thus, the annual O&S cost for the MTR SoS is a 
product of the number of days per year during which the platforms would be involved in 
MTR-related activities and the daily VAMOSC O&S rate.  The only exception to this 
practice is that when assets are involved in transoceanic intercept missions for either 
WMD or SAW, VAMOSC fuel costs are replaced by the cost of sprint speed fuel usage.  
This procedure is described in more detail in Section 7.6.2.5. 
7.6.1.2 MTR Procurement Costs 
In the case that additional units of existing platforms are required, official 
DoD budget documents120 are used to the maximum extent possible to obtain platform 
unit costs.  If official DoD budget documents can not be located, another reputable 
source, such as Jane’s or the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) Website, is used.  
The costs of USCG Deepwater assets are based on official USCG Website materials.121  
Where entirely new systems are required, appropriate analogous systems are identified, 
and their costs are scaled as appropriate.  The entire cost of both additional units and of 
new platforms is attributed to MTR SoS procurement costs, even if these platforms could 
be used for additional missions outside the MTR domain.  As in the O&S cost 
calculation, there is one important exception:  Program of Record National Fleet assets, 
such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the National Security Cutter (WMSL), are 
assumed to be sunk costs and are therefore not included in the total cost computation. 
                                                 
120 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), DoD Summary Budget Materials/Budget 
Links, http://www.dod..mil/comptroller/budgetindex.html 
121 United States Coast Guard Fact File, Fiscal Year 2004 Coast Guard Report:  FY2003 Performance 
Report and FY2005 Budget in Brief, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/index.htm 
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7.6.2 System Concept Cost Estimates 
7.6.2.1 C4ISR 
The main components of the C4ISR system are the Boarding Team 
Communications Pack (BTCP), correlation engine software, software training, 
headquarters workstations, shipboard combat information centers (CIC), small boat 
communications equipment, space and land-based base stations, and the planning effort 
required to develop ROE and SOP for MTR missions.  Of the preceding components, all 
are assumed to exist in an adequate form with the exception of the BTCP, correlation 
engine, and dedicated personnel for software and communications gear currency and 
readiness requirements. 
The detailed cost estimate for a single BTCP is shown in Table 7-30.  The 
BTCP is costed based on manufacturers’ Websites and analogous equipment. 
Item Qty Unit Cost Total Cost Data Source 
Marine grade 
ruggedized laptops 
4 $2,289 $9,156 http://www.consumersmarine.com 
100Mbps switch 1 $50 $50 http://www.compusa.com 
Biometrics scanner 1 $1,000 $1,000 Estimate based on analogous equipment 
UWB antenna 2 $300 $600 Estimate based on analogous equipment 
Skymate 
Communicator kit 
1 $1,199 $1,199 http://www.consumersmarine.com 
Miscellaneous 1 $3,000 $3,000 Power supplies, batteries, chargers, mounts, etc. 
  TOTAL $15,005  
Table 7-30:  Boarding Team Communications Pack (BTCP) 
The Rosetta Stone Advanced Capability Technology Demonstration is 
used as the analogy for correlation engine algorithm development and technology 
demonstration.  It is assumed that Area C2 requires only one correlation engine, while 
Local C2 requires an engine for each HVU escort team, of which there are approximately 
20.  An additional $2.5 million per C2 location is assumed for hardware/software 
integration costs, and the rule of thumb for software O&S is 20% of RDT&E. 
Five full time equivalents (FTEs) for 44 days per year are assumed per 
software-installed location.  FTEs include the commander, two analyst/operators, one 
boarding team communications expert, and one boarding team gear 
227 
maintainer/storekeeper.  The 44-day duration is comprised of one 20-day operation, one 
10-day exercise, and two weeks of either training or planning.  No cost differential was 
identified between the problem-solving and the objective-oriented command structures.  
The total C4ISR cost estimate is shown in Table 7-31. 






Total O&S Total Option
Area C2 7.687 1 10.187 0.015 20 0.3 1.569 12.056 1 & 2 
Local C2 7.687 20 57.687 0.015 20 0.3 2.162 60.149 3 & 4 
Table 7-31:  C4ISR Cost Estimate 
7.6.2.2 PBS 
PBS(1,2) 
The main components of the PBS system for the WMD and SAW missions are 
National Fleet assets, replenishment ships, and boarding teams.  For Option 1, the 
Current Ships O&S is an average of VAMOSC daily O&S rates for the CG-47, DDG-51, 
and FFG-7 classes of ships.  Boarding team members are drawn for ship’s company.  
Option 2 Program of Record (POR) Ships O&S uses the average of FFG O&S for the 
NSC and PC O&S for the LCS.  For both Options 2 and 3, each boarding team is an 
additional detachment of 12 personnel.  The VAMOSC standard FTE cost discussed in 
Section 7.4.1.1.1 is applied.  Option 3 also uses a modified COTS merchant ship with six 
interceptors carried onboard.  The manufacturer’s cost for the NASSCO Tote Orca and 
the Wallypower 118 are used for procurement costs, plus an additional $100M for  
Tote Orca modifications including a boat handling system.  O&S costs are assumed as 
follows:  Tote Orca equals MSC Fast Supply Ship (FSS) class average, Wallypower 
equals 80% of PC class average, and boat handling system equals aircraft elevator 
average.  Table 7-32 displays these costs and the total by option. 
 Unit Cost Qty O&S Cost Duration Total Grand Total Option
Current Ships + AO n/a 20 1.848 30 55.451 55.451 1 
POR Ships + AO Sunk Cost 20 1.005 30 30.145 31.691 2 
Boarding Teams n/a 20 0.002 44 1.546   
Modified Merchant 250.000 3 0.021 30 751.846 1,224.067 3 
Interceptors 25.934 18 0.010 22 470.675   
Boarding Teams n/a 20 0.002 44 1.546   
Table 7-32:  PBS(1,2) Cost Estimate 
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PBS(3) 
The main components of PBS(3) are escort boats and boarding teams.  Small 
escort boats are either RHIBs or other light patrol/security craft.  The small boat unit cost 
estimate is an average of the USCG Long Range Interceptor (LRI), the Sea ARK Marine 
“Dauntless” craft, and SOF combatant craft systems.  Small escort O&S is assumed to be 
20% of PC O&S, the scaling factor based on boat length and crew requirements.  The 
mid-sized escorts used in options 2 and 3 are similar to the Navy PC or the USCG  
Fast Response Cutter (FRC).  PC O&S cost and FRC procurement costs are used.  The 
total number of small and mid-sized craft required are reduced by the 20 USCG boats 
currently assigned to San Francisco Bay.  For simplicity, it is assumed that half of these 
existing boats are mid-sized.  Lastly, while the 12-man boarding teams could be drawn 
from USMC FAST, USN MSD, or USCG MSST teams, the USCG MSST in  
San Francisco is assumed to function as the base for boarding team staging and 
replenishment.  Table 7-33 presents the total costs of the four different PBS(3) options. 
 Unit Cost Qty O&S Cost Duration Total Grand Total Option
Small Boats 1.01981 82 0.002442 40 91.636 92.584 1 
Boarding Teams n/a 10 0.001756 54 0.948   
Mid-Sized Boats 43.637 34 0.012212 40 1,500.279 1,534.753 2 
Small Boats 1.01981 30 0.002442 40 33.525   
Boarding Teams n/a 10 0.001756 54 0.948   
Mid-Sized Boats 43.637 34 0.012212 40 1,500.279 1,583.923 3 
Small Boats 1.01981 74 0.002442 40 82.696   
Boarding Teams n/a 10 0.001756 54 0.948   
Boarding Teams n/a 27 0.001756 54 2.561 36.086 4 
Small Boats 1.01981 30 0.002442 40 33.525   
Table 7-33:  PBS(3) Cost Estimate 
7.6.2.3 Find/Fix 
Find/Fix(1) 
For the WMD mission, the main components of the Find/Fix system are the 
radiological sensors.  Six of each sensor are required per PAV, with eight assumed to 
account for any reliability issues.  Detector O&S is assumed to be $200K per year per 
detector class, which includes one or two FTEs, storage, equipment checks, and any 
servicing.  Table 7-34 shows the total cost by option. 
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 Unit Cost Qty O&S Cost Duration Total Grand Total Option
LRM 0.074 160 0.000548 365 12.040 36.240 1 
Fission Meter 0.150 160 0.000548 365 24.200   
LRM 0.074 160 0.000548 365 12.040 21.040 2 
HPGe 0.055 160 0.000548 365 9.000   
Nal Detector 0.019 160 0.000548 365 3.240 27.440 3 
Fission Meter 0.150 160 0.000548 365 24.200   
Nal Detector 0.019 160 0.000548 365 3.240 12.240 4 
HPGe 0.055 160 0.000548 365 9.000   
Table 7-34: Find/Fix(1) Cost Estimate 
Find/Fix(2) 
The main components of Find/Fix(2) are the Biometrics Kit and the server at 
headquarters.  Two kits are required per VOI:  a primary and one spare.  Similar to 
Find/Fix(1), detector O&S is assumed to be $200K annually.  The cost total is shown in 
Table 7-35. 
 
 Unit Cost Qty O&S Cost Duration Total 
Biometrics Kit 0.0010 40 0.000547945 365 0.290 
Server 0.05 1    
Table 7-35:  Find/Fix(2) Cost Estimate 
Find/Fix(3) 
The main components of Find/Fix(3) are the search teams and surface search 
radar.  Because the costs associated with the teams are previously assessed under PBS(3), 
and the radar is organic to both the small- and mid-sized escorts, there is no additional 
cost for either of these two options. 
7.6.2.4 Finish 
Finish(1) 
There is no additional cost for Finish(1).  The Finish(1) concept consists of 
handing off any suspected WMD device to existing DOE experts for assessment  
and disposal. 
Finish(2) 
The main component of Finish(2) Option 1 is a recapture team inserted via 
helicopter.  The H-60 VAMOSC data is applied to obtain a daily helicopter O&S rate.  
The VAMOSC per person rate is used for the recapture team, plus a 25% factor to 
account for their specialized equipment.  The recapture component is in addition to the 
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assets contained in PBS(1,2).  In order to appropriately cost Finish(2) Option 1, both 
PBS(1,2) and the corresponding Sustain fuel cost must be included a second time in the 
total architecture cost.  This is accomplished via the “Finish(2) Enable” column in  
Table 7-40. 
Finish(2) Option 2 is comprised of escort teams that board with the harbor pilot, 
as well as controlled mines.  The controlled mine concept uses converted MK-48 
torpedoes; thus, the Improved Submarine-Launched Mobile Mine (ISLMM) MK-48 
torpedo conversion program is an appropriate analogy.  Torpedo O&S is estimated at 
$200K per year plus the expenditure of one torpedo at $2.5M unit cost.  The total cost 
calculation for both options is displayed in Table 7-36. 
 Unit Cost Qty 
O&S 
Cost Duration Total 
Grand
Total Option
PBS(1,2) and Sustain Cost  Varies by Option (see the "Fin(2) Enable" column of Orthogonal Array) 1.219 1 
Insertion Team N/A 1 0.002196 44 0.0966   
H-60 N/A 3 0.012467 30 1.1220   
ISLMM (MK-48 conversion) 0.143 3 0.000548 30 2.6926 4.2383 2 
Escort Teams N/A 20 0.001756 44 1.5457   
Table 7-36:  Finish(2) Cost Estimate 
Finish(3) 
Finish(3) employs the escort teams and platforms already costed under PBS(3).  
The number of teams is consistent with PBS(3):  10 teams for Options 1, 2, and 3;  
27 teams for Option 4.  Additionally, Finish(3) main components include hand-held 
weapons, helicopters, and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs).  The MK-19 Grenade 
Launcher procurement cost was used as the standard hand-held weapon cost.  Hand-held 
weapon O&S is assumed to be 25% of procurement cost.  Helicopter O&S uses the same 
daily rate as Finish(2), which is based on the Navy H-60.  The SeaFox USV is used as an 
analogy for USV procurement cost.  Because the SeaFox is built atop an 8-meter RHIB, 
the same scaling factor used for PBS(3) small boats is applied here, namely that SeaFox 




 Unit Cost Qty O&S Cost Duration Total Grand Total Option
MK-19 GL (4 per team) 0.020 40 1.377E-05 54 0.834 0.834 1 
MK-19 GL (4 per team) 0.020 40 1.377E-05 54 0.834 13.799 2 
H-60 N/A 26 1.247E-02 40 12.965   
MK-19 GL (4 per team) 0.020 40 1.377E-05 54 0.834 21.270 3 
SeaFox 0.100 92 3.053E-03 40 20.435   
MK-19 GL (4 per team) 0.020 108 1.377E-05 54 2.252 35.653 4 
H-60 N/A 26 1.247E-02 40 12.965   
SeaFox 0.100 92 3.053E-03 40 20.435   
Table 7-37:  Finish(3) Cost Estimate 
7.6.2.5 Sustain 
Nearly all critical sustainment costs are captured in the VAMOSC data.  
For example, food is included through the Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) cost in 
the VAMOSC personnel data.  The VAMOSC reports also account for the majority of 
SoS maintenance requirements.  Any spares needed to meet reliability requirements are 
included in unit quantities.  For example, although only 4 USVs are required per high 
value commercial shipping unit (HVU), a total of 92 must be procured to account for 
refueling, maintenance, and breakage.  Training cost is included via the duration of MTR 
activities and is standardized as one 10-day exercise per year per mission, plus one  
2-week school for boarding team members on MTR mission-specific equipment  
and procedures. 
As mentioned in Section 7.6.1.1, VAMOSC fuel costs are not used for the  
high-speed transoceanic intercept concept used in PBS(1,2).  Instead, the annual 
VAMOSC fuel cost is subtracted from the total O&S cost before the daily O&S rates are 
calculated.  Sprint speed fuel rates are used to calculate more accurate fuel costs for each 
of the PBS(1,2) options.  Table 7-38 shows the operational and exercise fuel costs for all 
three PBS(1,2) options.  Option 1 and 2 include the fuel cost for 20 ships and 3 oil 
tankers, while Option 3 uses only the fuel cost for three oil tankers to approximate the 
modified merchant fuel burn rate.  For the 10-day exercise, a reduced number of ships is 
assumed to operate at sprint speeds.  Specifically, only 15% of the Options 1 and 2 ships 
sprint during exercises, and only one of the Option 3 ships sprints.  These operational and 




 Operational Fuel Cost Exercise Fuel Cost   
PBS(1,2) FY2005$ FY2006$M # Ships # Days Fuel Cost Total Cost Sustain
Option 1 16,468,837 16.830 0.15 0.5 1.262 18.092 1 
Option 2 9,415,517 9.622 0.15 0.5 0.722 10.343 2 
Option 3 2,569,696 2.626 0.33 0.5 0.438 3.064 3 
Table 7-38:  Sustain Cost Estimate 
7.6.3 Orthogonal Array Experiment (OAE) Costs 
Costs for all system concepts are tabulated and combined for the 32 OAE trials as 
shown in Table 7-39.  Columns within the table correspond to each of the concept cost 
estimates previously described in Section 7.4.2.  The “Finish (2) Enable” column 
accounts for the dual use of the PBS(1,2) system in both the WMD and SAW missions in 
the case of Finish(2) Option 1, and it includes both the PBS(1,2) O&S cost and the 
Sustain sprint speed fuel cost.  The total costs shown in the right-hand column of the 
table are normalized and used as a response in the orthogonal array analysis described in 
Section 7.1.2 to statistically derive the Top-Down Cost Effective architecture. 
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1 12.056 55.451 92.584 36.240 0.290 0.000 1.219 73.543 0.834 18.092 290.309
2 12.056 31.691 1,534.753 21.040 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 13.799 10.343 1,628.211
3 12.056 1,224.067 1,583.923 27.440 0.290 0.000 1.219 1,227.130 21.270 3.064 4,100.458
4 12.056 55.451 36.086 12.240 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 35.653 18.092 174.106
5 12.056 55.451 92.584 21.040 0.290 0.000 1.219 73.543 35.653 18.092 309.927
6 12.056 31.691 1,534.753 36.240 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 21.270 10.343 1,650.881
7 12.056 1,224.067 1,583.923 12.240 0.290 0.000 1.219 1,227.130 13.799 3.064 4,077.788
8 12.056 31.691 36.086 27.440 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 0.834 10.343 122.979
9 60.149 55.451 1,534.753 27.440 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 21.270 18.092 1,721.683
10 60.149 31.691 92.584 12.240 0.290 0.000 1.219 42.034 35.653 10.343 286.204
11 60.149 1,224.067 36.086 36.240 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 0.834 3.064 1,364.968
12 60.149 1,224.067 1,583.923 21.040 0.290 0.000 1.219 1,227.130 13.799 3.064 4,134.682
13 60.149 55.451 1,534.753 12.240 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 13.799 18.092 1,699.013
14 60.149 31.691 92.584 27.440 0.290 0.000 1.219 42.034 0.834 10.343 266.585
15 60.149 1,224.067 36.086 21.040 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 35.653 3.064 1,384.587
16 60.149 55.451 1,583.923 36.240 0.290 0.000 1.219 73.543 21.270 18.092 1,850.177
17 12.056 55.451 36.086 36.240 0.290 0.000 1.219 73.543 13.799 18.092 246.776
18 12.056 31.691 1,583.923 21.040 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 0.834 10.343 1,664.416
19 12.056 1,224.067 1,534.753 27.440 0.290 0.000 1.219 1,227.130 35.653 3.064 4,065.671
20 12.056 31.691 92.584 12.240 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 21.270 10.343 184.712
21 12.056 55.451 36.086 21.040 0.290 0.000 1.219 73.543 21.270 18.092 239.046
22 12.056 31.691 1,583.923 36.240 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 35.653 10.343 1,714.435
23 12.056 1,224.067 1,534.753 12.240 0.290 0.000 1.219 1,227.130 0.834 3.064 4,015.652
24 12.056 1,224.067 92.584 27.440 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 13.799 3.064 1,377.538
25 60.149 55.451 1,583.923 27.440 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 35.653 18.092 1,785.237
26 60.149 31.691 36.086 12.240 0.290 0.000 1.219 42.034 21.270 10.343 215.323
27 60.149 1,224.067 92.584 36.240 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 13.799 3.064 1,434.432
28 60.149 55.451 1,534.753 21.040 0.290 0.000 1.219 73.543 0.834 18.092 1,765.371
29 60.149 55.451 1,583.923 12.240 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 0.834 18.092 1,735.218
30 60.149 31.691 36.086 27.440 0.290 0.000 1.219 42.034 13.799 10.343 223.053
31 60.149 1,224.067 92.584 21.040 0.290 0.000 4.238 0.000 21.270 3.064 1,426.702
32 60.149 31.691 1,534.753 36.240 0.290 0.000 1.219 42.034 35.653 10.343 1,752.373
Table 7-39:  Orthogonal Array of MTR SoS Costs 
7.6.4 Candidate Architecture Costs 
The total costs are obtained for each of the three candidate architectures, using the 
cost estimates in Section 7.4.2.  All costs are reported in FY2006$M and are broken out 
according to the SoS components, procurement, and O&S.  The architecture costs are 
presented both individually and in combination in the sections that follow. 
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7.6.4.1 Individual Architecture Cost Results 
Maximum Performance Architecture 
The costs of the Maximum Performance architecture are displayed in tabular and 
graphical form in Table 7-40 and Figure 7-76, respectively. 
Max Perf. Component Procurement O&S Total 
4 C4 57.987 2.162 60.149 
2 PBS(1,2) 0.000 63.382 63.382 
3 PBS(3) 1,559.136 24.787 1,583.923 
1 Find Fix(1) 35.840 0.400 36.240 
1 Find Fix(2) 0.090 0.200 0.290 
1 Finish(2) 0.000 1.219 1.219 
4 Finish(3) 11.372 24.281 35.653 
2 Sustain 0.000 20.687 20.687 
 Total 1,664.426 137.118 1,801.543 
Table 7-40:  Maximum Performance Architecture Cost 











Figure 7-76:  Maximum Performance Architecture Cost 
Bottom-Up Cost-Effective (BUCE) Architecture 
The costs of the BUCE architecture are displayed in tabular and graphical form in 
Table 7-41 and Figure 7-77, respectively. 
BUCE Component Procurement O&S Total 
2 C4 10.487 1.569 12.056 
2 PBS(1,2) 0.000 31.691 31.691 
1 PBS(3) 83.624 8.960 92.584 
1 Find Fix(1) 35.840 0.400 36.240 
1 Find Fix(2) 0.090 0.200 0.290 
2 Finish(2) 0.143 4.095 4.238 
2 Finish(3) 0.804 12.995 13.799 
2 Sustain Fuel 0.000 10.343 10.343 
 Total 130.989 70.253 201.242 
Table 7-41:  BUCE Architecture Cost 
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Figure 7-77:  BUCEe Architecture Cost 
Top-Down Cost-Effective (TDCE) Architecture 
The costs of the TDCE architecture are displayed in tabular and graphical form in 
Table 7-42 and Figure 7-78, respectively. 
TDCE Component Procurement O&S Total 
4 C4 57.987 2.162 60.149 
2 PBS(1,2) 0.000 63.382 63.382 
1 PBS(3) 83.624 8.960 92.584 
1 Find Fix(1) 35.840 0.400 36.240 
1 Find Fix(2) 0.090 0.200 0.290 
1 Finish(2) 0.000 1.219 1.219 
4 Finish(3) 11.372 24.281 35.653 
2 Sustain Fuel 0.000 20.687 20.687 
 Total 188.914 121.290 310.204 
Table 7-42:  TDCE Architecture Cost 











Figure 7-78:  TDCE Architecture Cost 
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Architecture Cost Comparison 
The costs of the three candidate architectures are compared side by side in both 
tabular and graphical format in Table 7-43 and Figure 7-79, respectively.  Table 7-44 
displays the costs of all three candidate architectures by mission. 
Architecture Procurement Cost Annual O&S Cost Delay/Damage Cost Total Cost
Maximum Performance 1,664.426 137.118 4.912 1,806.455
BUCE 130.989 70.253 25.306 226.549
TDCE 188.914 121.290 4.912 315.116
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Figure 7-79:  Candidate Architecture Cost Comparison 
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Cost by Mission Architecture 
 Max Performance BUCE TDCE 
WMD    
C4 20.050 4.019 20.050 
PBS(1,2) 31.691 31.691 31.691 
Find Fix(1) 36.240 36.240 36.240 
Sustain 10.343 10.343 10.343 
WMD Total 98.324 82.293 98.324 
SAW  
C4 20.050 4.019 20.050 
PBS(1,2) 31.691 0.000 31.691 
Find Fix(2) 0.290 0.290 0.290 
Finish(2) 1.219 4.238 1.219 
Sustain 10.343 0.000 10.343 
Delay/Damage 4.912 25.306 4.912 
SAW Total 68.504 33.853 68.504 
SBA  
C4 20.050 4.019 20.050 
PBS(3) 1583.923 92.584 92.584 
Finish(3) 35.653 13.799 35.653 
SBA Total 1,639.626 110.402 148.287 
      
GRAND TOTAL 1,806.455 226.549 315.116 
Table 7-44:  Candidate Architecture Cost by Mission 
7.7 ARCHITECTURE SELECTION 
 As previously discussed, three MTR SoS architectures are considered:  the TDCE 
architecture, the BUCE architecture, and the Maximum Performance architecture.  The 
architecture ranking and selection process uses the processed EXTENDTM data output 
consisting of probability of success along with delay and/or damage costs. 
7.7.1 Architecture Selection Process 
 The performance of each architecture in each of the three mission areas is 
measured.  The results are post-processed to include the delay and damage costs 
sustained as a result of the implementation of the system.  The architectures are then 
compared in with respect to each individual mission area along with all three missions 
considered in aggregate.  The selection process then involves assessment of system total 
cost versus effectiveness for each architecture. 
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7.7.2. Architecture Selection Analysis 
 Section 7.5 discusses the overall effectiveness of each architecture.  Given the 
emphasis placed on limiting the impact on global maritime commerce, the MTR solution 
being sought has been conjectured from the beginning of the project to correspond to the 
most cost-effective architecture rather than the most effective architecture.  As will be 
seen later, the analysis results will support this conjecture and lead to the best  
cost-effective architecture.  Following is a discussion of the selection of the “best” overall 
architecture for the MTR mission. 
7.7.2.1 Architecture Selection with Regard to Mission 
 Figures 7-80, 7-81, and 7-82 show the cost-effectiveness curves for the 
WMD, SAW, and SBA missions, respectively.  The so-called cost-effectiveness curve 
depicts the total SoS cost against the probability of mission success for each architecture.  
As shown by these curves, the BUCE architecture would nominally be selected for the 
WMD and SAW missions, while the TDCE architecture would be selected for the  
SBA mission. 
 
Figure 7-80:  SoS Cost-Effectiveness for WMD Mission 
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Figure 7-81:  SoS Cost-Effectiveness for SAW Mission 
 
Figure 7-82:  SoS Cost-Effectiveness for SBA Mission 
7.7.2.2 Overall Architecture Selection 
 Figure 7-83 shows the cost of each architecture against the aggregated 
probability of success across all three missions.  The “knee” in the cost-effectiveness 
curve corresponds to the TDCE architecture.  The reason for the “knee” and hence the 
selection of this “best” architecture is now elaborated. 
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Figure 7-83:  SoS Cost-Effectiveness for Combined Missions 
Firstly, the large difference between the cost of the Maximum 
Performance architecture and the two cost-effective architectures is caused by the cost of 
the procurement of the requisite number of medium-sized escort ships for the  
SBA mission.  As discussed in Section 7.6, the cost for procurement alone of the 
combined SBA force in the architecture is $1,559.1 million in FY2006 dollars.  The cost 
for procurement alone of the small escort only SBA force in the TDCE architecture is 
$83.6 million.  The result is a 1385% increase in the overall SBA mission cost for only a 
12% increase in SBA mission effectiveness. 
Secondly, although the TDCE architecture is slightly more expensive than 
the BUCE architecture, it delivers 5% improvement in aggregated mission probability of 
success.  This causes the “knee” well beyond the tiny increase in improved mission 
effectiveness from the TDCE to the Maximum Performance architecture, as can be seen 
in Figure 7-83. 
The TDCE architecture can be procured and operated for a cost of  
$315.1 million in FY2006 dollars.  Table 7-45 shows the cost estimated for the results of 
the three different missions without the MTR system in place as well as the expected 
value of damage cost associated with the TDCE architecture in place.  As the table 
shows, the expected value of damage suffered without the MTR system in place drops 
from $1,900 million to $127 million.  This drop in expected value of damage of  
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$1,773 million is obtained through the expenditure of only $315.1 million in FY2006 
dollars.  In other words, the procurement of the TDCE architecture should save $5.63 for 
every dollar spent.  Even independent of the non-quantitative value in preventing a 
terrorist attack, the architecture would appear to have exceptional value given that such 





















WMD 99 500,000 0.001 1,000 10
SAW 99 2,500 1.0 500 5
SBA 72 1,000 2.0 400 112
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8.0 CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS 
Each of the Design Reference Missions (DRM) required mission-specific, pre-
planned Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) that needed to be executed to effectively 
respond to the type of terrorist attack underway.  The following CONOPS are not the 
only way to achieve the desired results, but were proposed by the team as to be simple, 
reliable, effective solutions. 
 For each mission, the CONOPS are initiated when the Joint Inter-agency Task 
Force (JIATF) for Counter-Terrorism is alerted to an impending attack against the  
United States, in our example, in San Francisco. 
8.1 COUNTER-WMD MISSION CONOPS 
• Intelligence is received that a WMD device has been smuggled onto one 
of 20 container ships coming from East Asia en route to San Francisco 
Bay.  The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan is 
exercised among the national level command centers in conference with 
the JIATF-CT headquarters and appropriate allocations of assets  
are decided. 
• Any PAV that is closer than 100 NM from CONUS is directed to turn 
around and proceed to 100 NM holding point and await boarding by  
U.S. search teams. 
• Up to 23 National Fleet (USN and USCG) vessels in the Pacific are given 
surge orders to be underway within 24 hours once specialized nuclear 
search teams have arrived at their homeport for boarding. 
• Specialized Department of Energy and other agency nuclear search teams 
within CONUS are alerted, activated, and transported via fastest means to 
ports in Yokosuka, Japan, Kodiak, Alaska, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and  
San Diego, California. 
• Once ships are ready and teams are onboard, ships surge at maximum 
sprint speed from their homeports to intercept PAVs emanating from  
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East Asia.  Priority is given first to Yokosuka, then to Kodiak, then to 
Pearl Harbor, and lastly to San Diego. 
• JIATF Staff Officers work through Department of State and Department 
of Homeland Security to obtain approval from vessel flag governments for 
search and inspection of their vessels underway. 
• National Fleet vessels intercept their respective PAV and deploy their 
search teams to the vessels via small boat and/or helicopter. 
• National Fleet vessels remain alongside PAV in order to support and 
sustain their search teams during the transit. 
• Within 24 hours after intercept culmination, surged vessels are UNREPed 
by MSC refueling ships that surged from appropriate bases to refuel  
escort vessels. 
• Search teams conduct exhaustive passive search of containers.  
Simultaneously, JIATF intelligence and national laboratory specialized 
support analysts screen manifests of cargo for potential WMD locations 
along with expected normally occurring radioactive material (NORM) that 
will likely set off initial detector searches. 
• Search teams employ passive identification of all exhaustive search 
detections along with containers expected to contain NORM or other 
potentially suspicious containers from intelligence analysis. 
• Search teams employ “reach back” through ad hoc, agile networks to 
transmit data pertaining to detected WMD characteristics for analysis by 
technical experts at national laboratories. 
• If a WMD device is detected, DoE Joint Technical Operations (JTO) 
teams are called in to dismantle and dispose of the threat device. 
• If a PAV being searched reaches the 100-NM holding point prior to the 
search being completed, the vessel is directed to hold at that point until 
such time as the search is completed and the vessel is cleared to proceed. 
• Once a PAV is searched and the team concludes no WMD device is 
resident, the PAV in question is cleared to proceed to enter the CONUS. 
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8.2 COUNTER-SAW MISSION CONOPS 
• Intelligence is received that a terrorist cell has made it onto 1 of 20 
merchant ships coming from East Asia en route to San Francisco Bay.  
The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan is exercised 
among the national level command centers in conference with the  
JIATF-CT headquarters and appropriate allocations of assets are decided. 
• Any PAV that is closer than 100 NM from CONUS is directed to turn 
around and proceed to 100-NM holding point and await boarding by  
U.S. search and escort teams. 
• Up to 23 National Fleet (USN and USCG) vessels in the Pacific are given 
surge orders to be underway within 24 hours. 
• Once ships are ready, ships surge at maximum sprint speed from their 
homeports to intercept PAVs emanating from East Asia.  Priority is given 
first to Yokosuka, then to Kodiak, then to Pearl Harbor, and lastly to  
San Diego. 
• JIATF Staff Officers work through Department of State and Department 
of Homeland Security to obtain approval from vessel flag governments for 
search and inspection of their vessels underway. 
• National Fleet vessels intercept their respective PAV and deploy their 
search teams to the vessels via small boat and/or helicopter. 
• If terrorists are in control of PAV and resist boarding, commanders 
evaluate situation and determine whether to proceed with opposed 
boarding if qualified personnel are already onboard escort vessel, to 
continue to shadow the PAV until such time as available qualified 
personnel can attempt to recapture the PAV, or to potentially disable the 
PAV to stop its progress and reevaluate the situation. 
• If terrorists are in control and they successful resist boarding and recapture 
attempts, National Fleet escort vessel disables PAV to prevent it to close 
to CONUS. 
• If terrorists are not in control of PAV, search and escort teams board PAV 
and conduct search of ship in order to seek out any terrorists hiding 
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onboard and to verify the identities of the crew personnel onboard the 
PAV.  Any identified terrorists are taken into custody for turnover to  
appropriate authorities. 
• Once ship has been searched and secured, escort teams remain onboard 
PAV until it is safely docked in CONUS port. 
• National Fleet vessels remain alongside PAV in order to support and 
sustain their search teams during the transit. 
• Within 24 hours after intercept culmination, surged vessels are UNREPed 
by MSC refueling ships that surged from appropriate bases to refuel  
escort vessels. 
8.3 COUNTER-SBA MISSION CONOPS 
• Intelligence received by JIATF Headquarters that SBA will take place 
within San Francisco Bay within some timeframe. 
• MOTR plan exercised. 
• Coast Guard MARSEC (Maritime Security) level elevated in  
San Francisco Bay to MARSEC – 3, indicating that an attack is imminent. 
• All nonessential recreational boat traffic is prohibited in the Bay during 
anticipated attack timeframe. 
• Local law enforcement and Coast Guard auxiliaries are detailed to boat 
ramps and civilian yacht harbors to help enforce recreational boat 
restriction and to seek out intelligence on impending attack. 
• Navy and Coast Guard counter-SBA forces are alerted and activated. 
• Coast Guard units assume defensive positions at static points of critical 
infrastructure such as refueling piers and ferry terminals. 
• Coast Guard teams are dispatched to essential commercial boat traffic 
such as passenger ferries. 
• Navy and Coast Guard small boats, armed helicopters, and USVs begin 
close escort patrols of essential boat traffic and points of  
critical infrastructure. 
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• Helicopters and USVs serve as primary warning to small boats that are 
close to penetrating 500-yard bubble around escorted merchant traffic. 
• Vessels penetrating 500-yard bubble are verbally warned. 
• Vessels continuing are engaged by nonlethal weapons intending to 
dissuade further closure on escorted vessel. 
• Vessels continuing are engaged by lethal weapons from all available 
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9.0 CONCLUSION 
In this AY2006 integrated project, the MTR SEA-9 team, through the  
Meyer Institute for Systems Engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School, was tasked by 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (OASD HD) to 
develop a conceptual, near-term, joint and interagency system of systems (SoS) in the  
5-year timeframe to respond to terrorist threats to the United States that emanate from the 
Maritime Domain by (1) generating SoS architecture alternatives using existing systems, 
programs of record, and COTS technologies and developing concepts of operations and 
(2) recommending a cost-effective SoS that must minimize impact on commerce.  The 
SoS would be deployed in three missions:  prevention of a nuclear WMD attack, 
prevention or defeat of an attack using a merchant ship (SAW), and defeat of a suicide 
SBA on a high-value target (such as an oil tanker or passenger ferry). 
To execute this tasking, the MTR SEA-9 team, as project manager and as lead 
systems engineer, developed a project management plan (PMP) with which to manage 
the project and employed the systems engineering approach and the SoS architecting 
methodology (Section 3) to design the recommended SoS.  The PMP provided guidelines 
and procedures for team formation, project schedule tracking, configuration management, 
quality assurance, risk mitigation, and contingency planning.  The SoS architecting 
methodology provided an SoS architecture design framework for scoping the problem, 
generating, modeling and analyzing SoS alternatives, scoring the SoS alternatives, and 
selecting and implementing the most cost effective and best-performing SoS.  Three SoS 
alternative architectures were considered:  TDCE, BUCE, and the Maximum 
Performance Architecture (Section 7).  As integral parts of the SoS architecting 
methodology, a cost analysis and a simulative analysis (supported by EXTEND™, 
MINITAB™ 14, FAST, and Excel) led to the following findings of this project. 
9.1 OVERALL MARITIME THREAT RESPONSE KEY FINDINGS 
• Adequate intelligence is a necessary, but not sufficient, component of a 
successful homeland security posture.  Knowledge of an impending attack 
must be complemented by robust forces and their concept of operations in 
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order to effectively stop an attack once it is determined with some 
confidence that it is underway.  With such forces in place and with 
established concepts of operation and rules of engagement, a variety of 
terrorist attacks can be successful repulsed without significant damage or 
impact on the homeland or the economy.  Intuitively, increased specificity 
with respect to the intelligence itself makes the problem of acting on such 
intelligence and responding to the emerging threat easier to handle. 
• Responding to maritime terrorist threats requires an integrated, 
interagency response taking advantage of the specific capabilities and 
authorities resident in different organizations within the U.S. national 
security apparatus.  Such a response needs to leverage off of preexisting 
command relationships to maximize the overall probability of  
system success. 
9.1.1 WMD Mission Key Findings 
• The majority of research effort in the field of radiation detection is 
centered on conducting a search as rapidly as possible.  Given reasonable 
intelligence latency of less than 160 hours, search teams could be placed 
onboard container ships to search the ship for over a week before the ships 
enter U.S. territorial waters.  Such search time enables minutes to be spent 
on individual container searches and multiple hours spent on individual 
cargo holds.  The potential application of such available time requires a 
different mindset in terms of detector development and specifications.  
Use of the Littoral Combat Ship’s high speed sprint capability (45+ knots) 
along with a small fuel capacity addition in its mission module spaces 
enabled the greatest time to search among all potential Navy and  
Coast Guard search and escort vessels (over 200 hours to search with  
72 hours of intelligence latency; see Figure 9.1).  Figure 9.2 shows the 
relationship between intelligence latency and mean time to search a vessel 
using LCS to ferry teams to the vessels.  Figure 9.3 shows the bases in the 
Pacific from which such vessels can be intercepted as a function of 
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intelligence latency.  As intelligence gets more latent, the forward bases 
such as Yokosuka become less useful. 
Mean Time to Search by base with 72 hours of 






















Figure 9-1:  Mean Time to Search by Base with LCS and 72 Hours of Intelligence Latency 
Impact of Intelligence Latency on Mean Search Time 
per Vessel
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Figure 9-2:  Available Search Time as a Function of Intelligence Latency 
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Figure 9-3:  Origination Points of Intercept Vessels as a Function of Intelligence Latency 
• A layered search protocol involving shipping manifest review, data 
mining, passive radiation detection, and passive radiation identification 
appears to be the most useful approach to stopping an attack when 
intelligence could not specify an exact ship and an exact container.  Fusion 
of sensor data to create a composite picture of radiation amounts, types, 
and locations on a ship appeared to show promise in quickly determining 
potential threats on a sizeable container ship.  Given search times ranging 
from 100 to 200 hours per ship, nuclear devices could be detected with 
high confidence even with slightly vague intelligence. 
9.1.2 SAW Mission Key Findings 
• The threat of a commandeered ship can be effectively countered through 
the employment of 10-man “Sea Marshall” teams that are placed onboard 
potentially threatened vessels with the Harbor Pilot approximately  
12 miles beyond the Golden Gate Bridge.  These teams serve to secure the 
five critical control spaces of the vessel in question (Bridge, Engineering 
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Control, Aft Steering, Engine Room #1 & #2) until the vessel is safely 
docked within the port.  This approach needs to be complemented by a 
“shore battery” of some kind that can disable the vessel nonlethally, 
typically by fouling of its propellers and rudders, if it is found that the 
terrorists are in control of the vessel when the Harbor Pilot and  
Sea Marshalls attempt to board.  There are a variety of weapons 
technologies that can perform this function.  Such a CONOPS precludes 
any opportunity to recapture the vessel in question once it is determined to 
be under terrorist control because the time from Harbor Pilot boarding 
until the vessel might reach the Golden Gate Bridge is potentially only  
22 minutes. 
• A different concept of operations can be employed that consists of surging 
Navy and Coast Guard vessels forward to intercept potentially threatened 
vessels as they come across the Pacific.  These vessels can then be 
boarded and searched to determine the crew’s status and use biometrics to 
attempt to identify any terrorists that are covertly onboard.  If terrorists are 
in control of the vessel in question in this case, there is adequate time to 
attempt to recapture the vessel from the terrorists, and if such a recapture 
attempt is not successful, then the ship can be disabled prior to becoming a 
threat to the United States.  This particular approach, while highly 
effective, places more U.S. personnel in mortal danger and is more costly 
in resource utilization than the Sea Marshall option.  It is more costly in 
terms of resource utilization because it involves surging up to 20 vessels in 
the national fleet to intercept the incoming merchant traffic and escort 
them into San Francisco, all the while supporting the search and escort 
teams onboard the merchant in question. 
• Little data exists with regard to the difficulty and challenges of attempting 
recapture of a commandeered, large merchant vessel at sea.  As such, it is 
difficult to predict the prospects for success of such action and the amount 
of damage that such a ship might suffer during an ensuing firefight 
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between U.S. forces and the terrorists onboard, as well as what potential 
exists for the terrorists in question to facilitate the sinking of the vessel if 
their plans were interrupted by U.S. MTR force action. 
9.1.3 SBA Mission Key Findings 
• Even in the fairly narrow water-space areas of San Francisco Bay, 
attached, close escort of merchant vessels and passenger ferries prove to 
be approximately 40% more effective than the establishment of random, 
barrier patrols within the Bay.  Further, separate escort vessels (typically 
four in number per defended asset) prove to be 2% more effective than the 
emplacement of escort teams onboard the defended merchant vessels and 
ferries themselves. 
• Effective countering of the small boat attack would be much more likely if 
recreational boat traffic within the bay were prohibited by local authorities 
and traffic within the Bay were limited to essential commercial traffic.  
Such a prohibition would require the effective coordination of numerous 
local law enforcement agencies. 
• “Red Cell” analysis of potential terrorist responses to MTR operations 
suggested that static points of critical infrastructure need to be defended as 
well as vessels to prevent SBA against refueling piers and the like.  This is 
especially the case if one is to presume that the terrorists would be able to 
observe that vessels underway were being escorted by armed forces.  The 
analysis also suggests that passenger ferries and oil tankers are more likely 
terrorist targets than container ships and other dry cargo-carrying vessels. 
• While the increased numbers of crew-served weapon stations onboard 
mid-sized escort ships (over 60 feet in length) and the longer-range visual 
detection capability associated with the same is found to increase the 
likelihood of stopping a SBA by approximately 11%, it is an 
extraordinarily costly approach when compared to just using small escort 
boats, helicopters, and USVs. 
255 
• The use of USVs is a cost-effective option to counter terrorist small boat 
attacks when used as a complement to traditional escort forces.  The USVs 
increase total time available to engage a threat because they reduce the 
amount of time required to warn off as yet unidentified incoming boats.  
The result is an approximately 9% increase in effectiveness for only a  
7% increase in cost. 
9.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.2.1 Recommended Architecture 
As previously discussed, the recommendation of the study is to employ the TDCE 
architecture for purposes of a ready response force to counter maritime terrorist threats.  
While it is arguable that virtually no counterterrorism force can ever truly be  
“cost-effective” given the extraordinary cost to prevent acts of terror versus the relatively 
inexpensive cost of undertaking terrorist acts, the TDCE appears to balance reasonable 
cost with high levels of effectiveness in the representative missions examined. 
9.2.2 MTR CONOPS 
As outlined in Section 8, the CONOPS developed in the study for employment by 
MTR forces in response to emerging terrorist threats take advantage of existing systems 
but use them in new ways in order to comply with Presidential Directives.  When 
attempting to minimize impact on global maritime commerce the force requirements 
tended to be significantly higher than what one would typically expect in a situation 
where ships could be delayed, grouped together in convoys, or other typical  
military solutions. 
9.2.3 Standing Joint Interagency Task Force for Counter-Terrorism 
 Throughout the study, it is repeatedly demonstrated that the effective response to 
maritime terrorism requires the integrated efforts of the bulk of the national security 
apparatus of the United States.  There are clear historical precedents demonstrating that 
preexisting command relationships are a pre-requisite for effective interagency 
operations.  While leaving about 1.3 million Americans homeless causing an estimated 
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$100 billion in damages, Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall between  
Grand Isle, Louisiana and Buras-Triumph, Louisiana on Monday August 29, 2005, lends 
proof that a DoD Task Force is not sufficient to support the operations necessary for civil 
support in the areas of preplanning, search and rescue, evacuation, humanitarian 
assistance and pure military presence.  Headed by the 82nd Airborne Division,  
Operation All American Assist’s purpose was to evacuate all affected persons out of the 
area while stabilizing the civil environment to a level that could be maintained and 
improved on by local, state and federal agencies.  Although orders were executed 
immediately upon receipt and appropriate assistance was provided, a key lesson learned 
by the 82nd during the Katrina efforts is that “a JTF is effective for Title 10 operations, 
but establishing a JIATF is the right answer for Defense Support to Civil Authorities 
(DSCA).”122  In conjunction with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents, ensures 
that all levels of government across the nation have a single, unified, national approach 
toward managing domestic incidents.  The Homeland Security Act also tasks the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Response Plan that 
integrates Federal government domestic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery 
plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan.123 
The Secretary of Homeland Security is also to develop and administer a  
National Incident Management System (NIMS) that would unify federal, state and local 
government capabilities within a National Response Plan framework to prepare for, 
respond to and recover from domestic events regardless of cause, size or complexity.  
These three echelons of government capability are three mutually supporting pillars of 
emergency response and civil support.  The intent behind the national response plan 
(NRP) is to provide the structure and mechanisms for establishing national level policy 
and operational direction regarding federal support to state and local incident managers.  
The NRP establishes the federal government’s response policy, whereas the NIMS serve 
as the operational arm of the NRP.  The NIMS improves the chain of national command 
                                                 
122 BG James A. Cerrone, “View from the American Gulf,” http://www.amc.army.mil/ausa/ 
123 National Incident Management System (NIMS), March 1, 2004, http://www.nimsonline.com/ 
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authority and coordination among the many federal, state, and local organizations; 
improves planning and readiness; and integrates crisis and consequence management.124 
As it pertains to the threat response within the maritime domain, these plans have 
distinct disadvantages in that they identify clearly with what is domestic, whereas this 
problem needs a directive that can go beyond the homeland domain.  Without altering 
existing authorities or responsibilities of the department leads and agency heads, 
(including authority to carry out operational activities or to provide or receive intelligence 
or information) the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan supplements the 
previously discussed directives and plans.  It directs the establishment of an integrated 
network of national-level maritime command centers to achieve coordinated, unified, 
timely and effective planning and mission accomplishment by the U.S. government.  The 
plan sets forth lead and supporting Federal agency roles and responsibilities for MOTR 
based on the following criteria: 
• Existing Law 
• Desired U.S. government outcome 
• Greatest potential magnitude of the threat 
• The response capabilities required 
• Asset availability 
• Authority to act 
The MOTR plan directs clear coordination relationships and operational coordination 
requirements among the lead and supporting MOTR agencies, enabling the  
U.S. government to act quickly and decisively to counter maritime threats.125 
However, clear evidence remains that the MOTR plan is not sufficient to counter 
self-imposed cultural barriers, “turf wars,” and other forms of non-cooperation between 
agencies.  A recent Department of Justice Inspector General Report found that during a 
major counter-terrorism exercises conducted in 2005 the FBI and Coast Guard actually 
worked against each other because of disagreements over which agency should be the 
“lead federal agency” during a mock terrorist strike against a passenger ferry.126  The 
                                                 
124 National Incident Management System (NIMS), March 1, 2004, http://www.nimsonline.com/ 
125 National Strategy for Maritime Security:  Maritime Operational Threat Response, October 2005. 
126 Eric Lipton, “Coast Guard, FBI Power Dispute Could Weaken Response to Attack,” The New York 
Times, Volume 126, Number 15, 4 April 2006. 
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report went on to conclude that the MOTR plan has “not eliminated the potential for 
conflict and confusion in the event of a terrorist incident at a seaport.”127  Recognition of 
inherent problems in interagency operations without prior coordination predates the 
attacks of September 11th and the Global War against Terrorism.  In particular, many 
military officers experienced with interagency operations point to the difficulties 
associated with “ad hoc” responses, and often cite them as “detrimental to mission 
success.”128  Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and other areas where the United States has 
intervened over the last decade and a half are riddled with lessons learned of problems 
arising from a lack of pre-established command relationships among interagencies.  
According to an Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) April 2002 report (which 
helped Generals Holland (CINC USSOCOM) and Kernan (CINC USJFCOM) refine their 
thinking about homeland security), 
 . . . based on the U.S. experience in counter-drug operations, establishing 
a JIATF is considered an important step in making the Interagency process 
more efficient.  Reinforcing, regionally-oriented JIATFs would be useful 
in identifying resource shortfalls and developing burden-sharing routines, 
especially in the CT and Counter-WMD areas where expertise and 
capabilities are limited and found largely only in the military 
community.129 
Another example of the model that could be used for a Counter-Terrorism JIATF 
is the Department of Justice Operation SEA HAWK in the Port of Charleston,  
South Carolina.  There, over 50 local, state, and federal agencies have representatives at a 
single headquarters where they share information and pool resources to enhance the 
nation’s ability to respond to incidents at the Port of Charleston.  Numerous members of 
the interagency group made reference to how much better cooperation they could achieve 
between their agencies now that they were co-located and working together every day. 
                                                 
127 Eric Lipton, “Coast Guard, FBI Power Dispute Could Weaken Response to Attack,” The New York 
Times, Volume 126, Number 15, 4 April 2006. 
128 Thomas Gibbings, Donald Hurley, and Scott Moore, “Interagency Operations Centers:  An 
Opportunity We Can’t Ignore,” Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Winter 1998,  
6 November 1998. 
129 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), “Homeland Security and Special Operations:  Sorting 
Out Procedures, Capabilities, and Operational Issues,” Workshop Report, April 2002. 
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It is the conclusion of this research team that in order to be prepared for any such 
terrorist attack, maritime or otherwise, there needs to be a standing interagency task force 
that is specifically trained and readied for any terrorist threat.  Much like the JIATF South 
mission to plan, conduct and direct interagency detection, monitoring, and sorting 
operations of air and maritime drug smuggling activities; so to should there be a JIATF 
dedicated to the same mission regarding the terrorist threat response and the war on 
terrorism.  Creating a counterterrorism JIATF will allow more effective coordination 
among federal, regional, state and local assets.  It should be feasible to leverage off of the 
existing Standing Joint Force Headquarters—North (SJFHQ-N) and Joint Task Force—
North (JTF-N) in existence at United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in order 
to stand up such a JIATF as recommended. 
9.2.4 Operational Evaluations of Current Nuclear Detectors 
 Based upon the research conducted by the team, it is not clear that many of the 
devices that have been procured or are being considered for procurement by the various 
federal agencies for detecting nuclear devices or illicit nuclear material have undergone a 
coherent operational evaluation.  From a military perspective, operational evaluations are 
critical for two reasons.  The first is to ascertain whether or not the device being 
evaluated actually satisfies its performance requirements under operational conditions 
with representative users performing the required tasks.  The second is to assist in 
developing the concept of operations, tactics, and techniques for how the device in 
question should be used in the field. 
 It is certainly possible that such evaluations have been made and are simply not 
available to the team for use in this study.  However, it is the impression of the team 
throughout that most answers received regarding the performance of certain nuclear 
detectors against certain types of nuclear devices under certain environmental and other 
influencing conditions are estimates rather than factual data provided.  The team does not 
feel that the specific questions asked are remarkable as would not have been asked 
previously during development of such devices.  As such, it is felt that extensive 
operational testing has perhaps not been undertaken.  The team concludes that such 
testing is critical and that the results of such testing would serve to make the entire 
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system more effective at preventing the introduction of a nuclear device into the  
United States by terrorists. 
9.3 FUTURE STUDY 
While the findings of this integrated project provide some insights into the SoS 
solution to the problem of maritime threat response in the 5-year timeframe, further 
research is needed to provide additional insights and to assess the robustness of the 
findings.  The following are recommendations for future research 
• Helicopters are proven to be useful in the counter SBA mission.  It is not 
clear within the context of the SBA model the extent to which such 
helicopters are useful because of their ability to scout sea space ahead of 
the protected vessel and warn incoming boats or because of their ability to 
be a rapid reaction engagement platform or both.  Further study could 
better isolate the value added of armed helicopters to the overall SBA 
architecture and by determining it could lead to more effective use of such 
helicopters within the overall concept of operations for the architecture. 
• Non-lethal weapons are found to be useful in warding off potential 
innocent boats that venture too close to protected vessels in the counter 
SBA mission.  However, it is presumed that actual attacking vessels would 
continue to press their attack even in the face of such nonlethal weapons 
engagement by MTR forces.  This is done to simplify the process and 
make the requirements of the system more stringent.  Further analysis 
could investigate the extent to which such non-lethal weapons might be 
effective in countering the terrorist attack, with the added benefit of 
securing prisoners with potential intelligence value, as well as reducing 
the likelihood of civilian casualties suffered due to accidental lethal 
weapons employment. 
• A preliminary analysis leads to a formation in which each protected vessel 
in the counter SBA mission has an escort vessel in front of it, behind it, 
and to each side of it.  Further analysis might provide insight into other 
formations and their potential benefits including possible reductions in 
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overall required numbers of escort forces.  Along with such analysis, the 
potential difficulties associated with multiple attackers, decoy attack boats, 
and other concerted terrorist efforts could be more fully examined than 
occurred during this study.  The concept of the terrorist attack boats 
engaging the escort vessels rather than simply attempting to bypass the 
escort vessels en route to the protected vessel would also be worthy of 
exploration.  War gaming found such enemy responses to be  
highly effective. 
• The prohibition on recreational boat traffic upon receipt of intelligence 
suggesting a small boat attack is implemented effectively.  However, what 
is the best manner to achieve the desired results of clearing the bay of 
nonessential boat traffic?  An entire study could likely be devoted simply 
to analyzing the best method of clearing the Bay in the quickest amount  
of time. 
• It appears that there is an opportunity for intelligence to be further refined 
and synthesized by the application of certain data mining principles to the 
cargo manifest in an attempt to narrow down the search for likely suspect 
containers in the counter WMD mission.  Further study could investigate 
how such data mining might be achieved and measure its  
potential effectiveness. 
• One Navy or Coast Guard vessel was assumed to be assigned to each of 
the incoming PAVs in the WMD or SAW mission.  This vessel would be 
the logistical support for the search and escort teams while they were 
aboard the PAVs.  A preliminary analysis suggested that many of the ships 
remain close enough to one another that multiple PAVs and their 
associated search and escort teams might be able to be serviced by one 
U.S. intercepting ship.  The first assessment of this, using the Joint Theater 
Logistics System, showed that up to four vessels tend to remain within 
350 miles of one another throughout the transit.  However, requiring teams 
to be shifted and re-supplied via helicopter over several hundred miles 
enormously complicates the already difficult sustainment problem 
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encountered by the forces.  A further study is warranted into the sundry 
issues pertaining to logistics support from a non-collocated platform to 
determine the appropriate number of U.S. interceptors to send out for a 
given number of incoming PAVs. 
• The prospect of attempting to recapture a ship that has been seized by 
terrorists at sea is largely in the realm of hypothetical discussion.  As such, 
significant assumptions had to be made with respect to the counter SAW 
mission with regard to the prospects for success as well as the damage 
potentially suffered by the ship in question.  Further analysis, drawing on 
the expertise of special operations personnel trained in close quarter battle 
(CQB) as well as having knowledge of the uniqueness of the shipboard 
environment, would help clarify the potential difficulties as well as 
identify areas to exploit when attempting such operations. 
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APPENDIX A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
1.0 C4ISR 
1.1 Command and Control 
1.1.1 Command Forces 
1.1.1.1 Plan Operation 
1.1.1.1.1 Assemble Data 
1.1.1.1.1.1 Acquire Intelligence 
1.1.1.1.1.1.1 Acquire Intelligence From 
MDA 
1.1.1.1.1.1.2 Acquire Own Force S&R 
1.1.1.1.1.1.3 Acquire Data from Port 
Authority 
1.1.1.1.1.1.4 Acquire AIS Data 
1.1.1.1.1.2 Acquire COP 
1.1.1.1.1.2.1 Acquire GCCS COP 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2 Acquire Own Force COP 
1.1.1.1.1.3 Acquire Peer Security Inputs 
1.1.1.1.2 Analyze Data 
1.1.1.1.2.1 Develop Situational Awareness 
1.1.1.1.2.2 Develop Courses of Action (COA) 
1.1.1.1.2.2.1 Establish Priority 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2 Develop Optimal Pairing 
Scheme 
1.1.1.1.2.2.3 Develop Optimal Intercept 
Tracks 
1.1.1.1.2.2.4 Develop Targeted Search Plan 
1.1.1.1.3 Select COA 
1.1.1.1.3.1 Update ROE 
1.1.1.1.3.2 Update Commander’s Intent 
1.1.1.1.3.3 Disseminate Orders 
1.1.1.1.3.3.1 Transmit Orders 
1.1.1.1.3.3.2 Brief Orders 
1.1.1.1.3.3.3 Delegate Briefing 
1.1.1.2 Direct Operation 
1.1.1.2.1 Activate Forces 
1.1.1.2.1.1 Contact Deployed Forces 
1.1.1.2.1.1.1 Contact U.S. Forces 
1.1.1.2.1.1.2 Contact Coalition Forces 
1.1.1.2.1.2 Contact Surge Forces 
1.1.1.2.2 Assign Resources to AVs 
1.1.1.2.2.1 Assign Sensors 
1.1.1.2.2.2 Assign Weapons 
1.1.1.2.3 Direct Engagement 
1.1.1.2.3.1 Transmit COP 
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1.1.1.2.3.2 Issue Commands 
1.1.1.2.3.3 Position Forces 
1.1.1.3 Coordinate Operation 
1.1.1.3.1 Disseminate COP Updates 
1.1.1.3.2 Disseminate Priorities 
1.1.1.3.3 Deconflict Forces 
1.1.1.4 Control Operation 
1.1.1.4.1 Monitor Operation 
1.1.1.4.2 Receive Updates 
1.1.1.4.3 Reassign Forces 
1.1.2 Interface with external C2 
1.1.2.1 Interface with Higher Authority 
1.1.2.1.1 Request Permission to Act 
1.1.2.1.2 Receive Permission to Act 
1.1.2.1.3 Provide Status Updates  
1.1.2.2 Interface with Coalition C2 
1.1.2.2.1 Coordinate Operations 
1.1.2.2.2 Transmit Information 
1.1.2.2.3 Receive Information 
1.1.2.3 Interface with GCCS 
1.1.2.3.1 Receive GCCS Data 
1.1.2.3.2 Provide GCCS Updates 
1.1.2.4 Interface with MDA 
1.1.2.4.1 Receive Intelligence Data 
1.1.2.4.2 Request Intelligence Updates 
1.1.2.4.3 Request Additional Intelligence Data 
1.2 Communicate – Provide Onshore, Ship Based and Sea Based 
Communication Network 
  1.2.1 Provide VOX/Data 
  1.2.1.1 Transmit Voice, Data, Imagery 
   1.2.1.2 Receive Voice, Data, Imagery 
  1.2.2 Network MTR nodes 
   1.2.2.1 Provide Sufficient Nodes 
   1.2.2.2 Provide Robust Network 
   1.2.2.3 Minimize Downtime 
   1.2.2.4 Provide Redundancy 
   1.2.2.5 Minimize Data Corruption 
   1.2.2.6 Minimize Nodal Failures 
   1.2.2.7 Reroute Transmissions around Failed Nodes 
  1.2.3 Receive MDA Intelligence 
   1.2.3.1 Maintain Link with MDA 
   1.2.3.2 Collect, Prioritize, Fuse Information 
   1.2.3.3 Disseminate Information 
 1.3 Compute 
 1.3.1 Information Assurance 
   1.3.1.1 Provide Confidentiality 
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     1.3.1.1.1 Support Multi-Security Level Login 
    1.3.1.1.2 Personnel and Physical Security 
1.3.1.1.3 Provide Discrete Access/Mandatory Access 
Control 
    1.3.1.1.4 High Assurance System 
    1.3.1.1.5 Harden System 
     1.3.1.1.5.1 Software Patches 
     1.3.1.1.5.2 Turn off Unwanted Services 
1.3.1.1.6 Prevent Unauthorized User from Accessing Data 
While in Transmission 
1.3.1.1.7 Prevent Unauthorized User from Accessing Data 
in Storage 
    1.3.1.1.8 Separate Classified Data Storage Area 
   1.3.1.2 Provide Integrity 
1.3.1.2.1 Prevent Unknown Data Modification 
    1.3.1.2.2 Perform Audit Check for Changes to Data 
   1.3.1.3 Provide Authenticity 
1.3.1.3.1 Ensure the User/Data are Authentic 
1.3.1.3.2 Provide Authentication by Password, Token, 
Biometric 
    1.3.1.3.3 Provide Authentication by Key, PKI 
   1.3.1.4 Provide Availability 
    1.3.1.4.1 Provide Timely Response to Data 
1.3.1.4.2 Provide Redundant System for Synchronization, 
Backup and Disaster Recovery 
    1.3.1.4.3 Provide Non-Single Point of Failure 
   1.3.1.5 Network Security 
    1.3.1.5.1 Employ Defense in Depth Strategy 
 1.3.2 Data Fusion 
   1.3.2.1 Data Association 
    1.3.2.1.1 Filter Iirrelevant Data 
1.3.2.1.2 Categorize Relationship to Scenario 
   1.3.2.2 Data Analysis 
1.3.2.2.1 Refine Data – Classification and Identification 
Using Rule-Based Prediction 
1.3.2.2.2 Refine/Update Situation – Deploy Function Status 
with Current Traffic 
   1.3.2.3 Threat Assessment Based on Scenarios 
   1.3.2.4 Automate Processes and Collaborative Tools 
   1.3.2.5 Request for Data Recollection 
   1.3.2.6 Collaborative Feedback 
    1.3.2.6.1 Provide Reasoning Engine 
    1.3.2.6.2 Predict Scenario Occurrence 
   1.3.2.7 Provide “No-MDA” Function 
 1.4 Provide Intelligence 
  1.4.1 Form Overall Operational Picture 
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  1.4.2 Analyze Operation Needs of Individual Functional Teams 
1.4.3 Provide Customized COP Overlays to Teams 
2.0 Prepare the Battlespace 
 2.1 Activate Security Measures 
  2.1.1 Prepare Critical Infrastructure 
   2.1.1.1 Heighten HSAS 
    2.1.1.1.1 Initiate Command to DHS to Heighten HSAS 
2.1.1.1.2 Receive Compliance that HSAS Has Been 
Heightened 
   2.1.1.2 Upgrade/Augment Existing Security Forces 
    2.1.1.2.1 Notify Gas Line Personnel on or Near Piers 
2.1.1.2.2 Add Security Teams Onboard Essential Boat 
Traffic 
2.1.1.2.3 Upgrade/Augment Security Teams at Points of 
Interest 
  2.1.2 Activate Preplanned Operation Orders 
   2.1.2.1 Place Specialized Teams on Alert 
    2.1.2.1.1 Contact Specialized Teams 
    2.1.2.1.2 Assemble Specialized Teams 
    2.1.2.1.3 Activate Specialized Teams 
   2.1.2.2 Get USCG to Activate Specific MARSEC Plan 
   2.1.2.3 Restrict Non-Essential Boat Traffic 
    2.1.2.3.1 Initiate Command to USCG to Post a “Notice to  
    Mariners” 
2.1.2.3.2 Receive Compliance that “Notice to Mariners” 
Has Been Posted 
    2.1.2.3.3 Activate Boat Traffic Restriction Teams 
 2.2 Assemble Forces 
  2.2.1 Activate Required Personnel 
   2.2.1.1 Decide Team Composition 
   2.2.1.2 Contact all Necessary Personnel 
   2.2.1.2 Muster Personnel 
  2.2.2 Issue Equipment 
   2.2.2.1 Gather Specialized Equipment 
   2.2.2.2 Provide Arms and Protective Gear 
  2.2.3 Prepare Deployment Platforms 
   2.2.3.1 Set Mission Specific Configurations 
 2.3 Deploy Forces 
  2.3.1 Embark Deployment Platforms 
  2.3.2 Move Deployment Platforms into Position 
  2.3.3 Move Teams to Attacking Vessel 
   2.3.3.1 Gather Teams for Debarkation of Deployment Platforms 
2.3.3.2 Provide Teams with a Means of Transport to the Attacking 
Vessel 
  2.3.4 Recover Teams from Attacking Vessel 
   2.3.4.1 Gather Teams for Debarkation of Attacking Vessel 
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2.3.4.2 Provide Teams with a Means of Transport to the 
Deployment Platforms 
3.0 Find/Fix Threat 
 3.1 Detect Threat 
  3.1.1 Scan Area of Interest 
   3.1.1.1 Scan Mechanically 
    3.1.1.1.1 Position Automated Scan Device 
   3.1.1.2 Scan Manually 
    3.1.1.2.1 Position Search Crew Member 
    3.1.1.2.2 Conduct Layout Specific Search 
  3.1.2 Process Data from Scan 
   3.1.2.1 Process Mechanically 
   3.1.2.2 Process Manually 
 3.2 Identify Threat 
  3.2.1 Analyze Data On-Site 
   3.2.1.1 Analyze Mechanically 
   3.2.1.2 Analyze Manually 
  3.2.2 Analyze Data Off-Site 
   3.2.2.1 Analyze Mechanically 
   3.2.2.2 Analyze Manually 
  3.2.3 Quantify Threat 
   3.2.3.1 Quantify Mechanically 
   3.2.3.2 Quantify Manually 
 3.3 Assess Threat 
  3.3.1 Determine Intent 
 3.3.1.1 Observe Declarations 
 3.3.1.2 Observe Actions 
3.3.2 Determine Damage Potential 
   3.3.2.1 Solicit Intelligence 
   3.3.2.2 Determine Destructive Potential 
   3.3.2.3 Determine Execution Time 
4.0 Finish Threat 
4.1 Use Non-lethal measures 
  4.1.1 Guard HVU from Internal Threat 
   4.1.1.1 Guard Control Spaces 
   4.1.1.2 Guard Crew 
  4.1.2 Guard HVU from External Threat 
   4.1.2.1 Escort HVU with Other Units 
   4.1.2.2 Place Forces on HVU 
  4.1.3 Warn 
   4.1.3.1 Use Visual 
   4.1.3.2 Use Auditory 
  4.1.4 Conduct Non-lethal Weapon Engagement 
   4.1.4.1 Use Anti-Personnel NLW 
    4.1.4.1.1 Target 
    4.1.4.1.2 Fire Weapon 
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    4.1.4.1.3 Assess Engagement 
   4.1.4.2 Use Anti-Vehicle NLW 
    4.1.4.2.1 Target 
    4.1.4.2.2 Fire Weapon 
    4.1.4.2.3 Assess Engagement 
  4.1.5 Shoulder 
  4.1.6 Tow Disabled Vessel 
  4.1.7 Conduct SAR 
4.2 Use Lethal Measures 
  4.2.1 Disable 
   4.2.1.1 Target 
   4.2.1.2 Fire Weapon 
   4.2.1.3 Assess Engagement 
  4.2.2 Sink/Destroy 
   4.2.2.1 Detect/Track 
   4.2.2.2 Classify 
   4.2.2.3 Target 
   4.2.2.4 Fire Weapon 
   4.2.2.5 Assess Engagement 
  4.2.3 Recapture 
   4.2.3.1 Board AV 
   4.2.3.2 Secure Control Spaces 
5.0 Sustain 
5.1 Support Units 
  5.1.1 Deliver Consumables to Units 
5.1.1.1 Deliver to Military Ships 
5.1.1.2 Deliver to Non-Military Ships 
5.1.2 Refuel Platforms 
5.1.2.1 Refuel Ships 
5.1.2.2 Refuel Boats 
5.1.2.3 Refuel Aircraft 
5.1.3 Provide Manning for Sustained Operations 
5.1.3.1 Receive Manning Reports 
5.1.3.2 ID Manning Deficiencies 
5.1.3.3 Locate Manning Sources 
5.1.3.4 Transport Manning to Units 
5.1.3.4.1 Transport Manning to Military Units at Sea 
5.1.3.4.2 Transport Manning to Non-Military Units at Sea 
5.1.3.4.3 Transport Manning to Military Units Inport 
5.1.4 Provide Barracks 
5.1.4.1 Provide Barracks for Units Onboard Military Ships at Sea 
5.1.4.2 Provide Barracks for Units Onboard Non-Military Ships at 
Sea 
5.1.4.3 Provide Barracks for Units Inport 
5.2 Maintain Units 
5.2.1 Identify Maintenance Deficiencies 
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5.2.1.1 Receive Unit Capability Reports 
5.2.1.2 Asses System Capability 
5.2.1.3 Correct System Deficiency 
5.2.2 Provide Non-Depot Level Maintenance 
5.2.2.1 Identify Components 
5.2.2.2 Stock Spares 
5.2.2.3 Replace Components 
5.2.3 Time to Provide Depot Level Maintenance 
5.2.3.1 Identify Prescheduled Depot-Level Maintenance 
5.2.3.2 Enable Unit Rotation 
5.2.3.2.1 Identify Unit Replacements 
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APPENDIX B REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION 
WMD SAW SBA
1.0 C4ISR - - -
Activation Time ? 1 Hr - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 23 Hrs - -
Operational Response Time ? 30 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 30 Min 1 Hr
1.1 Command & Control - - -
Activation Time ? 49 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 11 Hrs - -
Operational Response Time ? 19 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 19 Min 49 Min
1.1.1 Command Forces - - -
Activation Time ? 30 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 6 Min - -
Operational Response Time ? 14 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 14 Min 30 Min
1.1.2 Interface with external C2 - - -
Activation Time ? 19 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 5 Min - -
Operational Response Time ? 5 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 5 Min 19 Min
1.2 Communicate - - -
Activation Time ? 10 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 4 Hrs - -
Operational Response Time ? 10 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 10 Min 10 Min
1.2.1 Provide VOX / Data - - -
Activation Time ? 10 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 4 Hrs - -
Operational Response Time ? 10 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 10 Min 10 Min
1.2.2 Network MTR Nodes ? - - -
Activation Time ? 10 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 4 Hrs - -
Operational Response Time ? 10 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 10 Min 10 Min
1.2.3 Receive MDA Intell - - -
Activation Time ? 10 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 4 Hrs - -
Operational Response Time ? 10 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 10 Min 10 Min
1.3 Compute - - -
Activation Time ? 34 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 5 Hrs - -
Operational Response Time ? 14 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 14 Min 34 Min
1.3.1 Information Assurance - - -
Activation Time ? 1 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 1 Min - -
Operational Response Time ? 1 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 1 Min 1 Min
1.3.2 Data Fusion - - -
Activation Time ? 33 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 5 Hrs - -
Operational Response Time ? 13 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 13 Min 33 Min
1.4 Provide Intell - - -
Activation Time ? 1 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 1 Min - -
Operational Response Time ? 1 Min - -
Initial Response Time ? - 1 Min 1 Min
1.4.1 Form Overall Ops Picture - - -
Activation Time ? 1 Min - -
Orders/ROE Time ? 1 Min - -
Operational Response Time ? 1 Min - -
Requirement




1.0 Ps of C4ISR ? 0.999 0.999 0.999
1.1 Ps of Command & Control ? 0.99975 0.99975 0.99975
1.1.1 Ps of Command Forces ? 0.999875 0.999875 0.999875
1.1.2 Ps of Interface with external C2 ? 0.999875 0.999875 0.999875
1.2 Ps of Communicate ? 0.99975 0.99975 0.99975
1.2.1 Ps of Provide VOX / Data ? 0.999917 0.999917 0.999917
1.2.2 Ps of Network MTR Nodes ? 0.999917 0.999917 0.999917
1.2.3 Ps of Receive MDA Intell ? 0.999917 0.999917 0.999917
1.3 Ps of Compute ? 0.99975 0.99975 0.99975
1.3.1 Ps of Information Assurance ? 0.999875 0.999875 0.999875
1.3.2 Ps of Data Fusion ? 0.999875 0.999875 0.999875
1.4 Ps of Provide Intell ? 0.99975 0.99975 0.99975
1.4.1 Ps of Form Overall Ops Picture ? 0.999917 0.999917 0.999917
1.4.2 Ps of Analyze Operational Needs ? 0.999917 0.999917 0.999917
1.4.3 Ps of Provide Customized COPs ? 0.999917 0.999917 0.999917
Requirement





2.0 Time to Prepare the Battlespace ? 124 36 240
2.1 Time to Activate Security Measures ? 24 24 240
2.1.1 Time to Prepare Critical Infrastructure ? 12 12 240
2.1.1.1 Time to Heighten HSAS Level ? 1.5 1.5 60
2.1.1.1.1 Time to Initiate Command to DHS to Heighten HSAS ? 0.5 0.5 30
2.1.1.1.2 Time to Receive Compliance That HSAS Has Been Heightened ? 1 1 30
2.1.1.2 Time to Upgrade/Augment Existing Security Forces ? - 12 240
2.1.1.2.1 Time to Notify Gas Line Personnel On or Near Piers ? - 4 30
2.1.1.2.2 Time to Add Security Teams Onboard Essential Boat Traffic ? - - 240
2.1.1.2.3 Time to Upgrade/Augment Security Teams at Points of Interest ? - 12 120
2.1.2 Time to Activate Preplanned Operation Orders ? 24 1 60
2.1.2.1 Time to Place Specialized Teams on Alert ? 24 1 -
2.1.2.1.1 Time to Contact Specialized Teams ? 2 0.25 -
2.1.2.1.2 Time to Assemble Specialized Teams ? 12 0.25 -
2.1.2.1.3 Time to Activate Specialized Teams ? 10 0.5 -
2.1.2.2 Time to Get USCG to Activate Specific MARSEC Plan ? 1 1 30
2.1.2.3 Time to Begin Restriction of Non-Essential Boat Traffic ? - - 60
2.1.2.3.1 Time to Initiate Command to USCG to Post a "Notice to Mariners" ? - - 30
2.1.2.3.2 Time to Receive Compliance That "Notice to Mariners" Has Been Posted ? - - 30
2.1.2.3.3 Time to Activate Boat Traffic Restriction Teams ? - - 30
2.2 Time to Assemble and Prepare Teams / Platforms ? 24 24 55
2.2.1 Time to Activate Required Personnel ? 24 24 55
2.2.1.1 Time to Decide Team Composition ? 2 2 15
2.2.1.2 Time to Contact All Necessary Personnel ? 2 2 15
2.2.1.3 Time to Muster Personnel ? 20 20 25
2.2.2 Time to Issue Equipment ? 14 6 50
2.2.2.1 Time to Gather Specialized Equipment ? 12 4 30
2.2.2.2 Time to Provide Arms, Protective Gear, and Equipment ? 2 2 20
2.2.3 Time to Prepare Deployment Platforms ? 16 16 45
2.2.3.1 Time to Set Mission Specific Configurations ? 16 16 45
2.3 Time to Deploy Forces ? 100 12 50
2.3.1 Time to Embark Deployment Platforms ? 1 1 5
2.3.2 Time to Move Deployment Platforms into Position ? 96 12 25
2.3.3 Time to Move Teams to Attacking Vessel ? 2 1.5 10
2.3.3.1 Time to Gather Teams for Debarkation of Deployment Dlatforms ? 0.5 0.5 0.5
2.3.3.2 Time to Provide Teams with a Means of Transport to the Attacking Vessel ? 1.5 1 9.5
2.3.4 Time to Recover Teams from Attacking Vessel ? 2 1 10
2.3.4.1 Time to Gather Teams for Debarkation of Attacking Vessel ? 0.5 0.5 0.5
2.3.4.2 Time to Provide Teams with a Means of Transport to Deployment Platforms ? 1.5 0.5 9.5





2.0 Ps of Prepare the Battlespace ? 0.999 0.999 0.999
2.1 Ps of Activate Security Measures ? 0.999667 0.999667 0.999667
2.1.1 Ps of Prepare Critical Infrastructure ? 0.999833 0.999833 0.999833
2.1.1.1 Ps of Heighten HSAS Level ? 0.999833 0.999917 0.999917
2.1.1.1.1 Ps of Initiate Command to DHS to Heighten HSAS ? 0.999917 0.999958 0.999958
2.1.1.1.2 Ps of Receive Compliance that HSAS Has Been Heightened ? 0.999917 0.999958 0.999958
2.1.1.2 Ps of Upgrade/Augment Existing Security Forces ? - 0.999917 0.999917
2.1.1.2.1 Ps of Notify Gas Line Personnel on or Near Piers ? - 0.999958 0.999972
2.1.1.2.2 Ps of Add Security Teams Onboard Essential Boat Traffic ? - - 0.999972
2.1.1.2.3 Ps of Upgrade/Augment Security Teams at Points of Interest ? - 0.999958 0.999972
2.1.2 Ps of Activate Preplanned Operation Orders ? 0.999833 0.999833 0.999833
2.1.2.1 Ps of Place Specialized Teams on Alert ? 0.999917 0.999917 -
2.1.2.1.1 Ps of Contact Specialized Teams ? 0.999972 0.999972 -
2.1.2.1.2 Ps of Assemble Specialized Teams ? 0.999972 0.999972 -
2.1.2.1.3 Ps of Activate Specialized Teams ? 0.999972 0.999972 -
2.1.2.2 Ps of Get USCG to Activate Specific MARSEC Plan ? 0.999917 0.999917 0.999917
2.1.2.3 Ps of Begin Restriction of Non-Essential Boat Traffic ? - - 0.999917
2.1.2.3.1 Ps of Initiate Command to USCG to Post a "Notice to Mariners" ? - - 0.999972
2.1.2.3.2 Ps of Receive Compliance that "Notice to Mariners" Has Been Posted ? - - 0.999972
2.1.2.3.3 Ps of Activate Boat Traffic Restriction Teams ? - - 0.999972
2.2 Ps of Assemble and Prepare Teams / Platforms ? 0.999667 0.999667 0.999667
2.2.1 Ps of Activate Required Personnel ? 0.999889 0.999889 0.999889
2.2.1.1 Ps of Decide Team Composition ? 0.999963 0.999963 0.999963
2.2.1.2 Ps of Contact all Necessary Personnel ? 0.999963 0.999963 0.999963
2.2.1.3 Ps of Muster Personnel ? 0.999963 0.999963 0.999963
2.2.2 Ps of Issue Equipment ? 0.999889 0.999889 0.999889
2.2.2.1 Ps of Gather Specialized Equipment ? 0.999944 0.999944 0.999944
2.2.2.2 Ps of Provide Arms, Protective Gear, and Equipment ? 0.999944 0.999944 0.999944
2.2.3 Ps of Prepare Deployment Platforms ? 0.999889 0.999889 0.999889
2.2.3.1 Ps of Set Mission Specific Configurations ? 0.999889 0.999889 0.999889
2.3 Ps of Deploy Forces ? 0.999667 0.999667 0.999667
2.3.1 Ps of Embark Deployment Platforms ? 0.999917 0.999917 0.999833
2.3.2 Ps of Move Deployment Platforms into Position ? 0.999917 0.999917 0.999833
2.3.3 Ps of Move Teams to Attacking Vessel ? 0.999917 0.999917 -
2.3.3.1 Ps of Gather Teams for Debarkation of Deployment Platforms ? 0.999958 0.999958 -
2.3.3.2 Ps of Provide Teams with a Means of Transport to the Attacking Vessel ? 0.999958 0.999958 -
2.3.4 Ps of Recover Teams from Attacking Vessel ? 0.999917 0.999917 -
2.3.4.1 Ps of Gather Teams for Debarkation of Attacking Vessel ? 0.999958 0.999958 -
2.3.4.2 Ps of Provide Teams with a Means of Transport to Deployment Platforms ? 0.999958 0.999958 -
Requirement






3.0 Time to Find / Fix Threat ? 3 TBD 15
3.1 Time to Detect Threat ? 3 TBD 15
3.1.1 Time to Scan Area of Interest ? 3 TBD 15
3.1.1.1 Time to Scan Mechanically ? 3 TBD 15
3.1.1.1.1 Time to Position Automated Scan Device ? 3 TBD 15
3.1.1.2 Time to Scan Manually ? 3 TBD 15
3.1.1.2.1 Time to Position Search Crew Member ? 3 TBD 15
3.1.1.2.2 Time to Conduct Layout Specific Search ? 3 TBD 15
3.1.2 Time to Process Data from Scan ? 3 TBD 15
3.1.2.1 Time to Process Mechanically ? 3 TBD 15
3.1.2.2 Time to Process Manually ? 3 TBD 15
3.2 Time to Identify Threat ? 3 TBD 15
3.2.1 Time to Analyze Data On-Site ? 3 TBD 15
3.2.1.1 Time to Analyze Mechanically ? 3 TBD 15
3.2.1.2 Time to Analyze Manually ? 3 TBD 15
3.2.2 Time to Analyze Data Off-Site ? 3 TBD 15
3.2.2.1 Time to Analyze Mechanically ? 3 TBD 15
3.2.2.2 Time to Analyze Manually ? 3 TBD 15
3.2.3 Time to Quantify Threat ? 3 TBD 15
3.2.3.1 Time to Quantify Mechanically ? 3 TBD 15
3.2.3.2 Time to Quantify Manually ? 3 TBD 15
3.3 Time to Assess threat ? 3 TBD 15
3.3.1 Time to Determine Intent ? 3 TBD 15
3.3.1.1 Time to Observe Declarations ? 3 TBD 15
3.3.1.2 Time to Observe Actions ? 3 TBD 15
3.3.2 Time to Determine Damage Potential ? 3 TBD 15
3.3.2.1 Time to Solicit Intelligence ? 3 TBD 15
3.3.2.2 Time to Determine Destructive Potential ? 3 TBD 15
3.3.2.3 Time to Determine Execution Time ? 3 TBD 15
# Ships = 20    and Maximum TEUs = 9400
Requirement




3.0 Ps of Find / Fix Threat ? 0.9600000 0.9900000 0.9400000
3.1 Ps of Detect Threat ? 0.9600000 0.9900000 0.9400000
3.1.1 Ps of Scan Area of Interest ? 0.9797959 0.9949874 0.9695360
3.1.1.1 Ps of Scan Mechanically ? 0.9898464 0.9974906 0.9846502
3.1.1.1.1 Ps of Position Automated Scan Device ? 0.9898464 0.9974906 0.9846502
3.1.1.2 Ps of Scan Manually ? 0.9898464 0.9974906 0.9846502
3.1.1.2.1 Ps of Position Search Crew Member ? 0.9949102 0.9987445 0.9922954
3.1.1.2.2 Ps of Conduct Layout Specific Search ? 0.9949102 0.9987445 0.9922954
3.1.2 Ps of Process Data from Scan ? 0.9797959 0.9949874 0.9695360
3.1.2.1 Ps of Process Mechanically ? 0.9898464 0.9974906 0.9846502
3.1.2.2 Ps of Process Manually ? 0.9898464 0.9974906 0.9846502
3.2 Ps of Identify Threat ? 0.9999990 0.9999990 0.9999990
3.2.1 Ps of Analyze Data On-Site ? 0.9999997 0.9999997 0.9999997
3.2.1.1 Ps of Analyze Mechanically ? 0.9999998 0.9999998 0.9999998
3.2.1.2 Ps of Analyze Manually ? 0.9999998 0.9999998 0.9999998
3.2.2 Ps of Analyze Data Off-Site ? 0.9999997 0.9999997 0.9999997
3.2.2.1 Ps of Analyze Mechanically ? 0.9999998 0.9999998 0.9999998
3.2.2.2 Ps of Analyze Manually ? 0.9999998 0.9999998 0.9999998
3.2.3 Ps of Quantify Threat ? 0.9999997 0.9999997 0.9999997
3.2.3.1 Ps of Quantify Mechanically ? 0.9999998 0.9999998 0.9999998
3.2.3.2 Ps of Quantify Manually ? 0.9999998 0.9999998 0.9999998
3.3 Ps of Assess threat ? 0.9999990 0.9999990 0.9999990
3.3.1 Ps of Determine Intent ? 0.9999995 0.9999995 0.9999995
3.3.1.1 Ps of Observe Declarations ? 0.9999997 0.9999997 0.9999997
3.3.1.2 Ps of Observe Actions ? 0.9999997 0.9999997 0.9999997
3.3.2 Ps of Determine Damage Potential ? 0.9999995 0.9999995 0.9999995
3.3.2.1 Ps of Solicit Intelligence ? 0.9999998 0.9999998 0.9999998
3.3.2.2 Ps of Determine Destructive Potential ? 0.9999998 0.9999998 0.9999998
3.3.2.3 Ps of Determine Execution Time ? 0.9999998 0.9999998 0.9999998
Note:  P(False Alarm) for Detect Threat in WMD Scenario must be ? .000001 
# Ships = 20    and Maximum TEUs = 9400
Requirement







4.0  Time to Finish Threat ? 21 21 15
4.1 Time to Use Non-Lethal Measures ? 21 21 15
4.1.1 Time to Guard HVU from Internal Threat ? - ** -
4.1.1.1 Time to Guard Control Spaces ? - ** -
4.1.1.2 Time to Guard Crew ? - ** -
4.1.2 Time to Guard HVU from External Threat ? - - **
4.1.2.1 Time to Escort HVU with Other Units ? - - **
4.1.2.2  Time to Place Forces on HVU ? - - **
4.1.3 Time to Warn ? A* A* A*
4.1.3.1 Time to Use Visual ? a a a
4.1.3.2 Time to Use Auditory ? b b b
4.1.4 Time to Conduct Non-lethal Weapon Engagement ? A* A* A*
4.1.4.1 Time to Use Anti-Personnel NLW ? a a a
4.1.4.1.1 Time to Target ? b b b
4.1.4.1.2 Time to Fire Weapon ? c c c
4.1.4.1.3 Time to Assess Engagement ? d d d
4.1.4.2 Time to Use Anti-Vehicle NLW ? A* A* A*
4.1.4.2.1 Time to Target ? a a a
4.1.4.2.2 Time to Fire Weapon ? b b b
4.1.4.2.3 Time to Assess Engagement ? c c c
4.1.5 Time to Shoulder ? A* A* A*
4.1.6 Time to Tow Disabled Vessel ? ** ** **
4.1.7 Time to Conduct SAR ? ** ** **
4.2 Time to Use Lethal Measures ? 21 21 15
4.2.1 Time to Disable ? A* A* A*
4.2.1.1 Time to Target ? a a a
4.2.1.2 Time to Fire Weapon ? b b b
4.2.1.3 Time to Assess Engagement ? c c c
4.2.2 Time to Sink/Destroy ? A* A* A*
4.2.2.1 Time to Detect/Track  ? a a a
4.2.2.2 Time to Classify ? b b b
4.2.2.3 Time to Target ? c c c
4.2.2.4 Time to Fire Weapon ? d d d
4.2.2.5 Time to Assess Engagement ? e e e
4.2.3 Time to Recapture ? - A* -
4.2.3.1 Time to Board AV ? - a -
4.2.3.2 Time to Secure Control Spaces ? - b -
Notes: A* = A* is sum of times for subfunctions, must be  ? functional requirement
** = function/subfunction occurs automatically in this scenario or is not required for success
a,b,c,d,e indicate numbers to be summed into A*
Requirement




4.0 Ps of Finish Threat ? 0.9900 0.9100 0.8750
4.1 Ps of Use Non-lethal Measures ? - 0.9100 0.8750
4.1.1 Ps of Guard HVU from Internal Threat ? - 0.9100 **
4.1.1.1 Ps of Guard Control Spaces ? - 0.9539 **
4.1.1.2 Ps of Guard Crew ? - 0.9539 **
4.1.2 Ps of Guard HVU from External Threat ? - n/a 0.9900
4.1.2.1 Ps of Escort HVU with Other Units ? - n/a 0.9949
4.1.2.2 Ps of PlaceForces on HVU ? - n/a 0.9949
4.1.3 Ps of  Warn ? ** ** **
4.1.3.1 Ps of Use Visual ? ** ** **
4.1.3.2 Ps of Use Auditory ? ** ** **
4.1.4 Ps of Conduct Non-lethal Weapon Engagement ? ** ** **
4.1.4.1 Ps of Use Anti-Personnel NLW ? ** ** **
4.1.4.1.1 Ps of Target ? ** ** **
4.1.4.1.2 Ps of Fire Weapon ? ** ** **
4.1.4.1.3 Ps of Assess Engagement ? ** ** **
4.1.4.2 Ps of Use Anti-Vehicle NLW ? ** ** **
4.1.4.2.1 Ps of Target ? ** ** **
4.1.4.2.2 Ps of Fire Weapon ? ** ** **
4.1.4.2.3 Ps of Assess Engagement ? ** ** **
4.1.5 Ps of Shoulder ? ** ** **
4.1.6 Ps of Tow Disabled Vessel ? ** ** **
4.1.7 Ps of Conduct SAR ? ** ** **
4.2 Ps of Use Lethal Measures ? 0.9900 0.9100 0.8750
4.2.1 Ps of Disable ? 0.9900 0.9100 -
4.2.1.1 Ps of Target ? 0.9966 0.9690 -
4.2.1.2 Ps of Fire Weapon ? 0.9966 0.9690 -
4.2.1.3 Ps of Assess Engagement ? 0.9966 0.9690 -
4.2.2 Ps of Sink/Destroy ? 0.9900 0.9900 0.8838
4.2.2.1 Ps of Detect/Track ? ** ** 0.9900
4.2.2.2 Ps of Classify ? ** ** 0.9770
4.2.2.3 Ps of Target ? 0.9966 0.9966 0.9770
4.2.2.4 Ps of Fire Weapon ? 0.9966 0.9966 0.9770
4.2.2.5 Ps of Assess Engagement ? 0.9966 0.9966 0.9770
4.2.3 Ps of Recapture ? - 0.9100 -
4.2.3.1 Ps of Board AV ? - 0.9539 -
4.2.3.2 Ps of Secure Control Spaces ? - 0.9539 -
Notes: ** = function/subfunction occurs automatically in this scenario or is not required for success
Requirement




(all times are in per-days)
5.0 Sustain 6 6 6
5.1 Time to Support Units ? 6 6 6
5.1.1 Time to Deliver Consumables to Units ? 3 1/10 1
5.1.1.1. Time to Deliver to Military Ships ? 1/20 1/20 1
5.1.1.2. Time to Deliver to Non-Military Ships ? 3 1/10
5.1.2 Time to Refuel Platforms ? 1/5 1/5 6
5.1.2.1 Time to Refuel Ships ? 1/5 1/5 -
5.1.2.2 Time to Refuel Boats ? - - 1
5.1.2.3 Time to Refuel Aircraft ? - - 6
5.1.3 Time to Provide Manning for Sustained Operations ? 6 6 6
5.1.3.1 Time to Receive Manning Reports ? 6 6 6
5.1.3.2 Time to ID Manning Deficiencies ? 6 6 6
5.1.3.3 Time to Locate Manning Sources ? 6 6 6
5.1.3.4 Time to Transport Manning to Units ? 3 1/10 2
5.1.3.4.1 Time to Transport Manning to Military Units at sea ? - - -
5.1.3.4.2 Time to Transport Manning to Non-Military Units at Sea ? 3 1/10 -
5.1.3.4.3 Time to Transport Manning to Military Units Inport ? - - 2
5.1.4 Time to Provide Barracks ? 3 3 3
5.1.4.1 Time to Provide Barracks for Units Onboard Military Ships at Sea ? 3 3 -
5.1.4.2 Time to Provide Barracks for Units Onboard Non-Military Ships at Sea ? 3 - -
5.1.4.3 Time to Provide Barracks for Units Inport ? - - 3
5.2 Time to Maintain Units ? 6 6 6
5.2.1 Time to Identify Maintenance Deficiencies ? 6 6 6
5.2.1.1 Time to Receive Unit Capability Reports ? 6 6 6
5.2.1.2 Time to Asses System Capability ? 6 6 6
5.2.1.3. Time to Correct System Deficiency ? 1 1 6
5.2.2 Time to Provide Non-Depot Level Maintenance ? 0 0 1
5.2.2.1 Time to Identify Components ? - - 1/30
5.2.2.2 Time to Stock Spares ? - - 1
5.2.2.3 Time to Replace Components ? - - 1/2
5.2.3 Time to Provide Depot Level Maintenance ? 1/20 1/20 1
5.2.3.1 Time to Identify Pre-scheduled Depot-Level Maintenance ? 1/20 1/20 1
5.2.3.2 Time to Enable Unit Rotation ? 1/20 1/20 1
5.2.3.2.1 Time to Identify Unit Replacements ? 1/20 1/20 1
5.2.3.2.2 Time to Schedule Unit Turnover ? 1/20 1/20 1





5.0 0.999900 0.999900 0.999900
5.1. 0.999950 0.999950 0.999950
5.1.1. Ps to Deliver Consumables to Units ? 0.999987 0.999987 -
5.1.1.1. Ps to Deliver to Military Ships ? - 0.999987 -
5.1.1.2. Ps to Deliver to Non-Military Ships ? 0.999987 - -
5.1.2. Ps to Refuel platforms ? 0.999987 0.999987 0.999950
5.1.2.1. Ps to Refuel Ships ? 0.999987 0.999987 -
5.1.2.2. Ps to Refuel Boats ? - - 0.999975
5.1.2.3. Ps to Refuel Aircraft ? - - 0.999975
5.1.3. Ps to Provide Manning for Sustained Operations ? 0.999987 0.999987 -
5.1.3.1. Ps to Receive Manning Reports ? 0.999997 0.999997 -
5.1.3.2. Ps to Identify Manning Deficiencies ? 0.999997 0.999997 -
5.1.3.3. Ps to Locate Manning Sources ? 0.999997 0.999997 -
5.1.3.4. Ps to Transport Manning to units ? 0.999997 0.999997 -
5.1.3.4.1 Ps to Transport Manning to Military Units at Sea ? - - -
5.1.3.4.2 Ps to Transport Manning to Non-Military Units at Sea ? 0.999997 0.999997 -
5.1.3.4.3 Ps to Transport Manning to Military Units Inport ? - - -
5.1.4. Ps to Provide Barracks ? 0.999987 0.999987 -
5.1.4.1. Ps to Provide Barracks for Units Onboard Military Ships at Sea ? 0.999994 0.999987 -
5.1.4.2. Ps to Provide Barracks for Units Onboard Non-Military Ships at Sea ? 0.999994 - -
5.1.4.3. Ps to Provide Barracks for Units Inport ? - - -
5.2. Ps to Maintain Units ? 0.999950 0.999950 0.999950
5.2.1. Ps to Identify Maintenance Deficiencies ? 0.999975 0.999975 0.999983
5.2.1.1. Ps to Receive Unit Capability Reports ? 0.999992 0.999992 0.999994
5.2.1.2. Ps to Asses System Capability ? 0.999992 0.999992 0.999994
5.2.1.3. Ps to Correct System Deficiency ? 0.999992 0.999992 0.999994
5.2.2. Ps to Provide Non-Depot Level Maintenance ? 0.999983
5.2.2.1. Ps to Identify Components ? 0.999994
5.2.2.2. Ps to Stock Spares ? 0.999994
5.2.2.3. Ps to Replace Components ? 0.999994
5.2.3. Ps to Provide Depot Level Maintenance ? 0.999975 0.999975 0.999983
5.2.3.1. Ps to Identify Pre-scheduled Depot-Level Maintenance ? 0.999987 0.999987 0.999992
5.2.3.2. Ps to Enable Unit Rotation ? 0.999987 0.999987 0.999992
5.2.3.2.1. Ps to Identify Unit Replacements ? 0.999994 0.999994 0.999996
5.2.3.2.2. Ps to Schedule Unit Turnover ? 0.999994 0.999994 0.999996
Ps to Support Units ?
Requirements Allocation - Sustain Ps
Requirement
Ps to Sustain ?
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APPENDIX C MARITIME THREAT RESPONSE PROJECT SCHEDULE 
ID Task Name Resource Names
1 Integrated Project Kick-off Meeting
2 Interim Progress Review
3 Preliminary Design Review
4 Critical Design Review







12 Define SoS Missions
13 Analyze SoS Needs
14 Requirements Analysis
15 Perform Req Analysis
16 Perform Functional Analysis
17 Flowdown Requirements
18 SoS Architecture Alternatives
19 Identify Existing Systems
20 Postulate Future Systems
21 Identify Critical Elements
22 Define SoS Comm Structure
23 Define SoS C2 Structure
24 Perform Functional Embedding
25 Define SoS Force Composition
26 Define SoS Architecture Options




31 Perform Trade Studies
32 Perform Modeling & Simulation
33 Rank SoS Architectures
34 Select SoS
35 Deliverables Preparation
36 Compile and Edit Draft Report
37 Submit Draft Report
38 Prepare and Practice Final Pres
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APPENDIX D WEAPONS ANALYSIS 
Note:  In this appendix, #NUM! implies the data does not exist. 
 
negbinom for hits to kill .
.50, 25mm, 40mm:
0 0.4000 0.6000 # successes needed: 1.00











0 0.1600 0.8400 # successes needed: 2.00











0 0.6000 0.4000 # successes needed: 1.00











0 0.6000 0.4000 # successes needed: 1.00









10 0.0001 0.9999  
284 
Mixed WepCombined Shots .
p(kill) 1 0.0406 0.0203 Range band dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
p(kill) 2 0.0406 0.0203 500-1000 23 11 8 11 5
p(kill) 3 0.0000 0.0000 200-500 14 7 5 7 3
P(kill) 4 0.0000 0.0000 50-200 7 3 3 3 2
shots in 500-200 10 p(hit) 0.15
p(kill) combined 0.0796 0.0402 0.0406 shots in 200-50 6 p(hit) 0.40
weapon/combo range # shots # shots needed p(kill) X pdf cdf 1- X pdf
1xLMG,1xMMG 500 12/6 4 0.4267 0 0.1969 0.1969 0.8031 X=1 0 0.0467
1xMCG,1xMMG 500 12/6 3 0.6577 1 0.3474 0.5443 0.4557 X=2 1 0.1866
1xMCG,1xLMG 500 14/6 4 0.4933 2 0.2759 0.8202 0.1798 X=3 2 0.3110
1xMCG,1xGL 500 10/5 3 0.5325 3 0.1298 0.9500 0.0500 X=4 3 0.2765
1xMCG,2xMMG 500 17/9 3 0.8708 4 0.0401 0.9901 0.0099 X=5 4 0.1382
1xMMG,2xLMG 500 19/9 4 0.7450 5 0.0085 0.9986 0.0014 X=6 5 0.0369
6 0.0012 0.9999 0.0001 X=7 6 0.0041
1xLMG,1xMMG 200 6 4 0.1792 7 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 X=8 7 #NUM!
1xMCG,1xMMG 200 6 3 0.4556 8 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 X=9 8 #NUM!
1xMCG,1xLMG 200 6 4 0.1792 9 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 X=10 9 #NUM!
1xMCG,1xGL 200 5 3 0.3174 10 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 X=11 10 #NUM!
1xMCG,2xMMG 200 9 3 0.7682 11 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=12 11 #NUM!
1xMMG,2xLMG 200 9 4 0.5174 12 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=13 12 #NUM!
13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=14 13 #NUM!
14 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=15 14 #NUM!
15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=16 15 #NUM!
16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=17 16 #NUM!
17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=18 17 #NUM!
18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=19 18 #NUM!
19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=20 19 #NUM!
20 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=21 20 #NUM!
hits to kill 2 3 4 5
0.7667 0.6158 0.3660 0.2077
0.76565 0.43444 0.36597 0.14392
0.45570 0.61577 0.17141 0.04764






CASE Open Fire Range Rate of Fire # of Weapons Reload Policy
1 1000 best 1 individual
2 1000 best 2 = 1 coordinated *
3 1000 aimed 1 individual
4 1000 mix 1 individual
5** 1000 mix 4 = 2 coordinated
6 500 best 1 n/a
7 500 best 2 n/a
8 200 best 1 n/a
9 200 best 2 n/a
* One weapon reloads while other fires




















LMG 200.0000 20.0000 10.0000 2.0000
MMG 200.0000 20.0000 7.5000 2.6667
MCG 175.0000 6.0000 2.9000 2.0690
GL 48.0000 3.0000 0.6700 4.4776
Range band 
width dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
500.0000 22.5000 11.2500 8.4375 10.8750 5.0250
300.0000 13.5000 6.7500 5.0625 6.5250 3.0150
150.0000 6.7500 3.3750 2.5313 3.2625 1.5075
LMG







width dwell time 500.0000 22.5000 11 shots t
500.0000 22.5000 11 shots then reload 10 seconds 300.0000 13.5000 leaves 9 s
300.0000 13.5000 leaves 9 seconds here - so 2 shots here 150.0000 6.7500 3 shots he
150.0000 6.7500 3 shots here 5 hits to kill
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0.0000 0.3996 0.3996 0.6004 0.0000 0.7225 0.7225 0.2775 0.0000 0.2160 0.2160 0.7840 X=1 0.0000 0.3996 0.3996
X=2 1.0000 0.3823 0.7819 0.2181 1.0000 0.2550 0.9775 0.0225 1.0000 0.4320 0.6480 0.3520 X=2 1.0000 0.3823 0.7819
X=3 2.0000 0.1662 0.9481 0.0519 2.0000 0.0225 1.0000 0.0000 2.0000 0.2880 0.9360 0.0640 X=3 2.0000 0.1662 0.9481
X=4 3.0000 0.0434 0.9915 0.0085 3.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 3.0000 0.0640 1.0000 0.0000 X=4 3.0000 0.0434 0.9915
X=5 4.0000 0.0075 0.9990 0.0010 4.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 4.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=5 4.0000 0.0075 0.9990
5.0000 0.0009 0.9999 0.0001 5.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5.0000 0.0009 0.9999
6.0000 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6.0000 0.0001 1.0000
7.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7.0000 0.0000 1.0000
8.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8.0000 0.0000 1.0000
9.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 0.0000 1.0000














14.0000 2 shots reload (10s) 
7.0000 2 shots
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1-
X=1 0.0000 0.5132 0.5132 0.4868 0.0000 0.7225 0.7225 0.2775 0.0000 0.3600 0.3600 0.6400
X=2 1.0000 0.3570 0.8702 0.1298 1.0000 0.2550 0.9775 0.0225 1.0000 0.4800 0.8400 0.1600
X=3 2.0000 0.1087 0.9789 0.0211 2.0000 0.0225 1.0000 0.0000 2.0000 0.1600 1.0000 0.0000
X=4 3.0000 0.0189 0.9978 0.0022 3.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 3.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
X=5 4.0000 0.0021 0.9999 0.0001 4.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 4.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
5.0000 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 5.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
6.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
7.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
8.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!




AV Spd AV spd (yds/s) .
40.0000 22.2222




Wpn Ammo Burst size ROF (rps) Time of burst
LMG 200.0000 20.0000 10.0000 2.0000
MMG 200.0000 20.0000 7.5000 2.6667
MCG 175.0000 6.0000 2.9000 2.0690
GL 48.0000 3.0000 0.6700 4.4776
Range band width dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
500.0000 22.5000 11.2500 8.4375 10.8750 5.0250
300.0000 13.5000 6.7500 5.0625 6.5250 3.0150
150.0000 6.7500 3.3750 2.5313 3.2625 1.5075
LMG (presuming 2 LMG = 1 w/o reloads by coordinating fire/reload)
Range band width dwell time 4 hits to kill
500.0000 22.5000 11 shots
300.0000 13.5000 7 shots
150.0000 6.7500 3 shots
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0.0000 0.3996 0.3996 0.6004 0.0000 0.3206 0.3206 0.6794 0.0000 0.2160 0.2160
X=2 1.0000 0.3823 0.7819 0.2181 1.0000 0.3960 0.7166 0.2834 1.0000 0.4320 0.6480
X=3 2.0000 0.1662 0.9481 0.0519 2.0000 0.2097 0.9262 0.0738 2.0000 0.2880 0.9360
X=4 3.0000 0.0434 0.9915 0.0085 3.0000 0.0617 0.9879 0.0121 3.0000 0.0640 1.0000
X=5 4.0000 0.0075 0.9990 0.0010 4.0000 0.0109 0.9988 0.0012 4.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
5.0000 0.0009 0.9999 0.0001 5.0000 0.0012 0.9999 0.0001 5.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
6.0000 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 6.0000 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
7.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 7.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
8.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
9.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM!












X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0.0000 0.5132 0.5132 0.4868 0.0000 0.4437 0.4437 0.5563 0.0000 0.2160 0.2160
X=2 1.0000 0.3570 0.8702 0.1298 1.0000 0.3915 0.8352 0.1648 1.0000 0.4320 0.6480
X=3 2.0000 0.1087 0.9789 0.0211 2.0000 0.1382 0.9734 0.0266 2.0000 0.2880 0.9360
X=4 3.0000 0.0189 0.9978 0.0022 3.0000 0.0244 0.9978 0.0022 3.0000 0.0640 1.0000
X=5 4.0000 0.0021 0.9999 0.0001 4.0000 0.0022 0.9999 0.0001 4.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
5.0000 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 5.0000 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 5.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
6.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
7.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
8.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM!











AV Spd AV spd (yds/s) .
40 22




Wpn Ammo Burst size Time of burst
LMG 200 20 4
MMG 200 20 5
MCG 175 6 5
GL 48 3 5
Range band width dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
500 23 6 5 5 5
300 14 3 3 3 3
150 7 2 1 1 1
LMG 4 hits to kill
Range band width dwell time
500 23 6 shots
300 14 3 shots
150 7 1 shot reload OVER
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0.0000 0.6064 0.6064 0.3936 0.0000 0.6141 0.6141 0.3859 0.0000 0.6000 0.6000
X=2 1.0000 0.3164 0.9227 0.0773 1.0000 0.3251 0.9393 0.0608 1.0000 0.4000 1.0000
X=3 2.0000 0.0688 0.9915 0.0085 2.0000 0.0574 0.9966 0.0034 2.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
X=4 3.0000 0.0080 0.9995 0.0005 3.0000 0.0034 1.0000 0.0000 3.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
X=5 4.0000 0.0005 1.0000 0.0000 4.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 4.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
5.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 5.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
6.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
7.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
8.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM!











X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0 0.6591 0.6591 0.3409 0.0000 0.6141 0.6141 0.3859 0.0000 0.6000 0.6000
X=2 1 0.2866 0.9456 0.0544 1.0000 0.3251 0.9393 0.0608 1.0000 0.4000 1.0000
X=3 2 0.0498 0.9955 0.0045 2.0000 0.0574 0.9966 0.0034 2.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
X=4 3 0.0043 0.9998 0.0002 3.0000 0.0034 1.0000 0.0000 3.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
X=5 4 0.0002 1.0000 0.0000 4.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 4.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
5 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 5.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
6 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
7 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
8 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
9 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM!










AV Spd AV spd (yds/s) APPENDIX D
40 22











LMG 200 20 4 2
MMG 200 20 5 3
MCG 175 6 5 2
GL 48 3 5 4
Range band width dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
500 23 5 5 5 5
300 14 10 5 7 3
150 7 10 2 3 2
LMG 4 hits to kill
Range band width dwell time
500 23 5 shots
300 14 5 shots start reload
150 7 1 shot OVER
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0.0000 0.6591 0.6591 0.3409 0.0000 0.4437 0.4437 0.5563 0.0000 0.6000 0.6000
X=2 1.0000 0.2866 0.9456 0.0544 1.0000 0.3915 0.8352 0.1648 1.0000 0.4000 1.0000
X=3 2.0000 0.0498 0.9955 0.0045 2.0000 0.1382 0.9734 0.0266 2.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
X=4 3.0000 0.0043 0.9998 0.0002 3.0000 0.0244 0.9978 0.0022 3.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
X=5 4.0000 0.0002 1.0000 0.0000 4.0000 0.0022 0.9999 0.0001 4.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
5.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 5.0000 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 5.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
6.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
7.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
8.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM!










14 5 shots star reload
7 OVER
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0 0.6591 0.6591 0.3409 0.0000 0.4437 0.4437 0.5563 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000
X=2 1 0.2866 0.9456 0.0544 1.0000 0.3915 0.8352 0.1648 1.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
X=3 2 0.0498 0.9955 0.0045 2.0000 0.1382 0.9734 0.0266 2.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
290 
Case 5
AV Spd AV spd (yds/s) .
40 22











LMG 200 20 4 2
MMG 200 20 5 3
MCG 175 6 5 2
GL 48 3 5 4
Range band width dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
500 23 5 5 5 5
300 14 10 5 7 3
150 7 10 2 3 2
LMG 4 hits to kill
Range band width dwell time 4 weps = 2
500 23 8 shots
300 14 12 shots
150 7 6 shots
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0.0000 0.5132 0.5132 0.4868 0.0000 0.1422 0.1422 0.8578 0.0000 0.0467 0.0467
X=2 1.0000 0.3570 0.8702 0.1298 1.0000 0.3012 0.4435 0.5565 1.0000 0.1866 0.2333
X=3 2.0000 0.1087 0.9789 0.0211 2.0000 0.2924 0.7358 0.2642 2.0000 0.3110 0.5443
X=4 3.0000 0.0189 0.9978 0.0022 3.0000 0.1720 0.9078 0.0922 3.0000 0.2765 0.8208
X=5 4.0000 0.0021 0.9999 0.0001 4.0000 0.0683 0.9761 0.0239 4.0000 0.1382 0.9590
5.0000 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 5.0000 0.0193 0.9954 0.0046 5.0000 0.0369 0.9959
6.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 6.0000 0.0040 0.9993 0.0007 6.0000 0.0041 1.0000
7.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 7.0000 0.0006 0.9999 0.0001 7.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
8.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 8.0000 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 8.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
9.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 9.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
10.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 10.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 10.0000 #NUM! #NUM!
11.0000 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 11.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 11.0000 #NUM! #NUM!














X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
291 
Case 6
AV Spd AV spd (yds/s) APPENDIX D
40 22




Wpn Ammo Burst size ROF (rps) Time of burst
LMG 200 20 10 2
MMG 200 20 7.5 3
MCG 175 6 2.9 2
GL 48 3 0.67 4
Range band width dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
500 23 11 8 11 5
300 14 7 5 7 3
150 7 3 3 3 2
LMG Hold fire until 500 yards
Range band width dwell time
500 23 0
300 14 7 shots
150 7 3 shots
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0 1 1 0 0 0.320577 0.320577 0.679423 0 0.216 0.216
X=2 1 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 1 0.396007 0.716584 0.283416 1 0.432 0.648
X=3 2 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 2 0.209651 0.926235 0.073765 2 0.288 0.936
X=4 3 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 3 0.061662 0.987897 0.012103 3 0.064 1
X=5 4 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 4 0.010882 0.998778 0.001222 4 #NUM! #NUM!
5 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5 0.001152 0.999931 6.95E-05 5 #NUM! #NUM!
6 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6 6.78E-05 0.999998 1.71E-06 6 #NUM! #NUM!
7 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7 1.71E-06 1 0 7 #NUM! #NUM!
8 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8 #NUM! #NUM!
9 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9 #NUM! #NUM!
10 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 10 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 10 #NUM! #NUM!
11 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 11 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 11 #NUM! #NUM!
12 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 12 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 12 #NUM! #NUM!
13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 13 #NUM! #NUM!
14 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 14 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 14 #NUM! #NUM!
15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 15 #NUM! #NUM!
16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 16 #NUM! #NUM!
17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 17 #NUM! #NUM!
18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 18 #NUM! #NUM!
19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 19 #NUM! #NUM!





MMG Hold fire until 500 yards
dwell time
23 0  
292 
Case 6 (improved)
AV Spd AV spd (yds/s) .
40 22




Wpn Ammo Burst size ROF (rps) Time of burst
LMG 200 20 10 2
MMG 200 20 7.5 3
MCG 175 6 2.9 2
GL 48 3 0.67 4
Range band width dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
500 23 11 8 11 5
300 14 7 5 7 3
150 7 3 3 3 2
LMG Hold fire until 500 yards
Range band width dwell time
500 23 0
300 14 7 shots
150 7 3 shots
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0 1 1 0 0 0.320577 0.320577 0.679423 0 0.216 0.216
X=2 1 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 1 0.396007 0.716584 0.283416 1 0.432 0.648
X=3 2 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 2 0.209651 0.926235 0.073765 2 0.288 0.936
X=4 3 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 3 0.061662 0.987897 0.012103 3 0.064 1
X=5 4 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 4 0.010882 0.998778 0.001222 4 #NUM! #NUM!
5 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5 0.001152 0.999931 6.95E-05 5 #NUM! #NUM!
6 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6 6.78E-05 0.999998 1.71E-06 6 #NUM! #NUM!
7 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7 1.71E-06 1 0 7 #NUM! #NUM!
8 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8 #NUM! #NUM!
9 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9 #NUM! #NUM!
10 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 10 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 10 #NUM! #NUM!
11 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 11 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 11 #NUM! #NUM!
12 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 12 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 12 #NUM! #NUM!
13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 13 #NUM! #NUM!
14 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 14 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 14 #NUM! #NUM!
15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 15 #NUM! #NUM!
16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 16 #NUM! #NUM!
17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 17 #NUM! #NUM!
18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 18 #NUM! #NUM!
19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 19 #NUM! #NUM!





MMG Hold fire until 500 yards
dwell time
23 0  
293 
Case 7
AV Spd AV spd (yds/s) APPENDIX D
40 22




Wpn Ammo Burst size ROF (rps) Time of burst
LMG 200 20 10 2
MMG 200 20 7.5 3
MCG 175 6 2.9 2
GL 48 3 0.67 4
Range band width dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
500 23 11 8 11 5
300 14 7 5 7 3
150 7 3 3 3 2
LMG Hold fire until 500 yards
Range band width dwell time 2 weapons
500 23 0
300 14 14 shots
150 7 6 shots
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0 1 1 0 0 0.10277 0.10277 0.89723 0 0.046656 0.046656
X=2 1 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 1 0.253902 0.356671 0.643329 1 0.186624 0.23328
X=3 2 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 2 0.29124 0.647911 0.352089 2 0.31104 0.54432
X=4 3 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 3 0.205581 0.853492 0.146508 3 0.27648 0.8208
X=5 4 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 4 0.099767 0.95326 0.04674 4 0.13824 0.95904
5 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5 0.035212 0.988472 0.011528 5 0.036864 0.995904
6 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6 0.009321 0.997793 0.002207 6 0.004096 1
7 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7 0.00188 0.999672 0.000328 7 #NUM! #NUM!
8 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8 0.00029 0.999963 3.74E-05 8 #NUM! #NUM!
9 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9 3.41E-05 0.999997 3.22E-06 9 #NUM! #NUM!
10 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 10 3.01E-06 1 2.02E-07 10 #NUM! #NUM!
11 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 11 1.93E-07 1 8.77E-09 11 #NUM! #NUM!
12 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 12 8.53E-09 1 2.35E-10 12 #NUM! #NUM!
13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 13 2.32E-10 1 2.92E-12 13 #NUM! #NUM!
14 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 14 2.92E-12 1 0 14 #NUM! #NUM!
15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 15 #NUM! #NUM!
16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 16 #NUM! #NUM!
17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 17 #NUM! #NUM!
18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 18 #NUM! #NUM!
19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 19 #NUM! #NUM!






MMG Hold fire until 500 yards
dwell time
23 0  
294 
AV Spd AV spd (yds/s)
Case 8
40 22 APPENDIX D




Wpn Ammo Burst size ROF (rps) Time of burst
LMG 200 20 10 2
MMG 200 20 7.5 3
MCG 175 6 2.9 2
GL 48 3 0.67 4
Range band width dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
500 23 11 8 11 5
300 14 7 5 7 3
150 7 3 3 3 2
LMG pop up target
Range band width dwell time 1 wep 4 hits to kill
500 23 0
300 14 0
150 7 3 shots
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.216 0.216
X=2 1 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 1 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 1 0.432 0.648
X=3 2 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 2 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 2 0.288 0.936
X=4 3 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 3 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 3 0.064 1
X=5 4 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 4 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 4 #NUM! #NUM!
5 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5 #NUM! #NUM!
6 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6 #NUM! #NUM!
7 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7 #NUM! #NUM!
8 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8 #NUM! #NUM!
9 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9 #NUM! #NUM!
10 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 10 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 10 #NUM! #NUM!
11 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 11 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 11 #NUM! #NUM!
12 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 12 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 12 #NUM! #NUM!
13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 13 #NUM! #NUM!
14 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 14 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 14 #NUM! #NUM!
15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 15 #NUM! #NUM!
16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 16 #NUM! #NUM!
17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 17 #NUM! #NUM!
18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 18 #NUM! #NUM!
19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 19 #NUM! #NUM!
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Case 9
AV Spd AV spd (yds/s) APPENDIX D
40 22




Wpn Ammo Burst size ROF (rps) Time of burst
LMG 200 20 10 2
MMG 200 20 7.5 3
MCG 175 6 2.9 2
GL 48 3 0.67 4
Range band width dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
500 23 11 8 11 5
300 14 7 5 7 3
150 7 3 3 3 2
LMG pop up target
Range band width dwell time 2 weps 4 hits to kill
500 23 0
300 14 0
150 7 6 shots
X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf 1- X pdf cdf
X=1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.046656 0.046656
X=2 1 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 1 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 1 0.186624 0.23328
X=3 2 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 2 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 2 0.31104 0.54432
X=4 3 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 3 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 3 0.27648 0.8208
X=5 4 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 4 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 4 0.13824 0.95904
5 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 5 0.036864 0.995904
6 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 6 0.004096 1
7 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 7 #NUM! #NUM!
8 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 8 #NUM! #NUM!
9 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 9 #NUM! #NUM!
10 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 10 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 10 #NUM! #NUM!
11 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 11 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 11 #NUM! #NUM!
12 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 12 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 12 #NUM! #NUM!
13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 13 #NUM! #NUM!
14 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 14 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 14 #NUM! #NUM!
15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 15 #NUM! #NUM!
16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 16 #NUM! #NUM!
17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 17 #NUM! #NUM!
18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 18 #NUM! #NUM!
19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 19 #NUM! #NUM!
20 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 20 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! 20 #NUM! #NUM!
MMG pop up
dwell time
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APPENDIX E PLATFORM AND ESCORT OPTION ANALYSIS 
Note:  In this appendix, #NUM! implies the data does not exist. 
 
Mixed WepCombined Shots APPENDIX E
p(kill) 1 0.2365 0.1183 Range band dwell time LMG MMG MCG GL
p(kill) 2 0.2392 0.1196 500-1000 23 11 8 11 5
p(kill) 3 0.0000 0.0000 200-500 14 7 5 7 3
P(kill) 4 0.0000 0.0000 50-200 7 3 3 3 2
shots in 500-200 7 p(hit) 0.15
p(kill) combined 0.4191 0.2237 0.2379 shots in 200-50 3 p(hit) 0.40
weapon/combo range # shots # shots needed p(kill) X pdf cdf 1- X pdf
1xLMG,1xMMG 500 12/6 4 0.4267 0 0.3206 0.3206 0.6794 X=1 0 0.2160
1xMCG,1xMMG 500 12/6 3 0.6577 1 0.3960 0.7166 0.2834 X=2 1 0.4320
1xMCG,1xLMG 500 14/6 4 0.4933 2 0.2097 0.9262 0.0738 X=3 2 0.2880
1xMCG,1xGL 500 10/5 3 0.4191* 3 0.0617 0.9879 0.0121 X=4 3 0.0640
1xMCG,2xMMG 500 17/9 3 0.8708 4 0.0109 0.9988 0.0012 X=5 4 #NUM!
1xMMG,2xLMG 500 19/9 4 0.7450 5 0.0012 0.9999 0.0001 X=6 5 #NUM!
1xMMG, 1xGL 500 8/5 3 0.3860* 6 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 X=7 6 #NUM!
7 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 X=8 7 #NUM!
8 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=9 8 #NUM!
1xLMG,1xMMG 200 6 4 0.1792 9 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=10 9 #NUM!
1xMCG,1xMMG 200 6 3 0.4556 10 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=11 10 #NUM!
1xMCG,1xLMG 200 6 4 0.1792 11 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=12 11 #NUM!
1xMCG,1xGL 200 5 3 0.0640* 12 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=13 12 #NUM!
1xMCG,2xMMG 200 9 3 0.7682 13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=14 13 #NUM!
1xMMG,2xLMG 200 9 4 0.5174 14 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=15 14 #NUM!
15 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=16 15 #NUM!
4xLMG 16 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=17 16 #NUM!
17 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=18 17 #NUM!
18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=19 18 #NUM!
* combined p(kill) not shots - GL has different p(hit) 19 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=20 19 #NUM!
20 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! X=21 20 #NUM!
hits to kill 2 3 4 5
0.5327 0.2392 0.0998 #NUM!
0.53267 0.22220 0.04348 0.00000
0.28342 0.23916 0.05783 0.00949






Architecture worksheet APPENDIX E
PBS Architecture Options - Determination of P(kill) values
The following single weapon and two weapon p(kill) numbers are taken from the single weapon analysis completed seperately.  
They were used throughout this determination.
When weapons were used in combination, we combined the shots from each weapon as trials in a single binomial.  This is because any hit from either
weapon will count towards the accumulated total of hits needed to kill the target.  When weapons with different numbers of hits to kill were combined 
(such as the LMG and MMG), we used an average of the number of hits to kill.  Detailed calculations appear on a separate spreadsheet.  See Chapter
7 for a detailed explanation of the methodology used to derive the P(kill) numbers.
Definitions/assumptions:
All weapons use recommended firing policy (hold fire until 500 yds, use best ROF)
Pop-up means engagement begins at 200yds instead of 500yds
Single weapon means a single weapon as described (so 2-Twin MMG = 4 weapons)
LMG: light machinegun (ex: M60)
MMG: medium machinegun (ex: M2 .50cal)
MCG: medium caliber gun (ex: Mk38 25mm)
GL: automatic grenade launcher (ex: Mk19 40mm)
Weapon 1 Wep P(kill) 2 Wep P(kill) 1 Wep Popup P(kill) 2 Wep Popup P(kill)
LMG 0.0260 0.2932 0.0000 0.0409
MMG 0.1958 0.6158 0.0640 0.4557
MCG 0.2392 0.6879 0.0640 0.4557
GL 0.2365 0.7242 0.0000 0.4752
Twin MMG 0.4361 0.7667 0.3520 0.7667
1xMCG, 1xMMG n/a 0.6577 n/a 0.4556
1xMMG, 1xLMG n/a 0.4267 n/a 0.1792
1xMCG, 2xMMG n/a 0.8708 n/a 0.7682
3xLMG n/a 3 wep = .6491 n/a 3 wep = .2666
ARCHITECTURE DESCRIPTIONS
Option Description
1 4 small boats
Each boat has 3 hardpoints: one in the bow and one on each side.  They can mount LMG, MMG, or GL
Two of the three weapons can engage a target
Based on individual weapon analysis, we armed the small escorts with one MMG on each mount, therefore 2xMMG engage an attacker
There is a 50% probability that one of  two escorts can engage an attacker, so the combined p(kill) is determined by two steps:
1st, .5*(Pkill#1) = A and .5*(Pkill#2)=B
2nd, A+B
There is a 50% probability that one of two escorts can engage a POPUP attacker, so the combined p(kill) is determined by two steps:
1st, .5*(Pkill#1) = A and .5*(Pkill#2)=B
2nd, A+B
Example: Navy 34' Dauntless, SOC-R, Coast Guard TPSB
2 2 medium escorts
Each boat has one large mount forward and two hardpoints on each side.  They can mount the MCG forward and the LMG, MMG, or GL on the side.
The MCG and two other weapons (one side) can engage a target
Based on individual weapon analysis, we armed the medium escorts with one MMG on each mount, therefore the MCG and 2xMMG engage an attacker
There is a 75% probability that one of two escorts can engage an attacker and a 25% that no escort can engage an attacker, 
so the combined p(kill) is determined by two steps:
1st, .75*(Pkill#1) = A and .25*(Pkill#2)=B  (in this case, P(kill)#2=0)
2nd, A+B
There is a 50% probability that one of two escorts can engage a POPUPattacker and a 50% that no escort can engage a POPUP attacker, 
so the combined p(kill) is determined by two steps:
1st, .5*(Pkill#1) = A and .5*(Pkill#2)=B  (in this case, P(kill)#2=0)
2nd, A+B
Example: Coast Guard 110', 147' (FRC - Program of Record)
3 Mix of 2 medium, 2 small
As above
There is a 50% that one medium can engage an attacker and a 50% probability that one small escort can engage an attacker,
so the combined p(kill) is determined by two steps:
1st, .5*(Pkill#1) = A and .5*(Pkill#2)=B
2nd, A+B
There is a 50% that one medium can engage a POPUP attacker and a 50% probability that one small escort can engage a POPUP attacker,
so the combined p(kill) is determined by two steps:
1st, .5*(Pkill#1) = A and .5*(Pkill#2)=B
2nd, A+B
4 Teams onboard
A 12-man team onboard the HVU armed with up to 6 LMG, 4 MMG, or 4 GL, but never more than 6 weapons total.  3 weapons on each side




PBS FORCE STRUCTURE WORKSHEET
Assumptions
small escorts operate 8 hours out of 24 small escort group = 4 boats
med escorts operate 24 hours out of 24 medium escort group = 2 ships
teams operate 12 hours out of 24 mix escort group = 2 medium escorts 2 small boats
board by harbor pilot or on shore
assume "perfect" changeovers Note: small escort is endurance of craft; crews switch throughout day as needed
Rules
one escort group per HVU per day
Ferries operate 12 hours per day
5 tankers inbound every day
tanker transit is 9 hours, return trip for escort is 4.5 hours
There are 3 0.5 hr ferry routes
There are 2 1 hour ferry routes
Weekdays
FERRIES
1 ferry does a 0.5 hr route for a 1 hr round trip
2 vessels do 1 hr route for a 1 hr round trip
so 7 ferries operating (4 on 1-hr routes and 3 on 0.5-hour routes)
TANKERS
5 inbound per day uniformly distributed
Weekends
FERRIES
2 ferries do 0.5-hr routes for a 0.5-hr round trip
1 ferry does 1-hr routes for a 2-hr round trip
so 8 ferries operating (6 on 0.5-hr routes and 2 on 1-hr routes)
TANKERS
5 inbound per day uniformly distributes
Note: These schedules result in a transit total of 3246 for a 30 day month with four weekends.  If doubled to reflect two companies (6492),
it is close to the 2005 average number of ferry transits (6706) reported by the USCG Vessel Tracking Service in San Francisco.
From this point, use weekend requirement to determine force structure.
FERRY ESCORT SCHEDULE
small escort group 4 per ferry need 32 (8x4) for 8 hours and 32 (8x4) for 4 more hours
so a total of 64 boats
then 64/4 = 16 groups of 4
medium escort group 2 per ferry need 16 (8x2) for 12 hours
so a total of 16 ships
then 16/2 = 8 groups of 2
mix escort group one group escorts 1 ferry small: need 2 for 8 hours and 2 for 4 more hours
medium: need 2 for 12 hours
so a total of 32 (2x8+2x8) small boats so then (32/4) = 8 groups of 4
so a total of 16 ships (2x8) so then (16/2) = 8 groups of 2 
teams one per ferry team: need 12 (12x1) for 12 hours
so a total of 12 teams
TANKER ESCORT SCHEDULE
small escort group need 4 boats per tanker need 20 (4x5) per day (each group can only do one HVU per day)
so then 20/4 = 5 groups of 4
medium escort group need 2 per tanker need 10 (2x5) per tanker
each group can do 2 per day
so 3 groups of 2
mix escort group one group escorts one tanker 6 medium can do one day
10 small boats per day (5x2)
so then 10/4 = 2.5 round up to 3 groups of 4
so then 6/2 = 3 groups of 2




FINISH FORCE STRUCTURE WORKSHEET
Assumptions
USV operate 8 hours out of 24 USV group = 4 boats, 8 personnel (4 operators, 4 maintainers)
helo operates 4 hours out of 24 helo det = 2 aircraft
assume "perfect" changeovers during operations
Rules
one USV group per HVU per day
Ferries operate 12 hours per day
5 tankers inbound every day
tanker transit is 9 hours, return trip for escort is 4.5 hours
There are 3 0.5 hr ferry routes
There are 2 1 hour ferry routes
Weekdays
FERRIES
1 ferry does a 0.5 hr route for a 1 hr round trip
2 vessels do 1 hr route for a 1 hr round trip
so 7 ferries operating (4 on 1-hr routes and 3 on 0.5-hour routes)
TANKERS
5 inbound per day uniformly distributed
Weekends
FERRIES
2 ferries do 0.5-hr routes for a 0.5-hr round trip
1 ferry does 1-hr routes for a 2-hr round trip
so 8 ferries operating (6 on 0.5-hr routes and 2 on 1-hr routes)
TANKERS
5 inbound per day uniformly distributes
Note: These schedules result in a transit total of 3246 for a 30 day month with four weekends.  If doubled to reflect two companies (6492),
it is close to the 2005 average number of ferry transits (6706) reported by the USCG Vessel Tracking Service in San Francisco.
From this point, use weekend requirement to determine force structure.
FERRY ESCORT SCHEDULE
USV group 4 per ferry need 16 (8x2) for 8 hours and 16 (8x2) for 4 more hours
so a total of 32 USV
then 32/4 = 8 groups of 4
helo 1 per ferry need 8 (8x1) for 4 hours
so a total of 24 aircraft (8x3 4-hr blocks)
then 24/2 = 12 groups of 2
The high number of aircraft required and short distance of most ferry trips makes attached escort by helicopter logistically infeasible.  Instead, we make an alternate disposition of helos as follows:
need 5 (5x1) for 4 hours
so a total of (5x3) = 15 aircraft per day
15/2 = 7.5 rounded up to 8, so 8 groups of 2
In this case, a helo patrols one ferry route for the duration of its 4 hour flight.
TANKER ESCORT SCHEDULE
USV group 4 per tanker need 20 (4x5) per day (each group can only do one HVU per day)
so then 20/4 = 5 groups of 4
helo 1 per tanker need 2 (8hr/2) per tanker
so then 5x2 = 10 helos per day
10/2 = 5 groups of 2
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
USV group for 24hr protection, use 6 USV (2 for 8 hr, x 3 = 24hr)
so then 6/4 = 1.5 round up to 2 groups of 4 USV
then x5 (5 critical points) = 10 groups of 4 USV





Helo Determination of P(kill) values
Recommended helo: Armed with 1 MMG
Existing helo:  Armed with 1 LMG (doorgunner)
Assumptions: Helo p(hit), 200-500 yards: 0.6
LMG hits to kill: 5* 5
MMG hits to kill: 3*
Given: A single engagement allows 3 shots (pursuing/engaging attacker for 500yds or roughly 15 to 20 seconds)
A 'long' engagement allows 5 shots (pursuing/engaging attacker for 1000yds or roughly 30 to 40 seconds)
Recommended helo P(kill): single: 0.6480
long: 0.9130
Existing helo P(kill): single: 0.2160
long: 0.6826
* from earlier discussions, see worksheet
These architecture p(kill)s were used in our EXTEND Small Boat Attack model to determine architecture effectiveness against random attackers, with inclusion of 
the fopllowing parameters:
attacker initial distance









Weapon 1 Wep P(kill) 500yds 1 Wep P(kill) 200yds 2 Wep P(kill) 2 Wep Popup P(kill)
LMG 0.0260 0.0000 0.2932 0.0409
MMG 0.1958 0.0640 0.6158 0.4557
MCG 0.2392 0.0640 0.6879 0.4557
GL 0.2365 0.0000 0.7242 0.4752
Twin MMG 0.4361 0.3520 0.7667 0.7667
Weapon 2 Wep P(kill) 500yds 2 Wep P(kill) 200yds
1 Wep P(kill) 
500yds
1 Wep P(kill) 
200yds
LMG 0.2932 0.0409 0.0260 0.0000
MMG 0.6158 0.4557 0.1958 0.0640
MCG 0.6879 0.4557 0.2392 0.0640
GL 0.7242 0.4752 0.2365 0.0000
Twin MMG 0.7667 0.7667 0.4361 0.3520
Weapon 2 Wep P(kill) 500yds 2 Wep P(kill) 200yds
1 Wep P(kill) 
500yds
1 Wep P(kill) 
200yds
MMG 0.6158 0.4557 0.1958 0.0640
Twin MMG 0.7667 0.7667 0.4361 0.3520
MCG 0.6879 0.4557 0.2392 0.0640
GL 0.7242 0.4752 0.2365 0.0000
LMG 0.2932 0.0409 0.0260 0.0000


















ll) Wep P(kill) 500yds 1
Wep P(kill) 200yds 1
















ll) Wep P(kill) 500yds 1
Wep P(kill) 200yds 1
















ll) Wep P(kill) 500yds 2
Wep P(kill) 200yds 2
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v = 40 patrol speed in knots
u = 40 attacker speed in knots
d = 1 length of barrier in nautical miles
w = 0.25 intercept range of patroller in nautical miles
d' = 0.75 d - w
r = 1 v / u
h = 3 d' / w









Some patrollers and results:
0.5 NM BARRIER P(intercept) ONE NM BARRIER P(intercept) TWO NM BARRIER P(intercept) THREE NM BARRIER P(intercept)
small boat spd 15 0.5334 small boat spd 15 0.2669 small boat spd 15 0.1335 small boat spd 15 0.0890
rge .25 rge .25 rge .25 rge .25
small boat spd 20 0.5573 small boat spd 20 0.2792 small boat spd 20 0.1397 small boat spd 20 0.0931
rge .25 rge .25 rge .25 rge .25
med escort spd 20 0.5573 med escort spd 20 0.2792 med escort spd 20 0.1397 med escort spd 20 0.0931
rge .25 rge .25 rge .25 rge .25
helo spd 100 0.9882 helo spd 100 0.6135 helo spd 100 0.3238 helo spd 100 0.2190
rge .5 rge .5 rge .5 rge .5
helo spd 60 0.8208 helo spd 60 0.4373 helo spd 60 0.2225 helo spd 60 0.1490
rge .5 rge .5 rge .5 rge .5
 
APPENDIX F
Force structure calculations - barrier patrol
#'s req'd
8 hour endurance boats per mile, tanker route 0
boats per mile, ferry route 1
Route Length # routes Total miles 1st 8 hrs 2d 8 hrs 3d 8 hrs Total Req'd
Tanker 30 nm 1 30 0 0 0 0
Ferry, 0.5hr 3 nm 3 9 9 9 0 18
Ferry, 1.0hr 6 nm 2 12 12 12 0 24
Total 39 nm 6 51 21 21 0 42
12 hour endurance boats per mile, tanker route 0
boats per mile, ferry route 1
Route Length # routes Total miles 1st 12 hrs 2d 12 hrs 3d 8 hrs Total Req'd
Tanker 30 nm 1 30 0 0 0 0
0.5hr 3 nm 3 9 9 0 0 9
1.0hr 6 nm 2 12 12 0 0 12




2 per nm 1 per nm
Type Close escort mix mix
Endurance 8 hrs 8 8
ferry 64 84 42
tanker 20 20 20
CI 40 40 40
124 144 102
2 per nm 1 per nm
Type Close escort mix mix
Endurance 12 12 12
ferry 32 42 21
tanker 10 10 10
CI 20 20 20
62 72 51
Equal effectiveness in barrier patrol results in greater number of forces required.
Lesser effectiveness required for barrier patrol to require fewer numbers, and "savings" in forces is 11 or 22 boats, respectively.
Given already low effectiveness for most architectures, reduction in forces is not sufficient justification to accept lower performance.
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2.0 Prepare the Battlespace
4.0 Finish Threat








 1.1.1 Command 
Forces


































3.1.1 Scan Area of Interest






























4.1 Use Non-lethal Measures









5.2.1 ID Units w/o Organic 
Maintenance/Medical 
Capabilities
5.2.2 Provide Trained 




















Distance from US 
(miles) Assume 
SOA=20 kts 
Distance from US 
(miles) Assume 
SOA=25 kts 
Distance from US 
(miles) Assume 
SOA=30 kts 





1 9400.00 3.00 28200.00 470.00 19.58 9400.00 11750.00 14100.00 3.00 3 9
2 9400.00 3.00 14100.00 235.00 9.79 4700.00 5875.00 7050.00 3.00 3 18
3 9400.00 3.00 9400.00 156.67 6.53 3133.33 3916.67 4700.00 3.00 3 27
4 9400.00 3.00 7050.00 117.50 4.90 2350.00 2937.50 3525.00 3.00 3 36
5 9400.00 3.00 5640.00 94.00 3.92 1880.00 2350.00 2820.00 3.00 3 45
6 9400.00 3.00 4700.00 78.33 3.26 1566.67 1958.33 2350.00 3.00 3 54
7 9400.00 3.00 4028.57 67.14 2.80 1342.86 1678.57 2014.29 3.00 3 63
8 9400.00 3.00 3525.00 58.75 2.45 1175.00 1468.75 1762.50 3.00 3 72
9 9400.00 3.00 3133.33 52.22 2.18 1044.44 1305.56 1566.67 3.00 3 81
10 9400.00 3.00 2820.00 47.00 1.96 940.00 1175.00 1410.00 3.00 3 90
11 9400.00 3.00 2563.64 42.73 1.78 854.55 1068.18 1281.82 3.00 3 99
12 9400.00 3.00 2350.00 39.17 1.63 783.33 979.17 1175.00 3.00 3 108
13 9400.00 3.00 2169.23 36.15 1.51 723.08 903.85 1084.62 3.00 3 117
14 9400.00 3.00 2014.29 33.57 1.40 671.43 839.29 1007.14 3.00 3 126
15 9400.00 3.00 1880.00 31.33 1.31 626.67 783.33 940.00 3.00 3 135
16 9400.00 3.00 1762.50 29.38 1.22 587.50 734.38 881.25 3.00 3 144
17 9400.00 3.00 1658.82 27.65 1.15 552.94 691.18 829.41 3.00 3 153
18 9400.00 3.00 1566.67 26.11 1.09 522.22 652.78 783.33 3.00 3 162
19 9400.00 3.00 1484.21 24.74 1.03 494.74 618.42 742.11 3.00 3 171
20 9400.00 3.00 1410.00 23.50 0.98 470.00 587.50 705.00 3.00 3 180
 
 
21 9400.00 3.00 1342.86 22.38 0.93 447.62 559.52 671.43 3.00 3 189
22 9400.00 3.00 1281.82 21.36 0.89 427.27 534.09 640.91 3.00 3 198
23 9400.00 3.00 1226.09 20.43 0.85 408.70 510.87 613.04 3.00 3 207
24 9400.00 3.00 1175.00 19.58 0.82 391.67 489.58 587.50 3.00 3 216
25 9400.00 3.00 1128.00 18.80 0.78 376.00 470.00 564.00 3.00 3 225
26 9400.00 3.00 1084.62 18.08 0.75 361.54 451.92 542.31 3.00 3 234
27 9400.00 3.00 1044.44 17.41 0.73 348.15 435.19 522.22 3.00 3 243
28 9400.00 3.00 1007.14 16.79 0.70 335.71 419.64 503.57 3.00 3 252
29 9400.00 3.00 972.41 16.21 0.68 324.14 405.17 486.21 3.00 3 261
30 9400.00 3.00 940.00 15.67 0.65 313.33 391.67 470.00 3.00 3 270
31 9400.00 3.00 909.68 15.16 0.63 303.23 379.03 454.84 3.00 3 279
32 9400.00 3.00 881.25 14.69 0.61 293.75 367.19 440.63 3.00 3 288
33 9400.00 3.00 854.55 14.24 0.59 284.85 356.06 427.27 3.00 3 297
34 9400.00 3.00 829.41 13.82 0.58 276.47 345.59 414.71 3.00 3 306
35 9400.00 3.00 805.71 13.43 0.56 268.57 335.71 402.86 3.00 3 315
36 9400.00 3.00 783.33 13.06 0.54 261.11 326.39 391.67 3.00 3 324
37 9400.00 3.00 762.16 12.70 0.53 254.05 317.57 381.08 3.00 3 333
38 9400.00 3.00 742.11 12.37 0.52 247.37 309.21 371.05 3.00 3 342
39 9400.00 3.00 723.08 12.05 0.50 241.03 301.28 361.54 3.00 3 351













Distance from US 
(miles) Assume 
SOA=20 kts 
Distance from US 
(miles) Assume 
SOA=25 kts 
Distance from US 
(miles) Assume 
SOA=30 kts 





1 9400.00 3.00 28200.00 470.00 19.58 9400.00 11750.00 14100.00 3.00 2 6
2 9400.00 3.00 14100.00 235.00 9.79 4700.00 5875.00 7050.00 3.00 2 12
3 9400.00 3.00 9400.00 156.67 6.53 3133.33 3916.67 4700.00 3.00 2 18
4 9400.00 3.00 7050.00 117.50 4.90 2350.00 2937.50 3525.00 3.00 2 24
5 9400.00 3.00 5640.00 94.00 3.92 1880.00 2350.00 2820.00 3.00 2 30
6 9400.00 3.00 4700.00 78.33 3.26 1566.67 1958.33 2350.00 3.00 2 36
7 9400.00 3.00 4028.57 67.14 2.80 1342.86 1678.57 2014.29 3.00 2 42
8 9400.00 3.00 3525.00 58.75 2.45 1175.00 1468.75 1762.50 3.00 2 48
9 9400.00 3.00 3133.33 52.22 2.18 1044.44 1305.56 1566.67 3.00 2 54
10 9400.00 3.00 2820.00 47.00 1.96 940.00 1175.00 1410.00 3.00 2 60
11 9400.00 3.00 2563.64 42.73 1.78 854.55 1068.18 1281.82 3.00 2 66
12 9400.00 3.00 2350.00 39.17 1.63 783.33 979.17 1175.00 3.00 2 72
13 9400.00 3.00 2169.23 36.15 1.51 723.08 903.85 1084.62 3.00 2 78
14 9400.00 3.00 2014.29 33.57 1.40 671.43 839.29 1007.14 3.00 2 84
15 9400.00 3.00 1880.00 31.33 1.31 626.67 783.33 940.00 3.00 2 90
16 9400.00 3.00 1762.50 29.38 1.22 587.50 734.38 881.25 3.00 2 96
17 9400.00 3.00 1658.82 27.65 1.15 552.94 691.18 829.41 3.00 2 102
18 9400.00 3.00 1566.67 26.11 1.09 522.22 652.78 783.33 3.00 2 108
19 9400.00 3.00 1484.21 24.74 1.03 494.74 618.42 742.11 3.00 2 114
20 9400.00 3.00 1410.00 23.50 0.98 470.00 587.50 705.00 3.00 2 120
21 9400.00 3.00 1342.86 22.38 0.93 447.62 559.52 671.43 3.00 2 126
22 9400.00 3.00 1281.82 21.36 0.89 427.27 534.09 640.91 3.00 2 132
23 9400.00 3.00 1226.09 20.43 0.85 408.70 510.87 613.04 3.00 2 138
24 9400.00 3.00 1175.00 19.58 0.82 391.67 489.58 587.50 3.00 2 144
25 9400.00 3.00 1128.00 18.80 0.78 376.00 470.00 564.00 3.00 2 150
26 9400.00 3.00 1084.62 18.08 0.75 361.54 451.92 542.31 3.00 2 156
  
9400.00 3.00 1044.44 17.41 0.73 348.15 435.19 522.22 3.00 2 162
9400.00 3.00 1007.14 16.79 0.70 335.71 419.64 503.57 3.00 2 168
9400.00 3.00 972.41 16.21 0.68 324.14 405.17 486.21 3.00 2 174
9400.00 3.00 940.00 15.67 0.65 313.33 391.67 470.00 3.00 2 180
9400.00 3.00 909.68 15.16 0.63 303.23 379.03 454.84 3.00 2 186
9400.00 3.00 881.25 14.69 0.61 293.75 367.19 440.63 3.00 2 192
9400.00 3.00 854.55 14.24 0.59 284.85 356.06 427.27 3.00 2 198
9400.00 3.00 829.41 13.82 0.58 276.47 345.59 414.71 3.00 2 204
9400.00 3.00 805.71 13.43 0.56 268.57 335.71 402.86 3.00 2 210
9400.00 3.00 783.33 13.06 0.54 261.11 326.39 391.67 3.00 2 216
9400.00 3.00 762.16 12.70 0.53 254.05 317.57 381.08 3.00 2 222
9400.00 3.00 742.11 12.37 0.52 247.37 309.21 371.05 3.00 2 228
9400.00 3.00 723.08 12.05 0.50 241.03 301.28 361.54 3.00 2 234
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APPENDIX I  CONTAINER SHIP SEARCH PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
(Operations Research – Feasibility Study on Weapon of Mass Destruction Passive 
and Active Detectors) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this century, countries benefit from healthy, prosperous, confident 
partners.  Weak and troubled nations export their ill—problems like 
economic instability and illegal immigration and crime and terrorism.  
America and others . . . understand that healthy and prosperous nations 
export and import goods and services that help to stabilize regions and add 
security to every nation.1 
President George W. Bush, November 20, 2004 
The Port of San Francisco has security concerns that are much more varied and complex 
than almost any other port, encompassing not only a variety of maritime cargo terminals, 
but much more including dramatically increasing cruise ship activity, world-famous 
tourist attractions such as Fisherman’s Wharf and Pier 39, excursion boat terminals, a 
commercial fishing harbor and fish processing terminal, a ship repair yard and dry dock, 
lay berths for Maritime Administration vessels, the strategically important western 
anchorage of the Bay Bridge, two major power plants, and numerous public waterfront 
piers and promenades.  The average annual throughput in TEU is around 30,000 and 
growing (32,045 TEUs - in year 2004).2 
A Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) attack would be devastating and unimaginable.  
The estimated damage for a successful attack costs about US$500 billion.  This leads to 
the initiative to study the feasibility of searching for and detecting any WMD that is 
suspected to be onboard a Potential Attack Vessel (PAV) en route from Asia to the  
Port of San Francisco. 
Currently, there are several nuclear detection capabilities that are available in the market.  
They range from handheld to machine based detectors.  This report leverages on the 
passive detector and active interrogator concept to explore and gain insights. With limited 
technical knowledge of the devices, the report was based on an assumed detector 
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capability as well as on the premise of desired Probability of Detection (Pd) and 
Probability of False Alarm (Pfa). 
Sensitivity analysis was also performed to look into the tradeoffs between detector 
capability and quantity.  In addition, without the ability to forecast the container ship 
manifest and predict the number of containers with high radiation that have to be scanned 
by an active interrogator, a range of quantity of containers with high radiation was input 
into the model to gain an insight on the point where having “a lot of high radiation 
containers” become “too many high radiation containers to handle.” 
SCENARIO OVERVIEW 
This scenario is based on 20 PAVs traveling (Randomly distributed) from the Port of 
Singapore to the Port of San Francisco.  There are three possible routes that the PAVs 
may take. Namely, the Northern route (from Singapore – China – San Francisco), the 
Direct route (from Singapore – Philippines – San Francisco) and the Southern route (from 
Singapore – Hawaii – San Francisco).  However, our findings have concluded that the 
main route that the PAVs are taking is the Northern approach (see Figure I-1).  Some of 
the PAVs may or may not stop at ports (e.g., the Port of Beijing) along the way.  
Assuming that the intelligence gathered about the PAVs is accurate; detection teams will 
be dispatched accordingly from their various locations to board and search the PAVs. 
 
Figure I-1:  Northern Shipping Route 
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ASSUMPTIONS 
Our analysis has the following assumptions: 
1. 100% accurate intelligence on suspected PAVs. 
2. Detection Teams are on standby. 
3. No administrative and logistic time lost due to last minute notice to move. 
4. Successful boarding of PAVs by detection teams. 
5. Zero resistance by crews or insurgents onboard suspected PAVs. 
6. Time to board the PAVs is not taken into consideration. 
7. A triangle distribution for the number of containers onboard PAVs  
was used. 
8. Setting an upper and lower bound will prevent “extreme” results. 
9. Number of containers range from 2,000 (min) to 10,000 (max) with an 
average of 6,000. 
10. Transit times also follow a triangle distribution 
a. An EXTEND™ simulation was performed to model the possible 
times to port via three routes across the Pacific Ocean. 
b. Results showed that the time to port is between 70 hours to  
200 hours, with an average of 135 hours. 
c. Setting the upper and lower bound will again prevent “extreme” 
results. 
11. Dwell times for both passive and active detectors are unknown.  This is 
one of the unknown capabilities that need to be quantified. 
12. All containers have to be scanned by a passive detector.  Only false alarms 
will be further scanned by an active interrogator. 
13. All containers on the manifest listed as possibly high radiation will be 
scanned by passive detector AND active interrogator. 
14. Sequential and non-stop scanning of the containers.  Therefore, there is no 
time wasted installing and dismantling the detectors.  
15. The process of scanning with the active interrogator is assumed to start 
immediately after the passive detector, i.e., the start of the active 
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interrogator scans do not need to wait for the completion of the passive 
detector scans. 
16. Up to 20% of the PAVs’ manifest is listed with high radiation.  They will 
need to be scanned by the active interrogator. 
17. It is assumed that up to 10 passive detectors and 3 active interrogators will 
be deployed per PAV, limited by resource and manpower constraints. 
18. Probability of false alarm, Pfa, for the passive detector is assumed to be 1% 
(this is considered to be an underestimate of the capability of a passive 
detector available in the market currently). 
19. Two triggers out of three looks of the passive detector will qualify as a  
false alarm. 
20. Active interrogators have 0% false alarm and 100% detection. 
METHODOLOGY 
Scanning Process 
Our model begins when the detector teams starting the scanning process.  A total of  
10 teams (each with 1 passive detector) will scan the containers concurrently.  The first 
scan will be done by a passive detector.  If the container triggers the passive detector at 
least twice out of three looks, then it will be tagged and an active interrogator will be 
employed to confirm the detection. 
Total False Alarm Probability, Pfa 
The total Pfa is computed using a Binomial distribution function of 2 or more false alarms 
out of 3 looks.  The Binomial’s probability is taken off the Pfa of the Passive detector 
(assume 1% in this case).  With this total Pfa, we then proceed to find the factors 
involving PAVs. Each PAV is given a ship number for identification purposes. 
Total Number of False Alarms for 20 PAVs 
The individual ship’s false alarm is obtained by multiplying the number of containers by 
the overall Pfa when scanning a single container.  Thus the total number of false alarms 
can be easily obtained by summing all the 20 PAVs’ false alarm.  A Critical Binomial 
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function is used in Excel and the number of trials will be the total number of containers 
scanned, while the probability is the total Pfa and Alpha is a random number. 
Given all the facts and assumptions that have been generated earlier, we now proceed 
onto finding out recommendations for the detectors.  For this research, we will focus on 
the following: 
1) Dwell time of both passive and active detectors 
2) Manifest 
Dwell Time 
Firstly, dwell time of the detector plays an important role in determining the accuracy of 
the scan.  Generally, a longer dwell time equate to higher chance to generate a false alarm 
but a longer dwell time also equate to more time dedicated to scan a container.  There 
must be a trade off between them. 
Dwell Time of Passive Detector 
The dwell time of the passive detector is computed using the hours to port, containers on 
each PAV and the upper bound of the passive detectors.  The following equation is used 
to obtain the Dwell time: 
Hours to port ×60(minutes)
ContainersonShip
Upper bound of Passivedetectors
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
A total of 20 dwell times are obtained from the 20 PAVs.  Thereafter the minimum of the 
maximum dwell time is taken for comparison. 
Dwell Time of Active Interrogator and Manifest of PAV 
The items carried in each PAV’s containers may consist of items that are high in 
radiation.  These containers are assumed to be highly dangerous which have to go 
through the active detector scan right from the start.  Recalling the assumption that a 
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PAV can have up to 20% of its manifest being high radiation, there is a need to formulate 
an equation to determine the dwell time.  The equation is very much similar to the 
passive detector. 
Hours to port ×60(minutes)
20% of containerson VOI
Upper bound of Activedetectors
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Again, the minimum of the maximum dwell time is obtained the same way as before. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
First, the assumption of detector probability of detection needs to be analyzed.  With the 
need to meet the WMD scenario detection probability of 0.99, and given the adoption of 
the “3-look” method, it can be calculated that the lowest detector probability that can be 
afforded is 0.9415.  This is based on the fact that the detector has to register detection at 
least 2 out of 3 looks.  Therefore, for a required probability of WMD detection of 0.99, 
the binomial function gives us the required passive detector Pd to be at least 0.9415. 
With the Pfa of the passive detector assumed to be 1%, and adopting a “3-look” method 
and only recognizing 2 triggers and above out of 3 looks to be a false alarm, the revised 
probability of false alarm for each container scanned then becomes 0.000298. 
Assuming that we place an upper bound of 10 passive detectors onboard each PAV, and 
under the constraint of no disruption to commerce, a Monte Carlo simulation of  
10,000 runs gave the following for maximum average dwell time for the passive detector 
to be 2.489 min.  The lowest occurrence of dwell time is 1.472 min.  In other words, if 
the characteristic of the passive detector is such that the dwell time has to be more than 
1.472 min, then we risk the event of delaying a container ship from entering the Port of 
San Francisco.  The Monte Carlo result for max dwell time is shown below. 
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Summary Statistics Notes 
Average 2.489     
SD 0.3774     
Max 4.153     
Min 1.472     
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Figure I-2:  Distribution of required dwell time (min) of passive detector with 10,000 runs (if we set 
upper bound of no of passive detectors deployed onboard each ship to be 10).  Pfa of passive detector 
= 0.01, 2 triggers out of 3 looks to be considered a FA. 
Using a Monte Carlo simulation of 10,000 runs, the average total number of false alarms 




Summary Statistics Notes 
Average 35.705     
SD 6.3576     
Max 64.000     
Min 17.000     
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Figure I-3:  Distribution of total no of false alarms with 10,000 runs.  Pfa of passive detector = 0.01,  
2 triggers out of 3 looks to be considered a false alarm. 
It should be noted that this number is significantly smaller than the number of containers 
with high radiation, which is estimated to up to 20% of the total no of containers.  At this 
point, we can conclude that the deciding factor that will influence the capability 
requirement of the active interrogator will not be the number of false alarms, but instead, 
will be the number of containers with high radiation as listed on the cargo manifest. 
Using the pessimistic case of 20%, and assuming that the upper bound of active 
interrogators we can place in each PAV to be 3 (due to resource and manpower 
constraints), we went on to calculate the required dwell time that the active interrogator 
must achieve, as shown below. 
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Summary Statistics Notes 
Average 11.204        
SD 1.6889       
Max 18.477       
Min 6.672        
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Figure I-4:  Distribution of required dwell time (min) of active interrogator with 10,000 runs (if we 
set upper bound of no of active detectors deployed onboard each ship to be 3).  Assumed 20% of 
containers on each ship listed with high radiation content. 
The above shows that the dwell time of the active interrogator must be at most  
11.204 min.  In the most stringent case, we should target that the dwell time of the active 
interrogator must be below 6.672 min. 
Conversely, if we set the dwell time of the active interrogator to be 10 min, using the 
same Monte Carlo simulation of 10,000 runs tell us that we will need 2.745 active 
interrogators onboard of each PAV to prevent any disruption to commerce.  In the most 
stringent case where the combination of inputs (such as a high number of containers, very 
little time left to port, high number of containers with radioactive content), contribute to 
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the longest search time out of the 10,000 runs, we will need up to 4.610  
active interrogators. 
Summary Statistics Notes 
Average 2.745        
SD 0.4216       
Max 4.610       
Min 1.614        
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Figure I-5:  Distribution of required no of active interrogators needed assuming dwell time of 
interrogator is fixed at 10 min (with 10,000 runs).  Assumed 20% of containers on each ship listed 
with high radiation content. 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity Analysis was performed to look at the tradeoffs between the number of 
detectors deployed onboard each PAV and the dwell time required of the passive 
detector.  It was found that the more passive detectors deployed in each ship, the less 
stringent the dwell time is for the passive detector.  For example, if we are willing to 
place the infrastructure and setup for 25 passive detectors per ship, we could allow the 
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dwell time of the passive detector to be an average of 6.239 min, or 3.707 min in the 
worst cast.  The relationship can also be shown in the plot for the worst case of dwell 
times required. 
Number of passive detectors per ship 10 15 20 25
Dwell time required from passive detector 2.489 3.742 4.985 6.239
SD 0.377 0.559 0.756 0.940
Max 4.153 6.163 8.099 10.910
Min 1.472 2.248 3.025 3.707
Dwell time required of passive detector vs Upper bound of 
passive detectors per ship
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Figure I-6:  Plot of Dwell time required of passive detector vs. Upper bound of passive detectors 
deployed per ship 
From the above, we could observe that increasing the number of detectors by 1 will 
“buy” you an approximate 0.15 min increase in required dwell time of the  
passive detector. 
As for the active interrogator, the number that can be deployed per ship was adjusted 
upwards from 3, which was our baseline.  It can be found that if resources enable an 
increase to 6 active interrogators to be placed on each PAV, the dwell time required 
becomes 22.407 min and 13.466 min for the worst case. 
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Upper bound of active interrogator per ship 3 4 5 6
Dwell time required from active interrogator 11.204 14.931 18.630 22.407
SD 1.689 2.262 2.830 3.395
Max 18.477 23.511 28.885 37.054
Min 6.672 8.887 10.840 13.466
Dwell time of required of active interrogator vs Upper bound of 
active interrogators per ship
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Figure I-7:  Plot of Dwell time required of active interrogator vs. Upper bound of active interrogators 
deployed per ship. 
In this case, increasing the active interrogator by 1 per PAV, will “buy” you an 
approximate increase of 2.23 min of dwell time required of the active interrogator. 
Conversely, if we were given four different models of active interrogators with different 
characteristic dwell time, we are able to investigate the number of each we will need to 
deploy onboard each PAV.  From the plot, if model D was much cheaper than model A, it 
may be more cost effective to purchase more model Ds, provided we have the manpower 
support to employ them.  For a full analysis to be done, cost will need to be brought into 
the picture, as well as numerical manpower and infrastructure constraints. 
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Interrogator Model A B C D
Dwell time (min) 5 10 15 20
Number of active interrogators needed 1.368 2.745 4.108 5.484
SD 0.2132 0.4216 0.6382 0.8616
Max 2.161 4.61 6.774 8.896
Min 0.835 1.614 2.445 3.224
No of active interrogators needed vs Dwell time




























Figure I-8:  Plot of No of active interrogators needed vs. Dwell time of active interrogator 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research may have laid the groundwork in determining the detectors’ characteristics 
and also the numbers needed; however, there is a need to consider the following areas for 
further research so as to gain a better insight on the overall picture: 
Activation and Travel Time for the Units on Standby 
In this model, it is assumed that zero time is needed for activating the units.  This is not 
applicable as one would expect time delay of maybe up to 30 minutes, depending on the 
sensitive bureaucracy levels for activation.  The proximity of the units to the PAVs will 
also contribute to the delay.  These two factors will greatly affect the total time taken to 
scan the PAV, as a minute is wasted, it equates to less scanning time for the teams. 
Probability of Successful Boarding of PAVs 
PAVs are mainly operated by private companies and they travel over the open seas.  As 
the operator of the PAV, they might deny the boarding of search teams.  This again will 
cause delay to the total scanning time. 
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Scanning Sequence and Setup Time of Detectors 
Every PAV will have its own configuration of placing the containers.  This requires a 
new set of scanning sequence for almost every PAV.  The scanning of the containers will 
be further complicated if the PAV has very limited maneuver space to house the 
detectors.  Every detector will have its own respective setup time; this setup time has 
direct impact on the total scan time. 
Effects of Delay in Scanning Time 
As discussed above, there are various ways in which delays can happen, starting from 
intelligence collection to the time where the scanning starts.  These delays will have 
grave impact on the actual time spent on each PAV.  This increase could lead to increase 
of detectors, cost, number of units and logistic implications 
Deterministic vs Stochastic Model 
This current model is based on a deterministic model.  In actual fact, a model of 
stochastic nature will determine the selection of detectors better.  There is a lot of 
variability that can exist in this WMD scenario. 
Effects of Manifest List 
In this study, the manifest list is based on 20% of the containers having radioactive 
content.  The main bulk of containers to be scanned by the active interrogator actually 
come from the manifest list.  If the manifest is not accurate, delays may again be 
expected as there will be more false alarms being triggered by the Passive detectors.  
With a rule of at least three scans needed for the first trigger, it could greatly increase the 
total scan time for a PAV.  This increase in scan time will also contribute to the increase 
in active interrogators.  Therefore, there is a need to look into the accuracy of the 
manifest list. 
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Peacetime Scanning Procedures when there is No Intelligence on any Imminent Threat 
Given the high volume that the Port of San Francisco encounters daily, there is a need to 
look into the imminent threat.  A random scanning process of ships before they reached 
San Francisco may be possible to curb this problem.  However, to execute this pain-
staking process, it takes a lot of planning and high cost.  Therefore, an optimized random 
scanning for the incoming ships should be studied into.  It may be possible to have 
compulsory scanning zones out in the Pacific Ocean.  By having this proactive approach, 
it also serves as a deterrence factor. 
CONCLUSION 
It is concluded that the manifest of a PAV plays an important part in determining the 
number of detectors needed, rather than the number of false alarms.  The unpredictability 
of the manifest list with radioactive content also causes modeling the scan procedures a 
difficult task.  We can only go as far as by entering the number of radioactive containers 
based on the worst cast.  Our sensitivity analysis has also shown that if a shorter dwell 
time is possible, fewer detectors will be required.  This input can be interpreted to the 
decision makers, who can make use of this tradeoff study to objectively consider the cost 
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Appendix J  Nuclear Detection BASICS 
J.1 INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear weapons are arguably the most destructive weapons of mass destruction.  
One only needs to look at what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the  
Second World War—the immense destruction and huge loss of lives, and what continues 
to happen many years after that—the radiation-linked birth defects and diseases that the 
some of their bombing victims still suffer.  The economic, social and psychological 
losses are just catastrophic. 
While it is debatable whether a terrorist group will be able to either get hold of a 
nuclear weapon or build one, what can equally likely occur is an attack using a 
radiological dispersion device (RDD) or “dirty bomb.”  In such a device, conventional 
explosives are packed around radioactive materials, [which could have been stolen from a 
medical or industrial facility, or even a nuclear plant in the form of spent reactor fuel.  
These places generally tend to have lower levels of security than the military installations 
in which the nuclear weapons are kept. 
When an RDD is detonated, the explosion causes the radioactive material to 
disperse over the target area, usually a populated area.  While the damage extent resulting 
from such an attack depends on many factors such as the type of radioactive material 
used, the weather and environment conditions such as wind and geography, and while an 
RDD attack is deemed less catastrophic than a nuclear one, a successful execution of the 
former will no doubt cause widespread panic and confusion, resulting in economic and 
psychological losses.  A computer model, given in Figure J-1, indicates that fallout from 
a weapon using spent nuclear fuel could deliver a lethal dose in a 24-hour period over a 
broad area extending as far as 400 km.130 
                                                 
130 S.M. Nichelson, Medlin DD, “Radiological Weapons of Terror,” AU/ACSC/145/1999-04,  
Air Command and Staff College, 1999. 
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Figure J-1:  Simulation of a radiological attack at Langley AFB, Virginia, using 10.27 kg of spent 
nuclear fuel.  Cumulative dose contours after 24 hours are given in rem, which is the biological 
equivalent dose.  A dose of 600 rem (6 Sv) or greater during a 24-hour period is usually fatal.131 
There are an estimated ten million radioactive sources in existence around the 
world, with several hundred thousand radioactive enough to pose serious health 
problems.  These sources are used to keep food safe, treat diseases such as cancer, and 
detect flaws in structures and welds.  In industrialized countries, the more radioactive 
sources tend to be well guarded, but in less developed nations security is uneven.  A well 
armed and trained terrorist group could attack one of these facilities in the night and 
make away with the radioactive sources they need. 
 One school of thought, however, believes it is unlikely a terrorist group would try 
this method for two reasons:  (1) the more radioactive sources would kill them within 
minutes of exposure if they do not have extensive shielding and protection; and (2) the 
                                                 
131 S.M. Nichelson, Medlin DD, “Radiological Weapons of Terror,” AU/ACSC/145/1999-04,  
Air Command and Staff College, 1999. 
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radioactivity levels will be so high that existing detection technology will be able to 
detect shipments of these materials and render its mission a failure. 
 Nuclear explosives can be divided into three major categories:  devices that 
release the majority of their energy through nuclear fission; devices that release the 
majority of their energy through nuclear fusion; and hybrid devices that release large 
amounts of energy through both fission and fusion.132  In nuclear fission, energy is 
produced by splitting a fissile species such as Uranium-235 (235U) or Plutonium-239 
(239Pu).  In nuclear fusion, the energy is produced when two light nuclei combine into a 
single heavier nucleus.133  The SoS will focus its search efforts on locating two materials, 
namely, Uranium (U) and Plutonium (Pu), since, according to the International Atomic 
Energy Association (IAEA), both of these elements may be suitable for direct use in an 
improvised nuclear explosive device with little or no additional processing.134 
J.2 BASICS OF NUCLEAR PHYSICS 
 As a radioactive nuclide decays or goes through fission, by-products such as free 
neutrons, gamma rays and other nuclear fragments such as beta particles and alpha 
particles are emitted.  However, the primary long-range observables from nuclear 
materials are gamma rays and neutrons. 
 Gamma rays form the highest-energy end of the electromagnetic spectrum which 
are emitted during the decay of radioactive nuclei while neutrons are emitted during 
spontaneous fission.  These observables have mean free paths of the order of 100 meters 
in air and only about 10 cm in water.  Observables can be shielded as it is strongly 
attenuated by high atomic number and high density materials such as lead.  In addition to 
attenuation, the signal from a point source decreases with an inverse square 
proportionality with detection range. 
                                                 
132 Robert Harney, Chapter 2, Combat Systems, Vol. 4, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
January 2006. 
133 Ibid. 
134 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Illicit Trafficking Database, [http://www.iaea.org/] 
2006, accessed in February 2006. 
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J.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
 For uranium, the focus is on Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) which contains 
more than 20% U-235 and Weapons Grade Uranium (WGU) which contains more than 
90% of U-235.  The decay of U-235 will emit gamma rays of energy 185 keV, while its 
by-product, U-238, will emit gamma rays with energy level of 1001 keV.  The higher 
level gamma rays will be more difficult to shield and hence easier to detect.  If the 
uranium is contaminated with U-232, as in reprocessed uranium from reactor fuel, then 
U-232 emits gamma rays at energies of 239, 511, 583 and 2614 keV, the latter of which 
will be easy to detect. 
• U-235 source with depleted uranium tamper can produce as many as 105 
1001 keV gamma rays per second from U-238. 
• U-232 source can produce 2.68x1011 2614 keV gamma rays per second.135 
WGU also emits neutrons with an energy distribution of about 1 MeV.  These neutrons 
have a mean free path of about 2-6 cm in shielding materials.  Philips et al. show that a  
12 kg WGU with 79 kg DU tamper can produce 1,400 neutrons per second.136  This is 
considered low, and hence the observables for uranium are the gamma rays. 
 For plutonium, the focus is on Weapon Grade Plutonium (WGPu), which contains 
93.8% of Pu-239 and 5% Pu-240, and Reactor Grade Plutonium (RGPu), which contains 
60% of Pu239, 24.3% Pu-240, and 9.1% Pu-241.  P-239 will emit gamma rays at energies 
of 375, 414, 646 and 769 keV, while Pu-241 will emit gamma rays at energies of 662 and 
722 keV.  One by-product, Am-241, will emit gamma rays at 59 keV.  WGPu or RGPu 
emits a higher rate of neutrons.  Philips also indicates that a 4-kg WGPu with 52-kg DU 
tamper can produce as many as 400,000 neutrons per second.  These neutrons, with 
average energy of 1 MeV, will have a mean free path of 2-6 cm.  The background rate is 
50 neutrons per meter-squared per second.  Also, WGPu can emit 54,000 neutrons per 
second per kilogram, while RGPu emits about 349,000 neutrons per second per kilogram.  
Thus, plutonium is easier to detect than uranium. 
                                                 
135 G.W. Philips, D.L. Nagel, and T. Coffey, “A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological 
Weapons,” Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2005. 
136 Ibid. 
333 
• n + 3He → 3H + 1H + 0.764 MeV 
• n + 6Li → 4He + 3H + 4.79 MeV 
• n + 10B → 7Li* + 4He→7Li + 4He + 0.48 MeV γ +2.3 MeV (93%) 
   → 7Li + 4He +2.8 MeV (7%) 
• n + 155Gd → Gd* → γ-ray spectrum → conversion electron spectrum 
• n + 157Gd → Gd* → γ-ray spectrum → conversion electron spectrum 
• n + 235U → fission fragments + ~160 MeV 
• n + 239Pu → fission fragments + ~160 MeV  
Figure J-2 shows computer simulations of the gamma-ray spectra of WGU  
and WGPu.137 
 
Figure J-2:  Computer simulations of high-resolution gamma-ray spectra of WGU (left) and WGPu 
(right).  The most prominent peaks are labeled with their energies in keV.  Not included are the 
effects of the environmental background, which would obscure all but the strongest peaks.  The 
WGPu peak labeled 59 keV is from the decay of 241 Am. 
J.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 
 The primary potential sources of material for radiological weapons are medical, 
industrial and research sources, and spent nuclear fuel.  Grotto identifies eight of these 
                                                 
137 S.C. Geelhood, C.W. Frank, et al., “Transient QCM Behavior Compared,” Journal of the 
Electrochemical Society, 149(1), 2002, pp. H33-H38. 
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radioactive elements, given in Table J-1, based on a combination of radioactivity and 
relative prevalence in the industrial and medical world.138  Table J-2 lists their half lives, 
the types of radiation emitted and their energies, which will prove very useful in 
determining the optimum detector system to use, if necessary. 
Element Symbol Uses 
Americium-241 241Am To detect petroleum deposits and 
calibrate instruments 
In industrial gauges 
Californium-252 252 Cf To detect petroleum deposits 
Cesium-137 137 Cs In industrial gauges and to treat 
diseases, sterilize food and medical 
equipment, detect petroleum deposits 
Cobalt-60 60 Co In industrial gauges and to treat 
diseases, sterilize food and medical 
equipment, detect hidden flaws in 
structures 
Iridium-192 192 Ir To detect hidden flaws in structures 
and treat diseases 
Plutonium-238 238 Pu To generate low levels of power 
Radium-226 226 Ra In industrial gauges and to produce 
radon for cancer treatment 
Strontium-90 90 Sr To generate low levels of power 
Table J-1:  Eight Common Radioactive Elements 
Element Half-Life Type of Radiation Energy (keV) 
241Am 430 years Alpha 5,500 
  Beta 52 
  Gamma 33 
252 Cf 2.6 years Alpha 5,900 
  Beta 5.6 
  Gamma 1.2 
137 Cs 30 years Beta 190 
60 Co 5.3 years Beta 97 
  Gamma 2.5 
192 Ir 74 days Beta 220 
  Gamma 820 
238 Pu 88 years Alpha 5.5 
  Beta 11 
  Gamma 1.8 
226 Ra 1,600 years Alpha 4.8 
  Beta 3.6 
  Gamma 6.7 
90 Sr 29 years Beta 200 
Table J-2:  Half-Lives of Eight Common Radioactive Elements 
                                                 
138 A.J. Grotto, “Defusing the Threat of Radiological Weapons:  Integrating Prevention with Detection 
and Response,” Center for American Progress, July 2005. 
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By their nature, all the radioactive sources produce energetic and penetrating 
gamma rays. They are hard to shield and difficult to transport safely.  Table J-3 shows 
that that the materials in questions are being trafficked illicitly on the open global market. 
 
Date Location Material Involved Incident Description 
1993-05-24 Vilnius, 
Lithuania 
HEU/150 g 4.4 t of beryllium including 140 kg contaminated 
with HEU were discovered in the storage area of 
a bank.  Beryllium was imported legally. 
1994-03 St. Petersburg, 
Russian 
Federation 
HEU/2.972 kg An individual was arrested in possession of 
HEU, which he had previously stolen from a 








HEU/0.795 g A group of individuals was arrested in illegal 
possession of HEU. 
1994-07-25 Munich, 
Germany 
Pu/0.24 g A small sample of PuO2-UO2 mixture was 
confiscated in an incident related to a larger 
seizure at Munich Airport on 1994-08-10. 
1994-08-10 Munich Airport, 
Germany 
Pu/363.4 g PuO2-UO2 mixture was seized at Munich airport.
1994-12-14 Prague,  
Czech Republic 




HEU/1.7 kg An individual was arrested in possession of 
HEU, which he had previously stolen from a 
nuclear facility. 
1995-06-06 Prague,  
Czech Republic 








HEU/10 g Customs officials arrested a man trying to 




Pu/1.49 g Two individuals were arrested trying to sell Pu 
2000-04-19 Batumi, 
Georgia 
HEU/770 g Four individuals were arrested in possession of 
HEU. 
2000-09-16 Tbilisi Airport, 
Georgia 
Pu/0.4 g Nuclear material including Pu was seized by 
police at Tbilisi Airport. 
2000-12 Karlsruhe, 
Germany 
Pu 0.001 g Mixed radioactive materials including a minute 
quantity of plutonium were stolen from the 
former pilot reprocessing plant. 
2001-01-28 Asvestochori, 
Greece 
Pu/~3 g 245 small metal plates containing Pu were found 
in a buried cache in the Kouri forest near the 
Asvestochori village. 
2001-07-16 Paris, France HEU/0.5 g Three individuals trafficking in HEU were 
arrested in Paris.  The perpetrators were seeking 
buyers for the material. 
Table J-3:  Reported Incidents of Nuclear Material Smuggling 
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J.5 DIFFICULTIES IN DETECTION 
For a particular detection system, the successful detection of a nuclear WMD or 
RDD in a container onboard a container ship depends on a number of factors: 
• Type, rate and energy of the natural radioactivity 
• Amount of shielding and type of shield material and its effect  
on attenuation 
• Path loss due to the solid angle subtended by detector 
• Background radiation level at detector 
• Detector area, time 
• Energy specificity 
• Integration time 
In the absence of shielding, nuclear weapons can be detected by neutron or gamma 
counters at a distance of tens of meters.  Objects such as missile canisters can be radio 
graphed with high-energy X-rays to reveal the presence of the dense fissile core of any 
type of nuclear warhead, or the radiation shielding that might conceal a warhead.  
Subjected to neutron irradiation, the fissile core of any type of unshielded warhead can 
also be detected by the emission of prompt delayed-fission neutrons at a distance on the 
order of 10 meters.139 
 Detection of neutrons is not as easily amenable to analytical approximation as it is 
for gammas.  For a comparison with gammas, Srikrishna et al. present the basics of 
neutron emissions and attenuation in the specific case of WgU.  The lack of energy 
specific neutron detectors with sufficient portability is currently a technological 
limitation. 
• WgU emits neutrons at the rate of roughly one sievert/kilogram with an 
energy distribution centered around one MeV—primarily due to 
spontaneous fission of Uranium isotopes, with each of 234, 235, and 238 
contributing roughly equal numbers of neutrons given their relative 
composition in WgU. 
                                                 
139 S. Fetter, V.A. Frolov, M. Miller, R. Mozley, O.F. Prilutsky, S.N. Rodionov, and  
Roald Z. Sagdeevb, “Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” Science & Global Security, 1990, Vol. 1, pp. 225-302. 
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• These energetic neutrons also have mean free path lengths of  
2-6 centimeters in most shielding materials whereas one MeV gammas are 
only approximately one centimeter by comparison. 
• A 12-kg WgU sample with Tungsten tamper emits 30 neutrons per second 
in addition to 301 MeV gamma rays per second at the surface of the 
sample.  The path loss through free space is equivalent for both forms  
of radiation. 
• The background rate of neutrons (per meter-squared per second) is about 
50 whereas background rate for one MeV gamma rays is cited as being 
between 17 and 860.140 
J.5.1 Self-Shielding 
 Gamma rays may be scattered as they escape from the core of the nuclear 
material, losing some fraction of their energy and making them less useful for detection.  
Fundamentally, the more surface area per gram of material, the higher the number of 
gamma rays will escape.  The number of gamma rays that escape without scattering can 
be calculated precisely with radiation shielding theory and depends mainly on the 
geometry of the core.  For this analysis, the nuclear material is considered to be contained 
in a sphere of radius r and have a linear attenuation coefficient µ.  Srikrishna postulates a 
self-shielding attenuation coefficient G that describes the fraction of gamma rays 
emerging without scattering effect according to the following formula:141 
G = (1-e-4µr/3) /(4µr/3) 
J.5.2 External Shielding 
 Shielding materials such as lead, steel, and concrete behave similarly in their 
absorption of lower-level energy gamma rays. 
                                                 
140 D. Srikrishna, A.N. Chari, and T. Tisch, “Nuclear Detection:  Fixed Detectors, Portals, and NEST 
Teams Won’t Work for Shielded HEU on National Scale; a Distributed Network of In-Vehicle Detectors is 
also Necessary to Deter Nuclear Terrorism,” Version 1.22, [http://www.devabhaktuni.us/ 
research/disarm.pdf], 21 October 2005. 
141 Ibid. 
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J.5.2.1 Passive Detection of Shielded HEU 
 As HEU emits very few neutrons, the primary observables are low-energy 
gamma rays.  [Passive detection of shielded HEU is gamma rays at 1MeV from decay of 
U-238.]  This can be most effectively implemented by the placement of gamma ray 
detectors with the largest possible area and most energy-specificity as close as possible 
and for as long a time as possible. 
 The signal strength drops off at an inverse square rate with range.  At long 
distances, the solid angle subtended by the detector at the HEU source is likely to reduce 
the signal as much as any reasonable size shielding.  With sufficient time for the detector 
to integrate photon counts within a narrow enough photon energy range signals below the 
background can be detected.  Although trace quantities of U-232 can sometimes be 
present, resulting in more penetrating gamma rays of up to 2.4 MeV, they cannot be 
relied upon to be present in all HEU materials. 
J.5.2.2 Passive Detection of Shielded WGPu 
It is easier to detect emitting neutrons from WGPu than from WGU for the 
following reasons: 
• The rate of neutron production is about four orders of magnitude higher 
for plutonium. 
• The energies of the neutrons produced are identical. 
• The path loss through shielding and free space is identical. 
• The background rates of neutrons at the detector are identical. 
The primary gamma ray observable from WGPu is that of 769 keV.  Plutonium generates 
1-2 orders of magnitude more gamma rays per kilogram per second than does WGU at 
one MeV. 
 The shield is assumed to be a spherical shell of thickness x surrounding 
the nuclear material core.  Assuming a linear attenuation coefficient λ, the fraction of 
gamma rays emerging without scattering, F, follows an exponential distribution given by  
F = e-λx. 
Path Loss.  The solid angle subtended by a detector of area A at a distance 
d from the center of the nuclear material core can be approximated by  
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P = A/4πd2. 
If the distance from the source is doubled, the power received by the detector will be 
reduced by a factor of four. 
J.5.3 Background Radiation 
J.5.3.1 Gamma Ray Background 
The natural gamma-ray background is a combination of terrestrial, 
atmospheric, and cosmic-ray induced gamma rays.  A typical gamma-ray background 
spectrum is shown in Figure J-3 with the most prominent background peaks marked. 
 
Figure J-3:  A typical high-resolution gamma-ray background spectrum, taken for 4096 seconds with 
a 15% relative efficiency detector.  The most prominent peaks are labeled with their energies in keV.  
The scatter in the spectrum is due to random statistical variations. [Philips 2005] 
The terrestrial background is constant at a given location, unless there is a 
substantial change in nearby structures.  This background has three main components 
from the decay of 232Th, 238U, and 40K, generally referred to as thorium, uranium, and 
potassium.  Thorium and uranium have long decay chains through short-lived “daughter” 
nuclei, primarily by alpha or beta particle emissions, which are not detectable.  However, 
some of the intermediate decay products are also strong gamma-ray emitters.  Some of 
the characteristics of thorium, uranium, and potassium are: 
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• Thorium activity is due to decay products from 232Th, which has a half-life 
of 1.4x1010 years and is found in most rocks, soils, and building materials, 
such as concrete and brick.  It decays through a series of short-lived 
isotopes ending in stable 208Pb.  The most prominent gamma rays are  
239 keV from 212Pb, 511, 583 and 2614 keV from 208Tl, and 911 and  
969 keV from 228Ac.  The 232Th and 232U decay chains are similar, with the 
exception that 228Ac occurs only from 232Th decay.  Thus, the observation 
of the 228Ac gamma rays serves to distinguish the spectrum of 232Th from 
that of 232U. 
• Uranium activity is due to decay products from 238U, which has a half-life 
of 4.5x109 years and, like thorium, is found in most rocks, soils and, 
building materials.  It decays through a series of shorter-lived isotopes 
ending in 206Pb.  The most prominent gamma rays are 609, 1120, and  
1764 keV from 214Bi. 
• Potassium activity is due to decay of 40K, which has a half-life of 1.28x109 
years.  It has a single very prominent 1461 keV gamma ray. 
The open-ocean background is similar to the terrestrial background, but has about  
one-tenth the strength of the background over land.  Over fresh water and over the ocean 
near the shore, the background intensity depends on how much sediment is suspended in 
the water. 
 The atmospheric background can vary considerably with wind direction 
and meteorological conditions.  This activity is mostly due to short-lived decay products 
from 222Rn gas (3.8 day half-life), which is emitted from decay of soil deposits of 226Ra 
(1,600-year half-life), a member of the 238U decay chain.  Radon gas often builds up in 
the soil and can then be released in a burst, which may travel tens of kilometers with the 
wind as a “radon cloud.”  The cosmic-ray background is characterized by a 511 keV 
gamma ray induced by cosmic-ray interactions.  This comes about when high-energy 
cosmic rays (mostly muons at sea level with average energies of 100 MeV or greater) 
interact with matter, producing primarily neutrons and pairs of fast-moving positive and 
negative electrons.  The positive electron or “positron” is the antiparticle of the ordinary 
negative electron.  It eventually slows down enough to be attracted by and annihilate with 
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a negative electron, producing two 511 keV gamma rays.  The intensity of the cosmic-ray 
background increases rapidly above sea level and dominates the gamma-ray background 
spectrum at cruising altitudes of aircraft.  Underlying the gamma-ray peaks is a strong, 
continuous background spectrum, which is highest at low energies.  This is due primarily 
to higher-energy gamma rays that are only partially absorbed by the detector.  At higher 
altitudes there is also a strong contribution to the background continuum from  
high-energy cosmic rays, which produce a continuous bremsstrahlung spectrum as they 
slow down in the material in the vicinity of the detector. 
J.5.3.2 Neutron Background 
 The natural neutron background is mostly due to cosmic-ray interactions 
with the atmosphere, the ground, and massive objects such as buildings, ship 
superstructures and cargo (a phenomenon known as the “ship effect,” because it was first 
observed in the neutron signal from large ships.)  It peaks in energy at about 1 MeV and 
drops off rapidly above this.  At sea level, the average cosmic-ray neutron production is 
about 20 neutrons per kg of material per second.  This results in a neutron flux of  
100-300 neutrons/m2/s.  The average neutron background varies with geomagnetic 
latitude and is highest above 45 degrees, dropping to a low point at the equator.  It also 
varies with solar activity and is approximately a factor of two higher during the solar 
minimum, when the shielding effect of the sun’s magnetic field is lowest.  During solar 
flares, the neutron background at high latitudes increases dramatically due to atmospheric 
interactions with the energetic charged particles emitted by the flare.  This variability 
must be considered when using a neutron detector.  In addition, an inspector must know 
the expected amplitude of the ship effect, or cosmic-ray induced neutron signature, from 
any massive cargo container, to avoid mistaking it for a suspect source. 
J.5.3.3 Man-Made Background 
Since the cessation of atmospheric nuclear testing, man-made background 
due to fallout has declined to levels well below the natural background.  Except in 
regions contaminated by nuclear accidents, such as Chernobyl, or by an occasional lost 
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medical or industrial source, man-made background will not be an appreciable 
contribution to the radiation background. 
We can denote the gamma ray background radiation by b which is also 
dependent on the bandwidth of the channel in which the detector measures counts.  A 
high-resolution detector with a large number of channels will have a small value of b.  
With the detector area of A, the average rate of background is given by 
B = Ab. 
Detector Efficiency and Time.  Some fraction of the received gamma rays, 
denoted by ε, will not be counted due to the inefficiency in the detector.  Hence, the 
number of counts C registered by the detector due to background radiation is given by 
C = Bε. 
The total signal received at the detector is  
S = NGFP. 
Signals below the background can be detected when the total counts due to the signal 
exceeds the fluctuations in the background.  If a source is present, the former grows 
linearly with time while the latter is proportional to the square root of time.  If S is the 
signal received at the detector and t is the time over which counts are integrated, then Sεt 
will be the counts due to the signal, while the standard deviation of fluctuations in the 
background will be proportional to (Ct)1/2.  Therefore, the signal can be detected when 
the average signal exceeds a multiple m of standard deviations of the background,  
i.e., Sεt > m (Ct)1/2. 
The minimum time required for detection is then obtained according to t = 
m2Ab/(S2ε).  The larger the detector area, the more gamma rays will be collected.  The 
longer the detector is exposed to the source, the more reliable the count reading is as 
enough counts of gamma rays would be obtained to ascertain a significant deviation from 
the background. 
Detection.  There are three basic ways to detect fissile material: passive 
detection of the radiation emitted by its radioactive decay, active detection involving 
either radio graphing an object to detect dense and absorptive materials or irradiating an 
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object with neutrons or high-energy photons, and detecting the particles emitted by the 
resulting induced fissions.142 
 Passive detection is the preferred technique for verification purposes, 
because of its simplicity and safety.  However, passive detection can probably be evaded 
with the added shielding or self-shielding.143  Active detection can overcome some 
evasion scenarios, but only at much higher costs, inconvenience to the users, and 
complexity within the system.  In addition, the process of irradiating objects may pose a 
danger to nearby humans and to the objects themselves.144 
 Unfortunately, nuclear weapons and the materials to make them are quite 
difficult to detect at any substantial range (particularly if equipped with radiation 
shielding, such as a layer of lead), as plutonium and highly enriched uranium are not 
intensely radioactive.  To detect a nuclear weapon or nuclear material, a detector must not 
only be able to detect the radiation from this source, but also distinguish it from the 
natural background of radiation—placing fundamental limits on what can be detected.  
The decay rate—and therefore the rate of emission of radioactivity—of Pu-239, with its 
24,000-year half-life, is hundreds of times less than that of 30-year half-life Cs-137.  The 
decay rate of U-235 is 30,000 times lower than that of Pu-239. 
 In addition to having a low decay rate, the principal gamma ray from  
U-235 has a low energy as well, making it easy to shield the material to avoid detection 
(this gamma ray will travel through lead, on average, for only a millimeter); a daughter 
product of U-238 emits a more penetrating gamma ray, but such a signal would only 
indicate the presence of an unusual amount of uranium, not the presence of highly 
enriched uranium.  For HEU, the other dominant uranium isotope, U-238 along with  
U-235 can provide an approximate estimate of uranium enrichment.  However, even if 
the U-235 is detectable, the gamma rays from these two isotopes are sufficiently well 
separated in energy (notably at 186 keV for U-235 and 1001 keV for U-238) that 
unknown differential attenuation precludes knowledge of their true relative emission 
                                                 
142 D. Srikrishna, A.N. Chari, and T. Tisch, “Nuclear Detection:  Fixed Detectors, Portals, and NEST 
Teams Won’t Work for Shielded HEU on National Scale; a Distributed Network of In-Vehicle Detectors is 
also Necessary to Deter Nuclear Terrorism,” Version 1.22, [http://www.devabhaktuni.us/research/ 
disarm.pdf], 21 October 2005. 
143 The lowering of the flux density in the inner part of an object due to absorption in its outer layers, 
1994, 66, 2525 IUPAC Compendium of Chemical Terminology, 2nd Edition, 1997. 
144 Ibid. 
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intensities.  An exception to this statement is the “enrichment meter” method that 
examines the 186 keV peak and adjacent continuum to determine uranium enrichment.  
This method requires calibration against appropriate known standards, a condition 
unlikely to occur in many arms control scenarios.  Because of its low energy, methods 
that exploit 186 keV gamma ray generally are not applicable to detection of shielded 
HEU because the may be dependent on the item configuration.145  In short, HEU is quite 
difficult for passive detectors to find; for example, the pager-sized radiation detectors 
used by customs agents in many countries would have no chance of detecting HEU with 
even a very small amount of shielding.146  Plutonium is substantially easier for passive 
systems to detect, since it has dramatically higher neutron and gamma ray emissions.147 
According to Science and Global Security there are few methods to locate 
nuclear materials:148 
Weight.  If the type of nuclear material in a particular object or container is 
already well known, then its amount can be assessed simply by weighing it.  Hence, 
highly accurate scales are a key part of nuclear material accounting systems. 
Heat.  Similarly, measurements of the heat output from a sample can be 
used to measure how much plutonium is present with surprising accuracy, if the isotopic 
mix is known.  Unlike a weight measurement, a heat measurement is not affected by 
nonradioactive material mixed in with the plutonium. 
Gamma Emissions.  Each type of nuclear material emits gamma rays at 
characteristic energies.  Hence, the spectrum of gamma rays emitted from a sample can 
be measured, using instruments known as gamma spectrometers, and the concentration of 
different isotopes in the sample can be assessed. 
Passive Neutron Emissions.  Unlike plutonium, HEU does not emit 
enough spontaneous neutrons to be very useful in measuring HEU quantities.  A neutron 
                                                 
145 Thomas B. Gosnell, Uranium Measurements and Attributes, Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, UCRL-JC-139450, 1 July 2000. 
146 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “A Tutorial on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive 
Materials,” [http://www.nuclearthreatinitiative.org], 2006, accessed in February 2006. 
147 To further understand the physics involved with detection difficulties refer to Steve Fetter,  
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well counter, for example, can count the total neutron rate from a sample of material.  
This total count approach, however, has the disadvantage that it includes not only 
neutrons from spontaneous fission taking place in the sample, but also neutrons from the 
room background, and neutrons from interactions of the alpha particles emitted by the 
sample with lighter-element impurities.  A complementary approach, known as neutron 
coincidence counting, counts only those neutrons that are detected at once (as would 
occur from fission) and excludes the other neutrons. 
Active Neutron Emissions.  Both HEU and plutonium will fission if struck 
by a neutron beam.  Hence, a way of counting the neutrons from induced fissions is to 
bombard the sample with a neutron beam.  While passive counting of neutrons effectively 
assesses the amount of Pu-240 (since its neutrons usually dominate all other spontaneous 
fission neutrons in the sample), an active approach can measure U-235 and Pu-239, using 
active neutron well coincidence counters, which are quite accurate and  
available commercially. 
J.5.4 Detection and Identification Devices 
 In order to support the methods necessary to detect various nuclear materials, this 
project examined several tools available as COTS equipment. 
 High Purity Germanium-based (HPGe) Radioisotope Identifier (RID).  Many 
handheld radioisotope identifiers have been introduced with the claim to perform both 
identification and detection of gamma-emitting sources, yet only a few claim to be able to 
locate neutron sources and still fewer perform well as identification tools due to the low 
resolution gamma-ray detectors employed.  According to a R.M. Keyser et al., in their 
report on handheld RID, an HPGe RID has been shown to give superior performance in 
the identification of radionuclides in static conditions.149  When coupled with a device 
that is capable of locating the source, this tool provides ample evidence to suggest that a 
high level of success can be accomplished when searching for illicit materials.150 
                                                 
149 R.M. Keyser, T.R. Twomey, and D.L. Upp, “An Improved Handheld Radioisotope Identifier 
(RID) for both Locating and Identifying Radioactive Materials,” ORTEC, HPS Midyear Meeting,  
January 2005. 
150 Static Conditions are where the source has been located and the device is now being used to 
identify the isotope. 
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 The Detective EX, developed by the Tennessee-based company ORTEC, is a 
handheld radioisotope identifier based on a high purity germanium detector for the 
gamma ray detection and on moderated 3He tubes for neutron detection.  The size of the 
detectors are based on the efficiency requirements of ANSI N42.34 for the detection of 
differing amounts of material and on the ability to correctly identify the various nuclides 
in mixtures.  The mixtures specified in the standard are those which could be used to hide 
prohibited materials by masking it with other, innocent, radioactive materials. 
 The ORTEC Detective EX weighs 10.39 kg with a 50 mm x 30 mm detector 
cooled by a battery-operated Sterling cooler.  The neutron detector consists of 4 3He 
tubes 10 cm x 1 cm active volume.  The gas pressure is 20 atmospheres.  The data 
collection is controlled by an internal personal digital assistant (PDA) with a color,  
touch-screen display and the spectra are stored on removable media. 
 Fission Meter.  A complement to the gamma-ray identifier is a neutron 
detector.151  With special nuclear material (SNM), gamma-rays are approximately  
100 times more abundant than neutrons, so the concept of operation is to always use a 
high resolution gamma-ray identifier.  Like the CONOP of the HPGe RID, the fission 
meter needs to be able to identify the source in order to be effective.  Many neutron 
detectors exist, but like all other fieldable detectors with the capability for search and 
identification, are limited to basic counting.  The fission meter is a way to check for a 
neutron source beyond what would be expected from background.152 
The basic components of a fission meter are: 
• A detector subsystem consisting of multiple moderated 3He neutron 
detectors.  The number, size and degree of moderation depends on the 
application.  The detector subsystem includes the high voltage supplies for 
                                                 
151 Mark Rowland, CG-SMG-2 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
152 The Fission Meter Principle – A characteristic of SNM sources is that the radioactive decay of 
each nucleus produces multiple neutrons, which are released as the nucleus flies apart in the so-called 
spontaneous fission process.  Cosmic ray induced neutrons come from about seven different creation 
mechanisms that release neutrons in distinctly different ways from fission.  A sensitive neutron detector can 
observe the differences in the neutron creation mechanisms, then associate the differences to their origin.  
Detections of these neutrons, which largely pass through heavy metal shielding provides a complimentary 
method to detect SNM. 
The number of neutrons associated with a single nuclear fission varies from fission to fission and is 
referred to as “multiplicity,” but the key factor is that the average is always greater than unity and the 
neutrons released come from a single decay and occur in a short time window.  The neutrons are said to  
be correlated. 
347 
the 3He tubes and the preamplifier-discriminator units required to collect 
the neutron events.153 
• An electronic subsystem which processes the count data from the 
detection system.  By measurement of the relative time intervals between 
neutrons arriving at a detection system the statistical distribution of the 
“multiplicity” may be built up by the electronic subsystem.  The electronic 
coincidence system takes each neutron detected and looks in 512 time 
interval gates to record the time interval between each neutron and the 
others in the data stream from the detector.154 
A software application which analyzes the output from the electronic subsystem to 
determine if it is consistent with an innocent neutron source or a fission.155 
 Sodium Iodide (NaI).  In a scintillation detector, sodium iodide crystals are doped 
with thallium, NaI(Tl), then subjected to ionizing radiation which then emits photons 
(scintillate).  NaI(Tl) is the most widely used scintillation material and has the highest 
light output.  The crystals are usually coupled with a photomultiplier tube, in a 
hermetically sealed assembly.  Fine tuning of some parameters (radiation hardness, 
afterglow, and transparency) can be achieved by varying the conditions of the crystal 
growth.  Crystals with higher level of doping are used in X-ray detectors with high 
spectrometric quality.156  As a tool this is useful when a point source is suspected, but can 
not be verified with the use of other tools.  The size and weight of a sodium iodide 
detector limit its capabilities onboard a cargo carrying container ship. 
 Linear Radiation Monitor (LRM).  The LRM is a 24.4 meter long, self-contained 
gamma-ray detector system for use in the interdiction and location of nuclear materials.  
Its composition is 18 gamma-ray detectors and 9 neutron detectors on a rope, with a 
control module at the operator end for display and alarms.  When deployed from the top 
of a stack of intermodal containers, the gamma modules for the LRM are spaced such that 
there are two gamma-ray detectors measuring each container in the stack and one neutron 
detector measuring each container in the stack. 
                                                 
153 Mark Rowland, CG-SMG-2 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Wikipedia, “Sodium Iodide,” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sodium_iodide], 13 May 2006, accessed 
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